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ABSTRACT
POPULISM AND PUBLIC LIFE.
ANTIPARTYISM, THE STATE, AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1850S IN
CONNECTICUT, MASSACHUSETTS, AND PENNSYLVANIA
SEPTEMBER 1997
MARK VOSS-HUBBARD, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Bruce Laurie
This is a study of popular political thought and its interaction with the culture of
governance in three northern states before the Civil War. By putting matters of
governance at the center of antebellum politics, this study differs from reigning society-
based interpretations of the era. Drawing upon the polity-centered framework of Theda
Skocpol and the broader cultural approach to the political public sphere pioneered by
Jurgen Habermas, this dissertation emphasizes how political actors struggled to translate
socially conditioned anxieties into political questions that bore fundamental relationship
to governance.
The story pivots on the rise and fall of the Know Nothing movement, a
quintessential expression of nineteenth-century American populism. It argues that the
movement's breathtaking fury and appeal flowed from a pervasive sense that
governance was lacking in a broad moral purpose; that wire-pulling politicians, blinded
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by partisan calculation, had allowed dangerous special interests to threaten the public
good. Like other populist movements, the Know Nothings framed their agenda with
transcendent antiparty calls to eliminate office chasers and special interests from public
life. While key differences distinguished the movement regionally, Know Nothings in
each state cast the decade's principal issues—slavery, immigration, and economic
insecurity—as crises of governance within a radically changing public culture.
The decline of the Know Nothings suggests what happens to an antiparty
reform movement once it becomes a formal political party. Though Know Nothing
lawmakers in each state added a significant corpus of reforms to their prescriptive anti-
Catholic agenda, this dissertation stresses the limits of populism-a combination of
internal contradictions and cultural constraints that can be termed the third party
dialectic. Despite the Know Nothings' rhetoric of patriotic unity, factionalism dogged
the movement, while leaders undertook praetorian actions which contradicted the rank
and file's antiparty designs.
The study concludes by examining how the emergent Republican party
established partisan loyalty at the grassroots in the context of sectional polarization. By
the eve of the Civil War, the Republicans' antisouthem and herrenvolk appeals
incorporated the popular ideal of governance devoted to the public good and the
parallel fear of special interests in American public life.
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PREFACE
SIS
This is a study of popular ideas of politics and governance in three northern
counties-New London County, Connecticut, Essex County, Massachusetts, and
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Initially, 1 was inspired by recent calls for a resynthe
of social and political history. I had been especially interested in applying the methods
and insights of social history to the politics of the 1850s, suspecting that economic
changes felt at the grassroots broadly informed the electoral disruptions of that decade.
As the project unfolded I realized that a purely society-centered approach is inadequate
for explaining the political upheavals of the 1 850s. The choices of political elites
figured prominently in the decade's politics, both in framing the issues at stake and
giving momentum and direction to voter concerns. The actions of national and state
governments on a range of moral and political economic questions also bulked large,
both in spreading voter discontent and shaping popular ideas of politics and
governance. Most important, I discovered that voter anxiety over slavery and
socioeconomic change alone cannot account for the political movements that swept the
three counties during the 1850s. Socially conditioned anxieties were foundational to
politics, but their political significance lay in a larger shift in popular attitudes towards
party government. The political upheavals of the 1 850s must be traced to voter anger
with the character and direction of the era's political regime.
By putting ideas of governance at the center of the story, this dissertation dilTers
from reigning interpretations of antebellum politics. Political historians continue to
VllI
cthnorcligioiis afllliation, or class scntimciil in sliapiiig llic political ideas and behavior
of northerners.' Meanwhile, a generation of social historians have brought challenging
concepts and methodologies to the debate. I heir work documents the persistence of an
egalitarian and communal "moral economy" at odds with the atonusm and liberal
individualism that neoclassical political economy assumes were necessary corollaries
ol the ninelcenlh-cenlury\s "market revolution." In a variety of private and public
contexts men and women contested the valorization at law and in ideology ofab.solute
private property rights and di.sdained classical liberalisnrs sharp separation ol social
relations from moral considerations. I'hese findings have led social historians to
describe how small producers expressed their opposition to the market's disruptive
consequences in explicitly political terms. Opposition broke out suddenly and assumed
many forms. Always, social historians trace popular politics to some variant of a small
producer ideology, from the (whites-only) republicanism of Jacksonian democracy to
the cultures of protest that informed the entire panoply of nineteenth-century labor and
agrarian insurgencies.^
Despite the richness and complexity of their findings, most political and social
historians of nineteenth-century America share fundamental assumptions. Both groups
build from a society-centered paradigm that focuses attention on the social origins-
whether they be class, ethnoreligious, or sectional-of antebellum politics and political
thought. This dissertation pivots on a different axis. The emphasis here is on how
popular ideas of governance, in a period of acute economic and cultural transition,
themselves patterned third party mobilization; how political elites and insurgent
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reformers alike struggled to translate the insecurities and aspirations of ordinary people
into political questions that bore fundamental relationship to governance. What
distinguishes my approach from others is my focus on ideas of governance and the
interaction of those ideas with the political and governmental regime. I shall call this
approach regime-centered, and it is informed by the political-institutional focus
associated with Theda Skocpol and Stephen Skowronek.^
By adopting a regime-centered approach, I am not discounting the relevance of
large social and economic processes to politics. On the contrary, especially in the
1850s changes in society and economy imposed new demands on the regime. But
those issues became politically meaningful only when political actors-individuals,
parties, reform movements, the state itself-translated them into questions of
governance. Thus, I have not abandoned my initial impulse to weave together society
and politics so much as I have attempted to reframe the problematic in nineteenth-
century political history as one of ideas of governance in a changing public culture.
One place to begin untangling the relationship among governance, society, and
political thought in the nineteenth century is the northern Know Nothing party. The
Know Nothings, like many influential third parties, have attracted considerable
scholarly attention. The portrait that is emerging today, at least regarding the northern
Know Nothings, is of a much more complex and fissiparous movement than many
earlier historians assumed." Northern Know Nothings blended nativist militancy with
evangelical Protestantism, a profound distrust of party politicians, and a reform agenda
that included business regulation, debtor relief, political reform, and the ten-hour
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working day. Moreover, in some northern states the early Know Nothing party--say
before 1856--was as antislavery as it was anti-Catholic. In its programmatic
heterogeneity and antiparty animus towards the political regime, the northern Know
Nothings shared much with other nineteenth-century "populist" movements.^
The idea that populism may lay at the heart of northern politics in the 1 850s
raises important questions about how people in that decade conceptualized politics and
especially governance. Populism is an oft-invoked but terribly slippery category that
has defied political historians' best efforts to define and theorize it. One possible
definition equates populism with the democratic and antimonopoly agenda and small
producer base of the original populists, the People's party. ^ There are substantial
problems, however, with this approach. The most obvious is the range of policies that
populist movements have pursued over the course of American history. What does one
do wdth "reactionary" populism, the xenophobia of nativist movements, or the white
backlash of Alabama's George Wallace?^ Populist third party movements have
exhibited too much diversity over the years to equate populism with a specific
programmatic or ideological orientation. A broader cultural approach to populist belief
also presents problems. Populism is often understood as a generalized suspicion of
concentrated power, both political and economic* Yet if this is the unifying theme of
populism, the same may be said of American politics. Leaders of the major political
parties have routinely expressed opposition to powerful economic and political
interests. Because of these theoretical conundrums Michael Kazin, in a highly
simulating synthesis of American populism from the Gilded Age to the present, rejects
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"essentialist" definitions of populism altogether. Kazin sees populism as the nation's
common language of protest and persuasion, one that different political movements at
different times seized and filled out with their own bogeys to convince Americans of
the righteousness of their cause.'
Kazin quite rightly resists defining populism as a coherent system of ideas
unique to one material circumstance, social group, or political economic worldview.
But Kazin' s alternative plunges populism into a conceptual muddle. Defining
populism merely as the American way of political discourse strips the concept of all
operational meaning as a distinctive signifier of political dissent. This point is of
crucial significance for the study of third party movements. How does one differentiate
third party movements from the major parties, if leaders of both easily deployed
populist keywords and thus can be said to have been populists in the broad sense?
The linguistic approach divorces populism from its larger implications for the
study of governance and political thought. I believe there is an essence to populism, a
common thread which runs through all populist movements in American political
history. Whether the particulars of populist movements fall to the right or left, populist
movements have shared an abiding distrust of the established political parties that
resonated emotionally with voters because of a more basic belief that governance itself
was failing. On the surface this seems elementary--it is easy to see that populism
expresses voter anger. But the point moves beyond the prosaic if we ask how people at
particular historical moments conceptualized governance and what, in turn, they
expected of their political leaders. Certainly voter anger arises within many historically
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conditioned contexts-perceptions of political powerlessness, periods of economic
insecurity, a sense of cultural transition or decline. In this way the populist spirit does
indeed have roots in society-centered developments. But at its core, the political anger
which populism expresses reflects back the ideals and values that people long to find in
their system of politics and governance. To study populist movements is to study why
people thought what government was doing conflicted with their ideas of what
government ought to be doing.
I have conceptualized this dissertation to address the large question of
populism's essence and the specific matter of 1850s-style populism in the shape of the
Know Nothing party. The defining feature of Know Nothing populism was its
pervasive antipartyism. Several historians have noted the antiparty themes of the Know
Nothings, but none have placed antipartyism at the heart of the movement nor theorized
its wider implications for political thought. '° To a considerable extent this is because
scholars view antipartyism as ideosyncratic in an era of high voter loyalty to the parties
and a political culture that celebrated partisanship. Certainly, that orthodoxy has much
to recommend it. By the 1830s few raised fundamental objections to political parties in
the way that Madison and other thinkers of his generation did."
Nonetheless, a primary argument of this dissertation is that both antipartyism
and nonpartisanship were ubiquitous in nineteenth-century public life, and as such
broadly informed popular ideas of politics and governance. Underpinning both
antipartyism and nonpartisanship was the widely shared conviction that politics and
governance ideally worked to promote the public welfare, not party victories,
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politicians' careers, or special interests. Political thought in the antebellum republic
flilly accommodated the political party and its associated culture of partisanship. But
Americans also demanded that ultimately politics be guided by a larger moral vision
than simply electoral victories and the advancement of party influence over public
affairs. Governance should embody the public good, and partisan politics, however
disputatious, should not interfere with that more fundamental aim of public life. Here,
I draw upon the work of Jiirgen Habermas'^ to argue that antebellum citizens imagined
two frameworks of normative action in their (political) public lives: the contested and
highly charged arena of formal electoral politics on the one hand, and matters of
governance on the other. The former was a distinctively stylized framework of public
life, by the late 1830s characterized by intense and mass-based partisanship, especially
during campaigns when ostensibly free and equal citizens debated the issues of civil
society and ritualized their divisions over them. The other framework dealt with
matters of both public and private governance and, ideally, was nonpartisan in
character, because nonpartisanship, as both ideal and practice, gave vision and
concreteness to an elusive but always appealing public interest.
Antebellum Americans' desire for a political and governmental regime that
transcended mere party interests created problems for the major parties if their leaders
failed to adhere uppermost to what voters at specific historical junctures saw as the
public welfare.'^ Populism, I suggest, is a function of how and to what degree men and
women draw upon their nonpartisan expectations of, and experiences with, governance
to express their anger with the failures and governing style of the regime's political
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elites. The populism of the 1 850s flowed from a pervasive sense that the regime was
lacking in a broad moral purpose; that wire-pulling politicians, blinded by partisan
calculation, allowed dangerous special interests to threaten the public good in
government. The Know Nothings framed themselves as anti-pariy reformers and
forged an oppositional movement culture based on the nonpartisan ideal of governance.
Hence I argue that during the 1 850s political conflicts over industrialization,
immigration, and slavery reflected more than popular anxiety over socioeconomic and
ethnocultural change. Native-bom citizens made their nonpartisan expectations of
governance central to their antiparty populist politics. In 1853-4 native-bom citizens,
profoundly dissatisfied with the regime's solicitude toward special interests, especially
immigrants and the Slave Power, tumed to the Know Nothing movement in hopes of
restoring the public good in govemance. Like other nineteenth-century populist
movements, the Know Nothings framed their agenda with transcendent antiparty calls
to eliminate party hacks and special interests in politics, and thereby restore responsive
government. During the 1850s ideas of nonpartisan govemance, politicized through a
broader moral critique of partisan politics and distributive policymaking, figured
cmcially in the political conflicts over industrialization, immigration, and slavery.
A synthesis essay opens the dissertation by providing a larger frame of reference
for the analysis of antiparty populism in the 1 850s. Chapter One moves beyond the
antebellum era and offers a comprehensive historiographical and theoretical overview
of nineteenth-century third partyism from the Working Men's party to the Populists.
The chapter develops the case for a regime-centered approach to third parties and
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emphasizes the antiparty and commonwealth ideas that third parties shared.
Contradictions associated with nineteenth-century party politics and distributive
policymaking, no less than those attributable to socioeconomic change, are central to
any explanation of third partyism. Chapter One also analytically distinguishes populist
movements from the third political parties that arose from them. Preexisting
configurations of power and modes of political organization decisively shaped populist
movements as they completed the transition to formal political parties. But the
structural obstacles to third parties, though significant, were not the only reason for
their defeat. Third parties also fell victim to the dialectical tension that partisan
organization and political compromise created for movements rooted in antiparty ideas.
The remainder of the dissertation examines the gradual emergence of antiparty
populism in the 1850s and its eventual cooptation by the early Republican party in three
northern counties. The framework is comparative and interdisciplinary. I draw upon
methodologies from social and political history and cultural theory to reconstruct public
life before the Civil War in New London County, Cormecticut, Essex County,
Massachusetts, and Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. This approach demands attention
to grassroots ideas of politics, government and society, and illuminates a more complex
and variegated public culture than a conventional elite-centered narrative of state or
national level politics would reveal. The comparative framework also highlights the
uneven character of socioeconomic change and political development in the antebellum
North. The main body of the dissertation thus moves back and forth from county/state
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to county/state, and encourages a shift in focus from social factors to political cultural
ones in elucidating the core political themes of the 1 850s.
Chapter Two provides a social and economic overview of the three counties in
the decades before the Civil War and underscores the discontinuous character of mid-
nineteenth-century industrial and agrarian transformation. Throughout the antebellum
era petty production and accumulation persisted alongside the concentration of industry
and agriculture that accompanied the spread of railroads and banks and the arrival of
immigrant labor from Europe. Chapter Three examines how men and women at the
grassroots experienced politics and governance at the height of the second party system.
By supporting the major parties at elections, citizens in all three counties vitalized a
distributive political economy that greatly expanded the private sector. But while
electoral politics in the 1 840s was highly partisan, nonpartisan values also flourished.
Party leaders themselves encouraged such ideas in their rhetorical efforts to link their
party to a larger moral vision of governance. Nonpartisan values found clearest
expression in areas of public life that lay beyond partisan politics, most notably in
voluntary associations, local government, and local economic boosterism. In those
areas of public life people put aside presumably durable partisan ideologies to work in
nonpartisan ways for the private reform of society and various positive actions by
government. Nonpartisan values flowed from the efforts of people to improve their
communities and make government work, as well as the culture of governance (both
state and local) that such efforts set in motion. During the heyday of the second party
system frameworks of partisanship and nonpartisanship intertwined to shape popular
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ideas of politics and governance. Partisan politics taught citizens which issues were
"political," and hence characteristically partisan, and which issues were not; grassroots
nonpartisanship schooled people about the publicness of governmental issues (public
issues not necessarily political in the formal sense), and the larger moral purpose of
governance in public life.
Chapters Four and Five trace the gradual ascendancy of antiparty populism in
each county, climaxing in the early Know Nothing party. As economic and
demographic changes stimulated new demands on the regime, politics after midcentury
turned on public issues that politicized governance. In the early 1 850s reformers
focused attention on such matters as constitutional reform and fiscal policy, business
regulation, liquor, immigration, and slavery. As efforts for reform within the existing
party structure stalled, reformers' translated their nonpartisan ideals into a populist,
antiparty indictment of the political and governmental regime~in a word, party
government. Antipartyism resonated widely, sowing the seeds for the Know Nothing
eruption. While key differences distinguished this process in each state, Know
Nothingism in all three counties represented the principal problems of the decade-the
Slave Power, political Roman Catholicism, and a broadly felt economic and cultural
insecurity-as a function of the failures of the regime and its highly partisan style.
In chapters Six and Seven the focus shifts to the Know Nothings in power and
their decline by 1 858. Though Know Nothing lawmakers in all three states added a
significant corpus of reforms to their prescriptive nativist agenda, I stress the limits of
antiparty populism. Once the Know Nothing movement chose political leadership and
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chose political leadership and entered formal electoral politics and policymaking, it
confronted broader cultural forces and structural realities. Legislative outcomes varied
widely from state to state, underscoring how the immediate political context and
balance of political forces within the Know Nothing coalition shaped policymaking.
Meanwhile the Know Nothings split over state patronage issues and especially
the national question of slavery in the territories, hi antebellum America the interests
of southern slave holders had consistently found sanction in the federal government. In
this sense the antebellum regime, at the national level, was very much a pro-slavery
one. Beginning with the abolitionists and the antislavery Liberty and Free Soil parties,
northern voters had slowly but inexorably registered their opposition to this Slave
Power regime. The turning point for popular antislavery consciousness came in 1 854
when the northern Know Nothings grafted antislavery onto their expansive reform
agenda, popularizing an antisouthem, herrenvolk appeal that the Republicans would
soon seize as their own. Between 1854 and 1855 antislavery coexisted with a spate of
state and local issues in the antiparty populist politics of the North. But during the
presidential election of 1856 grassroots attention fixed on the national scene, enabling
the Republican party to claim the populist reform mantle from the badly splintered
American party. Internecine struggles over slavery and other issues continued to drive
wedges in northern Know Nothingism at the state level, and by 1857-8 the Know
Nothings in each county and state had lost the political initiative to the Republicans.
By the late 1850s the Republican party's herrenvolk and antisouthem appeal expressed
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northerners' nonpartisan vision of governance and their parallel fear of special interests
in politics. For the Republicans, section was a surrogate for both party and nation.
A final note on the three counties and why I chose them. First, I wanted
counties in states where the Know Nothings gained considerable power in government,
thus ruling out several states where the movement was weak in comparison to
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Next, I looked for counties that
exhibited some socioeconomic and regional diversity, and of course, strong support for
the Know Nothing party. A search for appropriate archival and newspaper sources for
the study of grassroots public life narrowed the possible choices. The three counties I
finally decided on meet these criteria-I imagine scores of others do too. Thus I make
no claim that these counties can stand as ideal representations of political experience in
the antebellum North. To the extent that the three counties reveal important differences
and broad continuities, I hope that my conclusions about them have implications well
beyond their borders. But on one level this is a dissertation very much about particular
people living in particular places. Still, these counties are as good a collection of sites
as any to execute a comparative study of political thought in the North before the Civil
War. The themes of this dissertation may be as easily studied in these three counties as
anywhere else in the North.
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CHAPTER I
THE "THIRD PARTY TRADITION " RECONSIDERED:
THIRD PARTY MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE, 1830-1900
The point of departure for this chapter is John D. Hicks' Mississippi Valley
Historical Association presidential address, delivered over sixty years ago. "The Third
Party Tradition in American Politics" capped a generation of Progressive scholarship
on third parties, much of it focused on the nineteenth century. In it, Hicks catalogued
the contributions of third party insurgencies to the larger story of American political
development. The ground Hicks covered is by now familiar; he pointed to the abolition
of slavery, the regulation of railroads, trusts and monopolies, the Australian ballot, the
direct election of senators, the national nominating convention, and attributed their
origin to one or another nineteenth-century third party. In the process of surveying the
field. Hicks offered a formulation which has largely fallen out of favor among scholars
today. Third party movements, he concluded, "have played perhaps quite as important
a role as either of the major parties in making the nation what it is today."' To Hicks
and others of his generation, the centrality of third parties to the American political
system-their function as vehicles for policy innovation, democratic expression and
reform—appeared obvious.
In the spirit of Hicks' s address, this chapter surveys the literature on nineteenth-
century third partyism to interrogate and reformulate that older theoretical insight. An
historiographical review might serve to reopen discussion of third parties' systemic
2relationship to nineteenth-century poHtics and governance, hideed my larger purpose,
developed in the second half of the chapter, is to suggest a provisional framework that
can reintegrate third parties and nineteenth-century public life. As both a review of
scholarship and theoretical intervention, this chapter is necessarily speculative, meant
to stimulate a broader rethinking of the third party phenomenon and politics more
generally. In my view, the need for rethinking is justified by current scholarship's
failure to systematically reckon with the ubiquity and recurrence of nineteenth-century
third partyism. It is, after all, a commonplace interpretation of both political science
and political history: nineteenth-century third parties were narrowly based single-issue
movements that wielded scant influence over the course of American political history.
One respected historian of nineteenth-century politics proclaimed recently that "most of
the time... nonconformist political movements played little role electorally or in policy
making in a culture textured by the partisan imperative."^
Such assessments have become incantatory. Yet we know that nineteenth-
century third parties were almost never single issue movements, their constituencies
almost never limited to a narrow band of the social spectrum. We know, too, that in
numerous state and local elections third parties were electorally competitive and
occasionally won influence over local and state government. In fact, third party
movements were pervasive in American politics from roughly 1830 to 1900. At least
one major third party erupted in each decade in this era; several at a time flared in the
postbellum years. A few, such as the Know Nothing and People's parties, had lasting
national repercussions. As Paul Kleppner reminds us, the average vote for third parties
3in most regions often exceeded the average difference between the two major parties.
For that reason alone major party leaders kept a careftil eye on developing
insurgencies/
Certainly we are not lacking in good scholarship on nineteenth-century third
parties. Each of the principal third parties has a robust literature, complete with
historiographical landmarks and seemingly irrepressible debates." With few
exceptions, however, recent scholarly output has taken the form of specialized
investigations of questions and categories keyed to a particular movement.^ We know a
great deal about the rich variety of nineteenth-century third party movements, but what
characteristics did third parties share? How did third partisans imagine politics and
governance? Can we identify common political and systemic themes in their rise and
fall?^ Arriving at preliminary answers to these questions requires devoting less
attention to the unique features of specific third parties than is currently fashionable.
This chapter, then, proceeds fi"om the ironic premise that flattening the many
differences among third party movements may well prove useful in advancing scholarly
thinking about them.
Developing a broader systemic perspective, this chapter makes the case for
shifting scholarly focus to the antiparty and commonwealth ideas that third parties
shared. I argue that contradictions associated with the regime of nineteenth-century
party govemance-chiefly distributive policymaking and patronage politics-are central
to any explanation of third partyism. The regime also shaped third party movements
when they formally entered the electoral arena. Building upon the arguments of Peter
4Argersinger and Richard Oestreicher, I stress the structural obstacles to the long-term
viability of third parties. Yet the structural obstacles to third partyism, though
significant, were not the sole reason for the defeat of third parties. I suggest that the
process of electoral mobilization itself raised a basic contradiction for movements
rooted in antiparty ideals, and created what can be called the third party dialectic.
Historical Explanations of Nineteenth-Century Third Parties:
Proaressives versus Counter-Progressives
In his address Hicks explained why third parties burst forth with such frequency
in American history the same way he had explained Populism. Discounting other
factors, such as economic hardship. Hicks concluded, "American third parties have
come about as natural by-products of our diverse sectional interests." Like Hicks, early
scholars of farmer-based third parties traced their origins to the hothouse of western
settlement and the clash between sectional interests.' Other Progressive historians,
studying eastern insurgencies, fashioned a different framework. They developed a class
explanation that pitted producer-based third parties against a conservative phalanx of
the wealthy and powerful.* Whichever model was adopted, Progressive scholars
reached identical conclusions: third parties, originating in socioeconomic and
geopolitical divisions that cut deeply in American society, were liberal-tempered
reform movements. More ambitious theoretical efforts by some Progressive scholars
put third parties at the center of American political development. Third parties were a
5"means for agitation and education," theorized the political scientist P. Orman Ray,
enabling a "considerable body of political opinion to find rational expression at the
ballot box." They were, according to the historian Fred Haynes, nothing short of the
"American method of dealing with political and economic reforms."'
Yet certain third parties did not fit the Progressive mold. Believing that third
parties were "instruments" of "social politics," Progressives had difficulty making
sense of the Prohibition party. '° Then in the 1930s scholars under the tutelage of
Richard Purcell uncovered rampant xenophobia in the Antimasonic, Native American,
and Know Nothing parties. A parallel problematic crystallized in early interpretations
of abolitionism and antislavery. This work portrayed antislavery reformers as
unpatriotic fanatics whose recklessness had pitched the nation towards an otherwise
avoidable Civil War." That some third party movements could serve such illiberal
ends as nativism and disunionism cast doubt on the idea that they were, necessarily,
liberal expressions of democrafic values.
These and other contradictions inevitably led scholars to question the
fundamental assumptions of Progressive scholarship. If third parties represented the
interests of farmers or workers rather than bankers or industrialists, it followed that
their leaders and membership should hold ideas about government consistent with such
interests. Progressive scholars rarely quesfioned that syllogism; in the 1940s and 1950s
it sustained withering scrutiny. New scholarship argued that liberal capitalist impulses
motivated such radicals as Langton Byllesby, Frances Wright, and George Henry
Evans. A young Richard Hofstadter drove the larger point home in a pithy assessment
6of Wendell Phillips's postbellum career as labor champion: "there was little of the
Marxist in the American labor reformer." Likewise a new generation of labor
historians, focusing on the Working Men's and Loco Foco parties, found coalitions of
skilled tradesmen, middle-class reformers, and frustrated political elites-hardly bona
fide expressions of working-class politics.'^
Counter-Progressive revisionism achieved its clearest form in Hofstadter's
canonical reinterpretation of Populism, The Age ofReform (1955). Ostensibly,
Hofstadter's subject in Reform was the era of reform ferment from the 1890s to the
1930s. At several junctures, however, he claimed to have identified a "larger trend of
thought, stemming from the time of Andrew Jackson, and crystallizing after the Civil
War in the Greenback, Granger, and cinti-monopoly movements."'^ Like the
Progressives before him, Hofstadter theorized the place of insurgency in nineteenth-
century politics.
Reform overturned virtually every key finding of the Progressives. In place of
the older materialist explanation of Populism Hofstadter offered his well-known "status
anxiety" thesis: the Populists were middle-class capitalist farmers suffering less from
"real" economic grievances than amorphous anxieties over "the rapid decline of rural
America." Populism was a reactionary impulse rooted in the past, not visionary, as the
Progressives had imagined. As if to cinch the case, Hofstadter went to extraordinary
lengths to show the "common climate of absolutist enthusiasm" which he believed
supplied much of the energy behind insurgent movements in America. There was, he
contended, a "populistic mind," salient throughout American history, fiush with anti-
Semitism and anti-Catholicism, prone to irrational theories of economic conspiracy,
and reflexively suspicious of cosmopolitan values.'" Hofstadter's focus on these
themes gave critics a range of easy targets to shoot at.'' Yet, despite Reform 's many
problems, scholars then and since have envied the sophistication Hofstadter brought to
his subject. Reform moved the study of politics beyond the simple narration of political
events to the structures of popular thought and culture from which they sprang. Within
a decade, new studies appeared that deployed Hofstadter's pathbreaking intellectual
and cultural approach. Antimasonry, political nativism, labor parties that shone nativist
hues, abolitionism and political antislavery, the anti-liquor crusade~all were linked in
one way or another to the protean "status" politics that Hofstadter pegged central to
populist dissent.'^
The claims advanced by Counter-Progressives had profound implications for
the study of nineteenth-century third parties. Third parties became anomalous
examples of extremism within a shared political consensus that was pragmatic and
liberal capitalist. And just as Progressives had greatly overstated the case for economic
radicalism among third parties, so, too, had they greatly understated the liberalism of
the major parties. Hence a final orthodoxy of Progressive scholarship-third parties as
the system's wellspring of policy innovation-could also be brushed aside. Indeed,
political insurgency was soon written out of the story of nineteenth-century reform
altogether. Scholars cut from the Counter-Progressive mold traced overhauls of the
banking industry to groups within the liberal mainstream, usually bankers and
entrepreneurs looking to jettison mercantilist constraints on enterprise. Others argued
8that the so-called Granger Laws regulating railroads, held up by Progressives as
examples of how agrarian insurgency could produce far-sighted policy, resulted from a
complex political campaign waged by a host of groups~but spearheaded by urban
merchants and fmanciers~to maintain economic hegemony and commercial stability.
Such important developments as the expansion of public education, general
incorporation law, and laws to protect debtors, Counter-Progressives argued, flowed
from a normative tradition of "liberal humanitarianism," not agitation by nonpartisan
reformers or worker-based third parties. Innovative ideas about government's role in
society sprang from the liberal center that included the major parties but excluded the
minor ones.'^
Parties, Policymaking, and the Two-Partv Svnthesis of the New Political History
The Counter-Progressives' original formulations had a lasting impact on the
field of political history. But, if politics was not a mask for economic self-interest
merely, what were its systemic features? The birth of the "new political history" in the
1950s and 1960s signaled the awakening of intense scholarly interest in the social bases
of the parties and the systemic features of politics. The new approach was unabashedly
social scientific, applying functionalist theories and statistical methodologies to
political behavior. The social science approach matched social history's concern for
the study of ordinary people, chiefly through analysis of voting behavior. Indeed, the
social science orientation shifted the frame of reference in political history away from
party elites to the voting behavior, partisanship, and social characteristics of rank-and-
file voters.'" Social science methods also influenced the study of policymaking. New
political historians closely scrutinized roll call data in both the national Congress and
state legislatures, focused attention on the policymaking circuitry of legislatures, and
systematically documented the social and regional make-up of legislative bodies. As
the research unfolded scholars consistently found partisanship to be the best, but by no
means the only, predictor of legislative behavior.
Without doubt the most significant contributions of the new political history
were the conceptual models scholars developed to produce a long-range view of
American political history. Policymaking was linked to a broad framework first
advanced by political scientist Theodore Lowi. Scholars categorized nineteenth-
century policymaking as "distributive," rather than regulatory or redistributional, both
seen as more modem zero-sum types.^° The study of mass voting behavior also yielded
distinctive long-range patterns and novel periodizations. Scholars identified "systems"
of voter alignments, each with unique social, cultural, and policy features, then folded
them into a larger "realignment synthesis," in which certain critical elections
punctuated the transition from one alignment to the next.^' At a broader level, the
research uncovered a "partisan imperative" throughout the nineteenth century.
Enviably high levels of turnout among staunchly partisan voters produced striking
levels of popular political participation and lent a fundamental stability to nineteenth-
century electoral politics.
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These considerable contributions notwithstanding, third parties generally did
not figure prominently in the new political history. To some extent this is
understandable, given the emphasis on the functions of parties and legislatures and the
long-range behavior of electoral systems. Those concerns necessarily directed attention
away from episodic reform movements. Certain third parties, however, received
sustained attention from new political historians and historically minded political
scientists. This work demonstrated that a few third parties--the Know Nothings, for
example-functioned as provisional intermediaries in a process of voter reshuffling that
periodically expanded the nineteenth-century electorate and recast its electoral
alignments. Thus, the new political history did indeed acknowledge an important
systemic role for some third parties." But the sigriificance of third parties, according to
this formulation, is not intrinsic to the phenomenon of third partyism itself. Rather,
third parties are important for what they reveal about the movement of voters from one
major party alignment to the next. New political historians and allied scholars,
analyzing long-term voting patterns and the broad functions of political institutions,
told us much about the organizational and behavioral framework of nineteenth-century
politics. But they failed to theorize third partyism as a distinctive and recurrent force
throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, one that both shaped and was shaped
by the two-party regime.^"
Broader theorizing does, nevertheless, require coming to terms with many of the
findings of the new political history because they constitute the wider political cultural
context of nineteenth-century third partyism. No less important, the themes that the
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new political history tended to downplay, especially distributive policymaking and the
relationship between the major parties and public administration, also factor into the
study of third partyism. We need to consider both areas in some detail.
Because the spread of communication and commercial systems proceeded
unevenly, parties were perhaps the most important trans-local institutions of social and
cultural integration in nineteenth-century America. Though sectionalism as a theme in
politics did not disappear, the major parties nevertheless aggregated a diversity of
interests across a broad social spectrum and geographic expanse; elections provided
annual opportunities for Americans to learn and then recast a common set of political
cultural norms through participation in political campaigns and attention to the parties'
symbolic gestures and policy orientations. A festive atmosphere attended nineteenth-
century campaigns, reflecting the enthusiasm which Americans had for politics
generally, as well as the birth pangs of mass entertairmient. The rich cultural conduct
of campaigns completed the process of socialization that party leaders initiated when
they drafted platforms and issued manifestos. The social cohesion embodied in rallies,
parades, and pole-raisings, the shrill partisanship of the local press, election day hoopla
filled with roving bands of ballot pushers and myriad treating rituals-all strengthened a
sense of shared interest and destiny among residents of close-knit communities.^^
Although historians can agree that a lively culture and distinctive "style" framed
nineteenth-century politics, they disagree over why voters chose one party over another.
One well-known explanation has come to be called the "ethnocultural interpretation."
Scholars taking this view hold that major party voting alignments in the nineteenth
12
century generally followed lines of ethnic and religious division in American society.
Party elites carefully crafted platforms and symbolic appeals to reflect the preferences
of rival "pietist" and "liturgical" constituencies. Voters responded predictably to those
appeals, turning out regularly and in large numbers for the party whose campaign
symbolism and policy orientation broadly reflected their own cultural and religious
sensibilities.^^
A less unified group of political historians have questioned these findings.
Through carefiil analysis of local politics, they have shown that ethnocultural divisions
were not always sharply drawn in nineteenth-century electorates, nor were
ethnocultural issues always constitutive of partisan loyalty and combat. Often
partisanship passed fi-om heads of families to sons and daughters and other kin. It was
also reproduced by collectivities of voters through social custom, or through subtle and
highly personal relations of influence and deference, all for reasons that had little to do
with ethnoreligious affiliation per se.'^^ No one seriously disputes that party leaders
paid close attention to religious and cultural issues, for segments of the electorate were
extremely passionate about them. But many other issues besides ethnoreligious ones,
like economic development policies, electoral reform, and highly charged racial or
sectional matters, found unmistakable expression in major party politics. Partisanship
and political representation-that is, the relationship between voters and their elected
party officials-was seemingly more complicated than the ethnocultural interpretation
implies.
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The activities of state legislatures raise the greatest doubt that a straightforward
connection existed between voting, partisan affiliation, and policymaking. In the
nineteenth century lawmakers spent most of their time sorting through the mountain of
demands by individuals and particularistic interest groups for economic goods and
privileges, such as a liberally worded charter of incorporation or state money for a local
improvement.^^ At other times, assemblies debated such economic policies as banking
and railroad regulation. Ethnoreligious loyalties may or may not have cemented
partisan affiliations. What is clear, however, is that ethnoreligious issues occupied only
a small fraction of legislators' time. Certainly lawmakers occasionally legislated on
social or cultural issues such as education policy or liquor restriction, and no doubt,
too, such policies reflected deep divisions within the nineteenth-century electorate over
lifestyle choices and cultural preferences. But in general lawmakers, of whatever party,
sought to avoid making a stand on polarizing questions. Lawmakers preferred
distributive policies that allocated goods and resources in what appeared to be an
impartial and nonideological manner. That way, they could campaign as public spirited
and fair minded, virtues most voters looked for.
Voters, for their part, generally rewarded the major parties with loyalty and
support, because distributive policies that modernized the economy were, above all,
popular and ostensibly did not set one constituency directly against another. Naturally,
on an issue connected to a national or state party platform lawmakers came under
intense pressure to vote according to party dictates. However, in most assemblies roll
calls on clearly partisan questions were exceptional events. Policy outputs in
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nineteenth-century legislatures derived from the ways that lawmakers managed the
cross-pressures inherent in patronage decisions and legislative log-rolling. It was
through those mechanisms principally that political elites determined the allocation of
economic goods and governmental appointments, engaged in trade-offs with other
lawmakers, and remained popular among key individuals and groups after a campaign.
The distributive tendencies of elected party leaders dovetailed with their control
over and elaboration of government patronage. With the acceptance of the Jacksonian
spoils ideal, the parties emerged as recruiting grounds for the staffing of government
posts at all levels of the federal system. An expanding array of state and local and
national governmental offices-from postmasterships to customs officers to federal land
surveyors-came under the purview of patronage, in effect enabling major party elites to
constitute the state's basic administrative framework and its specific functions. Of
course patronage decisions were, then as now, based on political calculations such as
the pressure to reward loyal party workers. But from the wider perspective of
governance, patronage is a paradigmatic form of distributive politics, and along with
the considerable authority enjoyed by elected assemblies in the nineteenth century, it
served to solidify the parties' sfranglehold over public administration. The nineteenth-
century's distributive regime was, in large part, a system of party governance.^"
The centrality of distributive economic policies and party patronage in the
nineteenth century underscores the preeminent role played by elected assemblies in
determining the essential features of a highly decentralized public administration. But
nineteenth-century governance was more than the sum total of patronage decisions and
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legislative allocations; the courts also figured in this regime. For one, they assisted the
parties in their efforts to distribute goods and promote the economy. By the 1 830s, as
Donald Pisani points out, the balance between regulation and promotion that marked
early American constitutionalism had tilted "permanently in favor of promotion" as the
courts extended sweeping new powers to business corporations.^' Through innovation
at common law the courts established the private business corporation as America's
leading instrument of economic development. In addition state assemblies, for political
reasons, also grew increasingly solicitous of business interests. Under pressure from
growing communities, no less than individual capitalists, to expand the economy, state
assemblies voluntarily dropped many of the early regulations they had written into early
business charters. In western states before the Civil War, pressure to limit spending on
public works compelled legislators to divest state government from direct involvement
in the economy. The rise everywhere of general incorporation law, a purely
administrative innovation, also signaled the willingness of lawmakers to liberalize the
legal environment in which private economic activity took place. Moreover lawmakers
increasingly deferred to the courts on a range of thorny matters such as labor and
conspiracy law and debtor-creditor relations, underscoring the political explosiveness
of those issues and the preference in American constitutionalism for judicial resolution
of economic conflict.^^ It should be stressed, however, that neither innovation at
common law, the rise of general incorporation, nor the de facto establishment of the
courts as arbiters of economic conflict completely obviated the regulatory impulses that
drove early public policy towards corporations. Indeed, the platforms of many
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nineteenth-century third parties are eloquent of the persistent popularity of statutory
regulation of the economy.
The Challenge Of (and To^ Social History: Nineteenth-Centurv Third Parties
Beyond the Class-Culture-Community Paradigm
Political and legal developments, seemingly independent of the partisan
ideologies held by voters and lawmakers, intersected in the nineteenth century to
advance the broadly popular goal of economic expansion by the private sector within
an overarching distributive framework of party governance. But what of third parties?
Over the past two decades scholars inspired by the methods and concepts of the "new
social history" have offered fresh insight into nineteenth-century third partyism. From
their favorite vantage point, the community study, social historians of politics highlight
the struggle of ordinary Americans for economic justice and political democracy and
the positive role that third party movements played as vehicles for that struggle. Many
third parties offered a powerful critique of the nineteenth-century's distributive regime
by focusing on the social costs and human casualties of economic development and
championing policies intended to mitigate those costs. Still the social history approach
is less concerned with governance than with linking politicization to everyday social
experience. Social historians of politics probe the changing economic and social
relations of workers and farmers for the common threads of daily life~the "culture of
protest"~that anchored political insurgency in the nineteenth century. While labor and
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agrarian-based insurgencies bulk large in this project, nativist and antislavery third
parties have also been analyzed through the conceptual lens of social history." Though
variations on the theme abound, one pattern emerges clearly: large numbers of
nineteenth-century Americans were not always satisfied with the major parties, and
swarmed into independent movements when the major parties failed them.
Certainly this insight is suggestive of a role for third parties in the political
system beyond that of merely halfway house in a process of voter realignment. For
social historians of politics insist that transformations in the nation's demography and
economy periodically thrust difficult new issues to the fore and altered popular
expectations of governance. These new issues and ideas, in complex and politically
mediated ways, produced pressure for specific governmental action-debtor relief laws,
anti-trust law, antislavery policy, anti-immigrant policy—that were not given adequate
expression, at least initially, by the two major parties. In what can be called a society-
centered explanation of third partyism, social historians, in a much more sophisticated
way, have redeployed an old argument. Insurgent movements spoke for the have-nots
in society, raised important issues that the major parties slighted, and prodded the
system forward to new policies and governing arrangements.
Yet recent scholarship also contains a number of conceptual limitations.
Because so much of this work subjects political insurgency to micro-analysis-
examining the origins and impact of political opposition at the local level-it has
overstated the importance of insurgency to normative modes of political action and
governance. Certainly third parties vented popular aspirations for political democracy
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and a more just economic order, and occasionally gained local power through skillful
appeals of that sort. But the larger relationship of third partyism to politics and
governance in the nineteenth century is not at all clear in this work. It has been said
many times: social historians need to step back from their workers, cultures, and
communities if they wish their work to have broader relevance for political history.^"
More problems arise if we interrogate the concepts social historians deploy to
examine politics. Typically, as in recent studies of labor and agrarian-based third
parties, historians stress the social ideologies and discourses associated with such
movements. Oppositional ideology has appeared in many guises over the past two
decades: artisanal republicanism, labor republicanism, hcrrenvolk republicanism, and
equal rights are but some of the rubrics one encounters in this work.^^ Whatever the
terminology invoked, insurgents are seen to use oppositional ideology to indict the
major parties for corrupt practices, or for adopting policies that benefit the few at the
expense of the many. Recently, Philip J. Hthington and Michael Kazin have
refurbished this argument with provocative interpretations of political discourse and
political development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ethington describes a
grand transformation from "republican liberalism" to "pluralist liberalism" in post-
Civil War San l-rancisco; Kazin finds a "populist persuasion" at the center of politics
from the Gilded Age to our own time. Both argue that insurgent movements were
pivotal to changes in American public life, infusing public debate with new discourses
of politics, government and society.
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For all the attention to popular ideology and discourse, however, it is not clear
what these categories explain in political terms. It is significant that very few
Americans in this period would have disagreed with the basic values embedded in these
discourses. Specifically, the belief that liberty was imperiled by concentrated power,
that the power of government in particular was susceptible to abuse, that good
government was fiscally conservative government, that all white men were entitled to
formal political equality, that there was a public interest that transcended private
interests, and that it was the responsibility of politicians and government to mediate
fairly and honestly between them when they came into conflict-these were common
sense (if exclusionary) notions that nearly all white men after 1830 or so would have
insisted on. While it may have provided a vocabulary of opposition, neither
republicanism, nor any of its baroque variations, tells us much about the specific issues
and policy demands insurgents carried into politics. How and why Americans chose to
cast off party loyalties in favor of a third party at some moments but not others are
questions that have little to do with ideology or discourse per se.
While social historians have told us much about the ideologies associated with
insurgent movements, we know much less about their political characteristics. For one,
nineteenth-century third parties, including those commonly thought of as farmer and
worker-based, assailed unresponsive and corrupt leadership at all levels of government
as often as they attacked corporate greed or exploitative relations in the private sector.
Empirical work on the social composition of nineteenth-century third party movements,
moreover, shows they were volatile cross-class and multi-issue coalitions." In social
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terms, we might try to imagine them as the late Herbert Gutman once did. In his
seminal analysis of political insurgency in Gilded Age Paterson, New Jersey, he found
an archetypal pattern: a broad-based movement that united elements of the city's
economically dispossessed with a significant segment of what he termed the "old
middle class."^* This was a fissiparous yet self-aware group of mostly native-bom
skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen, petty merchants and shopkeepers, and lower status
professionals. Here were the nineteenth-century's middling sorts, men who were
propertied though not rich, had acquired their competence and sunk deep roots in
Paterson. They thus felt entitled to police "their" city on behalf of the "public good,"
under siege, they believed, by an overweening industrial elite and their toadies in city
government. Recognizing third party movements as the cross-class and inherently
fragile coalitions they were might help us identify nodes of everyday experience that
gave such commonwealth language about the public good genuine social meaning.
Certainly union halls and alliance meetings were important sites where workers and
farmers forged common ideas about the public good. But there were undoubtedly other
focal points of experience, perhaps more important in the long run than discontinuous
protest organizations, that nurtured commonwealth ideas. Churches and local
government were probably key, as was the contradictory mix of mutualism and
paternalism that as frequently as not patterned class relations in the nineteenth
century.^^
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Towards A Regime-Centered Explanation of Nineteenth-Century Third P?^rtif>Q
The shortcomings and strengths of recent social history approaches to politics
suggest we might recast our categories when examining third parties. Instead of
rehashing their economic ideologies, we might study third parties for the problems in
partisan politics and distributive policymaking that they identified. Accounts of
various third party movements provide important clues to how nineteenth-century
Americans conceptualized politics and governance in ways that differed from the
highly partisan and patronage driven politics of the major parties. Joel Silbey and
Michael McGerr, among others, have argued that parallels in campaign style and
organizational structure between third and major parties indicate the period's "partisan
imperative" gripped third parties too."*^ Yet the preponderance of antipartyism in
nineteenth-century third party movements does not sit well in that scheme.
Antipartyism expressed the oppositional character of populist third party movements
and framed the specific issues and problems they identified. Those issues tended to
fold into very broad and recurrent themes-poverty, urbanization, immigration, slavery,
abuse of wealth or power. In this sense, as virtually all previous models of political
behavior have assumed, third parties indeed had origins in society-centered issues. But
third parties also had origins in regime-centered issues.'" Antipartyism communicated
anger with a system of governance that addressed needs according to the modes of
distributive politics. The regime of party governance itself gave rise to and in turn
shaped nineteenth-century third party movements.
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Protestations of antipartyism mark the formation and development of all
nineteenth-century third parties. The adoption of the moniker "hidependent"
everywhere in the nineteenth century by scores of third party conventions attests to
antipartyism's pervasiveness. A few third party movements did not call themselves
parties at all. What was in reality a recrudescent Greenback party in 1884 preferred the
infelicitous but nonpartisan "Anti-Monopoly organization of the United States.'"*^ In an
entirely different context and time, a Massachusetts Antimasonic convention in 1833
pledged not to pursue "the mere triumph of party or the success of their candidates."
George Henry Evans believed antipartyism at the core of the Working Men's party
mission: "We will unite with no party, as a party'' he pledged in 1830, "but simply
unite, if we can, the honest from all parties.'"*^ hi the 1 840s followers of the Liberty
party scorned the "baneftil spirit of partyism." A decade later, the astute observer of
antebellum politics and Lincoln's future Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles noted
that thousands "flocked" to the Know Nothing movement "for the purpose of relieving
themselves from the obligations and abuses of the old [party] organizations.'"*'' In the
preamble to their first national platform in 1 869, the Prohibition party decried a central
purpose of partisanship: "A lamentable evil is the education of the people into the
belief that a permanent political party is a great good...." In the 1 890s, midwestem
Populists portrayed their movement as "a protest against the dangers and tyranny of
permanent party organization.""^
Similar examples can be easily multiplied. Indeed, the reigning interpretive
paradigm fails to account for the ubiquity of antipartyism well after a two-party system
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of government became fixed in American public life. That third parties adopted proven
tactics when they organized themselves and waged electoral combat does not constitute
evidence that their members valued partisanship. Those purely organizational parallels
could have been merely artifacts of mobilization in that century's system of mass
politics. At all events, antipartyism was a constant in nineteenth-century public life; its
latent attraction helps us understand the lengths to which party regulars went to shore
up partisanship. Elaborate campaign ceremony, cheeky political rhetoric, and in the
1890s, legal barriers to third parties-all suggest that major party leaders knew the
appeal of antipartyism and feared its disruptive potential.
The emphasis on the organizational and behavioral features of partisan politics
has obscured evidence of nonpartisanship, the building bloc of antipartyism, in other
areas of public life. If previous work is any indicator, the still embryonic project of re-
integrating women into nineteenth-century public life will find them central to an
influential nonpartisan tradition of social and moral reform activism. Middle-class
white women reformers in particular infused the nineteenth-century public sphere with
transcendent notions of government's moral obligation to protect society's vulnerable
citizens, a theme echoed by many third parties."*^ The act of abstaining by otherwise
loyal partisans, a phenomenon that apparently was more pervasive than previously
thought, also hints at a significant antiparty sensibility in the nineteenth century, for it
suggests a wellspring of dissatisfaction among the party rank and file.'''
There is also the matter of local government, a crucial area of public life that
has received insufficient attention from political historians. In her extraordinarily
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suggestive study of government and political thought in rural New York State Paula
Baker finds "the simultaneous existence of partisanship and anti-party politics figured
crucially in male politics." Baker focuses on the choices and actions of local and
county governments, as opposed to the obviously partisan context of elections, and
discovers rural New Yorkers valued nonpartisanship when local officials made
decisions on policy matters that affected their daily lives. Divisive partisanship simply
had no place in the struggle to solve such common problems as poor roads, inadequate
public services, and perennial budget shortfalls."* In other areas of public life, too,
Americans during the nineteenth century worked in nonpartisan ways for positive
action fi-om government. Grassroots campaigns to leverage support fi-om state
legislatures for economic development projects, like a branch-line railroad or turnpike,
were often notable for their nonpartisanship. In those campaigns boosters stressed their
project's larger promise to improve the local economy, and dwelt but briefly on their
own material interest as investors. Usually, though not always, affected residents
accepted reasoning of that sort—and in turn expected results.'*'
The values of partisanship and nonpartisanship came into conflict, of course,
and always existed in tension. That dynamic of tension is suggested in the pre-histories
of the nineteenth-century's principal third parties. The seeds for nineteenth-century
insurgency were sown by protean social movements often led by grassroots voluntary
organizations. Typically these movements turned to independent politics reluctantly,
after voluntary strategies failed. Stubborn traditions of partisanship explain some of
that hesitation. Equally important were the particular agendas of community-based
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organizations; in their voluntary phase, social movements stressed self-help and
nonpartisanship on matters both economic and moral. The panoply of farmers'
associations-Granges, Wheels, and Alliances--that waxed and waned in Gilded Age
America immediately spring to mind. These groups adopted cooperative economic
programs to solve such persistent problems as high transportation costs and low
commodity prices. At the same time they sought to influence state and national policy
through nonpartisan techniques, querying candidates on specific issues such as railroad
regulation or stay laws and, ideally, voting for the candidate who responded favorably.
The Antimasons launched their crusade against Freemasonry in this manner as well,
carefully probing political candidates for ties to the secret order. Antislavery politics
commenced in the 1830s, not in 1840, when the American Anti-Slavery Society
mounted a series of nonpartisan petitions against the admission of new slave states, the
interstate slave trade, and for the abolition of slavery in Washington, D.C.^°
The prevalence of grassroots nonpartisanship in the nineteenth century suggests
that people conceptualized questions of governance separately from their formal
partisan political identities. Party politics provided space for ostensibly democratic
debate over key public issues and the articulation of ritualized political difference over
those issues. On matters of governance not systematically incorporated into party
platforms, on the other hand, people seemed willing to lay aside supposedly rigid party
ideologies in efforts to forge common ground. This hypothesis-that nonpartisanship
both framed ideas of and constituted experiences with governance while partisanship
normally framed political ideas and defined formal political experience-should not be
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surprising. Historians have long noted the persistence of classical antiparty belief into
the age of Jackson, while scholars of the Progressive era have identified
nonpartisanship to be among the many impulses driving reform of urban politics and
state election law.^' We should consider the possibility that nonpartisanship was not
discontinuous. The multilayered federal structure of the American state provided
ample room for nonpartisanship and partisan politics to exist throughout the nineteenth
century more or less in parallel. Governance on the one hand and partisan politics on
the other were seemingly interrelated yet distinctive frameworks of nineteenth-century
public life, each a sphere of unique social experiences and cultural imperatives.
Any analysis of third parties must consider both of these frameworks of thought
and experience together. Although electoral politics in the nineteenth century was
remarkably partisan, nonpartisan ideals of governance could also be accommodated.
On issues that lay outside of party platforms, partisanship was expected to yield to the
public interest. This is not to argue that citizens completely disconnected party from
governance and policymaking. Voters took seriously the broad pledges that parties
made; broken promises sometimes led voters to break party ranks. Nevertheless, when
it came to matters that affected everyday life, citizens wanted and expected government
to respond effectively and fairly. One of the primary ways elected officials
demonstrated their responsiveness was by delivering the economic goods that people
clamored for. But what happened when segments of the electorate became restless
over recurrent social problems that required more discriminating action by
government? Vexed issues of that sort were omnipresent in the nineteenth century;
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distributive policies that modernized the economy were, ironically, one important
source of them. Industrial workers squared off against abstemious and sometimes
ruthless employers; debtors charged banks purposefully maintained crushing cycles of
debt by controlling the currency; women and men blamed alcohol consumption for
rising crime rates and high taxes (to fund poor relief). As they groped for solutions,
party politicians felt great pressure to avoid taking sides. New and potentially
disruptive issues augured unpredictability at elections, a condition party leaders sought
to avoid.
For their part, citizens worried over intractable social problems found scarce
little in partisan politics which suggested easy solutions. Local experience reinforced
nonpartisan ideals about governance devoted to the public interest. Experience with
state and local government in a distributive regime raised expectations for action by
fair-minded lawmakers. Yet lawmakers, for political reasons, looked to duck volatile
issues. Recurrent social or economic problems related to class conflict, regional
conflict, or cultural difference therefore tended not to find expression in major party
platforms, at least in any consistent and unambiguous manner. On balance this was a
source of great strength for the parties. But the peirties' imprecision on issues was also
an essential source of popular frustration with party politics when groups of voters
grew concerned over issues that demanded very specific responses. When people
alighted upon specific agendas for governmental action, the parties became especially
vulnerable to the antiparty charge that they were more interested in winning elections
and distributing patronage than addressing voters' felt needs. Nineteenth century
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insurgents had little trouble linking public problems to partisan intrigue and corrupt
special interests, because partisanship and particularistic interests were the mainsprings
of the distributive regime. In other words, the regime of party governance itself
provided momentum and a ready target for nineteenth-century insurgents. Again and
again third party movements turned nonpartisan ideals of governance against the
regime by framing their reform agendas in explicitly antiparty terms, seizing on telling
examples of partisan calculation to focus an angry citizenry fed up with the
mishandling or avoidance of pressing public concerns.
Indeed, the charge that governance under major party auspices had become
corrupted by self-interested politicians stands out as a central theme of every third party
movement in the nineteenth century. In the 1830s, the Antimasonic and Working
Men's parties called for greater democratization because they believed politics was
becoming the exclusive domain of aristocrats out of touch with people's needs. The
nativist and antislavery parties of the 1840s and 1850s framed their agendas with calls
to overthrow conniving politicians and party hacks, who they believed pandered
shamelessly to such "special interests" as Irish immigrants and southern slave holders.
For their part, the nativist Know Nothing party also identified state-level partisan
corruption as a principal rationale for their movement." Prohibitionists in the 1870s
and 1880s idealized their movement as an expression of evangelical Protestant
democracy that would break the grip of the country's liquor interests over government
and restore Christian virtues to politics. The Populists, of course, saw reforms like the
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direct election of senators and Australian ballot as tools to end party control and restore
responsive government."
Nineteenth-century condemnations of office-chasing politicians constituted
more than a trans-historical language of protest. They expressed genuine anger at the
limitations and failures of the nineteenth-century's distributive framework of party
governance. Third parties organized to fill the interstices of a system that smoothly
mobilized national coalitions and distributed economic goods but sometimes sputtered
on issues related to class, occupation, ethnoculture, region or locality. Agitating issues
the major parties balked at, nineteenth-century third parties crystallized opposition to
the partisan and patronage driven system of mobilization and representation that
marked public life. Antipartyism resonated in nineteenth-century third party
movements because it mediated the powerful ideal, reinforced by grassroots
experience, that governance ought to advance the public good. Of course, the major
parties cast themselves in similar terms—Republicans in the 1880s stumped for high
tariffs and against Grover Cleveland and insisted, among other things, the public
interest would be served by Republican administrations. The nonpartisan vision of
governance was, in all likelihood, a shared vision, not one inherent to third partyism
per se. And yet, because third parties identified failures of party governance as the
political source of people's problems, they constituted movements of a qualitatively
different sort. Antipartyism eventually formed the core of third party dissent because it
communicated the idea that the major parties had somehow failed to meet voters'
nonpartisan expectations of governance. Antipartyism served as the key organizing
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principle for third party movements because segments of the electorate finally decided
that the major parties had strayed too far from their larger moral purpose: ideally, a
government independent of special interests and a politics that served the public
interest, not party spoils merely.
Despite the pervasiveness and flexibility of antipartyism, third parties focused
on reform agendas specific to their socioeconomic and cultural circumstances. If the
major parties were long on popular themes such as economic expansion, household
independence, and fiscal responsibility, but short on policy specifics, third parties
raised specific demands for government action, especially at the state and local level
where their chances for success were brightest.''' A brief perusal of third party
platforms illustrates the point. The Working Men's parties of the 1830s stumped for
increased spending on public education for the poor and middling classes, debtor relief
measures such as abolition of imprisonment for debt and mechanics' lien laws, along
with more labor-specific reforms like a ten-hour day in textile factories." The
multitude of Gilded Age labor parties organized around an expansive agenda that
included free homesteads, Henry George's single tax scheme, an eight-hour day,
abolition of convict and child labor, creation of state bureaus of labor, municipal
ownership of "natural" monopolies like gas and street car companies, and compulsory
child education.'^ The famous Omaha Platform of the People's party adopted in 1 892
was a visionary agenda designed to reform politics, reign in monopoly capital, and
assist small producers hobbled by debt. The Populists proclaimed "the power of
government...should be expanded," and offered a far-reaching platform for activist
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govcrnnicnl that included inllalionary monetary policies, a graduated income tax,
public ownership of railroads and telegraph companies, and a litany of labor and
electoral relbrms.''^
Though the local political economic context was decisive in shaping the
specific agendas of third party movements, we should not lose sight ol the common
themes which run through nineteenth-century third parties. I hird party movements
framed their agendas with aiitiparty rhetoric and self-images. Often they claimed to be
reform vehicles, not parties in the conventional sense. Indeed, as reform movements,
they implicitly celebrated their lack of partisanship. Precisely because of their antiparly
designs, moreover, third party movements were, at least according to their
spokespersons, well suited to pull up the roots of a corrupt or unresponsive status quo.
Thus third parties also pegged specific legislative proposals for reform to the
transcendent appeal of nonpartisan governance; government belonged to the organic
community—the People—and therefore ought to advance the conunon good, not
partisan-political or personal agendas. In the context of the industrial, commercial, and
demographic revolutions of the nineteenth century, the common good most often meant
that government should insure these processes entailed a mininuim of disruption to
communities and insecurity for individuals. In this way many nineteenth-century third
party movements also nurtured traditional conunonwealth ideas about government's
role as enforcer of social responsibility and guarantor of the public interest. They
carried forward into the modern era of mass politics traditions of state activism which
the nineteenth-century regime suppressed. As the regime of "courts and parties" fell
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into line with the imperatives of laissez faire capitalism, third party movements served
as vehicles for the statutory regulation of economic and social life. Though it is quite
true that government was divested from direct involvement in the economy by the
1830s, in other areas of public policy, such as prohibition, education, debtor relief,
protective labor legislation, and early business regulation, activism by state
governments continued to ebb and flow throughout the nineteenth century. It is hardly
controversial to suggest that third party movements often figured crucially in the
politics of that story.
Movement Into Party: The Third Party Dialectic
Just as the regime of party governance helped fiiel third partyism, so too did it
impose limits on such movements when they entered formal politics. As Peter
Argersinger and Richard Oestreicher have stressed, it is important to realize that
nineteenth-century insurgency took place within an institutional and cultural context
that was beyond a third party's capacity to alter in the short run.^* That context
included: preexisting ideas about politics and government that weighed against
immediate acceptance of radical new formulations of government and society; well-
funded major party organizations, each with a corps of well-heeled operatives and
profusion of party mouthpieces; near complete party control over public sources of
patronage; single member, winner-take-all electoral districts that strengthened the hand
of fusionist elements within third parties during state and national campaigns; traditions
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of partisanship that exerted centripetal force on voters, especially in lead-ups to
national elections; near major party monopoly over key legislative committees and
procedural protocol that were critical to determining outcomes in legislatures. These
structural features posed enormous obstacles to insurgent parties seeking to sustain
independence over several political seasons. They dramatically underscore the need to
distinguish analytically between protest movements and the political parties that arose
from them. When social movements became third political parties, they were shaped
by the regime's institutional configurations and cultural norms.
Third parties faced daunting structural obstacles, but certain features of
nineteenth-century politics redounded to their benefit. Nineteenth-century election law
gave third parties access to the political process. Until the 1 890s the parties
administered campaigns and elections. They set times and sites for holding nominating
conventions, printed and distributed ballots, and oversaw the integrity of election
results. Such control gave the parties important sources of patronage and reinforced
their authority locally even as it put increased pressure on them to stir up partisan
loyalty. Insurgents turned this system to their advantage. With minimal resources any
disgruntled group was free to print ballots for distribution on election day. So easily
could insurgents exploit this private system that major party politicians turned to
"election reform" at the turn of the century to stifle insurgents. The Progressive era
movement to wrest control of elections from the parties was waged by major party
politicians who seized the opportunity to raise voting qualifications, restrict ballot
access, and erect a maze of legal barriers to insurgent candidates and parties. Before
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those changes, however, private control of elections within a federal political structure
gave third parties an important toehold in the system.^'
The sheer variety of issues that fueled third party movements and the relative
ease with which they could mobilize illuminates the considerable potential that existed
in nineteenth-century America to challenge the status quo. At the same time the
tendency towards multi-issue politics reflects how other features of the nineteenth-
century regime thwarted third party movements. Gaining meaningful political power,
at whatever level in the federal system, meant putting together the same sort of broad-
based coalition as the major parties. The winner-take-all system of election and
representation undoubtedly encouraged the choc-a-bloc accretion of issues that
distinguishes so many nineteenth-century third parties. In their desire to achieve
political potency, the tendency among third parties was to forge a super coalition of the
disaffected through appeals to other third party movements and pockets of discontented
voters. Ironically, the most influential nineteenth-century third parties were often the
most fragile, prone to internal power struggles between competing factions over the
minimal patronage third party leaders commanded. Simply adding more issues to the
insurgent cause was an easy way for third party leaders to mobilize potential
constituencies in a winner-take-all system. At the same time, it cut against the larger
themes of antipartyism and commonwealth at the heart of third partyism because it
contributed to subsequent fragmentation.^"
Third party factionalism also points to a crucial but often overiooked factor of
third party formation and development, namely leadership. The ways in which third
35
parties recruited leaders--and vice versa--as well as the quality of leadership they
offered, are critical to understanding their rise and fall. Third party leaders typically
pushed and pulled their movement in directions they believed would enrich their own
interests. Careful studies of the Farmer's Alliance and People's party, for example,
have shown the character of leadership figured crucially in the party's demise. The
conservatism of Alliance and People's party leaders in North Carolina and Alabama,
men such as Marion Butler and Reuben F. Kolb, shaped the free silver, pro-Bryan cast
of those states' Populist movements. On the other hand, the radicalism and
independence of men like MaCune in Texas and Watson in Georgia invigorated "mid-
road" Populism in those states. A similar pattern prevailed in the Midwest. In Iowa
conservative leaders beat back the more radical projects of midwestem Populism, the
sub-treasury and land-loan plans, at a very early stage in the movement's development.
In other states these ideas remained potent among the rank and file and leadership for a
longer period of time.^'
The interrelated problems of leadership and party organization raised a
fundamental contradiction for third party movements, organized around antiparty anger
with partisan politics. In their formative stages third parties generally turned to
experienced pols with histories of opportunism to provide leadership and expertise in
party-building. Massachusetts' s Ben Butler and Henry Wilson, New Hampshire's John
P. Hale, Iowa's James B. Weaver, Pennsylvania's Simon Cameron, South Carolina's
"Pitchfork" Ben Tillman, North Carolina's Leonidas L. Polk: all were political
mavericks in their day whose quirky ideas and independent streaks made them difficult
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bedfellows in the major party organizations that dominated politics in their state.
Covetous of but largely shut out from access to patronage, these ambitious men viewed
third party movements as opportunities to build a political machine that could elevate
its leader to an exclusive inner circle of power brokers. Experienced politicians no
doubt infused third parties with much needed organizational skills, but the actions of
political wire-workers-so necessary for electoral success-were at odds with the
antiparty vision at the core of many third party movements. For its part the third party
rank and file, seeking legitimacy for the cause and quick results from government,
usually capitulated in what was a classic dialectic. When nineteenth-century antiparty
movements were translated into political parties the outcome was shaped, as often as
not, by cadres of self-aggrandizing politicians, more interested in the spoils of office
than in carrying out the antiparty reform vision of the rank and file."
The third party dialectic is best illustrated in the phenomenon of fusion. Again,
the winner-take-all system encouraged most third parties to adopt fusion as a means to
maximize their clout. In closely contested elections, one or another major party often
coaxed and cajoled third party movements into fusion by endorsing a few third party
candidates or incorporating some third party issues into their platform, usually at the
state and local level. Through fusion third parties gained an important entry point into
govemment~in effect, the power to extract concessions from the regime." But fusion
had its downside too, as Peter Argersinger has most recently shown. For if third parties
hoped above all to end politics-as-usual, how could such high ideals possibly be
advanced by fusion with one of the major parties?*"^ In fact, because fusion often
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occurred at the behest of the principal poHticians involved, it entailed the sort of
compromises and horse-trading that most third partisans had banded together to
eliminate. Fusion laid bare the dialectic that crystallized in all nineteenth-century third
parties as they completed the transition from antiparty movement to third political
party. Because all third party movements looked to government for solutions to their
problem^s, they were compelled to mobilize within a political cultural framework that
rewarded unity, discipline, and subordination to organization and leadership. A
winner-take-all regime reinforced the tendency toward practical politics: the setting of
limited goals and a willingness to compromise in the interest of maintaining the long-
term viability of the organization. These tactical particulars are, of course,
characteristic of political organization in any system of party politics. They are also at
odds with the antipartyism that defined the third party challenge to the nineteenth-
century regime.
The regime's cultural characteristics also undermined third party movements in
one final way. When third parties threatened to make lasting inroads among voters the
major parties naturally defended themselves with the familiar tactics of distributive
policymaking and party patronage. The major parties responded in piecemeal fashion
to the issues powering insurgency, driving wedges in third party movements and
defeating their most radical challenges. Through fusion and some plum appointments,
the major parties could usually rob third parties of their most popular and able leaders
and compromise their organizational integrity. Because they almost always controlled
the machinery of state, moreover, major parties could selectively engage the third party
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program. Ultimately, the issue-oriented agendas of third parties could be managed,
however unsystematically, in a distributive regime. Insurgent workers and small
producers concerned for their economic security could be given new "rights" in the
form of lien laws, homestead exemptions, state bureaus of labor, or extensions of the
tariff; antimonopoly forces could be palliated with general incorporation laws and state
commissions to oversee railroad and banking industries; land reformers could be
quieted with the Homestead Act; nativists with anti-immigrant rhetoric and, if
necessary, laws restricting the political rights of the foreign bom.
Then too, on more explosive matters such as union activity or conflicts over
land use by railroads, politicians could always defer to the courts, which throughout the
nineteenth century strongly asserted their suzerainty over labor relations and property
disputes.^^ Nineteenth-century constitutionalism, in other words, helped politicians
craft ambiguous regulatory policy that could both defuse radical movements and
maintain a propitious environment for capital. And so it could go on indefinitely at the
state level, as long as insurgents did not insist upon a redistribution of wealth or
expensive tax increases to expand the public sector.
Indeed, as long as restless citizens could be stilled with state level reforms of a
distributive kind, the issue-oriented agendas of third parties could be easily
disaggregated into piecemeal demands for goverrmient action that the distributive
regime was geared to manage.^^ In the process of beating back third party challenges
with piecemeal reform, the major parties could afford to be selective, because third
party movements, built on the antiparty appeal, were never so disciplined as to present
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an impenetrable front. In the end, when third parties made strong bids for power, they
succumbed to the constraints on insurgency buih into the regime. They were beguiled
by the major parties' skillful use of patronage and short-term recognition of their
issues. They were fatigued by the struggle to be viable in a winner-take-all system of
election and representation. And they imploded on the contradiction of having
morphed into a party out of antiparty material.
Conclusion
If the regime of nineteenth-century politics and governance, no less than social
and economic change, spawned third parties, it was also the means by which the major
parties quickly reestablished connections to disaffected voters. When the major parties
responded to third party challenges, therefore, it was with methods they knew best~the
patronage and distributive policies that were the hallmark of nineteenth-century public
life. Nineteenth-century third parties, however, offered an alternative. They mobilized
a diversity of classes and interests by tapping popular nonpartisan and commonwealth
beliefs about governance, thereby challenging the prevailing framework of patronage
democracy and distributive politics. They met with mixed success. On the one hand,
many third parties won a number of policy concessions from the regime. But those
victories came at the expense of the larger antiparty vision of politics and governance
that underlay the attraction of third party movements. Party patronage and distributive
policymaking, in articulation with long-term social and economic change, produced
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specific instances of third partyism, while those very same attributes of party
governance operated to defeat, at least momentarily, the antipartyism at the core of each
third party's appeal.
Nevertheless, at a broader level third parties were among the nineteenth-century
system's principal nodal points for policy innovation because they aggregated divisive
issues and articulated controversial ideas about government. It is axiomatic that the
bulwark of liberal pluralism in American politics has been the ideologically flexible
and socially miscellaneous major party. But too often modem scholarship has buih
from that truism to conceptualize third parties as exogenous forces, situated on the
outside of the American political system looking in.^^ Surely third parties deserve an
important place in the system. Third party movements often played leading roles in
American political development, pushing the two major parties to overcome vested
interests, to break the built-in inertia, to change and adapt. Third parties served crucial
fimctions within the system of nineteenth-century politics and government; it is time
scholars analyzed them that way.
It is elementary that third parties organize at moments of acute disaffection
from the political status quo. The challenge awaiting historians is to theorize the
subject of voter anger—in a word, populism—in all of its political dimensions and
implications. Developing a satisfactory history of third partyism is fundamentally an
interdisciplinary task because it involves both partisan and nonpartisan political culture,
the architecture of the American state, and the socioeconomic and political context of
specific third party eruptions. The project centrally involves theorizing the political
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character of insurgent movements, analyzing their interaction with the major parties
within a broad constitutional and political context, and identifying the changes and
continuities in politics and government that were left in the wake of third party
challenges.
The analysis presented here suggests scholars might return to an older
understanding of politics, one in which the creative tension between popular and elite
sources of issue politicization, the style and character of leadership, and competition for
the spoils of office assume important roles. We need not embrace all the assumptions
underpinning the Progressive oeuvre in order to imagine, as the Progressives did, an
important role for third parties in nineteenth-century public life. After all, if third
parties were vehicles for "social politics," the regime of "courts and parties" always had
the last word. Historians, nevertheless, might fruitfully reposition third parties and
their social politics against a larger institutional and political backdrop. In their limited
way, Progressive scholars accomplished such a synthesis. Modem scholars might well
return to their enterprise, if not their categories.
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CHAPTER II
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY IN THE AGE OF MARKET REVOLUTION
In winter 1850 a Stonington, Connecticut, resident assailed the New London,
Willimantic and Palmer Railroad in a letter to the New London Daily Morning Star.
"One of the Olden Time" questioned the value of railroads by focusing on
developments in Stonington, a coastal community eight miles east ofNew London,
since the advent of another railroad, the New York, Providence and Boston, in 1837.
Olden Time began by barkening back to the days before the railroad. Stonington was
then a farming and fishing community of independent householders, notable for its
broadly distributed wealth and harmony of class interest. Each citizen "was acquainted
with the condition and wants of all the others," and residents subordinated petty
"jealousies" and individualistic impulses to the "common interests." In those days.
Olden Time reminisced, townsfolk were content "in their own limited circle, shut out to
a certain extent from the remainder of the world." However, in 1 837 a branch-line
railroad connected the center of Stonington to Providence, Rhode Island, and Boston
via the New York, Providence, and Boston Railroad. The railroad changed everything.
Goods produced hundreds of miles distant overwhelmed local producers and
storekeepers. "Our merchants suffer sadly from this state of things," rued Olden Time.
The younger generation scorned the "country folk and ways with contempt." They
disdained labor as "countrified," followed slavishly the "latest city fashions."
"Homespun and satinet gave place to brocade and broadcloth, cowhide to patent
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leather; steel forks to silver." The values of mutuality and community that Olden Time
happily recollected had by now retreated before the conspicuous commercialism and
cultural pluralism of the modem commercial order."
Other Stoningtonians issued complaints about late antebellum society that had
similar origins. In 1845 over 500 townsfolk petitioned for reinstatement of a law that
gave local civil authorities the power to regulate, even abolish outright, the sale of
liquor within town borders. Three years earlier a Democratic-controlled General
Assembly had struck down the old local option law, thus depriving local communities
of a legal means for regulating traffic in liquor. Stonington's location on the rail
network was the decisive factor in creating what the petitioners described as an "open
market" in liquor. Because of the railroad the town suffered an "invasion" of "vagrant
rumsellers" who also brought with them "their former patrons." Thus liquor dealers,
"invited by our milder legislation," utilized a key instrument of the market revolution to
threaten moral consensus. Stonington, once "conspicuous for the temperate habits of
its people," became "a community of drunkards." Intemperance, considered the chief
source of poverty and social discord, accompanied the new market society to
Stonington. Indeed, the petitioners invoked an earlier time when vigilance committees,
sure of community approval, forced local rum dealers to "voluntarily" cease their
wicked ways. By the mid- 1840s, however, townsfolk apparently felt they could no
longer rely upon their "moral economy" to discipline community members. According
to the petitioners, the state, through the law, now had to sanction, indeed (re)constitute,
morality in the face of changing social circumstances.^
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No doubt these complainants exaggerated Stonington's isolation and
homogeneity before the railroad. Nevertheless the anecdotes express far more than
mawkish romanticism. By midcentury New London County was industrializing, and
towns like Stonington experienced a metamorphosis. Certainly there were many who
avidly embraced this far reaching transformation. But many also felt ambivalence and
anxiety towards the market and industrial revolutions, for as the motor of social
change, they spawned problems of public morality and ultimately governance. Those
problems of governance, in turn, provided the basis for populist movements that would
transform the North's political landscape.
In the half century after the Revolution the northern United States underwent a
commercial revolution. Improvements in transportation, in systems of finance, in
business law, and in some locales industrial processes, fueled the development of a
capitalist infrastructure across the Northeast and Midwest. Turnpikes and canals
connected insular agricultural communities to regional and long-distance markets and
lured farmers into commercial exchange; banks supplied venture capital that stimulated
entrepreneurship; manufacturers divided labor processes into discrete tasks and
displaced skilled artisans with young and ill-trained hands; the nation's first factories
turned out woolen and cotton cloth cheaply and supplied wage work to redundant labor
in the countryside.^
Government bulked large in all of these developments. At the national level,
Hamiltonian economic policies facilitated interstate commerce, while early decisions
by the Marshall Court helped to lay "the legal foundation for a national market" by
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codifying freedom of competition in capital and labor markets/ State governments
took the most direct action. As individual entrepreneurs and in many cases whole
communities lobbied for economic development, state legislatures liberally granted
charters that conferred privileges to private business enterprises. To satisfy the popular
demand for economic development in the absence or scarcity of private capital, some
state governments invested heavily in private transportation companies and also created
publicly financed canal systems, complete with rudimentary public administrations to
oversee their construction and maintenance.^ In short the actions of state governments,
no less than private entrepreneurs, figured crucially in the market revolution.
How broadly based was the support for the market revolution and the policies
that facilitated it? The question has generated heated and at times polarized debate.^
One key to resolving the debate is to appreciate the contradictory and conditional
character of popular belief towards government and the economy. At the broadest
level, most ordinary Jacksonians hewed to what Philip Scranton has called a
"capitalism of competence"~the contradictory goal of economic security in a market
economy dominated by independent small proprietors.^ This was the enduring vision
of the middling classes in antebellum America: a faith that the traditional ideals of
competency and propertied independence were compatible with the new freedoms~and
new dependencies--of the Jacksonian market economy. The crucial point here,
developed more fully in the chapters that follow, is that economic development,
whether undertaken by private or public capital, enjoyed broad public sanction in the
antebellum years. This ideal contained contradictions. Dislocation and uncertainty
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accompanied the market and industrial revolutions-as our editorialist and petitioners
from Stonington attest--and prompted searches for ways to accommodate marketplace
imperatives and relationships to the goals of security and order. Still, by 1830 if not
earlier relatively few northerners disputed the idea, popularized by local boosters no
less than political economists like Henry Carey, that economic policies which
modernized the economy heralded prosperity for local communities and the nation.
The Market Revolution in Jacksonian America, 1815-1840:
Society & Economy in Three Northern Counties
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, New London County, Connecticut, and Essex
County, Massachusetts are good places to examine in comparative perspective the
social context of northern politics before the Civil War. For one thing, the states
themselves offer a nice contrast of public economic policy. Massachusetts and
Connecticut, hobbled by Revolutionary War debts but blessed with considerable private
capital, were archetypal "commonwealth" states. They promoted economic
development by stimulating private investment in transportation improvements and
banks through such incentives as public incorporation, tax exemptions, and limited
stockholder liability. Pennsylvania, in contrast, was a classic "public enterprise" state.
A shortage of private capital necessitated considerable public investment in banking
and transportation companies and construction of the nation's largest system of
publicly owned canals and railroads.^
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The cultural and demographic conditions of the counties also varied. Palatinate
German and Scots-Irish settler groups gave Dauphin County a rich cultural
heterogeneity. Sternly Calvinist German Lutheran and Reformed communicants
competed for spiritual supremacy with Scottish and English Presbyterians and
Methodists, while fighting an insurgency from within by German Methodists. The
Yankee stock settler groups ofNew London and Essex counties gave them an
altogether different cast. New England's Presbyterian and Congregationalist
establishment heavily influenced Essex and New London, though in the latter's case,
more populist strains of evangelical Protestantism challenged moderate light
orthodoxy.'
The three counties also contrast well along a number of economic axes. Both
New London and Essex underwent a general shift from sea-based commerce and
fishing to industry in the decades before the Civil War. This broad transformation,
however, imfolded in each county in distinct ways. In Essex County early
industrialization produced a diversity of economic organization by the 1 840s.
Industrialization followed three paths simultaneously: a factory model, exemplified by
the woolen factories located at Lawrence and a few other sites; an outwork model,
devoted to such items as boots and shoes and palm-leaf hats and organized by merchant
capitalists in Lynn, Haverhill, and other towns; and a decentralized small shop model,
spread throughout the county and involving a plethora of industries. New London
County industrialized along a narrower path. Though traditional craft manufacturing
persisted, the county gradually came to depend on whaling and textiles.'"
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liulustriali/atioM came later lo I )aiipliin ( \nm(y. I liilil the late lK4()s the
county's economy relied on craft manufacture and commercial farming linked to a
regional trade of agricultural and light manufactured goods. Lumber, wheat, and Hour
from saw and grist mills lloated down the Susquehanna River to I larrishurg, Dauphm
County's dominant market town, for transhipment lo Philadelphia or liallimore.
I larrishurg, the county seat and state capital, developed quickly into a lively
admiiustrative center with more than its share ()l i)olitical jobbers who swarmed there
to seek favorable legislation on pet projects. State legislators, anxious to improve
communications with the state capital, usually favored transportation projects that ran
through I larrishurg. Hy the 1 84()s the city occupied an enviable site on the slate's
thickening railroad, turnpike, and publicly-lundcd canal network."
Located on the mouth of Long Island Sound in the southeastern corner ol
Connecticut, New London County's geography delermined its early economic
development. Ik'cause of its superior si/e and location. New London I larbor emerged
in the second half of the eighteenth-century as one of New l lngland's principal links in
the West Indies trade. I'rom New London goods destined for the interior moved up the
I'hames River or overland to Norwich, the interior's primary market town located near
its geographic center north ol New London. I Endowed with many ol the state's best
harbors, the county's coastal belt naturally turned to whaling and fishing and related
cnterpri.ses.
A wealthy merchant class poured capital into whaling after the War of 1812,
and by IS.SO, New London was the third largest whaling port in the nation. By the mid-
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1840s, when the industry reached its zenith, whaling far outstripped other industries in
the county in reported capital investment and hands employed, and ranked second to
textiles in value of goods produced. During its heyday the Whale City was a single
industry town. In 1845 fully eighty percent of its non-agricultural workforce labored in
whaling or fishing.'^
The enormous growth of the whaling industry after 1 820 fueled a population
explosion in New London. After two decades of stagnation, New London grew rapidly
over the course of the next three decades, peaking at a rate of sixty-three percent in the
1840s. The success of local whalers also stimulated growth in subsidiary industries.
Small-scale boat and ship-building, cordage and coopering, sail-making, and soap and
candle manufacture employed a growing number of skilled artisans. Self-conscious of
their skill and independence, these petty producers, along with scores of neighborhood
businesses, occupied the expanding middle stratum ofNew London's social order in
the 1 830s and 1 840s. Growing numbers of young women and men employed as
outworkers in either the manufacture of ready-made sailors clothes or boots and shoes
constituted a different sort of workforce. Outworkers made up the city's third largest
sector in 1845, and their prevalence testifies to the transitional character of the local
economy. Though these workers fell into the orbit of the merchant-manufacturers who
set piece rates and quality-control standards (such as there were), outwork freed men
from the drudgery of the factory, dock, or whaling vessel and women from total
financial reliance on men. Working at home, outworkers employed traditional
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handicraft skills in production within a satellite outwork system spread throughout the
city and surrounding towns.
In fact, transitional aptly describes the economy of the entire coast. Stonington
swelled by forty percent in the 184()s, a threefold increase over the three previous
decades, thanks in part to dramatic expansion ol'the town's whaling industry.
Stonington also boasted a handlul of small shops specializing in the manufacture of oil
and fish casks, cordage, and in small to mid-sized fishing and whaling vessels. In
addition small woolen mills, machine shops, carriage-making shops, leather works, and
boot and shoe manufactures supplemented the maritime trades. In the smaller coastal
towns residents combined fishing with small-scale farming and manufacture in the
hoary New I'ligland tradition of by-employments.'''
The economy of the county's interior hinged on the developmeni of the I hames
River basin, a system of streams and small rivers spread out over ea.stcrn Connecticut
that converge at Norwich and feed the 1 hames River. By the late eighteenth-century
villages surrounding Norwich-Lisbon, (iriswold, franklin, Bozrah, and Lebanon-
flourished as landowners erected grist and sawmills on these streams. In the 1 82()s and
183()s local capitalists from Norwich and New London, along with a few from more
distant centers like Providence and Boston, saw still greater potential in this drainage
system. Small, family-based spinning houses modeled after Rhode IsUuuf s Slater mills
evolved in the 182()s and 18.10s into fully integrated cotton and woolen factories.
Though more modest ventures than the huge mill-complexes at Lowell or Lawrence-
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few exceeded 100 hands-these small factories signaled that large-scale
industrialization was on the horizon. ' ^
Magnets of settlement, the textile mills of the Thames River basin exerted
powerful influence over social experience in the countryside. Mill owners and
managers assumed prominent roles in building the institutions of village life and
promoting the moral rectitude of community members. Successive waves of popular
religious revivals, some of "uncommon power," swept over New London County
between the 1 790s and 1 840s, raising Baptist and Methodist churches to majority status
by 1850 (see Table B.l in Appendix B). Mill owners like Cyrus Williams of the
Williams Manufacturing Company, a cotton firm located in North Stonington,
encouraged the new religiosity by financing the construction of churches and avidly
promoting temperance and Sabbatarianism.'^ The blend of factory production,
religious revivalism, and elite piety and paternalism helped popularize the idea that
Christian values could flourish amid industrial order. Mill paternalism normally
reflected a genuine concern for the well-being of the community even as it enhanced
the power of mill owners and managers. The social and cultural interventions of
capitalist Smith Wilkinson at Pomfret Mills, a manufacturing village in southern
Windham County, reveal the combination of pious benevolence and avuncular
authoritarianism that prevailed in eastern Connecticut's rural milltowns. No country
grandee, Wilkinson lived by design in a modest home close to the mills in hopes of
establishing a "family connection" between himself and his workers. Committed to
uplifting the region's struggling yeomanry, Wilkinson reasoned that requiring hands to
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toil twelve hours a day, six days a week in textile mills would keep villagers from the
"vicious amusements." Wilkinson doggedly enforced a puritanical regime both in and
outside the mills. Ball playing or gaming of any kind was prohibited and Sabbath
observance mandated. Wilkinson countenanced no public drinking and even purchased
extra land to prevent outsiders from setting up grog shops on the village outskirts.
Sharing in the enthusiastic Protestantism of his workers, Wilkinson displayed his
Christian benevolence by donating land for a Baptist church.'"'
Wilkinson's Christian paternalism was in fact the reigning ethos in the eastern
Connecticut countryside before midcentury. In stark contrast to the moral laxity and
class conflict that punctuated industrialization in England, the example of the Pomfret
Mills suggested that industrialization could accommodate the values of moral order and
class harmony. Modest in size, locally managed, and paternalistic in practice, the
typical New London County textile mill integrated easily into the social and cultural
fabric of rural life and moved the bucolic countryside imperceptibly to the edge of the
modem industrial order.
The preponderance of small mills in New London County reflected both a broad
cultural preference and basic economic realities. Much of the capital controlled by the
region's rural elite was tied to farmland whose value had rapidly diminished in the
1820s and 1830s, when New England agriculture began to suffer from the competition
of western producers. Economic downturns hit the textile industry and the county's
rural belt especially hard, hastening emigration outward. Rural exodus was in fact a
leitmotif of the Connecticut countryside. Most small farmers scratched only a modest
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living from Connecticut's gravely soil. Excepting the rich flood plains along the
Connecticut River Valley, high quality farmland in Connecticut was dear, and nearly all
of it long since alienated. Productive farmland in Connecticut sold at a premium;
higher in this state at the beginning of the nineteenth century than in any other. Faced
with poor soil conditions and steep prices for quality land, many simply left for the
west, or the region's growing industrial centers.'*
The small land holdings ofNew London County farmers supported only the
most modest efforts at commercial agriculture. As late as 1860, two-thirds ofNew
London County's farms were smaller than one hundred acres. The region's farmers
relied on New England staples such as com, rye, oats, and potatoes, crops sturdy
enough to yield small surpluses. The only steady source of cash was the sale of wool to
local mills, and by the 1840s, the sale of butter and cheese. The relationship between
farm families and rural mills was complex. Farm families, seeking an additional source
of work for women and children, and a dependable market for wool, slowly turned to
the textile industry. The mills, of course, set prices for raw wool, rates for weaving
contracts, and wages for the hundreds of young men, women, and children who
episodically labored there for cash. Yet farm families probably entered such
arrangements with the intention of securing the continued independence of the farm.^°
By periodically selling a portion of its labor power to a local mill, the family farm
generated quick cash as a hedge against a poor crop. Ironically, the pre- 1850 expansion
of the rural textile industry boosted farmers' otherwise grim fortunes in New London
County. On the other hand the close ties of county wool raisers to area mills also made
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farm families susceptible to downturns in the woolen industry, as in the late 1840s,
when reduced duties adopted under the 1846 Walker Tariff threw domestic wool
manufacturing into crisis. New London County wool production plunged 51 percent
between 1 845 and 1 860. By the 1 850s New London County farms ranked among the
poorest in the state ^'
Situated on the Bay State's northeast coast, Essex County, Massachusetts, grew
to be a giant in the colonial and revolutionary era shipping and carrying trade. Salem
and Newburyport in particular were key sites. Capital accumulation in these two cities
soared after the Revolution, producing the region's first resident merchant class and a
highly stratified social order. At the top stood the merchant families--the Derby,
Parsons, Currier, Phillips, and Crowninshield clans were among the most powerful--
who amassed vast fortunes in the West Indies trade. At the bottom, untold hundreds of
anonymous working-class families found unskilled and semi-skilled employment on
the city's wharves or at sea. International commerce acted as a stimulus to a variety of
maritime trades in and around Salem and Newburyport, including fishing, ship and
boat-building, sail-making, and rope and cordage manufacture. Such related industries
rose in importance after the War of 1812. By the 1820s an economic transition, still
incomplete by the Civil War, pulled both cities away from sea-based commerce to
industry and interior trade. Gradually and inexorably, the industrial middling classes of
Salem, Newburyport, and other coastal towns pressed their political and economic
interests above those of the old merchant elite.^^
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Outside of these two dominant ports, independent petty production patterned
economic life. True, the craft of shoemaking, traditionally carried on in "ten-footers,"
gradually gave way to a ramifying network of rural outwork production built on semi-
skilled and underpaid adolescent and female labor. It is equally true that in these
decades textile factories sprang up along the Merrimac River and brought the people of
northern Essex County to the doorstep of industrial revolution. But amid these
revolutionary new techniques for mobilizing labor power it is important to see the
continued vitality of older forms." Before 1840 the remarkable feature of the county's
economy is the numerical preponderance of independent craftsmen, "cottage
fishermen," small farmers, and petty merchants, all of whom traded mainly in local and
regional markets.
Several factors militated against commercial agriculture in Essex County. The
first was average to poor soil conditions. Too, land scarcity magnified the problem.
Indeed, Essex Coimty farms were among the smallest in the state. Though average
farm size did increase slightly between 1820 and 1860, over four-fifths of all farms
remained smaller than 100 acres; nearly six of ten were under 50 acres. As
transportation with the West gradually improved, competition from western producers
struck the final blow to commercial farming in Essex. What commercial agriculture
remained was conducted on a very limited scale. Fresh fruit, upland hay, and dairying
were ready sources of cash in local markets. Nevertheless, antebellum agriculture in
Essex County, concludes a recent study, was "largely geared to self-sufficiency."^''
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Rising birth rates and lower infant mortality rates meant more mouths to feed,
and in turn required more efficient allocation of family labor power. Durmg the first
four decades of the nineteenth century area farm families apportioned a growing share
of their labor power to wage work in local textile mills and in the regional outwork
networks for the manufacture of shoes and straw or palm-leaf hats. That the early
industrial revolution in Essex County built upon preexisting relationships of power and
dependency within the traditional patriarchal family almost goes without saying.
Periodic stints of wage labor gradually disciplined the wives, sons, and especially
daughters of yeoman farmers to industrial production. Yet it is also clear that before
1840 or so farm families hired out sons and daughters largely to meet subsistence
needs. Modest state and local taxes had to be paid, but after that the cash from such
arrangements normally went back into the farm enterprise for farm implements and
seed, for last season's debt at the local store, or perhaps for a few "luxury" consumer
goods. Hard work and improvement were the means; economic security and family
independence the goal. As a result shoe manufacturers had difficulty recruiting
dependable sources of labor. High rates of failure plagued these early enterprises,
owing in part to the unpredictability inherent in the outwork system for mobilizing
labor power."
As the antebellum era wore on, male heads of households also turned to other
sources of income, pursuing a craft during winter lulls or engaging in day labor felling
timber and hauling firewood. The practice of by-employments had deep roots in
colonial New England and held on for so long because of its versatility as a strategy for
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maintaining propertied independence in the new market economy of Jacksonian
America. In small interior towns such as Middleton, Lynnfield, and Georgetown by-
employments figured crucially in the continued economic viability of the small farm
enterprise. By-employments persisted in non-agricultural towns as well. "Cottage
fishermen" combined diversified fishing with farming and household manufacture in
the coastal communities of Ipswich, Manchester, Essex and Salisbury. Cod fishing in
these towns gradually declined as residents first diversified their takes at sea, then
turned to the landward crafts. By the 1 830s the economic base of Marblehead, a
fishing town adjacent to Salem and Lynn, broadened considerably as shoe bosses from
those centers offered easy work (that is, compared to fishing) at decent wages binding
and stitching shoes. Though it is likely that some of those engaged at shoemaking had
already ceased fishing or farming altogether, it is equally likely that many Marblehead
families, along lines permitted by the sexual division of labor, followed both
shoemaking and the fishery. The only coastal town where by-employments were not
prevalent was Gloucester, which deepened its dependence on the fishery, pushing
competitors in Essex County to the brink of extinction.^*
The preponderance of by-employments among farmers and fishermen reflected
and reinforced the rich diversity of craft industry in Essex County in the early decades
of the nineteenth century. The county's transition to an industrial economy unfolded
over several generations, as area families slowly turned to industry to make up for
declining opportunities on the land or at sea. By the 1 830s Essex County was among
the Bay State's leading producers of boats, sails, leather, hats, boots and shoes, and
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woolen cloth. Shoes and woolens bulked large in the long distance market that
developed after the War of 1812, accounting for an ever larger fraction of the county's
industrial output. In the shoe industry merchant-manufacturers in Lynn, Haverhill,
Danvers, and Beverly, commanding small armies of rural outworkers, slowly gained
control of the market for cheap brogans and bootines. In the textile industry capitalists
from Boston teamed up with local managers to erect woolen and cotton mills along the
Merrimac and its tributaries. Andover, Amesbury, and Salisbury emerged as woolen
centers in the 1 820s, while cotton factories also sprang up at Methuen and
Newburyport."
These were medium-sized firms that, like the mills ofNew London County,
blended into the surrounding communities more easily than the mammoth complexes at
Lowell or Waltham. The woolen mills at Amesbury and Salisbury, towns of about
2,500 at 1840, were typical. Employing on average 250 and 360 hands, respectively,
the Amesbury Flannel Manufacturing Company and Salisbury Manufacturing Company
lay between the Waltham and Slater models. The companies' original agents, James
Horton (SMC) and Joshua Aubin (AFMC), were long-time residents of Amesbury and
had contributed to the founding capital when their firms were incorporated in the early
1 820s. The mills attracted some migrants from New Hampshire and Maine, but for the
most part both companies relied on local men, women, and children who lived in their
own homes or unsupervised tenements near the mills. The agents also practiced a sort
of informal paternalism that eased the transition to early industrial capitalism in these
towns. Symbolic gestures such as distributing turkeys to operatives and the town poor
were annual Thanksgiving rituals for the two agents. More substantive was the long-
standing prohibition against hiring youths under fourteen years of age, a policy not
required by state law. At other times townsfolk did not wait for company benevolence.
In 1 849 concerned residents solicited Aubin's help in improving the education of
younger millhands. The obliging agent convinced the AFMC's Boston-based
directorship to establish a library on company property, cut back winter hours, and open
a night school for teenage women operatives.^*
Partly because of such paternalism, early industrial development in Essex
County took shape in ways that small producers could accommodate. Local textile
mills helped sustain the small producer economy. Mechanic and "country" merchant
households, just like yeoman farm families, hired out sons and daughters for stints of
wage labor in factories. Thus the gendered division of labor enabled middling families
to exploit the early development of industry for their own ends: the continued security
and independence of the patriarchal household. Skilled men, with a little surplus
capital, could set up a carriage-making shop or dry goods store; their wives and
children could then supplement the husband's income with some wage work. Local
mills also provided small producers with short-term employment and contracts for
repair work, allowing more choices to mechanics and workers seeking a competency.^''
It is important to recognize that, despite the coming of factories and spread of
putting out networks, small producers were not immediately "done in" by industrial
capitalism. Indeed, where petty producers before the Civil War are concerned, a more
appropriate metaphor is rise and fall.^" Though industrial and commercial change
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fundamentally altered the petty producer's environment, until the 1840s much of the
county's male labor force toiled in decentralized small shops tied in to local markets.
Combmaking, carriage-making, cabinet making, silversmithing, cigar manufacture, and
a plethora of leatherworking industries were among the diverse trades practiced more
or less along traditional craft lines, while various sea-based trades also thrived in towns
up and down the coast.^'
While the Jacksonian era saw an explosion of industrial and business diversity
in New England, more rural states like Pennsylvania experienced a different economic
transformation. Dauphin County, located in southeastern Pennsylvania on the banks of
the Susquehanna River, remained essentially agricultural before midcentury. To the
south and southeast lay the entrepots of Baltimore and Philadelphia, to the west the rich
agricultural region of the Cumberland valley, the rugged Alleghenies, and beyond them
the Ohio River valley, gateway to the west. First attracted to this natural crossroads
were Palatinate German farmers pushing northwestward from neighboring Lancaster
County in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Then came equal numbers
of Scots-Irish beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century. English stock people
also settled in Dauphin over a much longer period, and remained its third largest ethnic
group. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, eastern Pennsylvania's three
principal ethnic groups dominated Dauphin's two distinct regions: the Lower End, a
rolling plane that encompassed the fertile agricultural lands south of Blue Mountain
and the booming market town of Harrisburg on the Susquehanna River; and the Upper
End, a rocky region of elongated mountain chains and narrow valleys that scarred the
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northern half of the county in a southwest-to-northeast swathe. The sparsely settled
Upper End was known for its stands of hardwood, deposits of iron ore, abstemious soil,
and poor roads. In the 1 820s the region's prospects brightened dramatically when
geologists located the southern termini of Pennsylvania's anthracite fields in the hills of
the Upper End."
The cultural preferences of these pioneer settler groups shaped Dauphin's
religious life and political culture. The early preponderance of German and Scottish
settlers gave the region a strong Calvinist accent that it would retain throughout much
of the nineteenth century. As late as the 1850s German Lutheran and Reformed
churches constituted from two-fifths to one-half of all church accommodations in
Dauphin County ( Table B.2). Though in Europe these two sects had split over
doctrinal disputes dating to the sixteenth century, Germans muted their religious
differences in the New World. In Dauphin County German Lutheran and Reformed
congregations often pooled resources for a single house of worship used by the two
denominations on alternate Sundays. In some instances, out of a common distrust of
non-Germans, these "church" Germans reunified their congregations and formed united
Lutheran Reformed institutions. The preferred religion of the early Scots was old
school Presbyterian, another of the Old World Protestant sects committed to traditional
Calvinism."
From the outset arminian German Moravians and Mennoniles challenged
Calvinism in Dauphin County. Small and isolated, these pietistic sects anticipated the
appeal of anticlericalism among the county's Germans during the explosion of religious
populism in the Jacksonian era. In the first half of the nineteenth century religious
revivals swelled the ranks of the Methodists, split the Presbyterian church into old and
new schools, and precipitated the formation of whole new sects like the Church of God
(Winebrennarians) and Disciples of Christ. By the mid-nineteenth century Dauphin
County enjoyed a heterogenous and increasingly plebeian religious culture. Sectarian
ferment prior to 1850 concentrated in the more populous and economically dynamic
towns of the Lower End. The United Brethren in Christ and the Church of God
(founded by John Winebrenner in 1827 at Middletown, a small lumber port on the
Susquehanna south of Harrisburg) found ready converts in communities that began to
commercialize with the turnpike and canal boom of the 1810s-1830s.^''
Just as the transportation revolution of the early nineteenth century helped
propel revivalism, so too it structured the county's economy. Fear of falling terminally
behind New York and Maryland for the bonanza of western trade prompted state
legislators to embark on an ambitious program of internal improvements. Private
capital in the Keystone state was scarce and demand for improvements intense after
New York announced plans to construct the Erie Canal. Philadelphia's powerful
merchant elite, nervously eyeing Baltimore's rapid rise, avidly promoted such a project
for Pennsylvania, as did untold thousands of smaller merchants in the countryside. The
Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Internal Improvements, a nonpartisan lobby
with origins in Philadelphia's counting houses but which soon attracted broad support,
orchestrated the statewide campaign for a system of public canals and railroads. The
proposal initially received a chilly response from Dauphin County because of its
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southward orientation. Residents opposed any public expenditure on communications
with the west, rather preferring improvements be made to the Susquehanna River.
However, after boosters gave assurances that money for branch lines and other
improvements would be included in any public system, locals quickly warmed to the
plan. The campaign culminated in the spring of 1 825 with a state convention at
Harrisburg. A year later the legislature approved appropriations to create the
Pennsylvania State Works and the Keystone state "began her canal-building orgy.""
The chief artery of Pennsylvania's public works was the Main Line, a chain of
canals and railroads connecting Philadelphia to Pittsburgh via Harrisburg. With the
completion of a mechanical Portage railroad over the Alleghenies in 1834, through
travel between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia over the entire system was at last made
possible. Representatives from outlier regions demanded that fimds for branch line
canals and stock subscriptions to local transportation companies be included in annual
appropriations. Omnibus public works bills during the 1830s extended the scope of the
state's transportation network, as well as the commonwealth's obligations to bond
holders and banks. By the early 1 840s, when economic depression and charges of
corruption ended expansion of the Public Works, nearly 900 miles of canals had been
laid. Though a drain on public confidence in politicians no less than the state treasury,
Pennsylvania's Public Works effectively brought rural communities into the orbit of
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and the growing commercial towns along the Main Line.-'*
One such town was Harrisburg, the county seat and state capital since 1810.
Harrisburg' s role in the river trade of the Susquehanna basin had long been a prominent
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one. Grist and lumber mills and whiskey distilleries jumped into feverish production
each spring when freshets made for safe and easy downstream shipping on the
otherwise shallow Susquehanna. Huge arks of lumber and rafts laden with wheat, rye,
flour, and coal made their way down to Harrisburg. The coming of turnpikes and
canals accelerated Harrisburg's development as an interior entrepot, luring the region's
farm families into commercial relationships with its merchants. Dealers and
forwarding merchants set up shop at Harrisburg to profit off the trade of goods and
resources between city and hinterland."
The emerging system of improvements stimulated rural industries that could
process the products of farm and forest. In the countryside, along major waterways and
turnpikes, grist and saw mills, distilleries, small collieries and iron furnaces appeared in
expanding numbers. Commodity markets in Harrisburg and Middletown raised
demand for increased output of the region's farms, particularly in the more fertile and
accessible lands south of Blue Mountain. Many farmers obliged, tempted by
newfangled manufactured goods that could be had at the shops of Harrisburg merchants
in exchange for grain, flour, or homemade whiskey. Using value of farm machinery as
a surrogate for commercialized agriculture suggests the extent to which Lower End
farmers had embraced the opportunities of the expanding market economy. Farms in
the Lower End held an average of $125 worth of farm machinery at midcentury; Upper
End farms less than $90. As the market's tentacles reached into the hinterland. Lower
End towns such as Lower Swatara, Derry, Conewago, and the Hanovers became
Dauphin's most commercially oriented agricultural towns. Increasingly area farmers
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raised beef cattle and sheep for export of raw wool to mills in Philadelphia and New
England.^*
And yet, despite these unmistakable signs of commercialized production, most
area farmers remained on the cusp ofmodem capitalist agriculture throughout the
antebellum era. Before midcentury countervailing traditions of security-first productive
strategies prevailed in the Pennsylvania countryside. Family farms in Dauphin County
raised such crops for home use as com in amounts equal to commercial crops such as
wheat and other grains. As in Essex and New London counties by-employments
constituted a cmcial element in the ensemble of subsistence-surplus strategies that
distinguished small from larger farms. One historian noted the overwhelming
preponderance of "part-time farmers" in antebellum Pennsylvania, men who gave
hyphenated occupations like tinsmith/farmer when canvassed by town census takers.
The testimony of a Dauphin County dairy farmer before the state Board of Agriculture
recollects the traditional character of local dairying and farm life about 1840:
Butter making did not constitute a business in itself because it formed one of
the many smaller... industries to be found on every farm at the time. In every
village or small town...the possession of a cow by each well-to-do family was
quite common. In such places there was no place for the milk dealer. Each
family who did not have its own milk supply, sent to a neighbor.... Every farmer
kept a few cows, but no farmer kept a large herd. Butter was made, sufficient
for the family use and, for at least part of the year, the housewife would have a
few pounds each week to exchange at the neighboring store for coffee, sugar, or
such other groceries or dry goods as were needed....^'
The farmer remembered a locally oriented economy built on small family farms and
suffused with the customary values of reciprocal exchange. It was a mral economy in
transition, a degree removed from the modem commercial order.
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Meanwhile Dauphin's primary commercial center and county seat expanded
enormously. Harrisburg seized fiill advantage of the changes underway in the
Jacksonian economy because of its natural dominance in the river trade and its unique
status as state capital. The economic infrastructure that a first-class interior entrepot
and administrative hub required dovetailed nicely and gave Harrisburg interests in the
state legislature leverage when jockeying for local improvements.
Harrisburg' s early transportation revolution, engineered by a relative few,
opened opportunities for a diversity of enterprises. Unlike other mid-sized cities in
Pennsylvania that industrialized sooner, Harrisburg' s economy remained commercial
until the 1850s. Artisanal production thrived, sustained by the steadily rising demand
in the region for finished consumer goods. Harrisburg' s artisans produced consumer
and light industrial goods primarily for local markets; relatively few seem to have
developed extensive links to markets significantly beyond Dauphin, Lebanon, and
Cumberland counties. As late as 1850, the earliest date for which reliable data are
available, there existed in Harrisburg only a single enterprise that employed twenty-five
or more hands and utilized steam or water power in the production process. The
preponderance of these workers were native-bom males; Harrisburg' s antebellum
workforce was structured rigidly by gender, race, and ethnicity. Few women, native or
otherwise, found employment in industry prior to 1850. The same can be said for Irish
immigrants who entered the city's workforce in the 1840s (that group constituted 5.4%
of the city's total population at 1850). Opportunities for skilled, high wage work were
dearer still for the city's Afi-ican-American population, a surprisingly high 1 1.3% at
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midcentury. Indeed four of five black males in 1850 toiled in the service sector or as
common unskilled labor. The city's status-conscious white upper crust especially
prized black male and female domestics, cooks, and gardeners. On the other hand
German immigrants-4.5% of the city's population in 1850--fared much better. Many
newly arrived Germans immediately stepped up to employment in skilled trades such as
baking, brewing, cigarmaking, and cabinetmaking.""
The Market Revolution Matures. 1843-1861: Railroads and TnHn^trialkm
Beginning with the economic recovery of 1843 the northern United States
entered a second, industrial phase of the market revolution. Westward expansion and
lower tariffs with Europe stimulated demand for manufactured goods, while the
discovery of gold in California eased the availability of investment capital. Railroads
both manifested and extended the new industrial order; their economic effects dwarfed
those of turnpikes and canals. In the two decades before the Civil War railroad
construction stimulated subsidiary and complementary industries including coal
mining, iron foundries, and the manufacture of locomotives and rolling stock.'*' In
these years a high tide of economic expansion swept over Pennsylvania, Connecticut,
and Massachusetts, in large measure due to railroads. The number of corporate charters
granted to banking, insurance, transportation, and manufacturing companies soared.
Between 1 800 and 1 840 Connecticut granted charters or capital increases to 40 banks.
In the ensuing twenty years that number climbed to 124; 94 alone in the 1 850s. Next to
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banks, railroads received the most attention. In the two decades before the Civil War
railroad mileage in Massachusetts jumped from 270 to 1,264, in Connecticut from 94 to
601
.
By the end of the 1850s, Pennsylvania had nearly 2,600 miles of track, over 2 'A
times its mileage in canals."*^
Meanwhile government remained a key actor, though its role changed, hi all
three states the volume of special charters for business enterprises skyrocketed, while at
the same time state assemblies passed general incorporation laws standardizing
incorporation procedure. In a very broad sense, as many previous scholars have argued,
these developments betrayed a reaction against the mercantilist ideas that had once
guided economic policy. By the 1840s if not earlier the legislattores of the three states
allowed private sector imperatives to determine the broad course of economic
development. Government's hand, once an ubiquitous presence in economic life,
retracted from direct involvement in the economy.''^
The revulsion against state involvement was strongest in western states like
Pennsylvania. The state had paid for additions to the Public Works principally through
direct borrowing and bond issues. As a method for funding internal improvements this
was relatively painless, for it minimized taxes, popular among no one. But it did create
an enormous debt, over $36 million by 1840. With the onset of hard times traffic on
the Works suddenly lightened and annual income from tolls soon failed to cover
interest payments. In 1843, on the verge of default, the Commonwealth sold much its
stock in private transportation and banking companies. The following year a non-
binding plebiscite for sale of the Main Line won a popular majority. The Public Works
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would not be sold for more than a decade as legislators skirmished over such
particulars as the proper selling price, the appropriate buyer, and what if any privileges
should be included in the deal. But on the general concept of "public enterprise" it was
clear a majority of the public had done an about face/''
As we shall see in later chapters, the Public Works would remain at the center
of Pennsylvania politics in the 1850s, shaping debate over politics and governance.
And so, too, would the people of Massachusetts and Connecticut continue to debate the
relationship between politics, governance, and society. Thus while government's direct
involvement in the economy diminished, it was not at all clear what government's role
would be in other areas of public policy, including, ironically, general statute law
regulating business corporations. Such was the ambiguous legacy of the reaction
against early public enterprise and the decisive shift towards private economic
development-uncertainty as to the ftiture role government could assume in a rapidly
industrializing society.
In many ways Dauphin County epitomized the economic and commercial
changes wrought by railroads. The Pennsylvania Railroad, chartered in 1846 as the
state's primary east-west trunk line, reached the county at Harrisburg in 1 849. A series
of lesser trunk lines criss-crossed at the state capitol by the late 1850s, while smaller
feeder lines opened the anthracite fields of the Upper End.''^ Agriculture, still the
coimty's largest employer in 1860, felt the impact most acutely. The elaboration of the
rail network introduced Pennsylvania farmers to competition from western growers.
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Export prices for wheat and other cereals plummeted, putting an additional squeeze on
wheat values, at one time the most dependable of Pennsylvania's cash crops. The
upshot was that railroads brought speedier shipping between industrializing centers and
their hinterlands. In Dauphin County, as throughout rural Pennsylvania, market
pressures and improvements in transportation precipitated a shift towards
commercialized dairying. Improvements in transportation sharply increased average
value of farm land and stimulated output of milk and butter. On the other hand wheat
production per farm leveled off in the 1850s, while beef cattle grazing and sheep
raising declined. These trends appear to have occurred evenly across the county.
Dauphin farmers also utilized agricultural equipment on a wider and more systematic
scale during the 1850s. The development of eastern Pennsylvania's iron industry in the
1840s and 1850s suddenly made a variety of drills, rakes, reapers, and plows
affordable. With their land values rising farmers could now risk short-term loans for
such improvements, and many did so."*^
Railroads also stimulated industry. Small shops remained the dominant form of
industrial enterprise before the Civil War, but large-scale coal mining and iron making
emerged as leading industries, accounting for nearly 40% of the county's industrial
workforce by 1860.'^^ Harrisburg led the county's industrial and demographic
expansion. Its population grew by 71% in the 1850s, rising to over 13,400. Over half
the county's industrial workforce toiled there, as the early 1850s saw a fully integrated
cotton mill, a factory for the manufacture of railroad cars, and two large-scale
anthracite furnaces set up business. Iron making proved to be the Lower End's long-
term source of industrial expansion. Prior to midcentury, the region's iron industry
consisted of small furnaces and rolling mills that by necessity located along streams
near forests that supplied the charcoal for fuel. The refinement of the hot-blast for
firing anthracite and forging pig, and the application of steam-engines to power rolling
mills and other machinery used in casting, enabled capitalists to establish vastly
expanded works in urban centers like Harrisburg with abundant labor and good
communications.''^
The beginnings of industrialization in Harrisburg coincided with the
development of deep-shaft anthracite mining in the Upper End. Modem shallow
surface mining began as early as 1825, when the anthracite deposits were first
uncovered. Mining companies soon organized to exploit the deposits on a larger scale.
The first coal companies were speculative ventures, launched in the early 1830s by
such wealthy Philadelphians as Simon Gratz and J. Edgar Thompson, later president of
the Pennsylvania Railroad. The pioneer firm was Gratz' s mammoth Wiconisco Coal
Company, founded in 1831
. Like other early efforts in eastern Pennsylvania,
Wiconisco Coal spent the first years developing its lands for leasing. The company
conducted extensive surveys, laid out the villages of Lykenstown and Wiconisco, and
built houses for lease to miners, the first group ofwhom were Englishmen and their
families imported from adjacent Schuylkill County. Anthracite coal became an
important commodity in the canal trade, and a principle source of home heating fuel in
Dauphin.''^
The investors had grander visions, however. The company reorganized itself in
1836 as the Lykens Valley Coal Company. Lykens Coal eyed the Baltimore and
Washington markets, but high operating costs plagued the company. Throughout the
antebellum era anthracite mining barely turned a profit and then only when coal sold at
a premium. Rates of failure among smaller mining companies and coal merchants
soared in the 1840s when coal prices fluctuated and the iron industry was just
beginning to use anthracite. Though another large enterprise, the Short Mountain Coal
Company, began in Wiconisco in the 1 840s, the great potential for industrial growth
buried in the hillsides around Wiconisco and Lykens went unrealized before the late
1840s.'°
Change accelerated in the Upper End after midcentury. Demand for coal shot
upward as cities along the Atlantic seaboard industrialized. High prices induced
expansion and consolidation as the industry improved deep-shaft mining and above
ground processing technology. Deep-shaft mining commenced in 1 849 and coal output
rose steadily thereafter, averaging over 1 19,000 tons annually in the second half of the
1850s. The town of Wiconisco stood at the forefi-ont of the social changes sweeping
the Upper End. During the 1850s the town's population doubled, eclipsing 2,600 by
decade's end and making Wiconisco the county's third largest town and biggest in the
Upper End. Hundreds of Welsh, English, German, and Irish miners and laborers
rushed into Wiconisco and the neighboring town of Lykens for work in the sprawling
collieries of the Lykens Valley and Short Mountain Coal Companies. By the 1850s
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Wiconisco was a single industry, two company town. By 1860 the two companies
employed between 75 and 90 percent of Wiconisco's industrial workforce.''
To observe that the 1850s brought industrialism and intensified commercial
agriculture to Dauphin County is not to argue the county's economy changed
profoundly, only that change was patchy. The county as a whole remained basically
agricultural. In 1860 the average farm in Dauphin County was fairly modest, about 75
acres, while two-thirds of all farms were smaller than 100 acres in size. And if the
capitalist transformation of rural Dauphin County was still incomplete by 1860, so too
was its industrial revolution. Manufacturing in Harrisburg, as Gerald Eggert has
documented in an exhaustive survey, remained the province of traditional skilled and
semi-skilled craftsmen well after the Civil War. And this pattern persisted across the
county. The dynamic villages of Hanover, Lykens, and Middletown, for example,
housed such traditional handicrafts as tanning, cabinet making, carriage making, and
blacksmithing." Industrial factories and large-scale anthracite mining came to Dauphin
in the 1850s, but it would take another generation or more for the tradition of rural
industry to loose its grip on Dauphin County.
Essex Coimty's railroad boom erupted earlier than in Dauphin or New London.
Over four-fifths of the county's pre-Civil War track mileage dates to the 1840s. The
two pioneer roads, the Eastern and Boston and Maine, remained the county's most
important throughout the antebellum era. Begun in the early 1 840s, these north-south
railroads served as the county's two trunk lines. Originating in Boston, the Eastern
railroad connected the coastal communities, then ran northward into southern Maine.
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The Boston and Maine cut through the interior of Middlesex County before reaching
Essex County's newest textile city, Lawrence, in the county's northeast comer. It then
extended northward into New Hampshire and Maine. Over the course of the 1840s and
1850s eight major cross lines and several lesser spurs were built between these roughly
parallel roads, bringing every community in Essex County within the orbit of the
maturing network. With the coming of railroads to Essex County, rhapsodized a
resident booster, "the country has been carried to the city, and the city with its
advantages, for all practical purposes, has been carried into the rural districts.""
Essex County's railroads generated demographic and economic changes that far
outstripped those of the still mainly rural Dauphin County. Because of westward
migration Essex County experienced only modest population growth between 1810 and
1840--a decennial average slightly below 10%. During the 1840s the county
population exploded by nearly 40 percent and rose another 25 percent in the 1850s.
Rapid industrial expansion accompanied this growth. Beginning about 1 840 and
intensifying after 1850, centralization and capitalization characterized industrial
development in Essex as the spread of railroads permitted inexpensive long-distance
shipping of consumer goods, and banks increased the availability of venture capital. In
the 1850s alone, reported capital investment in industry increased by 62 percent, while
numbers employed in manufacturing and industry rose by 32 percent. Indeed, on the
eve of the Civil War, nearly 50,000 county residents labored in industry, and an
increasing fraction of these in large steam- or water-powered factories or
manufactories.^"*
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The founding of the textile eenter of Lawrence marked the arrival of truly
mammoth corporations in Fssex. Like the textile cities of Lowell and Walthani,
Lawrence owed its existence to Boston-based investment capital. Abbott Lawrence
immodestly gave his name to the new site, carved out of Andover and Methuen in
1845, after he and other investors financed construction of a huge dam on the Merrimac
River. Unlike Lowell, which specialized in cottons, Lawrence began as a woolen and
worsted center. The first firm, the Bay State Mills, commenced operations in the late
1840s and employed at its peak over 1,700 hands. Other mills soon followed, again
financed with Boston capital. By 1855 five woolen mills gave employment to 2,300
operatives, about 1,000 of them women. Capitalists soon diversified operations at
Lawrence to include cotton manufacturing, which promised larger profits than wool.
By 1855 six cotton factories employed more hcinds than did the local woolen mills.
Rapid expansion characterized other industries, too. Large factories utilizing both
water and steam power produced steam engines and boilers, railroad rolling stock and
other vehicles, paper, and cotton and woolen machinery.'''
The infiux of capital and industry into Lawrence transformed the city's social
character and demographic make-up. Lawrence grew at a dizzying pace: in the six
years preceding 1850 its population climbed from virtually nothing to 8,300. By 1860,
after the population more than doubled—a rate of growth that far out paced all other
Essex county towns-Lawrence was Essex county's third largest city, behind only
Salem and Lynn. Much of this growth owed to a tidal wave of Irish Catholic and
Scottish immigrants attracted to work in the new mills. Indeed, the percentage of
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foreign-bom in Lawrence, over 41% in 1860, exceeded the countywide figure by over
twofold. Overnight Lawrence developed perhaps Essex County's largest resident, self-
reproducing working class, drawn to the city because of the textile industry's dynamic
expansion and reputation for fair wages. The lucky ones found steady work and decent
housing; the remainder, plagued by underemployment and squalid living conditions,
fell into Lawrence's burgeoning underclass. Other communities witnessed similar,
though less thoroughgoing transformations. Newburyport, like other Essex County
communities that industrialized along factory lines, grew rapidly. Immigrants and
native-bom alike flocked there as cotton and woolen factories expanded.
Similarly high rates of growth in the 1850s prevailed in the county's principal
shoe and leather towns, where the widespread deployment of machines in shoe binding
and stitching concentrated production in large central shops. With the expansion and
consolidation of the shoe industry the population of the county's principal shoe towns,
especially Lynn, Danvers, and Haverhill, soared. The central shops competed with the
old putting-out network for labor power. Shoe bosses frequently played one group of
shoeworkers against the other, thereby keeping wages low, especially in the central
shops, where workers might more easily organize and register their opposition to
exploitative conditions. More and more shoe bosses expanded into large shops
outfitted with the new technology, and hired adolescents and women in place of skilled
joumeymen; both developments severely reduced the ranks of rural outworkers. Before
the Civil War, it should be stressed, these changes manifested in the large shoe towns,
for a majority of shoeworkers continued to labor in outwork networks. Nevertheless,
the transformation of production in Lynn, Haverhill, Danvers, and Marblehead left little
doubt about what the steam powered central shop augured for shoe manufacturing.
During the 1850s these large enterprises "began to ftinction like factories," as Mary
Blewett points out, dividing the labor process into discrete and redundant tasks and
enabling close and constant supervision of shoeworkers."
Other industries mirrored these transformations. During the 1850s factories
emerged for the manufacture of paper, combs, and hats, displacing traditional
handicraft production. Other trades, though resistant to the technological innovations
and productive efficiencies that define modem factory organization, nevertheless
underwent consolidation and expansion. The local dynamics of this process can be
seen in Amesbury, a town that, in addition to woolens, specialized in carriages.
Between 1845 and 1855, the number of carriage-making establishments fell to twenty-
one fi-om fifty-six, while the average number of employees per shop leapt upward to
fourteen hands fi-om two. By 1855 reported capital investment in this sector rose to
$258,000, a tenfold increase in just a single decade. Much of this resulted from greater
access to capital and more distant markets enjoyed by local craftsmen after a spur was
finally laid between Amesbury and Newburyport by the Eastern Railroad in 1848.
Now, money-minded masters could more profitably undertake the risk of mortgaging
their property, expanding production and distribution. By the 1850s carriage makers
entered partnerships with other tradesmen whose skills and expertise complemented
their own: production of carriages rapidly centralized in ftilly integrated manufactories.
The fortunes of the areas' wheelwrights illuminates the scope of accelerated
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industrialism. Nearly two dozen such workers labored in small independently owned
shops throughout the 1840s. In 1848, however, capitalists incorporated the West
Amesbury Manufacturing Company, and for the first time in this town water-power
was harnessed in the production of wheels. Five years later the town was bereft of
independent wheelwrights. As one resident later recalled, previous to the founding of
this factory the high precision trade "gave employment to many wheelwrights," but
soon "nicely adjusted machinery performed nearly all the work."^*
The gradual expansion of small shops into large manufactories signified a
broader reorganization of economy and society in Essex County. In the two decades
before the Civil War the coming of railroads, the influx of cheap immigrant and rural
migrant labor, and above all the increased availability of capital worked an industrial
revolution in Essex County. The range of business opportunities available to the
county's resident producers, their very success or failure in the new economy, depended
more and more upon the effective use of capital to mobilize wage labor and produce
goods that could be sold in long-distance markets. The region's diversified, small shop
economy that had prevailed until the mid- 1840s fell into eclipse."
Between 1 845 and 1 860, while stagnation characterized New London
agriculture, economic and demographic changes in the county's industrializing cities
and towns dramatically altered the region's social order. Predictably, New London's
growth communities concentrated along the region's first railroads. The 1837 spur
connecting Stonington to the New York, Providence and Boston Railroad
foreshadowed a railroad boom in the 1840s and 1850s. The Norwich and Worcester,
completed in 1840 (with bond help from the state of Massachusetts and the city of
Norwich) was another early sign. The New London, Willimantic and Palmer, opened
for travel in 1849, really launched the building craze. By the eve of the Civil War
several railroads connected New London's busy ports and factory towns to New Haven,
New York City, and Boston.^"
The coming of railroads accelerated the decline ofNew London County
agriculture, quickened the pace of its industrialization, and increased the economic and
social distance between the county's rural and industrializing communities. Capital
and numbers employed in such sea-based industries as whaling and fishing and boat
and ship building dropped precipitously after 1845, underscoring the considerable
economic troubles of the coast. The coast's general dependence on whaling and
subsidiary enterprises augured poorly for the region when innovations in ship design
and rising costs suddenly gave fleets in Massachusetts the competitive edge (though
there the industry had long since seen its best days). By 1 860 knowledgeable observers
claimed that only one in twenty expeditions yielded a profit. With the demise of
whaling, the area's merchant elite diverted capital to railroads, financing the boom of
the 1850s but also limiting the amount of local capital available for other industries;
industrialization in these years eluded the coastal belt. What few advances took place
did so largely along traditional lines in the form of modest expansion in certain trades
like blacksmithing, leathers, and carriage-making. But overall the coastal belt limped
through the 1850s, suffering from chronic unemployment and the lowest per capita
property values in the region.^'
The abrupt fall of whaling coincided with the rise of capital intensive industries
in the interior. Indian-rubber and iron manufacturing emerged to complement the
established textile and paper-making industries. The fortunes of the county's leading
industry, textiles, illustrate the broad trends. Whereas prior to 1 850 the large textile
factory was an anomaly, scarcely a decade later large factories had overtaken the
industry in Norwich and indeed much of the surrounding region. In 1845 the average
cotton manufacturing firm controlled just under $30,000 in capital; by 1860 mean
capital per firm rose to over $191,000. Norwich, the epicenter of these developments,
sent Shockwaves through adjacent communities. Bozrah, Griswold, and Lisbon, once
emblematic of the bucolic Yankee milltown, saw their small woolen and cotton mills
superseded by full-sized cotton manufacturing corporations. For the first time
industrialization produced a large and more permanent factory class, as the surging
industry attracted native-bom families from the countryside and Irish-Catholic
immigrants from abroad for steady but monotonous work. The transformation of work
and economy in the 1850s occurred in other industries. Outwork of boots and shoes
and ready-made clothes declined, further marking the turn toward factory production.
New technologies in book binding and printing reduced the need for high skilled and
high priced labor in those industries.^^
In this context small shop production, rather weak in northern New London
County to begin with, declined still further. The rise and fall of petty production in the
town of Griswold, in the county's northeast comer, fits this pattern. Rocky soil made
agriculture an uninviting prospect in Griswold, so most people looked to industry for a
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livelihood and especially to textile mills clustered at Jewett City, a village of Griswold
at the natural falls of the Quinnebaug. So promising was this mill site that Samuel
Slater and his brother John, in addition to their substantial interests across southeastern
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, poured money into mills at Jewett City in the early
1810s. By the early 1830s five small to mid-sized cotton factories and a woolen mill
turned out cotton sheeting and satinets for commission merchants in Norwich,
Hartford, and New York. The mills supported scores of families, which in turn
attracted a bevy of small cottage industries devoted to hats, shoes, carriages, cabinets,
and various leather trades. But mill shutdowns and rural exodus during the depression
years choked off the local market for light consumer goods. Prosperity returned by the
mid- 1840s, but with it came a weaker market for rural manufacture. Railroads and
other transportation improvements brought affordable goods of decent quality to
Griswold, soaking up an ever increasing share of the millhand's income. By the 1850s
nearly Griswold' s entire industrial labor force worked in cotton manufacturing.
Though the town's fate exaggerated the completeness of the transformation, in New
London County the status of the traditional small manufacturer had slipped badly in the
1850s."
Conclusion
The social and economic history of the three counties form an important
backdrop to their politics in the decade before the Civil War. By the mid- 1 850s
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industrialization and commercial expansion buffeted communities throughout the
North, producing unease among residents who worried over their own economic
wellbeing and that of their community. One Amesbury, Massachusetts, writer
undoubtedly expressed the anxiety of many when he assailed "manufacturing
corporations" for "killing off...ship-building, machine-works, shoe business, and in fact
many other branches" of small, independent industry which for generations had thrived
alongside textile mills.'' The writer's point, though drawn in terms unusually stark for
the antebellum era, was unmistakable: the early republic's industrial and commercial
revolutions had progressed to a point where the transitional world of the petty producer,
including the community values associated with that social formation, was in eclipse.
The small-farm, small-shop economy of the first half of the nineteenth century gave
way before a new industrial economy, one more stratified socially and more dependent
on the successful marshaling of wage labor than ever before. Though small farming
and traditional trades did not die out by any means, the spread of large economic
institutions and recondite market relationships irretrievably altered the social and
cultural landscape. A sense of inescapable dependence on outside market forces
increasingly characterized the social experience of the middling classes by the 1850s.
To varying degrees everyone perceived this, and whatever their opinion of change, few
could deny its unsettling impact on traditional modes of life and relationships.
Industrial and market revolution also produced more tangible threats. By the
1850s labor strife was on the upswing in all three counties as textile corporations
eschewed paternalism for an autocratic managerial style and a demanding regimen. As
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we shall see native-born workers in all three counties, made doubly insecure by rising
immigration rates, organized in opposition to changing social relations of work,
sparking the sort of class and community conflict which most had naively assumed
would not erupt in the New World.
Immigrants, implicated to one extent or another in the new economic order and
its attendant social tensions, gave residents of all three counties a convenient scapegoat.
In New London immigrants accounted for less than 10 percent of the population in
1850; by the end of the decade, they numbered nearly 16 percent. Most new arrivals,
three-quarters of whom were Irish-Catholic, settled in the factory communities of
Griswold, Lisbon, and Colchester, or in the cities of Norwich, New London, and
Stonington, precisely those places most acutely affected by industrial and commercial
expansion.*' In Essex County Irish-Catholic immigrants caused a labor glut which
plagued the county's textile and shoe towns during the 1 850s, feeding fears ofjob
insecurity and wage stagnation. That only six of the county's thirty-four towns had a
higher percentage of forcign-born in their population than the county as a whole- 18%
by 1 860~mattered little to struggling native-born workers, because the rate of growth
of the immigrant population during the 1850s far outstripped that for the native-born
population.^'' In Dauphin the rate of influx was much less significant. Although Irish
Catholics constituted over half of all forcign-born residents in 1850, fully 95% of the
population was native-born, a ratio that remained virtually unchanged a decade later."
Nevertheless, Irish-Catholics in Pennsylvania, as in Massachu.sctts and
Connecticut, appeared to embody the forces of social disintegration that accompanied
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economic and social change before the Civil War. In each county ethnoreligious and
class antagonisms intertwined to produce a highly volatile politics. Immigration pitted
Irish-Catholic workers against native Protestants, enabling factories to slash wages and
"drive from our manufacturing villages the best portion of the native population, and to
fill their places with a vagrant, dependent and irresponsible class." By the mid- 1 850s
spread-eagle rhetoric excoriating Europe for "vomiting her filthy Catholic population
upon our shores," inflamed Protestant xenophobia and wove the threads of fear and
anxiety into a virulent nativist politics. Immigrants personified crime, drink, and public
disorder and hence, a crisis of governance for the regime. "Let the people carefully
note," read a typical editorial in 1 854, "the attempts to overthrow our Republican
school system,. ..the insolent demand for the abolition of all Sunday laws, Thanksgiving
days, Prayers in Congress and the Legislature, and oaths upon the Bible. We say, let
the American people carefully note these movements, and they will have a solution to
the question, "what can be the cause of the fearful increase of immorality and crime in
the country?"^"
Despite many differences, then, common themes stand out in the social and
economic history of these three counties. Socioeconomic modernization introduced
vast segments of the native-bom middling classes to two fundamental realities of an
industrializing market economy: insecurity and dependency. Antebellum
industrialization and commercialization raised difficult questions for northerners,
questions that constituted the subtext of politics in the 1850s. Would industrialization,
dependent in part on immigrant labor, create a permanent proletariat and choke off
new
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upward mobility into the ranks of independent proprietor? Would it dissolve the glue
ofcommon interest and mutuality that appeared to distinguish class relations in
Jacksonian America? Would social order and moral piety be realized amidst the
pluralism of an industrializing society? Above all, the accelerated pace of economic
and demographic change produced an explosive mixture of expectations and anxieties
among citizens and an unstable environment for political elites.
For public life in the North it is crucial that acute industrial and social change
coincided with the repoliticization of slavery in the territories. But, just as antislavery
reformers questioned the efficacy of national party leadership on the slavery issue, so
too temperance activists, nativists, moral and labor reformers, and antimonopoly
theorists framed their reform agendas as crucial matters of governance. People
expected major party elites to rise to the occasion, as they had done in the 1840s, by
responding to new issues and demands. Ultimately their failure to do so opened the
door for third party movements that derived their political potency from the belief,
pervasive at the grassroots, that governance had broken down, corrupted by self-
interested and arrogant party elites. Before we can fully comprehend and appreciate the
meaning of those developments we need first to examine how ordinary citizens
experience politics and government before midcentury.
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CHAPTER III
CULTURES OF PUBLIC LIFE: FRAMEWORKS OF PARTY AND
GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES
The residents of Dauphin, Essex, and New London counties would have agreed
with modem scholars about the main features of antebellum partisan politics. Election
campaigns were vibrant and festive social events. All members of the community,
male and female, young and old, participated in the rich pageantry of partisan politics.
Men organized town "clubs" named for their favorite presidential candidate that
sponsored events in which partisans socialized and cemented durable bonds of
friendship. Women organized auxiliaries that sometimes coordinated with the male
clubs, sometimes sponsored their own events, and certainly extended the sisterly
camaraderie that was a keynote of their otherwise nonpartisan social activism. Political
campaigns came alive with exciting and long-anticipated picnics, pole raisings,
parades, and conventions. Here, in the autumn lead-up to an election, the substance
and symbolism of politics intertwined. Local partisans saw friends, relatives, or
neighbors in positions of public leadership, perhaps carrying a banner at the head of a
long party procession, leading a marching band, or waxing eloquent in partisan rhetoric
about protective tariffs and internal improvements. On election day a high proportion
of eligible voters went to the polls and cast ballots, usually for one of the major parties.
Residents of the three counties participated enthusiastically in the rich social life of
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campaigns, learned and shouted partisan verities, and voted in high numbers for the
major parties.'
It would serve no useful purpose to reproduce such findings here. The aim of
this chapter is to explore other features of antebellum public life.^ What lessons about
politics and government did citizens draw from political campaigns? What sorts of
ideas of politics and governance did citizens, whether Democrat, Whig, or independent,
hold in common? Did partisanship define certain issues as "political?" If so, how were
public issues, those not systematically incorporated into formal partisan discourse,
conceptualized? Put differently, what were the boundaries--and connections-between
partisan campaign culture and the other less partisan spheres of public life? After all,
while antebellum campaign culture was strikingly partisan, it was an ephemeral culture,
for the election season was brief. Investigation of such questions might complicate our
understanding of politics and governance in the antebellum republic. It can also
suggest clues about the sources of antebellum populism.
Despite its partisan trappings, politics in these years ideally worked to advance
the general goal of economical government devoted to the public good. Though deeply
held convictions about the pluses and minuses of the parties' policy orientations
actuated voters to some degree, broader rhetorics framed the construction of partisan
combat over such specifics as tariffs and banks. Party publicists collapsed issues into
an amorphous yet powerful appeal to party "principles," such as loyalty and self-
sacrifice for the cause. During political campaigns voters learned of their party's
honorable work on behalf of great principles which, regardless of any particular
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ideological orientation, ftirthered the wellbeing of the entire commimity, state, and
nation, just as they had learned these virtues in their youth from parents and
schoolteachers.^ It mattered not whether the office at stake was President or Canal
Commissioner, party leaders cast elections as epic struggles between competing
"armies," one marshalled on behalf of government in the name of the public interest,
the other of special interests, party spoils, and profligate administration. Partisanship
reinforced popular expectations of politics as an inclusive, democratic arena within a
broader public sphere. In partisan politics people engaged in cross-class socialization
and action towards the general goal of effective and economical government.
Similar ideals framed descriptions of candidates. Party workers stressed their
candidates' moral attributes necessary for effective government. If voters cared to
know the specific policies that a candidate might pursue if elected, they were surely
frequently disappointed. Candidates were said to be independent of special interests,
free of the taint of selfish motives, and unfailingly loyal to the party. A framework of
partisanship, emphasizing loyalty to party principles and selfless standard-bearers,
established the contours of partisan political culture in antebellum public life.
Meanwhile, ideas of governance took shape in another framework of public life,
one that held sway, by and large, outside of partisan politics. Of course, governance
included affairs of state, and when legislative assemblies debated partisan issues,
governance could easily produce intense partisanship. Yet governance in the broadest
sense encompassed a much wider scope of issues and activities than party manifestos
might suggest. For one thing, governments, both state and local, undertook a wide
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range of ftinctions independent of the pressing political debates of the day. In such
spheres of public life as local government and local economic development, people
found political elites willing to lay partisanship aside to promote the wellbeing of
communities. For another, governance was understood broadly to include individual
moral agency (self-government) and social virtue (community obligation) because of
the public implications of such issues as liquor or worker-employer relations. In such
cases people first groped for nonpartisan solutions out of a belief that problems of
private and community governance were best handled through citizenwide appeals to
private morality and communal obligation. Such voluntary societies as the
Washingtonians, for example, adopted nonpartisan strategies to effect the moral
perfection of individuals and communities. From this perspective, issues of both
private morality and community obligation entered public life as issues of governance,
not politics sui generis. They were public issues, akin in that respect to the condition
of local roads or the regional economy, yet distinct from the issues which animated the
highly formalized and stylized arena of partisan politics.''
This framework of governance, I suggest, was nonpartisan for two reasons.
First, the vast majority of public issues with implications for governance lacked
salience as political questions in the formal sense that partisan politics taught. This
would change in the 1850s, as social transformation allowed reformers to politicize
new issues as problems of governance. In so doing they translated public questions
into explicitly political ones-in effect, bridging the partisan and nonpartisan arenas of
the public sphere through politicization of the nonpartisan ideal of governance.
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Second, and related, people hoped above all to keep partisanship from despoiling the
processes of governance. In the 1850s reformers, and ultimately third partisans,
constructed antiparty appeals for support on precisely that ideal-that the major parties
had allowed party to corrupt governance.
Prior to midcentury, however, the distinction between party politics and
governance held more or less intact because most people saw little reason to question
the major parties' fealty to the ideal of nonpartisan governance. Viewed as a whole,
public life in these years taught citizens the virtues of partisanship in politics and
nonpartisanship in governance. In the antebellum republic partisanship and
nonpartisanship intertwined as mutually reinforcing values in the mix of peoples'
experiences with, and expectations of, politics and governance.
The Partisan Framework of Politics:
Mass Mobilization and the Vernacular of Party and Governance
Political campaigns are opportunities for partisans to draw stark distinctions
between their party's candidates and those of the opposition. In the 1840s partisan
spokesmen in the three counties, in tediously repetitious editorials and stump speeches,
claimed that incalculable benefits would flow to the nation if only their party's position
on protective tariffs, government spending, and the war with Mexico were adopted.^
Throughout, partisans framed these familiar issues with rhetoric about political
leadership and its fundamental relationship to governance. The Harrisburg
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Pennsylvania Telegraph, a Whig paper, contrasted its party's 1844 gubernatorial
candidate General Joseph Markle with his Democratic rival, Francis Shunk. Markle, a
veteran leader of men in wars to conquer Indian land, was an ''honest, true-hearted
FARMER, who never held an office of emolument." The General was no mere
political hack. He had "risked his life for his country." Markle 's agricultural
background and patriotic service, according to the Telegraph, qualified him for office.
Markle 's self-sacrifice, honesty, and lack of ambition for office contrasted with
Democratic candidate Shunk, "a veteran office-holder, who never served anyone but
himselfand his party According to the Telegraph, this was a contest not simply over
competing policy agendas. It pitted two men with wholly different characters and
moral attributes. One candidate, the paper's own, was a selfless and dutiful citizen-
soldier, the other a wire-puller out for the spoils of office and mere party rule. A
"veteran office-holder" struck suspicious deals on behalf of partisan or private interests.
A favorite candidate's long record of office-holding, in contrast, reflected
statesmanship, sterling integrity, unmatched character. Partisans never failed to point
out the sordid political motives of their opponents. But they saw their own party's
warhorses in more favorable light. Their men were consistent and firm in principle,
intrepid public servants on the hustings and in office.
The Telegraph's attacks on Shunk' s partisan motivations failed to persuade a
majority of Pennsylvania voters. Shunk defeated Markle by about 4,000 votes in a
competitive race typical of Pennsylvania elections in the 1 840s, though he failed to
carry Dauphin County, a Whig stronghold in this mostly Democratic state (Table B.7).
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The Telegraph's rhetoric, however, had applications well beyond Dauphin; analogous
examples suffuse campaign discourse about candidates. Among the qualifications that
the New London Morning News listed for John A. Rockwell, Whig candidate for
Congress in Connecticut's Third District, was his past work as "a thoroughgoing
Whig" who "has done good service in that glorious cause." Rockwell's private life
also recommended him to voters. A well known lawyer, Rockwell was a
"gentleman...a man of unsullied honor and integrity in all the transactions of life."
Integrity in private life and service on behalf of the "glorious cause" in public life
should convince voters, especially Whig voters, that Rockwell "will not submit to
Southern dictation nor sacrifice the interests of his constituents for any sinister
advantage for himself."^
Framers of partisan opinion frequently described a candidate's personal virtues
that qualified him for office. Under normal circumstances descriptions of individual
candidates rarely included specific policy positions. Indeed, even the party platforms to
which candidates were pledged, such as those that committed Whigs to a protective
tariff and Democrats free trade, in fact were quite ambiguous. What, for instance,
constituted a protective tariff? What specific items would be protected, and to what
degree? Very few platforms were that specific. Rather than make direct promises to
voters about future laws, a qualified candidate must possess an unyielding commitment
to principle, honorable service to the party, and a solid moral character. Equipped with
these virtues, leaders could resist the temptation that came with elective office to abuse
power or cave in to special interests. The Harrisburg Clay Club lionized Henry Clay as
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a "great champion, advocate and defender" of the Whig cause, which included "honest
and economical administration of the Government, leaving public officers perfect
freedom of thoughts." The Telegraph backed Charles Trego for Canal Commissioner
in 1846 because he was a successful merchant "familiar with the improvements and
business of the state" who enjoyed the respect and admiration of "men of all parties."*
Democrats tended to be more specific than Whigs on issues. But with equal
tenacity they also highlighted their candidates' personal virtues. According to the Lynn
Bay State, Essex County's Democratic party ticket consisted ofmen "who have raised
themselves, by labor and enterprise, to high positions as moral, intellectual and
valuable citizens." One candidate was said to be "honest, capable, and worthy of the
support of freemen," another a merchant of "undoubted integrity and good talents,"
while still another possessed "the integrity which will never allow him to abuse the
trusts committed to his charge." Democratic candidates had the sterling integrity
necessary for disinterested public service, unlike Whig candidates, who legislated on
behalf of "the money power." Democrats in New London County campaigned on an
impressive array of state reforms, including abolishing imprisonment for debt and
abolition of the state's poll tax. Yet, on one level, these were offered not so much for
their ideological content as evidence of the Democracy's unyielding commitment to
enduring principles. The Whigs used the tariff for "base party purposes," while the
"honest, faithful, and capable" leaders of the Democratic party worked for the "welfare
of Connecticut."'
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The Newburyport Herald directed readers' attention to an exchange between
state senatorial candidate Joseph T. Buckingham and the Committee of the Industrial
Reform Association of Lowell in 1846 to illustrate the values that Whig candidates in
Essex County should emulate. The Committee's letter to Buckingham was part of a
nonpartisan campaign of the Industrial Reform Association to compel political
candidates to take clear positions on a number of "labor" issues. The Committee
sought assurances on a ten-hour labor law, a policy of free homesteads to western
settlers, and a homestead exemption law. Buckingham began with a noncommittal
answer to the questions of free homesteads and homestead exemptions. These were
matters "that are now for the first time presented to me for consideration. In my
humble judgement, no wise and prudent man would venture to a definitive action on
questions...without first giving to them the most thorough and sober investigation."
Lawmakers with the public good in mind did not jump to rash conclusions,
Buckingham was saying, but thought carefully before adopting a prudent course.
Moreover, Buckingham considered the Committee's letter off-putting in the first
instance, for "on all questions of general policy, instructions from [constituents] and
pledges from [legislators] are equally improper, and both have a tendency to check that
freedom of action and to disturb that impartiality ofjudgement, for which every honest
legislator should aspire." Buckingham thus argued that candidates distance themselves
from the special claims of narrow interest groups. Such candidates made fair and
independent lawmakers, who in turn governed in the public interest. '°
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Buckingham's claim to be above the debilitating influence of special interests
did not dissuade him from offering an opinion of the ten-hour law. Buckingham
opposed the law because "the hours as well as the price of labor should be settled by
agreement between the employer and the employed." "How can it be otherwise?" he
averred. Markets, not legislatures, should determine economic relations; worthy
candidates for government office should possess a commonsense knowledge of legal
precedent and economic theory. Nor was Buckingham dissuaded from offering a
specific rationale for his candidacy. He invoked his "mechanical profession"
(Buckingham was a printer and editor by trade), which "has given the public the
opportunity to know something of the principles which govern my actions, and to form
a proper estimate ofmy character." Buckingham got right to the heart of the matter
concerning his character. "If, in my career as the editor of public journals,...! have
misused my influence in flattering wealth, supporting injustice, advocating fraud,
extenuating hypocrisy, adverse to any scheme for the melioration and improvement of
society [and] the alleviation of calamity,... if I have cringed at the footstool of power,
pandered to the vices of authority, or have endeavored to promote my own private
interest at the expense ofmy neighbor," concluded Buckingham in a lofty flourish,
"then, gentlemen, I am entirely unworthy of your consideration, and a promise to
support your favorite measure would not deserve your confidence."" A private career
of selfless principle offered the surest prediction of wise leadership in public life. The
people's government would be safe with Joseph T. Buckingham, a man who would
stand firm against the special interests.
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An objection might be raised that such pervasive campaign rhetoric was mere
diversion, intended to mask the unsavory side of political ambition. No doubt this is
partly true. Partisans dressed up their candidates with selfless values and good
character traits because politics was tainted with opportunism and cupidity. Politics put
men in power, which everyone understood could be used for good or for ill. Political
leaders controlled access to patronage, wrote law, gave vision to government. Their
decisions affected the lives of people, who were keenly aware that benevolent
magnanimity rarely describes the actions of office holders. But this should not obscure
the central place that ideas of character occupied when people imagined the values that
a government, through its leadership, ought to embody.'^ The rhetoric that evolved to
describe candidates' virtues reflected a genuine desire that politics should produce
leaders who would work for purposes of broad concern to the entire public. The
character of candidates was a recurrent rhetoric because it provided a narrative of
heroic resistance to the emoluments of political power, a testament to the public good
triumphing through principled statesmanship and sterling character. The rhetoric of
candidates' virtues constituted a vital component of a popular vernacular in antebellum
America which expressed the general values that citizens expected to find in politics
and government. This popular vernacular constituted a shared vision of politics and
governance in antebellum America that linked enthusiastic partisanship with
nonpartisan values. Partisan politics for mere party's sake could be carried to a slavish
extreme and thus devolve into a form of special interest. Devotion to the public good,
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not partisanship per se, ought to drive politics. On that general point party leaders and
voters could agree.
Party spokespersons faced the difficult task of celebrating party and partisanship
in ways that were consistent with the popular expectation that politics and government
be guided by a broader public purpose than merely winning elections. One way they
accomplished this was by focusing attention on the character of candidates. Party
leaders also deployed rhetoric that linked the wellbeing of communities with the
partisanship of voters and the success of their party. They translated party platforms in
ways that resonated with local voters, a critical mass ofwhom seemingly required
reassurance before they would dutifully march to the polls and vote the party line.'^
Party leaders connected the fate of local communities with their party's
electoral fortunes by accenting the universal aim of economical government and
principled leadership embedded in the popular vernacular. The Harrisburg Clay Bugle
stuck to the twin themes of high protective tariffs and economy in state government
throughout the months leading up to the 1 844 election. The paper pointed to
gubernatorial candidate Joseph Markle's pledge to enforce "the most rigid economy in
the administration of the state government." "Every man's farm is mortgaged for its
[the state debt] redemption," charged the Clay Bugle. According to the Bugle, the
Democrats abused the vast patronage of state government and the Public Works. "The
public works have been used as a part of the political machinery of the State," the
Bugle wailed, used by Democrats "for enriching political favorites, and buying power."
Government in the hands of Democrats unduly taxed ordinary people for the
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enrichment of party solons and their sinecures. What specifically the Whigs would do
to rectify the corrupt culture on the Public Works, besides staffing it with Whigs, was
never too clear. The point the Bugle wanted voters to realize was that continued
Democratic control of state government would mean high taxes and profligate
administration.''*
Drawing connections between the wellbeing of voters and electoral outcomes led
partisans to make grand claims about the issues at stake in elections. According to the
Norwich Weekly Courier the election of 1843 was one in which "the fate of the present
Tariff policy...may hang upon the issue" of which party controls the Connecticut State
House. The New London Morning News admitted it was a stretch to connect the 1 845
state election to the issue of Texas annexation. The paper nevertheless bent to
convention. "Although the immediate and direct results of the election may not be a
matter of vital importance...yet we apprehend that its influence upon the great questions
now before Congress, will be plainly felt and seen by all."'^ In the state election of
1846 a convention of Dauphin County Whigs repeatedly stressed their opposition to the
Walker Tariff. Prior to the "suicidal policy" of reducing the tariff, one speaker
proclaimed, the local economy furnished "profitable employment for the poor, and
home markets for the surplus of agricultural productions." After further resolves
celebrating Whig candidates as worthy defenders of Pennsylvania interests, the
convention invited "all honest and independent Freemen, opposed to the dictation of
politicians in office, to party favoritism and prodigality,...and of the repeal of the
British tariff, to unite with us in support of James M. Power, for the office of Canal
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Commissioner." The precise relationship between Pennsylvania Canal Commissioner
and national tariff policy was anybody's guess. But Whig voters did not have to draw a
close connection between the two, for more was at stake than tariff policy. The
opposition had bowed to "party favoritism" in government, and right-minded Whigs,
along with other "independent Freemen," must rally to the polls to set government
straight.'^
During the campaign season partisan banter over tariff or banking policy
reflected much more than a calculated ploy to tap the self interest of farmers or
industrialists. Issues operated at several complex levels on activists and voters alike,
but almost certainly worked to jar emotional identifications and fond memories of past
campaign glory. Democrats "knew" aristocratic Whigs were out to raise the tariff and
bestow special privileges on parasitic bankers. These were issues of intense political
contestation in the past, and would surely be so again, unless Democrats turned out en
masse. At the same time, however, partisanship meant loyalty to principles bigger than
any issue or interest. Partisan duty meant acting upon those principles by working for
the party's triumph. In this way issues acted as party cues, signifiers of a tradition of
honorable principle and service which all members were said to share, independent of
any rational calculation by voters or activists to weigh their own interests against
election outcomes. The party's specific issues and interests mattered, of course, but
were scarcely comprehensible outside of the intellectual framework provided by the
popular vernacular. Deploying that framework in campaigns enabled party leaders to
fold issues and interests into a transcendent moral purpose consistent with peoples'
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expectations of politics and government. Every election counted in the moral struggle
of principles over selfish men.
Party politics transcended the mundane, partisan opinion-makers insisted,
because it required honor and sacrifice for lofty principles. According to the
Newburyport Herald, the election of 1844 was "not a struggle of contending parties for
office alone, as every one with any discrimination will readily see." That the Whig
party worked for purposes more meaningful than winning elections was obvious to all,
this editorial implied. "Great principles are involved in this contest; and many
important and vital interests are at stake." For the sake of "great principles," the party
rank and file should sacrifice their personal interests for the good of party and country.
Party politics affirmed the virtues of individual sacrifice and loyalty to a transcendent
cause. Partisanship was an honorable demonstration of one's commitment to the
wellbeing of community and nation. A Norwich Whig denied that winning elections
was the paramount goal of his town's Clay Club. "It is not victory alone we wish to
achieve," proclaimed this local organizer. "We have more liberal views~a more noble
and enlightened purpose. The contest is for principles."'' Self-seekers need not apply
to the Norwich Clay Club.
Certainly partisans crafted such idealized constructions of the meaning of
partisan mobilization in part to obfuscate less honorable motives. Like the rhetoric of
candidates' virtues, the rhetoric of partisanship reflected popular ambivalence towards
politics because politics elevated men to public office, where they manipulated the
levers of power on behalf of certain individuals and interests but not others. The
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rhetoric of partisanship was so overwrought in part because party leaders worried that
voters might reject partisan politics in light of that fact. Usually voters registered their
dissatisfaction with party politics by staying home on election day, a subtle form of
protest that frequently determined close elections. Partisans designed rhetorics of party
loyalty to make the choice of staying home seem unbecoming, even unpatriotic.
Voters might also be attracted to third parties. At times when voters appeared
ready to bolt the party, major party leaders redoubled their calls for party unity. The
Telegraph portrayed the efforts of the local Native American party as a dire threat to
the wellbeing of Dauphin County. The Native Americans were run "by a set of office
holders, who have sprung into existence through the want of harmony in our ranks."
Whig opinion makers responded by idealizing their party as a vehicle of patriotic
virtue, deploying the popular vernacular in their challenge to Whig voters to stand firm.
"Union of the Whigs for the sake of the union," went the typical battle cry. Conceding
that dissatisfaction existed among some Whigs in 1845, the paper cast the upcoming
election as a test of these voters' continued fealty to the virtues of self-sacrifice. The
Telegraph summoned Whig voters to unite in defense of time-tested party principles
higher than any single goal or personal reward. "Let all individual preferences be left
aside," one editorial urged, "for the performance of a more important duty, the
maintenance of our principles, and the great interests of our country against the uplifted
hand of spoilers."'* Third parties challenged major party leaders to elaborate the
character traits and broad vision of government that both justified and flowed fi-om
partisan politics.
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The mass demonstrations staged by the parties during campaigns also
celebrated, in publicly ritualized ways, the good character traits and broad vision of
government that partisanship was said to foster. The pageantry of partisanship reached
its zenith in presidential contests, when party leaders intensified partisan interest
through pole raisings, picnics, parades, and conventions that both entertained and
schooled citizens in the virtues of partisan politics. A mass meeting of Pennsylvania
Whigs held at Harrisburg in 1844 was claimed to have ennobled local Whigs, for the
locals did their "duty" and entertained the thousands who flocked to the city. Wealthy
party leaders provided food and drink for the faithful. In return leaders were publicly
eulogized for demonstrating right virtues. Thomas Elder, member of one of
Harrisburg's first families and a leading Whig patrician in the city, "lunched and
furnished refreshment for upwards of EIGHT HUNDRED." "If any other private
citizen has shown greater liberality and zeal in the cause," waxed the Telegraph, "we
hope to see his name known to the Whig party."'^ The processions themselves
symbolized the party's concern for the wellbeing of the entire community. Carpenters,
stone cutters, weavers, blacksmiths, and other craftsmen plied their trade on the back of
wagons with banners that read "by industry we thrive." A "beautifully rigged ship,
manned with boys, in tarpaulins" followed a canal boat filled with commercial goods.
Farmers worked the latest agricultural implements mounted on wagons in scenes of
rural labor. Women put their stamp on the parade as marchers, as spinners of cloth,
and through presentations of banners "of surpassing beauty" to the men.'° The
spectacle of campaign pageantry schooled onlookers and participants alike in the
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paity's dciiiocratic roots and broad appeal, as well as its particular legacy and policy
orientation. Parades showcased how partisan politics hannoni/.ed society's diverse
elements and composed them into the higher moral purpose of achieving victory for the
hallowed cause.
Women's piirtisan participation most clearly expressed the ideal (hat
paitisanship worked towards the public interest. Party leaders seized upon evidence of
women's partisimship to reinforce the parly's image as defender of public virtue. In a
speech before the Hssex North Clay dub, club president John Porter interpreted the
support women gave to the Whigs through their work weaving banners for the club. A
crowded audience of both men iuid women listened intently as Porter proclaimed "that
mothers and daughters. ..should smile upon our principles, is sufficient guaranty of their
excellence." When women enter "into the spirit of our public dangers," Porter intoned,
their example "elevates, ennobles, and sanctifies our cause." I he women brought (heir
female virtues to bear on public questions, l\)rter argued, and I'ound Whig principles
congenial to liberality, benevolence, and sacrifice for the public good. " I hal they
I
Whig women], apart from their prejudices and passions, should instinctively
appreciate and su.stain I'llH RlGl I f, may well shame our doubts and divisions, and
ought to inspire us to united action for the common good." Party leaders reproduccti
discourses of feminine virtue when describing women's partisanship. Antebellum
white women who actively supported a party "proved" its moral purpi)se.''
Voters had an important role to play in governnient. They took the measure o\'
men standing for office and separated the fit from the unfit. Meanwhile party leaders
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artfully crafted ceremony and rhetoric to ensure thai voters iuirilled that obligation m a
partisan manner. Party leaders had to be artful, l-lections in this period were usually
very competitive, in the three counties as throughout the United States (See Tables B.3-
B.6). Margins of victory proved chronically slim; frequently the number of votes for a
third party exceeded the difference between the two majors ( fable B.6). In an age of
competitive, winner-take-all elections and high voter turnout, a near complete
mobilization of the party's base held the key to electoral success." fhe high rates of
voter turnout in these years reflect in part the success party leaders enjoyed in
mobilizing their base (Tables B.4 and B.5). Voters who deigned to stay home on
election day, or support an opposition party, were the bane of nineteenth-century party
politics. In their rhetoric and ceremony, party leaders went to great lengths to convince
people of this.
The emotional ties that constituted partisanship rested on much more than the
parties' skill at entertainment ajid melodrama. Partisan culture reflected the interests of
the parties and their candidates, who had one goal that took precedence above all else:
to win." Parades and other spectacles, constant reference to longstanding party
"issues," colorful negative campaign rhetoric, ful.somc descriptions of a candidate's
public and private virtues, use of the popular vernacular-all geared to cementing a
voter's emotional ties to the parly. In the main, such tactics worked belter to unify a
miscellaneous social base than, say, detailed policy pronouncements and promises
about laws to be enacted. The very competitiveness of the system and the multiplicity
of conflicting interests in the emerging capitalist order weighed strongly against that
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alternative tactic. So partisan culture in the antebellum republic prodded voters to
connect and reconnect with the party's grand tradition and rather amorphous vision, not
its particular "ideology" in any instrumentalist sense. Partisanship was based primarily
on emotional ties constructed over many seasons of socialization to the party, its
history, its leaders, and its symbolic universe.^'' Throughout, the major parties folded
particular issues into transcendent rhetorics which celebrated their commitment to the
larger moral vision that voters expected from politics. Electoral campaigns fused
values of nonpartisanship and partisanship and translated political combat into battles
over ideals that were said to be larger than the specific issues and interests in play
during partisan campaigns. For the parties insisted above all that they were
instruments for advancing the common good, an elastic yet powerful principle far
nobler than party dogma or specific policy objectives. The culture of partisanship
reflected the needs of political elites in search of formal political power, but also bore
the imprint of the broad nonpartisan values embedded in the popular vernacular.
The Antipartisan Framework of Governance:
Local Nonpartisanship and the Ideal of a Public Interest
But what were the sources of this nonpartisan framework, one in which the
public good, not partisanship, ideally guided public life? Clues come from an 1 844
election postmortem in the New London Morning News. After a hard fought "war," the
paper called for a "truce to politics." "Gladly, we bid farewell to politics for a time; at
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least to the strife and turmoil and commotion of politics. We renounce caucuses,
conventions, mass meetings, processions, torch-light marches, clubs, estimates,
comparisons of returns and calculations of chances. All these, and the other adjuncts of
the great struggle, have had their day and place, and now," concluded the editorial,
"like the scenes and properties of a melo-drama that has had its run, they may be
stowed away in vaults, garrets and lumber-rooms until the lapse of time calls them
forth again."^' However appropriate for elections, the "turmoil" that partisan
campaigns brought into focus seemed ill-suited for life after the campaign. By calling
for a "truce," the paper implied that intense partisanship, expressing stark differences
among people, had its place in elections, but should not pattern the whole of public life.
The editorial is suggestive of the capacity of citizens in the antebellum republic
to see partisan politics as a distinct arena of public life. What of the other arenas of
public life? This chapter closes with an examination of three areas of public life that,
as the Morning News implied, fell largely outside the "strife" of electoral politics: local
government, voluntary activism, and local boosterism for "progress" in the form of
economic development projects. These cireas of public life are certainly not exhaustive.
Nor were they by any means free of conflict. Indeed, nonpartisanship constituted a
powerful ideal precisely because conflict imbricated public life. But evidence drawn
from the three counties does suggest that antiparty, or nonpartisan values had genuine
roots in the social experience of antebellum communities, where public concerns
intersected intimately with private lives. In these areas of public life people acted to
solve problems or resolve differences which they understood to be public but not
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necessarily political. The desire expressed by the Morning News for an end to the strife
that accompanied electoral politics reflected an ethos that derived from local struggles
over matters of governance in public life. More than anything else, it was the
cumulative experience in these areas of public life that helped constitute a nonpartisan
framework of governance.
Like state government, local government undertook a range of functions in the
antebellum era. Local administration grappled with building and maintaining public
roads, promoting fire and night watches, overseeing public schools, and assisting in
pauper relief. Party ideology informed very little of what local government did in the
antebellum republic. Rather, local government enlisted the energies of all residents to
solve shared problems, local road administration being one good example.^^ The
maintenance of local roads constituted far and away the single largest item of business
of local governments. In 1842 the common council of Harrisburg devoted fully 72% of
its business to the repair, care, and construction of roads and sewers, often inseparable
forms of activity. Throughout the antebellum era and indeed well beyond, teams of
neighborhood men organized to build and maintain roads through a road tax based on
the value of their real property. Those who held no property were assessed a poll tax,
which still obligated them to minimal service on road teams. The system was
progressive in the sense that large landowners, who presumably benefited the most
from roads, worked~or paid-more than small holders. Frequently the wealthy avoided
working on road teams by paying men to take their place or lending oxen and horses to
the teams. Road administration was localistic in that residents usually worked on
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projects nearest their homes. It was also flexible, for residents could send their sons to
work in their place or pay the road tax with a combination of labor and cash. Road
teams organized twice a year, typically May-June and September-October, but most
work commenced in the spring to accommodate farmers. The records kept by a road
surveyor in Stonington, Connecticut, for 1841 indicates that labor fulfilled over 80
percent of the entire road tax." In antebellum America the success of local road
administration, like local government itself, rested on mobilizing private individuals in
the work of grassroots public administration.
Community mobilization aside, what did people expect from local government?
Here, the sharp and presumably rigid party ideologies that historians have employed to
explain political behavior in this epoch tell us very little. Local government in the
antebellum era, as Paula Baker shows, bent to the overriding goals of economy and
harmony.^* Pursuing economy in local administration promised to quell potentially
divisive debates over tax increases to fund county roads, new county or municipal
buildings, or public schools. Such projects, unless they benefited large segments of the
community, were sure to produce controversy.
Town meetings and councils ft^equently voted to postpone or deny consideration
of divisive matters that involved increased expenditures. In 1 844 pointed debate
erupted at a Norwich, Connecticut, town meeting after some residents petitioned the
town to rebuild a badly rutted road in the north of town. Opponents howled that the
city had already raised the local road tax; the ambitious project of rebuilding the road
would surely entail yet another tax increase because the city's road budget was already
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in the red. Proponents retorted that if the road could be repaired economically, the
benefits were well worth a slight tax increase. In the end, the town meeting voted to
indefinitely postpone the proposal, leaving the option open for later consideration, but
effectively dooming any immediate plans to relieve the petitioners. A similar situation
prevailed in Lynn, Massachusetts. Several petitions asked the local highway
department to lay out a public way in their neighborhood, where, it was claimed, the
roads were inadequate to meet rising commercial needs. Time and again residents from
other sections of Lynn defeated the plan. Local officials, loathe to divert funds to such
an unpopular project, simply ignored the petitioners' request. Parsimonious residents
"have an influence upon our city officers, preventing them from doing what they know
ought to be done," wrote one fiiistrated petitioner. Postponement was a good strategy
when problems proved divisive, and local resources scarce.^'
Concern for economy and harmony informed views of county government as
well. The decisions of county government often pitted towns against one another.
Towns vied for the prestige or money (in the form of building contracts) that such
insfitutions as county courthouses or jails inevitably bestowed. In the 1850s residents
of Lawrence, Massachusetts, pushed for relocation of the county courthouse to their
city at the cost of over $ 1 50,000 in county funds. The court's current location at
Salem, in the extreme south of the county, inconvenienced residents of northern Essex
County, the boosters claimed. Opponents argued that the county debt was already too
high, and the claims of Lawrence unjustified. "Here is a contemplated expenditure,"
the Lynn News editorialized, "for which no necessity exists." The News insisted that
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countywide considerations ought to drive spending decisions by county government.
"The most important considerations...which bear upon this question, are a regard for
economy, and a desire to prevent an increase of our already enormous county debt."
Thus, the claims of Lawrence residents that their city was entitled to a courthouse "are
improper and absurd. The convenience and equal accommodation of all the people
require that all the courts should be removed to Salem," argued the News, "not for the
sake of that city, but for the benefit of the whole county."^"
Nonpartisan goals also influenced the conduct of local elections, hiterestingly,
most local elections were not held concurrently with state and national elections. For
example, before the Civil War most town and county elections in Dauphin and Essex
coimties were held in the spring. According to at least one contemporary, the rationale
for the practice was to "separate these offices, as far as possible, from the influences
which naturally exist and govern men in voting for members of the Legislature and
other clearly political offices." The duties of local government officers required a level
of fairness and respect for the diverse needs of communities that transcended partisan
politics. "Let them be selected with as little regard for politics as possible, and voted
for at a time when political feeling influences men but little or not at all."'' Though the
parties often put forward distinct tickets in many of these races, this by no means
assured a high level of partisanship. The dearth of reportage in the partisan press at
Harrisburg on borough elections, to say nothing of local elections in surrounding towns
and villages, is illustrative. The silence indicates that elections for local offices rarely
evoked the partisan interest and acrimony characteristic of fall elections. Especially in
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small communities, partisans usually refrained from turning town elections into party
brawls. In the Essex town of Amesbury, for example, the tradition was merely to
represent each section of town on the three member council and other offices.
Partisanship rarely informed these "elections" (more like ad hoc appointments by the
annual town meeting); members of all parties routinely served in politically mixed
administrations."
Even in smaller cities, where the patronage accompanying municipal
government encouraged partisan competition, voters seemingly preferred to keep
partisanship out of local elections. George Hood accepted the nomination for mayor of
Lynn by a "People's Meeting" in 1850 because "he desired to see the spirit of party
allayed, and all good citizens united on a ticket for the public good." Lynn had just
emerged from a series of local struggles over the issue of a municipal charter, which
the General Court had granted after a plebiscite narrowly approved the measure." The
charter issue divided the city into pro- and anti-charter factions, culminating in a
movement by pro-charter forces to exclude from city government those who voted
against the charter. The charter forces believed that the plebiscite was like any other
high stakes political election, an election which they had won. Hood and the "People's
Meeting" saw matters quite differently. Their municipal ticket comprised equal
numbers of Democrats, Whigs, and Free Soilers who would "fairly represent the
different interests, feelings, and parties of the city." Mayoral candidate Hood, in a
speech before the meeting, argued that "in the management of our local concerns there
is no necessity...of party spirit." In "all the common interests of our local government,"
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I looci continued, ^Ihc spirit of party or sect should be lorcvcr hushed...." On the basis
of such appeals Hood and (he nonpartisan People\s ticket gained a narrow victory/^
Obviously, such episodes can be read bolii ways. The pro-char(er forces, alter all, did
attempt to niobiii/e a prescriptive niovenienl, even il il had litlle to do with the lannliar
themes ol party politics. Rul nonpartisanship was resurgent again and again in
municipal elections, l-our years later the Lynn News rhapsodized that ^Mhe system of
carrying politics into municipal elections has been elTectively checked..;^ ^^Ol tlie
political connection oflhose who siiall be elected to the various city ollices;' the News
asserted, "we care lillle--irthey are men qualined for the places which Ihey are to
occupy.
While it would be a gross error to claim that all local elections were free of
partisanship, it seems equally true that residents of small towns, and even smallish
cities, drew distinctions between local government and state and national polities.
Local govenunent dealt with matters of broad concern to the c()mmunity--the public.
In this context prescriptive party ideologies would have greatly complicated the already
delicate task of mediating the inherently divisive challenges that local administrations
faced. Such challenges could produce bitter conflict, and might even lead some to call
lor tax increases—two things conununilics sought above all to avoid. Helore the Civil
War the goal ol" nonpartisanship, Iherelore, seemed better suited for achieving economy
and harmony in local government. While clearly not always attained, nonpartisanship
was the popular ideal in local government.
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Voluntary association was another important arena where nonpartisanship was
both learned and then carried into public life, sometimes with explosive results, hi the
1830s and 1840s the nonpartisan voluntary association emerged as the principle means
for improving the material lives of people and the moral and spiritual condition of
society. Labor reform associations, for example, like many voluntary organizations in
antebellum America, emphasized cross-class solidarity by framing worker grievances
as issues of concern to the entire public, meaning the (white) community at-large. They
deployed the rhetoric and organizational forms of moral reformers by forcibly shunting
the private~in this case, economic relations--into the public.^^ At the same time
voluntary association privileged grassroots, nonpartisan solutions to labor problems.
Before midcentury, labor reformers underlined the fundamental relationship of labor's
plight to public life, yet in the main eschewed partisan political activity that might
divide them.
In New London, nonpartisan alliances-infelicitously dubbed Mechanics,'
Operatives,' and Laborers,' Associations-sprung up in 1836-7 to agitate for the ten-
hour day while an independent weekly newspaper appeared in Norwich to publicize
their efforts. The Mechanics
',
Operatives
',
And Laborers ' Advocate pledged "not to
meddle v^dth party politics" and treated readers to essays that assailed the "crafty,
designing, selfish, and ambitious spirits" who headed parties. Private negotiation with
employers and nonpartisan campaigns to improve workers' lot were the primary
strategies of the New London County labor movement. It sought foremost to persuade
employers of the morality and justice of shorter hours by appealing to their moral
conscience. The movement also folded labor reforms like the ten-hour working day,
the abolition of child labor, and the abolition of imprisonment for debt into a broader
moral vision that included temperance and Sabbath observance." In part this
nonpartisan approach reflected the success of voluntarism. Under pressure from the
Associations, master craftsmen and manufacturers in the building trades, machine
shops, and iron foundries of eastern Connecticut adopted the ten-hour rule in the
summer and fall of 1836. The owners of the region's textile factories, however,
remained resolutely opposed. Thus in February 1837 the Associations unveiled a plan
for a nonpartisan petition drive to codify ten-hours as a legal day's work in textile
factories.
The early optimism of the campaign quickly disintegrated. For one thing, now
that the ten-hour day was the rule throughout the region's trades, some journeymen saw
no ftirther need for action, and in fact complained in the pages of the Advocate that the
Associations were devoting too much attention to the plight of textile operatives. In
this way labor activists learned that even such nonpartisan political activity as
petitioning could be divisive. Then disaster struck. Firm closings and widespread
unemployment accompanied the financial crash of 1 837. By May, the Advocate ceased
publication, its subscription list having evaporated. The much heralded ten-hour
petition never materialized.^*
Elsewhere, labor reformers adopted similar strategies. In the 1 840s Essex
County labor reformers eschewed third party politics and organized grassroots
voluntary societies of male and female factory operatives and skilled journeymen to
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raise wages and shorten the length of the working day. Groups of mechanics and
factory operatives in Andover, Lynn, Marblehead, Newburyport, and Danvers loosely
affiliated themselves with the New England Association of Workmen (renamed the
New England Labor Reform League in 1 847), and the Lowell Female Labor Reform
Association. The principal voice of the eastern Massachusetts labor movement was the
Lynn Awl and the Voice ofIndustry, based in the sprawling cotton city of Lowell,
immediately adjacent Essex. Both papers enjoyed a large circulation in Essex County.
Weekly editorials called on male and female workers to unite for higher wages and
especially a ten hour day, so that workers might have time to cultivate spiritual and
moral perfection. Indeed, as Teresa Murphy shows, labor activists developed a
powerful critique of social inequality based in large part on inverting Yankee middle-
class conceptions of private morality, turning such values as moral piety and Christian
conscience against exploitative employers and claiming shorter hours would greatly
improve the moral condition of operatives and factory towns. ^'
Such a focus cut two ways. On the one hand, appropriating the language of
moral reform enabled labor reformers to forge alliances with middle-class sympathizers
and other fellow travelers. Like various moral reform causes, labor reform gained
adherents faster when it was understood as an issue of conscience and morality. But
this emphasis reflected, too, the essentially nonpartisan character of labor reform during
the 1 840s. These local organizations did question candidates on "labor" issues, and
sponsored a handful of nonpartisan petitions for a ten-hour law in manufacturing
establishments that were notable for the participation of skilled artisans, merchants and
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retailers, and farmers. Through the pages of their weekhes they also perennially
debated the question of whether the labor movement would be better served by a
reentry into independent politics. Despite the sheer volume of political rhetoric,
however, in the end labor reformers focused mainly on mutual aid and self-
improvement, such as teetotalism, cooperative union stores, lyceums, and widow's
benefits, while also appealing to employers to voluntarily accede to their just
demands.''" Thus, while activists thrust the cause of labor into public spotlight, the
reigning strategy for solving labor-capital relations remained voluntary appeals to
employers' social obligation to the welfare of their workers and operatives. The overall
emphasis betrayed a deeper commitment to the ideal of a producerist and reciprocal
society in which even wealthy members met customary standards of morality and
fairness. By the 1 850s, social changes coupled with a new political critique would cast
doubt on this ideal, tilting reformers' efforts decisively in favor of state coercion. The
critique and its public representation would remain the same: private social relations
inevitably affected the moral character of the public sphere and thus demanded the
community's attention. The solution reformers would seek in the 1850s, however,
demonstrated a renewed emphasis on the state as the constitutional embodiment of the
public welfare.
Other voluntary movements with potentially divisive agendas were also careful
to stress nonpartisanship. In Dauphin County the Sons of Temperance swore off
discussion of subjects "of a sectarian or political character," as their Constitution made
explicit. Its members proclaimed that "the society is strictly a Temperance Beneficial
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Association," indirectly acknowledging the politically charged nature of the liquor
question. The closely related Harrisburg Washingtonian movement followed this
tactical path as well. Washingtonians stressed moral suasion over coercion, hoping to
facilitate the policing of personal morality through fraternal organization and vigilant
self-improvement. Men and women flocked to the movement in Harrisburg; in its first
three years, over 1,700 men and women signed the pledge of total abstinence.
Women's activism in the Martha Washingtonian Society in Harrisburg naturally spilled
into poor relief, given the organization's emphasis on identifying and reforming the
downcast inebriate. The male and female associations also sponsored lectures by local
clergy so as to publicize the moral codes necessary to strengthen the wills of their
members, for fear of a dreadful backslide into "rum slavery" haunted many. Always,
the Washingtonians boasted of their power to improve public morals. Said one
member: "The moral effect on the community is more powerful than legislative
enactment; and designed more harmoniously [than legal coercion] to carry out the great
object of the Temperance enterprise.'""
The nonpartisan framework was equally strong in Essex County. David H.
Barlow, editor of the Essex County Washingtonian, published between 1 842-44,
pledged that his temperance sheet "will not meddle at all" with "partizanship in Politics
or sectarianism in Religion." Barlow plainly hoped that by pursuing the goal of total
abstinence in this way he would win wide acceptance for his paper and cause. Indeed,
Essex County was a hotbed of Washingtonianism and temperance activism. Lynn,
Andover, Amesbury, Salisbury, Danvers, Marblehead, and Newburyport all had large
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Washingtonian and temperance societies. Temperance forces in the 1840s, like labor
reformers, eschewed partisanship altogether in favor of the moral regeneration of
inebriates, which in turn would improve public society. Drink was an issue with public
ramifications because it was said to impact families, poverty rates, crime, and public
morality generally. Promoting total abstinence among individuals promoted the moral
betterment of society, temperance activists claimed time and again.''^
As moral suasion proved disappointing, temperance reformers turned first to
local option laws. By the late 1840s the local option movement enlisted a phalanx of
men and women concerned for the decay of public life in the form of crime and
pauperism, and private morality in the form of domestic and child abuse, all allegedly
encouraged by unregulated liquor. In 1 849 Dauphin County women, asserting that
lawmakers were the "constituted guardians of the public prosperity," petitioned for a
countywide licensing ordinance. Few if any questioned the legal right of the state to
grant such petitions, and by midcentury, local option laws were a common feature of
the Pennsylvania law code. Although certainly coercive in many respects, local option
emerged from the voluntaristic culture of nonpartisan governance. In such cases where
a petition was granted, lawmakers in effect constituted at law the reformers' key claim
that issues of public morality were best handled through the normative institutions and
practices of local governance. Lavraiakers seemed most comfortable handling the issue
on a case by case basis. When lawmakers were faced with strong grassroots opposition
to local option laws, they typically refiised to devolve the state's police power to local
anti-liquor zealots.''^ In this way, as William Novak has recently shown, the state's
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police power over liquor and other unpopular commodities remained subject to local
control, unleashed only when local residents presented sufficient evidence of the
popularity and necessity of the "well regulated" community/"
Labor and temperance reform during the 1840s illuminates how people
conceptualized the broad question of personal and communal governance in a rapidly
modernizing society. Both movements identified private morality-unreconstructed
drunkards or selfish employers--as the principle sources of potential trouble for
communities. Both movements intimately connected the private to the public,
primarily by underscoring the debilitating effects of strong drink and exploitative
working conditions for public order and social relations in communities. Nonpartisan
voluntary activism aimed not simply at reform of the private but also of the public,
ascribing to the private a recognizably public connotation because of its consequence
for social comity and communal order. Nonpartisanship "fit" the larger intellectual
framework within which reformers of the private-public nexus operated because,
ideally, it mobilized the entire community on behalf of private improvement which, in
turn, benefited the commimity at-large.
The ideal of nonpartisanship did not originate in some distant ideological
tradition so much as it flowed from social experience with local institutions that
nurtured commitment to mutuality and commonalty in matters affecting governance.
The break with the partisan framework was made easy because of the perceived
"public" character of govemance--antebeIlum communities confronted a raft of social
and economic problems that demanded everyone's attention irrespective of their
partisan identification. Nonpartisanship suffused antebellum public life because of
people's efforts to imagine and then realize a single public interest out of the
fractiousness that inhered in the public sphere. Sustained partisan or sectoral conflict
within the comparatively limited bounds of the local town or village was m no one's
best interest. This is not to romanticize the antebellum community so much as it is a
recognition that certain key features and institutions of local public life reinforced
extant social, material, and cultural predispositions for nonpartisanship.
The countless efforts of antebellum communities to gain assistance from state
legislatures for local economic improvements provide perhaps the best evidence for
this dynamic. Such projects were as varied as the needs of communities. They
included monies for public roads, bridges, river improvements, and canals, or charters
for private transportation and indeed even industrial enterprises that promised to infuse
jobs and money into the local economy. Projects like these usually elicited broad
nonpartisan support among affected residents and within state assemblies. Indeed,
grassroots economic boosterism reflected both the general popularity of local economic
development and the distributive pattern of nineteenth-century economic policymaking.
Much has been made about the competing political economic ideals that divided the
major parties.'*^ But in fact, by the 1840s, both the major parties proved quite willing to
use government for economic modernization. In Massachusetts, the Whig party
dominated state government in part because of the popularity of their "American
System" of protective tariffs, internal improvements, and the liberal distribution of
corporate charters and business privileges. State government in Connecticut, though
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usually divided equally between Whigs and Demoerats, likewise aggressively pursued
economic development through liberal charter policy. In Pennsylvania, Democrats
controlled state government and promoted economic development through liberal
charter policy and the state's elaborate system of Public Works, while the Whigs carped
about the enormous debt rolled up by Democratic administrations and pushed for even
greater reliance upon private enterprise."'^ Despite the differences in the partisan make-
up of state assemblies, government in all three states promoted economic development.
Public economic policy was largely determined by intense inter-regional competition,
not party ideology. The specific distribution of economic goods in the form of charters,
tax abatements, or public works' funds depended on nonpartisan mobilization of
individuals and communities.'*'
This was certainly the case in the city ofNew London's campaign on behalf of
the New London, Willimantic, and Palmer Railroad, chartered in 1847. The initial
impulse for the railroad was the collapse of the city's whaling industry. Fhe city's
leading whaling merchants, looking for new areas of investment, promoted the plan to
provide the city with its first railroad from New London to the small manufacturing
centers of the Thames and Willimantic valleys to the north. Urging everyone who
could to purchase at least "one share," the New London Morning News reasoned that
even if "the original money subscribed is lost, business of every kind will increase in
that proportion that would more than doubly meet the loss on stock.'""* Backers argued
that the railroad would raise properly values, stimulate commerce and industry, and
claimed unrealistically that New London would emerge as a dominant commercial
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entrepot. Fear of falling behind the region's other cities was a central argument in
defense of the plan. Boosters stressed the general economic benefits that the railroad
would bring to the local economy.
Though a few viewed the NLW&P as another example of government
sponsored "monopoly," most New Londoners initially welcomed the plan. One study
of the stock subscription lists of the NLW&P found that over 85 percent of the
shareholders in the enterprise held between one and five shares, with the largest
average holdings concentrating in the city ofNew London (5.72 per subscriber), and
small holdings the rule in interior towns along the road's route (2.76 per subscriber)."^
If the railroad enjoyed broad financial support among the region's middle and upper
classes, it also received hearty praise in the local Whig and Democratic press. Partisans
put aside supposedly deep ideological differences to lend united support for a project
that most viewed as essential to the economic wellbeing of the city and region.^"
To be sure, economic elites often led such nonpartisan campaigns. Predictably,
they linked their own material interests with those of the community at-large, seizing
on the quixotic ideal of the harmony of class interests to legitimate their public-
mindedness and win handsome profits in the bargain. Thus the nonpartisan ideal of
governance by no means constituted an ipso facto threat to the power of elites. On
occasion, class differences between elites and non-elites complicated local economic
development policy, sparking controversy and class conflict within communities. That
said, most of the time, when opposition to such economic institutions as railroads or
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banks did erupt, it took the form of quite specific problems and objections that were not
directly bom of class interests.
For example, in New London County a local Sabbatarian questioned whether
"Christians of this community" should be supporting the NLW&P, which would
operate on the Sabbath. Other opponents of the NLW&P were motivated by what
economic historian George Rogers Taylor called "metropolitan mercantilism." The
NLW&P evoked a chilly response from Norwich, because it threatened to siphon
business from that city. Residents of small towns north ofNew London who had
campaigned vigorously for the railroad turned against it as they realized the NLW&P
was not going to pass through their town. Many in New London itself criticized the
NLW&P 's distribution of free passes to political elites and its speculation in
Massachusetts railroad stock. Still others grew antagonistic when the NLW&P
petitioned city government for loans to pay debts and finish construction. Why should
the city float a bonded debt to bail out a poorly managed railroad, critics justifiably
asked?^' Opposition to railroads arose for many reasons, but few of them had to do
with partisan ideology or, for that matter, some broader anti-development mentalite.
Similar examples can be cited for Essex and Dauphin. In Essex the railroad
"mania" consumed the imaginations of Liberty, Democratic, and Whig partisans alike.
Railroad projects attracted wide support, in some cases occasioning unanimous town
meeting votes pledging the town's financial and moral backing." In Dauphin, the
desire to keep Harrisburg and the rest of the county a step ahead of its regional rivals
prompted nonpartisanship on a variety of economic development issues, from support
for the Pennsylvania Railroad in its epic struggle with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
to a campaign for the removal of a federal Iron Works to the state capital." Broad
community support for projects which foreshadowed growth and "progress" did not
stop at transportation companies. In Harrisburg both the Democratic and Whig press
celebrated the founding of the Harrisburg Cotton Mill Company in 1849 because it
augured "the amelioration and improvement of the condition of laborers, and the rapid
growth of the borough in population and wealth." Analysis of company subscription
lists shows that while Harrisburg' s merchant and banking elite invested handsome
sums, fully 62% of stockholders held between one and five shares.^"
In the 1 850s railroads and manufacturing companies would come under
increased criticism for mismanagement, high shipping rates, exploitative working
conditions, and the disruption of residential neighborhoods. Such problems in tandem
with other issues fueled the populist eruptions of that decade. But throughout the
antebellum era, few doubted that the key to expanding opportunity and assuring their
community's prosperity lay in the spread of transportation and manufacturing. In these
counties, the appeal of development far outweighed generalized suspicion of economic
modernization. In this sense, local development projects took on a public character
before the Civil War. While all recognized that profits were to be made, people also
saw that such projects brought additional jobs and commerce to their community-
outcomes few objected to. Suspicions of economic development certainly followed
failure, and critics minced few words expressing their anger with promises unfulfilled.
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But the public character of economic development led most people to conceptualize
economic growth in ways that suited their needs and expectations.
Conclusion
Local campaigns for economic development projects further illuminates how
residents of the three counties understood the limits of partisanship. When it came to
meeting local economic development needs, partisanship provided few solutions, if
only for crass material considerations. So, too, was partisanship of limited utility in
local government, where the goals of economy and harmony proved more attractive and
durable guides. Partisanship seemed equally at odds with the voluntaristic strategies of
labor and moral reformers. In all of these areas people worked in nonpartisan ways for
solutions to problems that can be broadly viewed as matters of governance, whether
they be the state of the local economy or poor roads or alcohol or labor relations in a
local factory. Viewed in this way, few in the 1830s and 1840s seemed inclined to
interject partisanship into local governance.
Two frameworks constituted antebellum public life, one partisan the other
nonpartisan, sometimes unfolding in harmony, other times in tension. These
overlapping frameworks were forged in electoral politics and community projects and
local and state government and voluntary association, merging into a broadly shared set
of ideas and experiences that echoed in the popular vernacular of political discourse.
Citizens applied lessons learned through local experience to evaluate their government
151
and its leaders. Above all, they expected nonpartisanship to prevail in matters of
governance. Even in electoral politics, where certain select issues fostered-indeed,
even constituted-partisanship, people found that the parties folded their appeals into a
popular vernacular that bore the imprint of nonpartisan governance. Political leaders
should be responsive to democratic impulses, work to harmonize antagonistic interests,
and most importantly pursue the larger goals of economy and the public good. From
the perspective of most citizens in these years, politics and government worked in ways
that were consistent with these basic expectations. It was left to reformers, politicizing
the nonpartisan vision amid social and economic flux, to change that.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF ANTEBELLUM POPULISM:
PARTY GOVERNMENT AND ANTIPARTY REFORM AT MIDCENTURY
Antebellum political elites could be reasonably confident in their abilities to
meet Americans' general expectations of politics and governance. Yet, by midcentury,
reformers of various stripes identified problems in the North's changing demographics
and economy and relationship to the South. Liquor consumption seemed dangerously
at odds with evangelical Protestant ideals of piety and order, clouding peoples' moral
judgement and leading to poverty and the dissolution of families, hnmigration brought
foreigners by the thousands to once relatively homogenous communities, where they
competed with the native-bom for jobs and political influence. The spread of railroads
and factories unleashed a larger reorganization of work and economic relationships and
produced class tensions that threatened to disrupt community harmony and forestall
further commercial progress. The influence of powerful commercial interests on the
political parties and state government proved equally worrisome. Then too, the spread
of slavery into newly acquired territories made many nervous about the future of the
West and the pro-slavery drift of the federal government. In the three counties, as
across much of the North, an array of "reform" impulses generated new demands on
political elites and their parties.
Specific socioeconomic and political contexts determined the priorities that
reformers set in each county. Those differences notwithstanding, the reform impulses
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of the early 1850s were variations on one overarching theme. Above all reformers
developed a critique of party government. They raised fundamental questions about
political leadership and the direction of the regime under major party auspices. The
political stability of the 1830s and 1840s had rested on the parties' success at meeting
nonpartisan expectations of governance. Insurgent reformers asked voters to reevaluate
the capacity of the parties to meet the many new challenges of governance that now
confronted society.
As that process of reevaluation unfolded, reformers politicized nonpartisan
ideals of governance. The reformers adopted antiparty rhetoric, assailing partisan
politics for its paucity of broad moral vision, its single-minded pursuit of winning
elections and the spoils of office. Politics and government under the two parties
operated in the interest of career politicians, the reformers charged, and thus failed to
address the needs and concerns of the public. As the preeminent oppositional discourse
of the 1850s, antipartyism emerged from the social experience of local public life to
communicate genuine disaffection from the regime of party government. Antiparty
appeals to voters worked particularly well on issues that lay outside of the framework
of formal party competition: prohibition, nativism, certain state and local political
economic issues, and eventually the expansion of slavery. These were issues with
broad public ramifications, and as such framed larger debates about governance in a
changing society. Whichever the issue at hand, reformers mobilized people on the idea
that partisanship ought not to affect decisions on issues of broad concern to the entire
polity. Antipartyism lay at the heart of populism in the 1 850s because a critical mass of
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citizens came to believe that the major parties had strayed too far from their larger
purpose-both a government independent of special interests and a politics that served
the public good.
This chapter and the next focus on that process of politicization at the
grassroots. This one examines the origins of antiparty populism between roughly 1 849
and 1 853. The first half surveys politics and government in each county and state,
directing attention to the rising significance of state political economic reform issues in
state politics; the second half traces how reformers developed new frameworks for
comprehending party politics and its relationship to governance in that new context.
The next chapter will take up the Know Nothing movement during its formative season
of 1854-5. The chapters do not present a blow-by-blow narrative of electoral politics in
the three counties. Rather, they investigate changing ideas of politics and governance
in specific contexts and the politicization of those ideas in the form of the Know
Nothing movement.
Transitions: Party Government at Midcentury
The demographic and industrial changes that reordered society and economy in
the three counties provided one impetus for changes in public life.' Equally important
were the connections that people drew between distributive policies, new public issues,
and the question of governance. Distributive economic policies implicated the parties
in industrial and commercial expansion. Such projects reassured citizens that
governance was, generally speaking, attuned to the public welfare. But while most
people supported economic growth in their communities and expected government to
facilitate it, many citizens recoiled from the insecurities that accompanied economic
modernization. At midcentury economic anxiety swept the ranks of the native-bom
working- and middling classes, and state-level distributive policies became one
important source of political controversy. At first, the major parties in the three
counties and states managed the many impulses for reform by and large within the
existing party framework. At the national and state level. Whig and Democratic party
leaders suppressed sectional discord and supported the Compromise of 1850, the
regime's deus ex machina on the vexed slavery question. There were, to be sure,
dissenting voices over the Fugitive Slave Law, but the major parties' pro-Compromise
consensus reflected the turn towards local and state issues.^ State policy issues related
to debtor relief, the regulation of business, and, in Pennsylvania, the future of the
Public Works, gradually crowded out the traditional issues that had undergirded
national party competition.
Essex County
Antiparty populism in Essex County was built upon foundations laid by the
Democratic-Free Soil Coalition. The Coalition was the brain-child of Democratic
leaders George Boutwell, Nathaniel Banks, and Free Soil leader Henry Wilson, all of
whom recognized the softness of Whig political hegemony in Massachusetts. The
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Whig appeal rested on the aggressive promotion of economic growth. Whig political
economy envisioned the state as a facilitator of commercial and industrial expansion,
ideally promoting general economic opportunity. The interests of the Bay State's
commercial and industrial elite lay at the center of Whig political economy, but across
Essex County Whiggery had a plebeian dimension that has been routinely
underestimated by historians: what we might call popular Whiggery. Especially during
the 1 840s, Whigs had worked hard to wrap their patrician image in plebeian cloth,
emphasizing the benefits that would redound to workers and the petit bourgeoisie from
high tariffs and liberal charter policy. As popularized in the 1840s, Whiggery promised
an interdependent polity working to ensure upward mobility from the ranks of the
dependent laborer to the independent small proprietor.^
During bullish periods such suimy optimism seemed a stretch to only a fraction
of the electorate. Nevertheless, the Whigs had little margin for error; in many places
their electoral support hovered at or below fifty percent. But the party skillfully
parlayed the state's election laws—including a general ticket system for most of the
state's large eastern cities and an apportionment system in the General Court that
favored eastern towns-into near monopoly control of Massachusetts government. The
Coalition's electoral strategy was thus a straightforward one. In many of the state's
electoral districts, including Essex County, Democrats and Free Soilers together
outnumbered the Whigs; if they united behind single tickets for state senator and
representative, they could gain control of the General Court. The Coalition could then
elect its own candidates to the United States Senate, fill state offices with Democrats
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and Free Soilers, and thereby control state policy. Central to the entire scheme was the
fact that on a number of state reform issues, Democrats and Free Soilers were agreed.
The Coalition in Essex County pitched their movement to small producers with such
issues as abolition of imprisonment for debt, homestead exemptions, mechanics' liens,
and general incorporation laws, all policies that the Coalition enacted during their two-
year reign (1851-1852).'*
The theme of economic security and its connection to governance suffuses
Coalition politics in Essex County. In one campaign column entitled "Laboring Men
Remember," for example, Lewis Josselyn, editor of the new Lynn Bay State and an
architect of the Coalition in Essex County, argued that a mechanics' lien law would
"secure the pay of the mechanics and all workmen, for their labor on buildings, and
prevents their being cheated by Whig shylocks." Similarly, homestead exemptions
offered safety against the vicissitudes of the market, where failure threw families of
limited means into debt and sometimes out on the street. A homestead exemption law
would enable "laboring men and all men of small means to secure a home for their
families from the grasp of avaricious creditors, who think more ofmoney than of
souls." Just as the Whigs had popularized the protective tariff, so too the Coalition
tapped the widely popular goal of security and competency among the county's native-
bom middling classes.^
General incorporation and free banking laws constituted another policy theme
of the Coalition. Like debtor relief measures, general incorporation laws addressed the
anxieties of mostly middling folk with reasonable hopes of acquiring a small business.
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The General Court routinely handed out special privileges to banking, railroad, and
manufacturing corporations, thus facilitating the concentration of economic power.
Curtailing the authority of the state legislature to create concentrated economic
enterprise would reduce special legislation and, perhaps, the influence of private
business interests over lawmaking. It would also democratize economic opportunity by
insuring that privileges enjoyed by large corporate businesses were freely available to
all. Amesbury Villager editor William H. B. Currier described general incorporation as
a "democratic measure...designed as a check upon the special legislation which has
occupied the time of the General Court...in behalf of the great corporate bodies of the
state." Regulation also figured prominently in arguments for general incorporation
laws. Coalition supporters pushed for a free banking law that would standardize
chartering procedures, limit capitalization, require armual reports to the legislature, and
impose stringent specie and bond reserve requirements on banks. As George J. L.
Colby argued, the state ought to "give all the advantages of entering into the business
[of banking] who desire it, and secure the public against mismanagement and frauds, by
placing them under proper regulations."^
While the Coalition's broad policy orientation looked to allay the anxieties of
middling sorts, it also directed attention towards state politics and governance more
generally. Coalition publicists folded specific reform policies into a larger critique of
government under Whig auspices in Massachusetts. Indeed Whiggery, particularly
elitist "Boston Whiggery," quickly emerged as the Coalition's reigning negative
referent. The Coalition fingered Boston's financial and industrial elite which,
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reformers claimed, exercised a controlling influence over the Whig party and thus state
government. "The Whigs, although the minority, rule the State through their corporate
influence," the Democrat-Coalition paper Haverhill Essex Banner proclaimed flatly.
The Banner linked the growing power of corporations directly to Whig rule in the Bay
State, echoing a principal theme of the Coalition. Lewis Josselyn chimed in: "let the
whole people, and not a few capitalists and speculators, be the only ones that engross
the time and attention of legislators."' Coalition forces pegged Whiggery to problems
and failures of Massachusetts government, an easy connection to draw, since the Whigs
had ruled for the better part of two decades. As described by Coalition publicists,
Whiggery was synonymous with special interests, particularly commercial and
industrial interests, and therefore stood against the public good in government.
The Coalition's anti-Whig animus dovetailed into a series of legislative and
electoral reforms designed to break Whiggery' s stranglehold over state government. At
issue, according to reformers, were several features of the Bay State's constitutional
system that advantaged Whiggery. Among them, the general ticket rule of many Whig
controlled cities—Boston, Lowell, Springfield, and Salem, for example—which
magnified Whig power in the General Court; countywide election of state senators,
which favored Whig candidates from larger towns; majority rule for elections, which
undermined the strength of minority parties in the state; and most important, an
outmoded system of representation in the General Court that favored Whiggery' s base
in the densely populated towns of eastern Massachusetts.*
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Other features of the state's electoral law also generated cries for reform.
Coalitionists viewed the $1.50 poll tax, small though it was, as a symbol ofancien
regime in a democratic age. A similar anti-aristocratic temper informed the Coalition's
critique of open voting, a procedure that prevailed in most Massachusetts towns
throughout the antebellum years. For decades Democrats and labor reformers had
complained that the open ballot was a tool used by Whig employers to intimidate
workers into voting Whig. As the Coalition crystallized, reformers resurrected the
secret ballot issue and incorporated it into the Coalition's agenda. The implacable
opposition of most Whigs to a secret ballot raised suspicions that Whig elites did
indeed blackmail voters through the open ballot procedure, as did a highly publicized
case in 1851 of coercion by Whig managers and agents of Lowell's Boott
Manufacturing Company. To Essex County Coalitionists, the Lowell example
confirmed how public life under the Whig regime was "retrograding and diminishing in
the very elements of personal equality and freedom."'
Such themes played well in Essex County, historically a Whig stronghold.
Between 1850 and 1853, Essex County was a battleground of closely fought contests.
In races for Essex County's five senate seats. Coalition candidates won three in 1850
and swept all five in 1 85 1 . In elections for state assembly Coalition candidates fared
nearly as well, battling the Whigs to a draw in 1 850 and 1851, and winning 1 8 of 30
races in 1 852. As we shall see, this late surge by the Coalition owed to the
politicization of the ten-hour working day in Essex County. Indeed, though they failed
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to pass a ten-hour labor law, pro-labor Coalition lawmakers brought ten-hour bills to
the floor for votes, a first in Massachusetts.'"
A brief analysis of voting in Essex County further illuminates the social
geography of Coalition politics (Tables B.7 and B.8). The tables outline a clear portrait
of Whiggery's base of support in these years, and by implication, that of the Coalition.
On average, the Whigs did best in small towns and large cities with high per capita
property values and lower percentages of industrial workers. These were the
nonindustrial and farming communities of Topsfield, Lynnfield, Bradford and Essex,
and the cities of Salem and Newburyport, the former an essentially commercial
economy, the latter a more mixed industrial/commercial center. Through 1851, the
Whigs carried the factory towns of Andover, Salisbury, and Lawrence and the shoe
town of Danvers. In 1852, however, they slipped badly. Not surprisingly, the Whigs
also ran strong in towns that accommodated large numbers of Orthodox Protestant
communicants, namely Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians.
Conversely Coalition bailiwicks reflected the particular social characteristics of
Free Soil and Democratic towns. Communities dominated by Dissenting Protestant
denominations, or communities where Orthodoxy and Dissent were closely balanced
and thus more likely to experience inter-denominational conflict, on average registered
greater levels of support for Coalition." The Coalition also tended to run very strong in
shoe towns like Haverhill, Lynn, Georgetown, and Marblehead, and the fishing
communities of Gloucester and Swampscott (until 1851, a village of Lynn). After
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1851, the Coalition made deep inroads in the factory towns, as well as towns with a
mixture of large and small manufacturing.
New London County
Unlike Whig-dominated Massachusetts, Connecticut's party system from its
inception was extremely competitive.'^ Intense party competition compelled party
leaders to react swiftly to new and potentially destabilizing issues. Close elections in
Connecticut put great pressure on party leaders to adopt flexible and pragmatic policy
orientations, for they often had to craft symbolic appeals and policy gestures that could
mollify potentially restless voters in their own ranks.
The Democrats are a good place to start. The party rose to prominence in the
mid- 1830s by championing a variety of reforms that included expansion in the number
of popularly elected state officials, public education, debtor relief, and a ten-hour labor
law for children. It also attracted "wet" voters by fighting Whig-inspired local option
and license laws; it satisfied white supremacists with cuts in state aid to several private
schools devoted to educating African American children. Slowly, pragmatic elements
gained control of the party and steered it towards greater support for commerce and
industry, a necessity in a state coming to be dominated by banking, insurance, and
railroads.'^
Connecticut Whigs, like their Massachusetts counterparts, countered by
trumpeting the "American System" as the engine of social mobility and economic
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security for the middling classes. Throughout the 1840s the party gradually shed its
elitist image, which stuck longer in Connecticut than in Massachusetts because of Whig
support for poll taxes and property requirements for voting. By 1845, however, under
the guidance of Governor Roger Sherman Baldwin, the Whigs ended their opposition
to suffrage qualifications, signaling the maturity of the party's popular wing.
Connecticut WTiigs also moved to undermine the incipient Liberty party with
antisouthem and antislavery rhetoric and policies. The party strongly endorsed the
Wilmot Proviso, while Baldwin's influence helped produce a personal liberty law
preventing state officers from arresting alleged runaways. Whig antisouthemism and
antislavery, especially when framed against the state Democracy's defense of the Polk
administration, made Whiggery in Connecticut appear a credible vehicle for opposing
southern domination of the federal government.'''
Increasingly after midcentury the dynamics of politics in Connecticut altered.
From 1850 through 1853, the Democrats gained the advantage by refurbishing the
themes of state political economic reform. Behind their popular governor, Thomas
Seymour, the Democracy regained complete control of state government for only the
second time since 1842, adding to its majorities in successive General Assemblies by
campaigning as reformers. In New London and across the state Democrats stumped as
the "party of the people." Democratic assemblymen, taking their cue from Seymour,
abolished imprisonment for debt and strengthened the state's mechanics' lien law,
enacted the state's first free banking law that imposed strict limits on currency
circulation and capitalization, expanded the powers of the state's Bank Commission,
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created the state's first independent Railroad Commission with broad powers of
inspection and oversight, and for the first time imposed direct taxes on banks, railroads,
and insurance companies. The increased revenue nearly eliminated the state debt and
permitted more spending on social and benevolent services like the state Reform
School and Asylum for the "Insane Poor.'"' Though a faction of the party, led by
Seymour, supported bans on small note issue, unlimited stockholder liability,
homestead exemptions and ten-hour factory laws, those forces were outnumbered by
pro-business Democrats, Whigs, and the tiny contingent of Free Soil representatives.
Indeed, though Seymour did his best to stop new bank charters by issuing a blanket
veto of twenty bank charters in 1851, his efforts failed; the chartering of banks and
railroads actually increased slightly over previous Whig-led sessions.'^
As in Massachusetts, the security of individuals in the market figured
prominently in political economic issues at midcentury. Connecticut Democrats
predicated their arguments on the belief that government's role in creating large
businesses obligated the state to insure that the market operated in ways that minimized
dislocation. On free banking and general incorporation laws, Seymour was
straightforward: "The vast power given to banking corporations calls for the exercise
on the part of the Legislature, of frequent scrutiny into their operations." Banks were
"created for the public good," Seymour reasoned, and government officials must
always probe prospective banks to discover "how far the main purpose of obtaining
their charters [e.g., the public good] is proved to be the real one." On the need for a
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state Railroad Commission, the Governor was equally blunt: "...a law is wanted to
bring our railroad companies under the immediate supervision of the State."'^
In Connecticut, then, economic expansion produced efforts in the 1850s that, at
least in theory, carved a role for the state in overseeing large private businesses. Unlike
Massachusetts, however, one of the major parties--the Democrats-managed political
economic reform issues in ways that strengthened its position in state politics. But the
new emphasis on state issues and the role of government in society spilled into other
areas of policy that eventually undermined the Democrats' majority and, more
important, wrecked the Whigs.
The initial culprit was a robust prohibition movement. On that issue Seymour,
along with most of his party, stood implacably opposed, in sharp contrast to the party's
earlier flexibility. The Whigs proved even more inept at handling the issue, at first
picking it up as their own only to quickly drop it. Free Soilers took up the cause with
abandon in 1853, and watched their electoral fortunes rise to unseen heights in New
London County. Voting patterns confirm the key role of the Maine Law in New
London County politics in 1853 and 1854 (Tables B.9 and B.IO). (Because
Connecticut held its state elections in April, this and later discussions of Connecticut
politics will extend into the spring of 1854, just before the Know Nothing emergence.)
The Free Soilers surged in 1853, but the following year, with independent Maine Law
candidate Charles Chapman in the field, the Free Soil vote returned to its normally
anemic level. The Maine Law's popularity, whether registered by Free Soil or
independent Maine Law votes, was most pronounced in the industrial city of Norwich
can
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and the fishing cities ofNew London and Stonington, along with the economically
"mixed" coastal towns of Groton and Lyme. The first three in particular had been
among Whiggery's principal strongholds, and much of the Whigs' losses after 1852
be traced to poor performance in those communities, the county's largest. On average.
Democrats did best in the crescent of small textile towns north of Norwich, the small
farming towns also surrounding Norwich, and the mixed farming-fishing-light
industrial towns along the coast. The Democrats also ran strong in Norwich, New
London and Stonington--that is, until Chapman's independent candidacy. Though the
Democracy had a history of running well in Dissenting towns (in New London, that
meant mostly Baptist and a smaller fraction of Methodists), its share of votes in these
locations slipped significantly in 1854. Indeed, Chapman's particular strength in
Baptist and Methodist towns is unmistakable.
Dauphin County
Just as the Maine Law movement threw party politics into chaos in New
London County, so too in Dauphin, where the issue fractured the Whigs and launched
the careers of several insurgent politicians. Until 1851, Dauphin County routinely
produced decisive Whig majorities that reflected widespread support across the entire
county. Even in the Democratic strongholds of Harrisburg, the county's only city, and
the semi-subsistence farming towns located mainly in the mountainous Upper End, the
Whigs culled a respectable vote. But the party's base clearly lay in the county's
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wealthier commercial farming towns of the Lower End, notable for their greater
investment in farm machinery and a more aggressive pursuit of dairy production. The
Whigs also dominated the "mixed" commercial/industrial and farming towns of
Swatara, Middletown, and Paxton, all situated on the Susquehanna River. With smaller
majorities, they carried the Upper End coal mining towns of Lykens and Wiconisco.
High proportions of German Lutheran and Reformed churches and various Dissenting
congregations also characterized the centers of Whig power in Dauphin County.
Straightaway one notices the impact of the Maine Law insurgency on Whig
fortunes after 1851 (Tables B.l 1 and B.12). In 1852 the Whigs failed to obtain an
outright majority of votes cast for the first time since 1 846 and only the fourth time
since 1 840. The downward spiral continued precipitously thereafter, owing chiefly to
the inroads local Maine Law candidates made among Whigs. By 1853 the Maine Law
affected the WTiig party across a broad spectrum of towns and religious groups. The
most striking aspect of the Maine Law movement was its success in normally
Democratic Harrisburg. There Maine Law candidates cut into the popular base of both
parties and outpolled their Whig and Democratic opponents. The Whigs in particular
suffered a major bloodletting, and teetered on the brink of total collapse by the end of
1853.
For Whig partisans, the timing of their fall must have seemed strangely ironic.
Long the minority party in Pennsylvania, between 1848 and 1851 the Whigs had finally
managed to compete on nearly equal terms with the Democracy by politicizing the
Democrats' handling of state government. By posing as the reform party in state
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government, the Whigs advanced themes that had marked their slow rise during the
1840s. In order to understand Pennsylvania politics at 1850, it is necessary to briefly
trace the broad pattern of economic policymaking in antebellum Pennsylvania.
Spending on the Public Works had risen sharply by 1840s, spurred by
grassroots demand for improvements and the legislative practice of "logrolling" and
omnibus legislation. Lawmakers looking to secure a branch-line feeder to the Public
Works for their district routinely traded their votes on other bills in order to gain the
support of colleagues for their project. The result was that the scope of the system
ramified annually and inexorably. In lieu of raising taxes, Pennsylvania floated a
massive debt-over $40 million by 1 844-to fund the expansion. Meanwhile logrolling
also pervaded private charter policy. Special charters of incorporation often appeared
in their final form in "omnibus" bills that incorporated several enterprises
simultaneously and sometimes contained a variety of general laws. The practice of
bundling legislation together created embarrassingly long and often internally
incongruous bills. As the antebellum era wore on, moreover, the practice accelerated,
despite an explicit ban on omnibus bills in the 1838 Constitution. In 1850, for
example, fiilly 133 of the session's 473 "laws" were in reality at least two distinct laws,
and a majority of those several laws in one.'*
The proliferation of logrolling reflected the influence of lobbyists at Harrisburg,
or "borers" as they were then disparagingly termed. Commercial and industrial
interests employed borers to influence legislators and if necessary, blandish cash,
preferred stock, free railroad passes, and jobs as inducements.'^ But logrolling also
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reflected more than corruption. In a state where intense inter-regional and inter-city
competition drove economic policy, logrolling sustained intraparty unity in the face of
powerful centrifugal tendencies. The mobilization of people and communities for
economic goods determined economic policymaking in Pennsylvania, regardless of
which party controlled the Capitol.^" Reforms proved futile. In response to the
growing outcry against special legislation, Pennsylvania legislatures enacted general
incorporation and "model charter" laws for voluntary associations (1833), towns and
boroughs (1834), manufacturing companies (1849), banks (1850), and insurance
companies (1 856). In theory, such laws reduced the decision-making burden and
constitutional authority of the legislature by transforming incorporation into a simple
court-audited procedure. In practice, before the Civil War lawmakers almost always
ignored these laws.^'
Pennsylvania's Public Works, itself a creation of localistic demand, along with
logrolling in charter policy, produced a political culture of particularistic mobilization
and enhanced legislative authority. The Works gave lawmakers a source ofjobs and
contracts that they could annually earmark for their region. This made lawmakers
resistant to challenges to their prerogatives, because such authority vastly increased the
patronage at their disposal and enabled them to appear responsive to local
communities. The persistent developmental and legal functions of the legislature and
the political pressures those functions placed on lawmakers led to an explosion of
public works spending, special legislation, and omnibus bills in Pennsylvania. As one
observer exquisitely summarized the overall pattern, "(n)o one deems it wrong to take
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and give for his county or district.... Exchanges of local advantages are the levers that
move the whole commonwealth."^^
Usually out of power, the Whigs throughout the 1840s consistently linked the
state's fiscal embarrassments to political corruption and mismanagement on the Public
Works under successive Democratic regimes." Democrats, for their part, attempted to
deflect Whig attacks by admitting the need to eliminate corruption on the Public
Works. In Dauphin County, which had supported the idea of selling the Main Line by
over a ten point margin in an 1 844 referendum,^" Democrats gravitated to this position.
Yet, despite such gestures the Democratic party remained stubbornly pro-Public Works.
Democratic governors Francis Shunk (1845-48) and William Bigler (1851-1854)
defended the Public Works even as they paid lip-service to the need for reform, as did
"improvement" Democrats from the northern and central parts of the state poorly
served by the transportation network.^^
The Whigs' focus on "retrenchment and reform" in state government finally
bore fruit in 1 848, when Governor William Johnston carried the state by the razor thin
margin of 300 votes. Johnston had been a Democrat until 1 846 when he broke with his
party over the Walker Tariff, a highly unpopular measure in a state which usually
evinced broad, bi-partisan support for protectionism. He was a vocal advocate of the
Wilmot Proviso, and had been pivotal in a successful legislative struggle in 1 847 for a
controversial personal liberty law (rescinded in 1852 by a Democratic-controlled
assembly) that prevented slave claimants from using state and county jails to detain
suspected runaways. But in 1848, Johnston's antislavery ideas mattered much less in
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Dauphin County than his personal popularity and reputation as a reformer. A skilled
politician who broke tradition and barnstormed the state on his own behalf, Johnston
won a record majority in Dauphin County by promoting protectionism, reform of the
state's Public Works system, and fiscal retrenchment.^* Johnston's coattails were long
enough to secure a slim majority in the General Assembly for fellow Whig lawmakers,
only the second time in the 1840s that the party controlled the Capitol.
Taking office in 1 849, Johnston immediately proposed a sinking fund for the
gradual elimination of the state debt, to be paid for by bank "bonuses" equal to a small
percentage of capital paid in. The bonuses would be imposed on banks as a condition
for receiving a charter or an extension upon an existing one. Bank bonuses were sure
to create added pressure for bank chartering, and Johnston was at pains to warn
legislators against "any extraordinary increase of banking capital," admonishing that
"care should be taken in the grants of authority to these corporations." Johnston blazed
a middle road on bank charter policy, insisting that banks operate safely and beyond
reproach, with enough securities and specie in reserve to guarantee the value of their
notes.
Johnston also urged reform of the state's 1 848 ten-hour law. That statute
declared ten hours a legal days work in textile, silk, flax, and paper mills, but included
a proviso that permitted companies to hire workers under special contracts requiring
longer hours. Johnston proposed striking out the proviso. In fact, both parties had
endorsed the change in their 1 848 platforms, and Johnston had directly campaigned on
this issue in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Lancaster, where labor had organized to
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enforce the 1848 statute, only to meet with dogged resistance from mill owners.
Strikes in those cities generated pressure for a clarification of the statute.^*
Lawmakers responded to Johnston's leadership with a wave of reform.
Johnston's sinking fund plan and bonus requirement for banks were made law. The
special contract proviso in the ten-hour law was eliminated, while enforcement
mechanisms were put in place for the statute's child labor and school attendance
provisions. In addition, lawmakers enacted a homestead exemption law and extended
several mechanics' liens. Another law gave a preference to the back wages of coal
miners and iron foundry workers in certain insolvency proceedings. General
incorporation and model charter laws were also established for manufacturing
companies, turnpikes, and railroads. Education reformers were placated when the
General Assembly abolished school districts that operated outside the common school
system and invested the Secretary of State with superintendency powers over the entire
common school system. Finally, over a three year span several appointive public
offices, including constables, district attorneys, auditor generals, and Supreme Court
judges, were made elective.^'
Most of the legislation passed the Whig-controlled 1 849 assembly. Local
Whigs took the credit, often casting the Democrats as opponents of reform. Such
Whigs annually directed their campaigns to "Tax-payers" with rhetorical questions like:
"Who Created the State Debt? And Who Is Now Paying It Off?" Of the homestead
exemption law. Whig editor Theophilus Fenn wrote: "This bill is in effect but carrying
out the spirit of the law that exempts the debtor from imprisonment, and the spirit of
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the age which is moving rapidly against the credit system, particularly in reference to
the poor." The bill had been "passed with Whig votes," Fenn pointed out, and
"violently opposed by leading locofocos." Fenn similarly endorsed the general
incorporation law as a plebeian measure. General incorporation enabled "those of even
limited means to associate their capital for manufacturing purposes."^"
On the other hand, once the Democrats regained control of the General
Assembly in 1850, local Whigs seized on Democratic opposition to reform the Canal
Board as evidence of the party's continued perfidy.^' Local Whigs also attempted to
score the Democrats for their Model Bank Law. That statute required banks to make
annual reports to the state auditor, imposed a graduated tax on dividends and a 4.5%
bonus fee on all new or renewed charters, banned small notes of $5 or less, and
established the ratio of specie to circulating paper at three to one. Ironically, the law's
specie to paper ratio was more liberal than Johnston and most Whigs had wanted.
Thus, Whigs charged that, "instead of restraining these institutions in their issues," the
law actually facilitated greater speculation on the part of banks. Because Johnston and
most Whigs had supported stricter limits on note issue, and because the Democratic-
controlled assembly chartered several new banks, Whigs could creditably argue that
Democrats were "the friends of monopoly and special privileged Indeed, local Whigs
annually blasted Democrats for turning the state legislature into a "Locofoco Bank
Factory.""
The Whigs' opposition to Democratic bank policy stemmed less from clear
ideological differences than the party's strategy to taint state government under
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Democratic rule as corrupt. 'Tor years past the public improvements of this
Commonwealth have been under the exclusive management of a set of poUtical
swindlers," Hamsburg Whig John J. Clyde declared in the archetypical "reform"
language that Whigs adopted in the early 1850s. More than mere swindlers of pubhc
money, Democratic lawmakers bowed to powerful special interests. In the Democratic-
controlled assemblies of the early 1850s the "wheels of legislation were well
"greased'"' by lobbyists blandishing money and privileges in return for special charters.
"Notwithstanding all the professions of hostility to the increase of Banking capital,"
wrote Clyde in another column, "Locofoco legislators can swallow a dozen Bank bills
(if they are well "greased") without so much as making a crooked face!"" In truth.
Democratic-controlled assemblies from the mid-1 840s onward were no more amenable
to business interests than Whigs, and if one focuses exclusively on the minority radical
element of the party, they were less so. A majority of both parties practiced an
indiscriminate charter policy in these years, but some Democrats, including Governor
William Bigler (1852-1855), sought legal restraints on corporate power, such as
unlimited liability for stockholders. Bigler, too, unlike most Pennsylvania Democrats,
was suspicious of banks under certain circumstances, vetoing over a dozen bank
charters passed by assemblies controlled by his own party.'' Not surprisingly, however,
such shades of intra-party variation attracted very little attention among Whigs. Both in
and out power, the Whigs positioned themselves on the high ground of reform in state
politics.
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The Whig effort in Dauphin County and across the state to link their party to the
cause of state reform illustrates broader themes of public Hfe at m.dcentury. In all three
states political economic reform constituted an important dimension of politics.
Modernization of the economy and the anxieties it fed produced specific political and
legislative efforts designed to ease the disruptions that so marked the late antebellum
era. Whether the felt problem was fiscal, political, economic, or some combmation,
state and local issues moved to the forefront of political debate.
Preexisting political configurations in the three states mediated this political
process. Whigs in Pemisylvania politicized the Public Works under Democratic
administration, blamed profligate Democratic lawmakers for a ruinous state debt, and
advocated a corpus of debtor relief and labor reform measures to undercut the
Democrats' own pro-labor appeals. Democrats in Comiecticut experimented with early
forms of railroad and banking regulation, imposed new taxes on those institutions, and
dallied with various debtor relief, general incorporation, and labor reform laws. In
Massachusetts the specifics of reform were similar, though its political manifestation
complicated by the strange alliance between Democrats and Free Soilers, unified to
topple the Bay State's one-party government.
The Shifting Framework of Public "Reform." 1849-1853
Nothing that reformers advocated constituted a radical departure in political
economic thought. Pleas for debtor relief measures, ten-hour laws, general
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incorporation laws, or, in Pennsylvania, reform of the PubHc Works, had been bruited
about for years. Nevertheless policies that affirmed the state's role in protecting
debtors from the disruptions of the market or extended the state's police power over
corporations raised difficuh questions. What, precisely, was government's role m
historically private areas like debtor-creditor relations, labor law, or business
enterprise? How far could the state go in policing private affairs m the name of the
public good? In the early 1850s the politics of state political economic reform reflected
a deeper struggle over the moral dimensions of the state, the responsibility of
government to new social and economic realities.^^ The change found clearest
expression in a number of antiparty reform causes which eventually propelled "reform-
beyond the bounds of regular politics and party government.
Essex County
From the start, Coalitionists understood that residual partisan loyalties and
enmities figured to complicate matters. Those committed to the defeat of the Whigs
and reform of state government had to imagine a different sort of politics guided by •
specific reform objectives, not party victories in the conventional sense. Lewis
Josselyn put it this way. "A union of parties for the sake of office only, should always
be opposed....But when men agree in principle and wish to bring about the same
results, to refuse to act together is in violation of principle, and... sets up party as of
more importance than principle itself. "^'^ In the familiar idiom of the popular
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vernacular, Coalitionists denied they were out for mere political office. Placing
"reform" ideals above traditional party goals, the backers of Coalition in Essex County
framed their efforts in transcendent antiparty terms. In the unlikely alliance between
Free Soilers and Democrats in Massachusetts, "party" stood in the way of "principles."
Antiparty ideas also framed the Coalition's reform appeals. Town and county
conventions of Free Soilers and Democrats abjured party labels, and pledged support
for "Union," "Reform," "Coalition," or "People's" tickets in races for state senator and
representative, as well as some county offices. Coalition publicists reinforced the new
departure by deploying antipartyism and linking it directly to the defeat of the Whigs
and triumph of state reform. The Amesbuiy Villager urged voters to support the
"Union" state senatorial ticket of 1850 because "these gentlemen are pledged to the
principles of state reform." The Essex Freeman backed the same ticket because "it was
designed to be supported by both parties, upon the basis of State reform." "There is not
a man on the ticket," the Freeman continued, "who is not known to be true to the great
object of state reformr Lewis Josselyn, addressing skeptical Democrats wary of
joining with Free Soilers, stated simply: "For our part we are willing to act with any
body of men who desire to see change in the legislation of this State." "Throw mere
party questions to the winds," urged George J. L. Colby, "and let one effort be made for
the people."" In races for seats in the General Court, the Coalition cast itself as a
nonpartisan vehicle for reform, and in so doing, implied that partisanship stood in the
way of the project of remaking Massachusetts government.
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No issue better illuminates the antiparty dimensions of Coalition reform in
Essex County than the ten-hour working day. The hours issue reemerged in 1850 after
journeymen shoemakers in Lynn and mechanics in Salem forced master manufactures
to voluntarily adopt the ten-hour rule. The county's Democratic party adopted a ten-
hour plank in its state platform in fall 1 850, while a few Coalition papers began to
devote more attention to the issue. But the real turning point for the movemem came in
1852. In that year a series of "Ten Hour" conventions at Boston put the statewide ten-
hour movement on a solid foundation. The first meeting, a small organizing affair,
convened in January, and included such labor veterans as Charlestown's James M.
Stone, Boston's William Fielding Young, and Lowell's William S. Robinson and
Benjamin Butler. Subsequent meetings in fall 1852 fimctioned more like mass
conventions, attracting delegates fi-om across the state. The initial meeting founded a
central coordinating body for the statewide ten-hour movement, the State Central
Committee, which facilitated the organization of auxiliary ten-hour "Clubs" at the town
level. The locals worked closely with the Central Committee, reported regularly on
their membership activities and provided up-to-date lists of local officers. Later in the
spring and summer the State Central Committee also set up lecture tours and
organizing circuits. Butler, Stone, and other leading activists scoured the Bay State's
factory towns, promoting the ten-hour cause and the need for local organization.^*
The leadership and coordination supplied by the Central Committee produced
immediate dividends. By eariy spring 1852 ten-hour locals cropped up in some of the
state's principal manufacturing towns, including the Essex towns of Lawrence,
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Andover, and Lynn. As the grassroots organized, the State Central Cotmnittee
orchestrated a ten-hour petition to the General Court. Tlte 1 852 petition differed from
earlier ones in two crucial respects. First, nearly all the petitions were standardized,
with identical print and preamble language, suggesting a high level of coordination,
perhaps even the fingerprints of a single printing shop. Second, the 1 852 campaign
asked for a general ten-hour law, with no exceptions for special contracts or workers
above a certain age. Such coordination and consistency had not characterized previous
ten-hour petitions.-'^
Events in two Essex county towns in summer 1 852 politicized the ten-hour
issue across much of the region. In June strikes at the Salisbury Manufacturing and
Amesbury Flannel Manufacturing companies plunged Amesbury and Salisbury into
political turmoil and galvanized the area's ten-hour movement. The conflict began
when new agents took over management at the mills and moved to clamp down on a
lax workplace culture. Under the previous paternalistic management, the companies'
skilled male operatives had always enjoyed the right to take fifteen minute breaks in the
morning and afternoon to do the day's shopping, tend to their vegetable gardens, or
whatever. With agents and overseers turning a blind eye, the operatives occasionally
extended the fifteen minute breaks into longer absences with impunity. However,
things changed quickly in June 1 852 when the new agents abolished the fifteen minute
breaks and stopped the practice of unauthorized absences. At both companies virtually
all operatives, male and female, staged walkouts in June and July to protest the new
rules. Residents of both towns overwhelmingly supported the strikers and organized
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ten-hour locals. Meanwhile, the new management dug in its heels and defeated the
operatives in August by hiring permanent replacements, many ofwhom were Irish
Catholic.'"'
The Amesbury-Salisbury strike spurred the organization of ten-hour locals in
several heretofore unorganized towns. All of the county's major opposition
mouthpieces, as well as Democratic and Free Soil papers in Lowell, supported the
strikers and used the conflict as an opportunity to elaborate several key themes for the
opposition. The overweening actions of the new management and the corresponding
demise of older paternalistic practices in the mills crystallized several issues:
opposition to more demanding work regimens; popular hostility towards the growing
power of corporations; the responsibility of the state to protect vulnerable workers from
corporate tyranny and harsh working conditions; the influx of Irish Catholics into the
regional labor market. Many observers thus submerged the specific issues involved in
the strike into a set of larger themes that attracted support from a broad cross-section of
area residents. An analysis of the social composition of the ten-hour locals in
Amesbury and Salisbury shows that skilled craftsmen, petty merchants, and
professionals such as school teachers and ministers dominated the local movement."'
Commentary in the Coalition press linked the cause of the operatives and the
ten-hour day to a broader vision of government devoted to the rights of ordinary
people, conflated with the "public good." In this sense ten-hour advocates expressed
more a political critique of corporate power in the market and polity than an anti-
corporate mentalite. A local meeting of ten-hour activists in Amesbury resolved: "we
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doing, that they do not pass them." Amesbury's William Currier, situated literally at
the center of the crisis, plainly stated that management's actions at the local mills "is a
case which makes us sensible of the value of the state.'"*^
Like the Coalition's debtor relief and regulatory policies, the ten-hour issue
grew from the intersection of rapid social change and previous nonpartisan state
activism in the economy. References to the "health" and "intellectual capacities" of
factory workers suggested the broader implications for nonpartisan governance in ten-
hour agitation. The difference was that in this later, more political phase of labor
agitation, reformers redrew the state's responsibilities in light of new social realities.
The earlier promotional activities of state government worked in parallel with changes
in the social relations of factories and their towns to shape the emerging critique of
party government in Massachusetts. Thus, perhaps more than any other Coalition
issue, the ten-hour day facilitated antiparty appeals to voters. From Salisbury came
cries "to throw aside all party differences" in the upcoming 1852 election and nominate
ten-hour men, while Amesbury's William Currier implored "workmen and their
friends.. .to unite on [ten-hour] candidates, irrespective ofparty" One Bay State
correspondent recounted how earlier attempts at gaining a ten-hour law had failed
"owing to the heartlessness of legislators...." The situation could be different,
however, if voters put aside "the clamor of political strife" and selected pro-labor
candidates. "Let men of all parties, in making up their tickets, see to it that they select
such men as will vote for the ten hour system."^^ Indeed, in 1852 Coalition candidates
for the General Court in several towns pledged support for a ten-hour law. In some
factor, towns Coalition standardWrs ran as 'Ten Hour" candidates for the state
legislature-and won. In the spring of 1853 the State Central Committee organized the
largest ten-hour petition yet, while Lowell's William S. Robinson and Amesbuiy's
Jonathan Nayson, both elected to the General Court as "Ten Hour" representatives,
successfully shepherded a ten-hour bill through the 1 853 Massachusetts House. That
bill, however, was defeated by a Whig-controlled Senate. Ten-hour reformers
remained frustrated with the political status quo.
Despite the predominance of state political economic issues, the slaveiy issue
simultaneously threatened to divide the Coalition in Essex County. Initially,
Democrats and Free Soilers handled these tensions well, chiefly by downplaying
national questions. To be sure, Free Soilers were less inclined to mute national issues,
for to them, the immorality of slavery was uppermost. Still the party hierarchy
gradually warmed to the Coalition. If there were any doubts, the Fugitive Slave Law
convinced the state's Free Soil leadership that the party of Daniel Webster had to go at
any cost. With a few notable exceptions, pragmatism guided the Bay State's Free Soil
establishment, including leading Essex County Free Soilers John Greenleaf Whittier,
Stephen C. Phillips, and Thomas Wentworth Higginson, into alliance with
Democrats."' But however expedient the Free Soil leadership was, a large segment of
the antislavery rank and file without doubt supported state reform. The evidence for
this is overwhelming, ranging from the prominent role that Free Soilers played in the
region's ten-hour labor movement to the consistent endorsements of state reform in the
county's antislavery press during electoral campaigns and legislative sessions."' It was
came to
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natural for party leaders to insist that coalition changed nothing when it
antislaveiy, always the Free SoU raison d'etre. Such pronouncements reassured their
most zealous and single-minded followers, and had the ring of truth in any event.
Nevertheless it is the partisan tensions that inhered in the Coalition that stand
out as the key theme shaping its history. Because the Whigs could only muster a
plurality in most towns, theoretically the Coalition could have swept most races for
state representative and certainly all of the county's five senate seats. The inability of
Democrats and Free Soilers to unite completely explains the Coalition's uneven
electoral success in Essex County. The elections of 1849 through 1851 saw Democrats
and Free Soilers "bolt" in large enough numbers to prevent the Coalition from flilly
capitalizing on their numerical majority. Conservative Democrats, who were always
uncomfortable in the Coalition, were scandalized after Coalition lawmakers elected
radical Free Soiler Charles Sumner to the U.S. Senate. In 1851 conservatives
organized meetings of "National Democrats" to protest their party's apostasy on slavery
and to formally establish a splinter movement. The Nationals, or "Hunkers," received
assistance from an unlikely quarter, conservative "cotton" Whigs in Salem, Lawrence
and Marblehead, who actively campaigned on behalf of National Democratic
candidates. The Hunkers fielded rump tickets again in 1852, supported by new
National Democratic sheets based in Lawrence and Salem.''^
Against this portentous backdrop, reformers geared up for what proved to be
their last battle as the "Coalition." In 1852 voters approved a plebiscite on the question
of revising the state Constitution. Coalitionists had brought the referendum forward
rise
were
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after efforts to pass electoral reform ran afoul of Whig obstructior^ism and regional
differences in their own ranks. Elections in spring 1 853 chose delegates to a state
Constitutional Convention and Coalition forces in Essex again made antiparty appeals
on the more basic principle that partisanship should yield to the public welfare-a fairer
Constitution. George J. L. Colby hoped the Constitutional Convention would ''not be
connected with political associations, farther than is absolutely necessary." In typical
Coalition fashion, Colby enlisted antipartyism on behalf of a larger anti-Boston, anti-
Whig message. "If, however, he be a whig," the editor concluded with a waming, "it
should be certain that Boston does not hold a bill of sale for him, and that he will
above his party connections." Of the county's 44 delegates to the Convention, 25
Coalition products, while some of the county's Whig delegates also committed to
reform.'"
Coalition forces, which dominated the Convention, produced a wholly new
Constitution, subject to popular approval in November 1853. The document was a
bold attempt at sweeping change in the state's political-constitutional order,
representing a fitting capstone to the Coalition's reform efforts. Virtually the entire
package of democratic reforms that had been advanced by the Coalition was to be
codified in a refurbished Constitution, including house reapportionment in favor of
small towns over large cities, election by plurality for most state races, single-member
senate districts, abolition of the poll tax, a secret ballot, and the replacement of the
general ticket system in cities with a ward system of representation. In addition, the
1853 Constitution proposed to eliminate the considerable patronage that the majority
194
party wielded in Massachusetts. A raft of state and local offices heretofore appointed
annually by the Governor were to popularly elected.
The document also contained several economic, legal, and social reforms,
including doubling of the state's public school flmd, abolition of imprisomnent for
debt, and a constitutional ban on special laws of incorporation for all banking and
manufacturing companies. Nativism was also a theme of the Constitutional
Convention. One provision prohibited the use of state ftinds for sectarian schools, a
clear attempt by the Coalition to capitalize on the growing fear among Protestants of
the Catholic Church's influence in education matters. Indeed, anti-immigrant
sentiment was a subtext in Convention debates over a number of issues. Some
proponents of reapportionment, for example, invoked the immigrant vote as one
justification for scaling back urban representation in the General Court, while the
Convention also considered a literacy amendment for voting and a proposal to prevent
unnaturalized citizens from serving as Governor.
Taken as a whole, the 1853 Constitution synthesized many of the reform themes
of the Coalition, but its reapportionment scheme proved controversial. Whigs
repeatedly charged that the plan was a "party trick" gotten up by the Coalition
leadership to ensure their permanent control of state government. Eastern voters
responded by ringing up large majorities against the Constitution, sending it down to
defeat by a narrow margin and handing state government over to the Whigs in the
process. Overall, Essex County voted against the Constitution by a 6 point margin,
hardly a smashing victory for the status quo, but nonetheless underscoring the problems
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of the reapportionment plan among eastern voters and the skill with which the Whigs
had politicized the issue."
Besides the inherent problem of reapportionment, several other factors also
contributed to the Constitution's defeat. Some prominent Free Soil and Democratic
leaders joined the Whig hierarchy in opposition. Essex County Whigs quickly alerted
voters to this fact, circulating anti-Constitution speeches by Charles Francis Adams, Jr.,
John G. Palfrey, Marcus Morton, and Orestes Brownson. These cracks in the Coalition
facade betrayed much deeper fissures that proved fatal to the Free Soil-Democratic
alliance. Franklin Pierce's election in 1 852 had shifted the center of gravity in the
Democratic party decisively towards its pro-southern National faction. The ascendancy
of the Nationals placed renewed emphasis on party discipline, and patronage was a key
variable in the equation. In Essex County, the Pierce administration handsomely
rewarded Democrats who backed the party's pro-slavery, 1852 Baltimore Platform and
punished those who collaborated with Free Soilers. Salem Hunker Nathan J. Lord
acted as the administration's eyes and ears in Essex County, and through his influence,
post offices, collectorships, federal surveyors, and Custom's House jobs were given to
those who "had lent their aid in the county to build up the democratic party distinct
from coalition and freesoilism.""
The resurgence of the National Democracy augured trouble. In the midst of the
1853 campaign, a momentous struggle erupted between Nationals and Coalitionists for
control of the Democratic County organization. Its 1853 county convention, echoing
the state convention, eulogized Pierce and backed the Baltimore Platform in the
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clearest expression yet of pro-slavery by a Democratic convention in Essex County.
But Hunkers remained unsatisfied, and eventually held a rival convention that
nominated a senate ticket untainted by any free soil influence whatsoever. Then, less
than three weeks before the election, U.S. Attorney General and Newbuiyport's own
Caleb Cushing issued his famous "ukase" pronouncing the Coalition a "fatal eiror" and
enjoining all Democrats to cease ftirther cooperation with Free Soilers. James Coffin's
People •s Advocate was the first Coalition paper to endorse the National line, railing
against the Coalition in the weeks before the election. Others hedged their bets,
downplaying Coalition in the lead-up to the election while stumping hard for the
proposed Constitution. Later, after the election. Coffin formally announced that the
Democratic party in Essex County "will find it necessary to commence a new career,"
to be realized "by avoiding all side issues and resisting all factious temptations.""
Democrats uncomfortable with the Baltimore Platform and the party's pro-slavery
orientation were shown the exits.
Meanwhile, the Whigs had moved to capitalize on their rivals' factionalism.
After the near passage of the ten-hour bill in the 1853 General Court, the state's textile
barons, most ofwhom moved in the Whig party's exclusive inner circle, deftised the
ten-hour issue by voluntarily adopting an eleven hour day in textile factories across
eastern Massachusetts. This gesture reflected broader currents within the state's Whig
party. Whig conventions in summer and fall 1853 endorsing most of the reforms
contained in the proposed Constitution, while in a few locales Whigs endorsed a ten-
hour law. Observers in Essex County claimed that the local Whig party was little more
than a stalking horse for an incongruous assortment of anti-Constitution forces.
Whatever the case, the key point here is that the Whig party opposed the
reapportionment scheme, and framed it as a power play by designing Coalitionists.
Thus, accordmg to Whigs, the Coaht.on had produced not a "people's Constitution but
a party Constitution." As the campaign unfolded. Whig leaders and editorialists argued
that the next General Court could address the need for reform without altering the
state's existing constitutional framework or reshuffling its regional balance of power.
Whigs, in short, claimed to have finally accepted the necessity of state reform and
promised to protect eastern hegemony to boot. Coupled with the demise of the
Coalition and the inherent unfairness of the reapportionment plan. Whig gestures
towards reform defeated the Constitution and secured one last Whig victory.'"
The loss hit reformers hard. "Yesterday not only settled the coalition, blowing
that to splinters, but it has settled the very existence of the minor parties, for all
practical action," wrote a sullen George Colby, who had battled for the Constitution till
the end. Others acknowledged the death of the Coalition, but insisted that reform
remained at the center of public life. "If the coalition has received its quietus," wrote
Amesbury's William Currier, "the ten hour agitation has not." Indeed, another reported
that ten-hour sentiment was stronger than ever, and as a result "party lines are forgotten
by many who were once leading members of the leading political parties.""
New London Counry
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In contrast to Essex, antiparty reform in New London County took the form of a
Protestant middle-class uprising over the failure of Connecticut lawmakers to address
the liquor question. The Maine Law movement expressed anxieties related to
evangelical Protestant demands for piety amid a new cultural heterogeneity.^^ But that
was only one element of its appeal. In New London County, Free Soilers and Maine
Law advocates (and later the Know Nothings) linked ethnoreligious symbolism to
failures of the regime of party government. As a political issue liquor was nothing
new. During the mid- 1840s Democrats and Whigs skirmished over liquor licensing
and local option laws. But the idea of a statewide prohibition statute contravened the
earlier tradition of allowing individuals or local communities, through appeals to
conscience, licensing or local option, to determine policy on the issue. Perhaps more
than any other single issue, Maine Law agitation represented the midcentury shift away
from voluntarist and local strategies towards greater state activism in public life."
The campaign for a Maine Law began as a nonpartisan effort. In 1 85 1 and
again in 1852, the Connecticut Temperance Society (CTS) called on "the friends of
Temperance in each and every town...to concentrate their strength, without distinction
of party," behind candidates who supported prohibition. The Whigs seized the
opportunity, nominating candidates who backed the Maine Law. No doubt many
Whigs supported the Maine Law for sincere reasons, yet many also embraced it on the
hunch that it might well give the party the boost it needed to recapture state
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government. In ,851 Whig lawmakers introduced a bill that provided for a referendum
on prohibition, which gained just enough support from eastern Democrats to pass.
Most Democrats, however, opposed the measure, and Governor Seymour pocket-
vetoed the bill. From the Whig point of view, the growing popularity of the Maine
Law. coupled with Democratic opposition and especially Seymour's veto, presented an
opening wedge.'*
With the Whigs playing up the Maine Law, the 1852 election turned into a
Democratic rout. Governor Seymour, who had adopted a position of silence on the
issue, swept into a third consecutive term with an outright majority, a first for any
Democratic gubernatorial candidate since 1 843, while the party made even greater
gains in the General Assembly. Crestfallen Whig bosses, convinced their strategy had
backfired, officially abandoned prohibition after the 1852 debacle.'" Though the
Whigs' 1853 gubernatorial candidate Henry Dutton was known to be friendly to a
Maine Law, he dutifully toed the party line and withheld any public pronouncement on
the matter. Intended to reunite the party on time-tested national questions, the strategy
further eroded the party's base in New London County, where support for the Maine
Law's was spreading fast.
By spring 1853, support for the Maine Law became a precondition for
nomination in most party caucuses for state representative and senator in New London
County, the Democrats included. Free Soil gubernatorial candidate Francis Gillette
earned the endorsement of the CTS, and the party blended the Maine Law into its
regular antislavery campaign. In New London County there was considerable overlap
200
in the Maine Law and Free Soil movements. Norwich's Moses Pierce, a longtime
leader of the county's Free Soil party, doubled as a prominent activist in the New
London County Temperance Association [NLCTA]. Pierce urged Free Soilers to
campaign hard on the Maine Law. The issue so dominated New London County
politics that some local Free Soil activists worried privately that prohibition was
crowding out the antislavery message. But most others were far less circumspect about
identifying the party with the Maine Law. Most shocking from the Whig point of view
was that Gillette actually outpolled Whig gubernatorial candidate Hemy Dutton in New
London County in 1853.*°
The Maine Law movement reached its zenith between the 1853 and 1854
elections. The CTS and the General Association of Congregational and Baptist
churches in Comiecticut collaborated on a huge petition to the Democratic-controlled
1853 assembly. Meanwhile, a young and obscure reformer from Norwich, Andrew
Stark, founded an independent weekly, the Norwich Examiner, to capitalize on the
popularity of the issue. Stark devoted his paper to the Maine Law, and by mid-1853
boasted a circulation of over "2,000 families." Throughout its two year run, the
independent paper agitated for a range reform causes, including public education,
Sabbatarianism, and women's rights, while also running a regular column devoted to
agricultural improvement and tips on domestic economy. Later, in 1854-5, when the
focus of local politics shifted, Stark turned to antislavery and political nativism. But it
was the Maine Law, and the social cultural anxieties it crystallized, which served as the
staging ground for ftiture insurgent politics. The epicenter of the local movement was
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urban and industrial-Stonington. New London. Nonvich, and the factory towns ringing
.ha. city. Indeed, the bulk ofNew London Cotmty's petitions originated in Norwich
and the surrounding factory towns.^'
The Maine Law movement served as a vehicle for evangelical Protestants to
express their concern about the cultural and social changes buffeting their communities.
Again and again, proponents offered the Maine Law as a panacea for a spate of public
problems. Strong drink led to crime and poverty and broke up families, Maine Law
zealots insisted. "Fully four fifths of all the pauperism in our State, and seven eighths
of all crime," one temperance convention resolved, "are directly traceable to the sale
and use of intoxicating liquors." The Maine Law, by forcing individuals to adhere
strictly to a high moral standard of personal conduct, would improve individual lives,
family relations, and benefit the public at large because it would "increase our powers
of industry as a people...""
Prohibition advocates spun lurid tales of intoxicated young men disturbing the
public peace with profane and violent outbursts. Intemperance was invariably
portrayed a male vice, the effects of which were especially troublesome for innocent
women and children, compelled to negotiate the unwholesome public spaces created by
vulgar and besotted males. Retreat to the private home promised no relief from the
scourge. Drunken voyeurs were said to visit the homes of respectable women and press
bloated red faces and ogling bloodshot eyes against window panes, while wives and
children of chronic drunkards suffered economically, emotionally, and physically from
the husband's moral depravity. One tale told of an inebriate who spent every nickel he
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owned, along with his wife's dowiy, on reding binges of "beastly intoxication »
depriving his starving children of food and driving his wife insane. Indeed, local
women supporters of the Maine Law sometimes played on gendered tropes of female
innocence and victimization in their own arguments on behalf of prohibition. A local
petition for a Maine Law from "Clarissa Ashley and 132 Ladies of Groton" recounted
the "rapid strides of intemperance in our midst" and justified their single-sex petition
by asserting that "our sex are the sufferers by the traffic in intoxicating drinks....""
The Maine Law offered, in the words of one booster, "protection against the
dram shop, as well as against the horse thief and the burglar..." And if intemperance
was, as prohibitionists claimed, responsible for such a multitude of social problems, the
logical response was to turn to state government, hideed, local Maine Law activists
justified legal coercion by reference to the state's obligation to act in the public interest.
"That which contributes nothing to the wealth and happiness of the community, but
saps the foundations of both," Stark wrote simply, "camiot be justly classed among
legitimate articles of commerce. It ought to be strictly regulated." Maine Law
advocates cast their cause as a people's movement to clean up public immorality and
vice. What better instrumentality to realize such a goal, prohibitionists reasoned, than
the state, the vested guardian of the people's welfare? Like so many other reformers,
Maine Law activists cast their cause as a matter of governance, seizing upon earlier
regulatory precedents, such as statutory restrictions on gambling, to legitimate their
own proposal. Such precedents, according to Stark, "show that there is nothing new in
the feature of the Maine Law by which property, in the form of liquor... is seized and
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des.royed....For no .nan has a right to keep or sell property to the injury of the con,.on
welfare- Whether they reasoned from such an infonned legal position or no,, all
Maine Law proponents viewed the liquor question as a preeminent public matter, one
that imposed moral obligations on the state the politicians that ran it, regardless of party
affiliation.
Such an orientation led reformers to issue antiparty calls to break the chains of
partisanship. Maine Law promoters cast their movement as standing above the normal
tactical considerations of the Democratic and Whig machines, which, they believed
with equal vehemence, had thwarted the glorious reform. One supporter from New
London wrote the Examiner that "many, here, have long felt that it was highly desirable
utteriy to divorce temperance from both political parties, as parties, that all its friends
might act for its promotion, as they would any other moral object, untrammeled by
political comiections." Another writer agreed: "Standing aloof, as we do, and mean to
do, from all party organizations, we say to the friends of the Maine law, beware of
divisive measures," by which the writer meant party divisions that have "postponed the
object at which we all aim." Temperance advocates in New London County
conceptualized the issue in such a way as to peg party affiliation as the chief obstacle to
moral reform. Andrew Stark explained. "We, who are for the Maine Law first and our
respective parties next, are not the real disorganizers....""
Thus as support for the Maine Law spread, advocates held that partisanship
divided people on an issue of grave public consequence. Meanwhile the major parties,
concerned for their own political fixtures, had placed party survival over moral
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obligations to serve the pubHc mterest. Here the Whig leadership seemed especially
devoid of principle, for it had pursued prohibition for political reasons, only to back off
at the critical moment. One disgusted Whig put it thus: "We are tired of the shuffling
expediency which has been exhibited in the management of the [Whig] party for the
last two years, and hope that men this spring will, for once, be outspoken somewhere -
that they will be on one side of the fence or the other."^^
By late 1853 temperance men thus faced a dilemma: form an independent party
based exclusively on the Maine Law, or continue the failed voluntarist strategy of
soliciting pledges from candidates of the major parties. The movement remained
divided. In New London County temperance forces sent out feelers about an
independent electoral run as early as December 1 853. The responses, reported at a
meeting of the NLCTA, were mixed. Many recoiled at the prospect of voting Maine
Law if that meant breaking completely with their party. However, others in the
movement welcomed the tension between partisan loyalty and transcendent moral
causes, viewing the independent Maine Law ticket more favorably. Norwich's Free
Soil cum Maine Law leader Moses Pierce interpreted a possible Maine Law ticket
against the larger backdrop of antislavery politics and an ailing party regime. "Our
great object as Free Democrats is to extend our principles until they pervade and
control the Legislation of this State and the nation," he wrote state Free Soil party
chairman Joseph Hawley in the fall of 1 853, "our object as Maine Law men is to
promote temperance be securing the Maine Law. Now if we can promote the first
while we secure the second in an "independent organization," then I am in favor of it."
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Pierce's carefol choice to wrap independent organization in quotes is revealing, for he
clearly understood that any putative Maine Law political organization would
necessarily be strongly influenced, if not controlled outright, by antislaveiy men. As he
continued his theorizing: "I fully believe that a...very large majority of Whigs &
Democrats who leave their parties to support a temperance organization will never go
back but will be found in the ranks of the Free Democracy hereafter." If such
conjectures proved correct, Pierce concluded, the antislaveiy cause would "gain faster
by an independent organization for [the] Maine Law then we do without it.""
The resolution satisfied most Free Soilers and prohibitionists, while Pierce's
prophesy was eventually borne out. Disgusted with the Whigs and Democrats, in the
spring of 1854 statewide temperance forces finally agreed to field an independent
prohibition candidate for Governor, the well-known Charles Chapman, a prominent
Whig. But the grassroots strategy of querying major party candidates for their position
on the liquor question continued unabated by Chapman's independent candidacy; in
races for state representative and senator, the movement maintained its familiar role as
nonpartisan pressure group. The two-pronged strategy further eroded voter loyalty to
the major parties' state machines, while allowing Maine Law men to maintain the web
of connections and fi-iendships that partisanship in local communities had been built
upon-a^ long as the local party caucus dropped traditional party themes and agreed to
field candidates that backed the Maine Law. After nearly two years of Maine Law
agitation, the fi-ames of reference that guided most Whigs and at least some Democrats
in political matters had shifted. Increasing numbers of voters, disapproving of the
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parties and placing the Maine Law at the center of public life, followed leading
reformers to the logical antiparty conclusion about party government in Connecticut.-
By early 1854 the Whigs teetered on the brink of total collapse, their traditional
party appeals and issues of little effective use. Indisputably, then, the Maine Law
.ssue
already had scrambled party lines and begun the process of Whig decon.position
locally. That process further intensified in early March, when the U.S. Senate passed
Illinois Congressman Stephan A. Douglas's fateful bill overturning the Missouii
Compromise and opening the Kansas-Nebraska territory to slavery. The Kansas-
Nebraska Act, passed by the Senate with strong northern Democratic support, struck
the knockout blow to the Second Party System in New London County. Local mass
meetings, held "without distinction of party," immediately denounced the Senate's
action. In New London, an angiy meeting hanged Democratic Senator Isaac Toucey in
effigy for supporting the bill, while in Norwich, leaders of the Democratic, Itcc Soil,
and Whig parties addressed throngs of outrage citizens. Similar meetings erupted in
the county's smaller towns. Local anti-Nebraska forces quickly alighted upon the
herrenvolk themes that would constitute the basic building blocks of Know Nothing
and later Republican indictments of the Slave Power. ''The meeting at the Town Hall
in this City was just what we anticipated it would be," cheered one Norwich
commentator, "it was a great gathering working men:' brought together by their
common "stake" in determining whether "the teeming West. ...shall be the abode of
freemen like yourselves, or of .s7«vt'.v."^'
207
In Comecticut all parties, Democrats included, denounced the bill. But the
Democrats- association with Nebraska indisputably hurt the party, no matter how
sincerely local and state party leaders opposed the bill.™ The Whigs, for their part,
seized on Nebraska as an opportunity to revive their flagging fortunes. Locally and
statewide, the party attempted to position itself as the anti-Nebraska party, wasting few
chances to attack the Democratic party and the Pierce Administration." Even at this
earliest of stages the question of slavery in the territories, everyone recognized, was a
critical one.
There can be little doubt that the Nebraska controversy extended the voter
disaffection begun by the liquor question. In this way both issues are best seen as two
dimensions of the single phenomenon of populist anger at the regime of party
government. Most people were familiar with Chapman's views on slavery; one New
London Free Soiler considered him anything but a "hunker" Whig. Meanwhile Stark's
Maine Law Examiner covered local anti-Nebraska meetings closely, supporting
candidates who were sound on both the Maine Law and Nebraska.'^ For his part David
S. Ruddock, a local Democratic leader with antislavery leanings, attributed the
Democratic loss to the Nebraska bill. "We deny, in toto, that the Maine Law question
has defeated us," he wrote, "last year we swept the state on this issue..." Ruddock
acknowledged that both the Maine Law and Nebraska "had a hand" in the Democrats'
misfortune, but insisted "Nebraska is by far the greatest murderer."^^
Whatever the sources, the defeat was indeed a bad one for Democrats. Its
dimensions can be best seen at the grassroots level, where the party won less than 40%
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of state races to the Connecticut House of Representatives; m New London County, the
figure was 33o/o. Democratic losses were even more pronounced m senate races, where
the party won only 5 of 21 seats. This represents a startling reversal of the previous
two-year trend when the party, facing the Maine Law challenge, had claimed large
majorities in both chambers, for example, 6A% of the house and 1\% of the senate m
1853. Indeed, across New London County ad hoc meetings of "Freemen" opposed to
the Nebraska bill, led by Free Soilers but attracting antislavery Democrats and Whigs,
demanded that candidates for state representative and senator profess opposition to the
bill. The result was an irregular assortment of Democrats, Whigs, and Free Soilers
committed to a Maine Law and opposed to Kansas-Nebraska. Only a handful of
openly avowed Hunkers seemed to have survived the 1 854 reaction. Such evidence
adds still more weight to the idea that Nebraska figured crucially in spreading voter
anger with the regime. "'^
Indeed, local anti-Nebraska Whigs and Democrats were none too pleased with
the late actions of their respective leaders, if for different reasons. One anti-Nebraska
Whig denounced the Whig press for attempting to use Nebraska for partisan advantage.
Adopting antipartyism, the writer rather hoped for its defeat "by a union of parties at
the North" through some entirely new vehicle. "[I]f whig editors must be constantly
claiming that voters should support the whig ticket because the whigs are the only party
opposed to the extension of slavery," the writer warned, "I, for one, should bid farewell
to any hope of unity or strength in our opposition to the measure." For their part, anti-
Nebraska Democrats felt they were "made to occupy a false position" on the Nebraska
question. One wrote ruefblly: "The subject of the extension of Slavery is not a poHtical
one between whigs and democrats," for a majority of both opposed it. For most New
London citizens, of whatever party, the Nebraska bill seemed a grotesque breach of
faith between the sections, "a wanton violation of the principles of humanity and
freedom, unparalleled in the history of legislation in this country. "^^ Many opponents
of the Nebraska bill in New London County recognized the intimate comiection
between party leadership and governance. Nationally, the regime now appeared
unequivocally pro-slavery and prosouthem.
The evidence from New London County suggests it is folly to neatly separate
the Maine Law and Nebraska, as if many anti-Democratic voters in 1854 were
concerned with one at the exclusion of the other. If the question is. What issue initiated
voter dissatisfaction with the major parties in New London County?, then the answer
must be the Maine Law. That issue had polarized the electorate in a way that
Connecticut's political establishment was unused to, and irretrievably damaged the
Whig party well before the repoliticization of slavery. But, in relation to 1854, surely
that question is beside the point. For what we are interested in is the state of
confidence with which voters viewed the regime of party government in the spring of
1 854. On that score both major parties were in severe trouble, at least among
traditional native-bom voters. Increasingly, of course, the Democrats would turn to
other sources of popular support to make up for native-bom defections, namely
immigrants. The Whigs were already too far gone to save themselves using antislavery,
or any other issue.
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In the four way race Whig Heniy Dutton received less than one third of the
popular vote, but was elected governor by a General Assembly controlled by
antislavery and prohibitionist Whigs and Free Soilers. Dutton repaid the favor with a
lofty plea for the Maine Law and a lengthy peroration against the Kansas-Nebraska
bill.- Whig lawmakers finally passed a Maine Law statute in 1854, while adding a
strong antislavery resolution to the official record. Despite this hasty conversion,
however, Comiecticut's Whig party was faltering badly. Both the Maine Law and anti-
Nebraska movements emerged from the more basic nonpartisan idea that certain issues
relating to governance stood above party considerations. Through their early antiparty
indictment of party politics, Maine Law and anti-Nebraska reformers drove wedges
between major party elites and their traditional constituencies.
Dauphin County
Maine Law advocates in Dauphin County constructed a similar framework for
understanding the relationship between moral reform issues and partisan politics. Just
as the Maine Law movement in New London County linked the cause of prohibition to
the resolution of public disorder, so too the movement in Dauphin County, where
reformers pegged crime, debauchery, moral decay, and high taxes to the spread of
intemperance. As Maine Law reformers made their case, they also made demands on
local residents to imagine antiparty paths of political mobilization.
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The first unambiguous signs of the Maine Law 's remarkable popularity in
Dauphin County appeared in early 1852, though the movement for a statewide
prohibition statute had been launched two years earlier. In 1 852 Maine Law meetings
in several Lower End towns, including Harrisburg and Middletown, organized as a
statewide petition was underway to the General Assembly. In Febmary, temperance
reformers from across the state convened a huge Maine Law convention at the state
capital, in hopes of drawing the General Assembly's attention to the movement. The
throng resolved that intemperance left a "fearftil train of evil" in its wake, including the
devastation of families and higher county taxes for "the trial, conviction and support of
criminals and paupers." Claiming that all "gradual and moderate remedies have failed
to cure this great public disease," the assembled reformers pledged to stir up "public
sentiment" until the day when lawmakers shall become convinced "that the people are
prepared and ready for the Maine Law." Finally, the reformers warned legislators
about the political consequences of ignoring this "all-important object." The reformers
would, "if necessary,...sacrifice our party attachments, and support no candidate for the
Legislature who refuses to pledge himself favorably to this movement.""
The statewide meeting immediately stimulated more local Maine Law
gatherings in Harrisburg and surrounding towns. From the start, leadership of the local
movement fell to Whig publicist John J. Clyde, editor of the Whig State Journal, and
his close associate, Stephen Miller, a Whig newcomer to Dauphin County. Both had
attended the statewide meeting and served on organizing committees in Dauphin
County. Other leading lights included C. C. Rawn, one of a handftil of Free Soilers in
the area, ar.d a spate of Methodist, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Church of God ministers
across the county who preached the Maine Law from their pulpits and gave their
churches over to local Maine Law meetings. Another was Hemy Radabaugh, a
Harrisburg labor activist and subscription agent for George W. Morgan's Borough
Item, an independent pro-labor and pro-Maine Law weekly. In 1852 Radabaugh stood
for one of Dauphin County's two seats in the General Assembly as an independent
Maine Law candidate. His insurgent candidacy attracted only a small fraction of votes
(Table B. 1 1), but it was enough to prevent area Whigs from obtaining a majority for the
first time since the mid-1840s (Table B.3). Dauphin County Maine Law refonners
headquartered in Harrisburg, where Radabaugh achieved double-digits. German and
Scotch-Irish residents of the county's Upper End, on the other hand, remained
decidedly less enthusiastic about prohibition.'"'
In the movement's formative years Clyde's role proved pivotal, for as editor of
one of Dauphin's leading Whig papers, he was in an ideal position to publicize the
Maine Law. As an outspoken proponent, Clyde was an exception among the county's
Whig editors. Telegraph editor Theophilus Fenn initially hedged, then turned strongly
against the movement as it became clear that it threatened to hive off Whig voters.
Fenn acknowledged that the cause was an honorable one, but expressed doubt that rum
could be "driven out of our State" through legislation. "Moral suasion, after all, is the
engine to be used." By fall 1853, with the Maine Law movement again fielding an
independent ticket, Fenn was ranting away at the influence of local clergy and
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complaining of "those who have foisted themselves" into positions of leadership in
both the Maine Law movement and the local Whig party.''
Another opponent was John J. Patterson. Patterson purchased the Whig State
Journal sometime in the fall of 1 853 from Clyde, who sold the paper in apparent
disgust at Whig stalling on the Maine Law. Indeed, Clyde soon found employment at
the Crystal Fountain, voice of the county's prohibition movement For his part,
Patterson wanted to unite local Whigs around such traditional issues as reform of the
Public Works and protectionism. Like Femi, he attacked the independent Maine Law
ticket "as a trick worthy of the best wire-workers in the State." One month into his
editorship, in response to charges that he opposed the Maine Law, Patterson offered the
orthodox Whig view of the whole matter of moral refonn and its relation to regular
party politics. "We never discussed the question in our columns, nor do we intend to
do so now....We devoted our colunms to the success of Whig candidates...without ever
intimating our views on the moral reform being agitated."^" It was a response that
captured perfectly what Maine Law reformers believed was wrong with the local Whig
party. Political calculations, not moral imperatives, guided the Whigs; Whigs offered
silence on the Maine Law, not open avowals of positions for or against.
Fenn and Patterson's championship of the "old landmarks" of Whiggery sowed
the seeds of discontent among Maine Law proponents in Dauphin County. That
discontent was antipartisan and political, though Maine Law politics rested on a thick
overlay of social anxieties and moral aspirations. A large and impassioned meeting in
Middletown condemned intemperance as "the greatest scourge that has afflicted our
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Commonwealth, and the most prolific source of crime, immorality and pauperism-
Clyde also routinely pointed to the social costs of intemperance and the pecuniary
advantages of a Maine Law. "The people will gain fromy^v. to ten millions annually in
money saved by the abolition of the liquor traffic." Clyde failed to cite the source of his
estimates, but no doubt most of his readers were less interested in matters of evidence
than the comiections Clyde drew between "the people," felt social problems, and a
reform cause that transcended party politics. Local women, too, threw "their influence
in the scale of Humanity, Patriotism, and Religion." Clyde, for his part, felt it
necessary to publicly approve of women's Maine Law activism. "Let them talk, write,
petition, hold meetings, agitate for the Maine Law," he wrote. Having given the
women his benediction, Clyde described the Maine Law in gendered terms. The law
would serve as a "broad shield...spread for the protection of every wife, mother and
every daughter."'' Like reformers in New London County, Dauphin County
prohibitionists framed the Maine Law as a public necessity with broad implications for
the protection ofwomen and children and the betterment of society.
Given the cold welcome by Whig regulars and the implacable opposition of
most Democrats, Maine Law reformers inevitably sharpened their antiparty attacks on
party government itself Maine Law reformers declared with thumping certainty that
"the people demand a law," and assured everyone, "they will have it, regardless of the
consequences to the existing political parties." The fate of political parties mattered
not in the great moral crusade of prohibition. According to reformers, petitions were
one measure of the popularity of their crusade. In 1853, Maine Law forces across the
atlon.
ature
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state marshalled a petition over 300,000 strong, and leaders made plain that this was
the legislature's last chance. "If the people are agam disappomted, and their petitions
disregarded," the question of prohibition will enter politics "to the disorganization and
defeat of the existing parties." Should lawmakers refuse to enact a prohibition statute,
another Maine Law meeting declared, "it will...become our duty to use our political
power in such a way as to secure a legislature favorable to prohibition."*^
Despite the threats, the Democratic-controlled assembly balked at legisl
Local Maine Law activists were incredulous, and infiiriated. "Such another Legisl
cannot be elected in the face of an Indignant Press and an outraged people," wrote
William P. Coulter, editor of the independent Crystal Fountain. Coulter linked the
failure to the wider culture of corruption and logrolling that pervaded Pennsylvania
government. He published indictments of the 1853 legislature taken from the regional
press and complained of the legislature's "neglect of public business and public
interests." Corruption and bribery was widespread, the "representatives of the people
bought and sold like sheep." Democrats and Whigs alike, concluded Coulter, must
undertake to send a "REFORMED AND REGENERATED LEGISLATURE."" For
Maine Law reformers in Dauphin County, antiparty appeals followed legislative inertia
and party backpedaling.
Conclusion
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The early 1850s have long been interpreted as years of ethnoreligious
polarization in the North, punctuated by a few obtrusive antislavery reformers out to
rekindle interest in the slavery issue and develop a politics based on sectional
identification.- That interpretive framework has yielded important insights into the
changing social composition of the northern electorate, the role of local and state issues
in mid-nineteenth-century public life, and the social cultural origins of the Know
Nothing party. But the evidence from Dauphin, Essex, and New London suggests that
more complex political forces stirred the electorate prior to the Know Nothing eruption.
In these years a Zeitgeist of "reform" swept across the counties. Reform
assumed many and various guises, and directed attention to a range of political
strategies and solutions. In this light, Essex County presents the most interesting case,
for reformers there focused mainly on political economic issues, not ethnoreligious
ones.^' Also of particular interest is the broader debate in Pennsylvania over the Public
Works and the corrupt culture of lawmaking that gradually intensified in these years.
As we shall see, the Know Nothing movement would assimilate their nativist agenda to
this larger political cultural milieu, combining anti-Catholicism with a forcible assault
on the patronage politics and corrupt practices that the Public Works emblematized.
Then too, Connecticut's spring 1854 elections demonstrated the intensity of popular
anger with the Democratic party's pro-slavery orientation, a harbinger of things to
come in the other states. To be sure, the Maine Law crusade in both Dauphin and New
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London can be broadly tenned ethnoreligious in character. And cerminly the Know
Nothings would take up ethnoreligious causes. But it will not do to abstract
ethnoreligious issues from their wider political context. In all three counties, reformers
differentiated themselves from the party regime by politicizing issues that lay outside
the boundaries of normative Whig/Democratic polities and developed alternative forms
of political mobilization to realize their goals.
Part of the reason lay in the specificity of the reformers' agenda and the
uncompromising character of the movements they led. Reformers adopted the broad
rhetoric of the popular vernacular to couch their causes in the name of the public good,
yet they also demanded quite specific answers from govemment-a Maine Law statute,
a ten-hour working day, constitutional revision, the overturn of the Nebraska bill, and
so on. Reform gained momentum in these years for a number of reasons, including the
socioeconomic and cultural transformations that imbricated anti-liquor crusades and
labor reform. But reform also attracted attention because the parties' distributive
policies, framed in the popular vernacular, had long since raised expectations among
citizens about the nonpartisan, public purpose of politics and particularly government.
Although most citizens rightly viewed the parties' lofty claims about service to the
public good with some skepticism, they nevertheless expected principled leadership
and a minimum of partisan calculation when elites took up matters of governance.
When sharp-eyed reformers spotted persistent societal-wide problems, citizens took
stock of party government and its leaders. Eventually, the reformers' antiparty critique
of a corrupt, unresponsive political system seemed persuasive. By 1853-4, many
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citizens, alienated from their party organ.zations and nush with reform ideas, became
convinced that politics and government required a major overhaul. Into this context
rushed nativism.
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CHAPTER V
TO "EXCLUDE BROKEN-DOWN WIRE-PULLERS AND PARTY HACKS-
KNOW NOTHING POPULISM
In October 1854, Harrisburg's Stephen Miller, editor of both the I larrisburg
Morning Herald 'md Harrisburg Telegraph, analyzed the Know Nothings' startling
success in the recent election. A prominent Maine Law activist. Miller had spent the
previous months railing against "political Jesuitism" and championing the mysterious
Know Nothing order. With the Know Nothings assured of a Governor and majority
control of the House of Representatives, Miller described the antiparty temper that
underlay the movement. "There is a determination everywhere to take from the
professional politicians the government of States and cities..." The Democrats and
Whigs had treated "this country as the mere skittle-ground of gambling politicians,"
and for that the Know Nothings had overthrown "the banded officials and their servile
press." "The purposes for which the great Know Nothing movement has been
organized" Miller concluded proudly, "is the purification of official administration
[and] the preservation of American Nationality."'
Know Nothing self-descriptions in Essex and New London counties echoed
Miller's patriotic and antiparty drum-beating. The leading nativist organ in New
London County listed the "overthrow of corrupt parties and politicians" among the
Know Nothings' first principles. Likewise the Hartford Courant, the Connecticut
Know Nothings' statewide mouthpiece, called the movement "a spontaneous uprising
of the great middling classes; the real virtue, enterprise and substance of the land
was
men s
irrespective of old fogy party hacks."^ A Know Nothing from Essex County
more effiisive. This portrait, Hke many, glossed over nativist xenophobia with
astonishing equanimity. With no apparent irony this writer asserted that the Know
Nothings were "true Americans who left the party clique, and cast all prejudice
aside." The Know Nothings' rapid rise demonstrated an elemental principle of
politics: "when a party gets corrupt, the sooner a man clears his skirts of them the
better." Notwithstanding the bizarre sartorial metaphor, clearing one's "skirt" of
corrupt parties was the crux of the matter. The Know Nothings were hard sons of toil
who had cast off the yoke of party to bring democracy and good government back to
the Bay State. "The American movement gives more power to the mechanics, the
true strength of the country. It excludes those broken-down wire-pullers and party
hacks who will sell themselves for political office."^
What are we to make of these antiparty self-images? It is tempting to dismiss
this nativist variant of the popular vernacular as transparent bombast. In the
antebellum language of political suasion, as we have seen, the antiparty ideal of
patriotic principle trumping particularistic interest was ubiquitous. So, too, was the
related construction of designing politicians threatening the public interest and its
embodiment, the nation's expansive class of upright, independent producers. As
historian Michael Kazin has most recently shown, these reified categories have been
close to the center of American political discourse since the birth of mass parties."
But to regard antiparty rhetoric simply as a common lexicon of political
discourse, indiscriminately deployed by elites and insurgents across time and setting
and political spectrum would be unsatisfactory. In regards to the Know Nothings (or
any other insurgency), such an approach conflates the movement's political
distinctiveness and oppositional character with the normative currents of American
political culture. Worse, such an approach could lead to a cynical evaluation of the
movement's pronouncements of faith, reducing them to base voter manipulation.
Know Nothing self-descriptions conveyed real beliefs and expectations of their
movement, of their political setting, and of the state of governance as they viewed it
in the mid- 1 850s. Many people in the three counties had both good reasons and new
vehicles for turning against the regime of party government. Reformers politicized
new issues by utilizing antiparty techniques and appealing to the nonpartisan ideal of
governance. The parties and their leaders, reformers charged, corrupted governance
by allowing partisan motives to guide action on crucial public questions involving
liquor, political economic and labor reform, and slavery. Ultimately, the Know
Nothing movement's signal achievement was its capacity to absorb many "reform"
impulses under a single, transcendent vehicle that promised to reconstitute
government's purity of purpose. Embedded in the movement's programmatic
multiplicity were two common denominators: extreme anger at the regime of partisan
politics and idealized notions of the pursuit of the public good in governance.
Elaborating upon the work of earlier reformers, the Know Nothings used nativism to
complete the process of political translation whereby new issues entered the space of
formal politics. Partisan politics thwarted the public good by bending governance to
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serve party ends. Native-born citizens attracted to Know Nothingism hoped to
recenter governance on what most perceived to be its normative nonpartisan axis.
In this sense the specific issues in play in Know Nothing politics were less
important than their indictment of how party leaders handled those issues. Issues,
most prominently immigration, served as a kind of ballast in Know Nothing culture
around which the movement framed a larger agenda ofjettisoning partisanship and
turning out the regime's corrupt party officials. Know Nothings always folded their
specific fears of Irish-Catholics-and for that matter, all of their demon "Others"-into
the political situation as they perceived it. The most basic of Know Nothing beliefs
was that they were collectively engaged in a reform movement, distinct from and
opposed to partisan politics. They considered their movement immune to the partisan
calculations and obligations which had, in their view, hogtied the leadership of the
regime and laid bare its disastrous failures.
In this light Know Nothing antipartyism has intrinsic analytic and conceptual
significance. If situated in the appropriate political economic context and taken
seriously as a relational category of political thought and action, it can reveal both the
scope of discontent with the two-party regime among Know Nothings and the
constitutive features of their distinctive political culture~in a word, their "movement
culture."^ This chapter aims to recover that movement culture in its formative stages.
First, it locates Know Nothingism in the specific social context of the three counties,
and from there traces the Know Nothing movement culture to suggest the antiparty
character of 1 850s-style populism. Before investigating the Know Nothings'
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movement culture, it will lielp to brieHy investigate the social dimensions of the
movement.
The Social Dimensions ofKnow Nothinfrkm
In general, the social bases ofKnow Nothingism in the three counties diverged
little from the conventional wisdom: Know Nothing candidates ran strongest in
industrial-factory-urban towns and towns with high percentages of evangelical
Protestant denominations (Tables B. 1 3-B. 1 8). Without question, Know Nothingism
both reflected and politicized the social and cultural transitions of the decade: the
threat to Protestant certitudes posed by immigrants and their associated cultural
dispositions, particularly those of Irish Catholics; and economic insecurity attendant
upon immigration and the North's industrializing market economy.^ Partly on these
grounds alone the movement appealed strongly to younger, first-time and casual
voters. Low turnout among the demoralized Whigs and unenthused Democrats and
Free Soilers further inflated Know Nothing majorities.^
Consider New London County, the Know Nothings' banner county in
Connecticut's spring 1855 election. Here the Know Nothing state ticket, headed by
ex-Whig William T. Minor, carried 17 ofNew London's 18 towns-all but four with
an outright majority. The order appeared in fall 1853 in New Haven as a small
fraternal organization and slowly rose to power during the second half of 1854. New
Haven was the de facto nerve center for the order, headed by Nehemiah D. Sperry, a
shrewd operative who had solidified his poUtical friendships and honed his
organizational skills as Arch Chancellor of the Connecticut Order of United
Americans (OUA). In February, with a membership of 22,000 billeted in 169 lodges,
the Know Nothings pegged Minor to head their independent state ticket over then
Whig Governor Henry Dutton, who had signed the state's 1854 Maine Law.«
Though the movement was led mainly by ex-Whigs, Minor attracted roughly
equal numbers of Democrats and Whigs, while also gaining a significant share of the
independent Free Soil vote. The extent of Know Nothing power is somewhat
obscured by the statewide returns. Minor could only muster a bare plurality in a
three-way race against separate Democratic and old-line Whig tickets. But across the
state the Know Nothings ftised with Democrats, Whigs, and Free Soilers in state
assembly and senate races, thereby carrying the General Assembly overwhelmingly.
In New London County the Know Nothings' three state senate nominees averaged
64% of the popular vote, while Know Nothing~or Know Nothing approved-
candidates won 26 of the county's 27 assembly seats.'
Know Nothing power concentrated in the county's coastal belt. The chief
point of entry for new immigrants, the coastal belt comprised towns suffering a
stubborn recession and a declining whaling industry. New London, Stonington, and
Groton also harbored the county's largest sector of small-shop industry and
commerce; here scores of native-bom mechanics and petty merchants clung to their
independence amid the ravages of whaling's collapse. Know Nothingism also fared
better than average in the small to mid-sized cotton and woolen towns that ringed
Norwich. The parcy easily earried Norwich, another mduslrial center specializing in
textiles, paper, printing and ftreanns, albeit by a smaller figure than its countywide
average.'"
If impressionistic local accounts are valid, a steep rise in the prices of staple
goods and a drop in wages helped raise awareness of the immigrant "problem." for
younger mechanics, immigration refocused attention on the chaiiging social relations
between employer and employee. The appearance of the OUA and its sister
organization, the Order of United American Mechanics (GUAM), was one
manifestation of this growing restiveness among native-born middling sorts. As
nativist fraternal societies, the GUAM and GIJA offered an array of material benefits
and programs to a heterogenous Protestant membership. They offered entitlements
like disability "insurance" and financial assistance to widowed families. Regular
lectures on temperance and savings associations schooled members to the virtues of
self-improvement. Beyond this, the GUA and the GUAM, with their strange regalia
and assorted secret grips, passwords, and incantations, offered a ritual reaffirmation of
the cultural and social bonds that united native-born producers. Both organizations
prefigured the fraternal emphasis of Know Nothingism and served as staging grounds
for their antiparty politics. As one member of the New London GUAM put it, the
GUAM and GUA '^suppress party spirit," uniting "men of all parties" into a "purely
American Brotherhood" devoted to the "common good." The Know Nothing
contribution was to direct this fraternal energy into explicitly political channels."
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Inexorably, the influx of cheap labor into urban areas enabled employers to
challenge the mutualistic social relations that the OUA and OUAM embodied. The
complaints of one OUAM member are illustrative. He wrote of a local manufacturer
who quipped that he could easily replace his highly paid native-bom workforce with
"workmen oiforeign birth, who would be glad to work for four dollars a month and
board!" Initially, the manufacturer resisted the temptation, but pressure to reduce
costs was apparently too strong (or too attractive) to resist a pay cut of twenty-five
percent. Curiously, the mechanic did not begrudge the manufacturer for slashing
wages. Rather, he took a step back and examined the decision in context. There were
two crucial points to take fi-om the episode. First, it would not be very long "before
those who are disposed to pay a fair price for labor will be compelled to follow the
example of their unscrupulous competitors, or abandon their business." The
competitive logic of the free market gave the upper hand to a few "grasping and
avaricious capitalists" and undermined the intentions of honorable employers to do
good by American labor. The employer's traditional sense of obligation to his
employees, the mutualism that had always existed among proprietor and joumeyman-
these customary relations were in jeopardy, and immigrants were to blame. The
second point, even more starkly drawn, was that as selfish capitalists displaced
honorable employers, American mechanics "will be reduced to the condition of
European serfs."'^
It is impossible to discern which of these two developments the writer rued
more~the erosion of mutualism among employer and employed, or his own job
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insecurity and potential proletarianization. For to this native-born mechanic the two
were clearly of a piece. The same process was at work in New London's merchant
houses, where clerks were astir over gmeling work schedules. Clerks held meetings
in July 1852 to call on the city's merchants to voluntarily close early, thereby
shortening the workday, normally about fourteen hours. The clerks appealed to the
merchants' sense of fraternity and mutual interest in closing early and shortening
hours for all. At least one merchant responded favorably, insisting that merchants had
"a duty in this matter" to refrain from lording over their employees, "even if they are
to us what we once were to others-clerks." But, according to this merchant, the
problem was more complex than the clerks seemed to realize. Larger market forces
increasingly conditioned labor relations, shunting moral considerations to the
margins. Alas, observed the merchant, even well-intentioned merchants had to keep
long hours because their competitors kept long hours.
In the early 1850s such incidents were episodic in New London County, but
nevertheless indicate a growing sense among native-bom middling sorts that labor
relations in the industrializing marketplace seemed impervious to purely private,
voluntaristic intervention. Such was undoubtedly the rationale behind the ten-hour
petition campaign that erupted in Norwich and surrounding milltowns in 1 853 and
1854.'" Though small in size and barely noticed amid the Maine Law and Nebraska
imbroglios, those efforts anticipated a more noteworthy campaign during the Know
Nothing-led assembly of 1855. As Know Nothingism took hold in New London
County, growing numbers of people turned to the state to solve problems of
governance that had once been the primaiy provmce of private, voluntaristic action.
But that lay just ahead of the horizon. As the Know Nothings organized and
made appeals to voters, they rarely made specific arguments about labor laws or shop-
floor policies. Rather, they deployed an elastic economic nationalism that could
appeal to struggling workers and small producers and well-off employers alike. More
so in New London than in either Essex or Dauphin counties, nativist cries for
protectionism were incantatory. Norwich's Andrew Stark, convinced that foreign
investments bled the nation of its own capital, urged "American laborers" to "protect
themselves by protecting capital." For Know Nothings, it was vital that native-bom
merchants, mechanics, and manufacturers recognize their common interest in
protecting economic opportunity in America. Such opportunity was central to
maintaining avenues of upward mobility. This construction gained greater salience in
the process of distinguishing Americans from immigrants. Native-bom "journeyman
mechanics," wrote the Hartford Couranfs Thomas Day, well knew "the distinction
which should exist, between skilled labor and uninstructed labor. It was utterly idle to
tell these skilled laborers that they have nothing to fear from competition with raw
imported labor from Europe."'^ Ignorant, unskilled, dependent on wage work,
immigrants embodied the fears of many who felt that opportunities for modest
accumulation and upward mobility might someday be choked off The solution
offered by Know Nothings~a movement that would both protect and privilege
American rights and institutions-implied a mutuality of economic interest among
native-bom members of the producing and capitalist classes.
The Know Nothings in Pemisylvania, even more so than Comiecticut,
magnified their influence through fusion with both the major parties at the state and
local level. The movement eschewed an independent state ticket, instead choosing
from among Whig, Democratic, and Native American candidates already in the field.
A considerable degree of maneuvering and wire-pulling among Know Nothing
leaders and party regulars cloud these arrangements, but one thing is clear: in what
amounted to a secret primary, local lodges across the state selected Whig candidate
James Pollock to head their own state ticket after Pollock reportedly joined a Know
Nothing lodge in Philadelphia. Pollock, a Presbyterian known for his moral stridency,
also won the nomination of the tiny Free Soil party and the state's muscular
Prohibition movement after he pledged opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act and
support for a Maine Law.'^
Despite the choice of Pollock, the Pennsylvania Know Nothing movement
was no mere recrudescence of Whiggery. Know Nothing lodges selected Democratic
candidate Henry Mott (widely believed to be a Know Nothing) for canal
commissioner and the Nafive American candidate Thomas H. Baird (a Know
Nothing) for supreme court. The choice of Baird assured a means to measure
independent Know Nothing strength across the state, and to the astonishment of Whig
regulars, Baird' s total clearly showed that Know Nothings dominated the state's anti-
Democratic forces.''' Dauphin County Know Nothings cleaved to the multi-party state
ticket, but in local races, mostly backed nominal Whigs who were members ofKnow
Nothing lodges. Know Nothings nmnmg as Whigs easily won races for state senator,
and U.S. Congress. The only Democrat to receive the movement's endorsement was
Hummelstown's Jonathan Stehley, a close confidant of Simon Cameron who carried
one of the county's two state assembly seats, evidently following assurances from the
county's Know Nothing hierarchy that a Democratic Know Nothing would be placed
on the local ticket.'*
Know Nothing-backed candidates did best in towns notable for their
dissenting or mixed religious orientations, high proportions of non-agricultural
workers, and high per capita farm and property values (Tables B. 15 and B.16).
Predictably, they did less well in towns dominated by German Reformed and
Lutheran accommodations. Supreme Court Justice Baird tallied far below his
countywide average in four of five church German towns. Nevertheless, it is clear
that in certain communities a large fi-action of German stock voters gravitated, if
perhaps uneasily, towards the Know Nothings because of the movement's anti-
Catholicism. For example, the Upper End small-shop town of Lykens, served
exclusively by German Lutheran and Reformed accommodations, was one of the
Know Nothings' strongest. Several church German ministers regularly issued anti-
Catholic sermons, while others lent their meeting houses to local Maine Law
meetings, a cause closely linked to Dauphin County Know Nothingism. The county's
chiefKnow Nothing publicist, Stephen Miller, a third-generation German Methodist,
openly courted German stock Protestants by focusing on "Popery" and muting the
broader anti-immigrant themes in natwist rhetoric and goals. German stock bulked
large in the social composition of Dauphin County, thus shaping the local character of
political nativism, and prompting area Know Nothings to enlist Protestants of all
nationalities in the war against ''Jesuitical schemes.'"'
At the same time, the Know Nothings' enthusiastic support for Prohibition
drove away many Germans, especially the more libertarian Lutherans. Indeed, church
German towns overwhelmingly rejected prohibition in the non-binding ballot
question on the issue. Democrats campaigned against the plebiscite by targeting
German wheat and lye farmers and imi-keepers. Hoping to "scare the country people
by its [the Maine Law] effect," Democrats circulated anti-Maine Law tracts (printed
in both German and English) that emphasized personal liberty and the economic
losses that prohibition would surely visit upon farmers. Such appeals worked, leading
a frustrated Stephen Miller to launch harangues at German "Lager Beer" houses as the
campaign wore on.^" Cross-pressured by competing issues and loyalties, Dauphin's
German stock voters divided in 1854.
Miller's close association with the Maine Law movement and the keen interest
that the plebiscite question generated gave Dauphin County Know Nothingism a
strong prohibition cast. But forces besides anti-liquor fervor also underlay the
movement. As in New London, economic issues leavened Know Nothingism in
certain Dauphin County towns. The context was similar; high prices and low wages
plagued the county's commercial towns throughout 1854. Miller occasionally
invoked protectionist labor doctrines and the "cheapening and degradation of
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American labor" by Irish immigrants. Such rhetoric undoubtedly reassured American
mechanics whose nativist sensibilities had been awakened by the fraternal
brotherhoods. Indeed, several of the Know Nothings strongest towns, including
Lykens, Middletown and Harrisburg, had histories ofOUAM activism. Moreover,
several influential labor leaders, including George H. Morgan, Robert S. Boyd, Henry
Radabaugh (an OUAM leader), and Washington W. Barr all joined the same nativist
lodge. In fact Morgan was a founding member, and he and Radabaugh openly
canvassed on behalf of "Americanism" during the 1 854 campaign. Historian Gerald
Eggert's analysis of the social composition of this lodge, based on an extant
membership list, confirms the well-established pattern: middling skilled and semi-
skilled tradesmen, clerks, and small merchants joined in higher proportions than their
numbers in the city at large. Stephen Miller's description of the social base ofKnow
Nothingism, at least in Harrisburg, was probably not far off the mark: men "who
occupy the middle ground between riches and poverty."^'
As clear as the movement's social and ethnoreligious tendencies appear, it
must be emphasized that Know Nothingism attracted a broad, heterogeneous
constituency. This was particularly so in Massachusetts, where the Know Nothings
swept nearly every town and state office with a record majority. "There has been no
revolution so complete since the organization of government," observed an awestruck
Charles Francis Adams after the 1854 election. Unlike Connecticut and
Pennsylvania, the Massachusetts Know Nothings fielded completely independent
tickets at both the state and local levels.^^ Essex was one of four Massachusetts
counties where Know Nothing gubernatorial candidate Henry Gardner, a wool
merchant with Whig antecedents, received over 66% of the popular vote. Gardner
carried all of Essex's 32 towns, 30 with an outright majority.
Statewide the Know Nothings ran strongest in urban and industrial centers,
and Essex County was no exception. The shoe towns of Lynn and Haverhill and the
factory towns of Andover, Salisbury, and Lawrence delivered enormous majorities to
Gardner, as did several towns with a mix of small shops and larger factories. Shoe
and factory towns underwent rapid transformation in the 1850s, as immigrants,
railroads, and California gold enabled capitalists to consolidate and expand these
industries. The pace of change was particularly acute in shoes and textiles, but also
jarring in other trades, including carriage-making and comb manufacturing. Chronic
unemployment and depressed wages in the shoe and textile industries added to the
county's economic woes."
It is tempting to read from this evidence a direct link between Know
Nothingism and working-class politicization. Indeed, one scholar has concluded that
Massachusetts Know Nothingism was an uprising of the urban working-class
suffering the dislocations of industrialization. True enough, Essex County Know
Nothingism had a labor orientation rooted in the reform agenda of the Coalition,
including the ten-hour day. Yet labor reform was but one of several threads running
through the movement. As Tables B. 1 7 and B. 1 8 show. Know Nothingism was by no
means limited to industrial enclaves, to say nothing of native-bom "working-class"
voters.^" Like the movement statewide, the Know Nothings in Essex decisively
carried farming communities and small-shop towns. The movement cut across the
fault lines of class, party, denominational affihation, and economic typology partly by
constructing a multifaceted argument about the impact of unchecked immigration. In
Essex, as in the other counties, the immigrant-lumpen, clannish, alien-became a
master symbol for the forces of both moral decay and social stratification. As
metaphor for the impersonal and amoral industrial order, the immigrant embodied a
world wracked by clashing social groups and bereft of moral certitudes.
Some observers directly implicated immigrant Irish labor in the regional
recession. One described how immigrants "introduce the greatest of all curses which
can visit a manufacturing community, a permanent class of factory operatives."
Something had to be done to preserve cherished ways of life, this nativist contended,
before "the evils which have characterized the manufacturing towns of the old world
[are] transplanted with their operatives into our manufacturing towns."^^ in Essex
County, as elsewhere, immigrants symbolized the degree to which impersonal market
forces redefined the meaning of fi-ee labor to include a perennial underclass of
dependent wage workers.
Irish-Catholic resistance to Protestant conventions also fueled conflict. In
Lynn and Lawrence, Irish-Catholic families protested the use of the King James Bible
in the public schools, sparking reaction among angry Protestants. Catholic attempts
to gain public ftmds for parochial schools enraged Protestants, while the formation of
Irish militia and fraternal groups sent natives into a frenzy. Nativists blamed
immigration for introducing "criminals and paupers" to the region, echoing the
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arguments of Maine Law supporters who Hnked Hquor to a profusion of social
problems. Indeed, as the native-bom sought to clarify their identity amid the
onslaught of newcomers, many simply refused to admit that Irish-Catholic immigrants
were anything but a "drunken, vagrant class," unreachable through the hoary
traditions of self-improvement and moral suasion.^*
Such demonology was commonplace in all three counties, suggesting
nativism's wide and multidimensional appeal. In fact there is a real danger in
obscuring the heterogeneity ofKnow Nothingism by focusing only on its central
tendencies. For example, in each county (but especially Dauphin and Essex), Know
Nothingism found numerous adherents among "orthodox" Protestant communicants.
If, as one enemy charged, the Know Nothings were "Red Republicans" in politics,
they were often simply "Protestants" in religion. In its ability to mobilize across
denominational lines, Know Nothingism gestured distinctly towards a Protestant
ecumenism built upon the postmillennial idea that Christian activism and spiritual
awakening must necessarily antedate the Lord's second coming." Know Nothings in
all three counties repeatedly invoked "Protestantism" to unify an otherwise diverse
constituency behind a messianic project to repulse Romanism's march across
America. Roman Catholicism was said to be "venomous as the asp, poisonous as the
dragon, bloodthirsty as the starving hyena." Its spread threatened to "make America a
combination of numberless clans, as discordant in their purposes as in their national
characteristics."^^ More than mere bigotry was in play here. Immigrant Catholics
symbolized a genuine cultural transition in American public life. With immigration
re-constituting the nation's social and cultural fabric, Know Nothings turned to
Protestantism to reassert purity and singularity of purpose and vision. Local
Protestant churches witnessed revivals as political nativism crystallized, while local
clergy threw their support behind anti-Catholicism and other reforms. Know Nothmg
movement culture was in part an expression of this reinvigorated religiosity among
native-bom Protestants and their clergy, politicizing the ahistorical belief, made
possible by a sudden inundation of the "Other," that a common religious bond unified
the nation's institutions and history of past greatness. Nativists constructed a patriotic
cosmology with Protestant certitudes at the center of things. Revivalism and cultural
chauvinism also fueled the movement's unremitting optimism, a righteous faith that
native Protestantism would conquer foreign Catholicism-that good would triumph
over evil.^'
Just as the movement's appeal bridged denominational differences, so too
those of class. The central tendency was plebeian, but it is claiming too much to see
Know Nothingism as a stalking horse for working-class politics. When viewed across
all three counties the movement appears a rather miscellaneous assemblage. What
can be said, however, is that the economic transitions of the times (railroads,
industrialism, increased commercialism) set the broad context for the movement's
appearance and subsequent appeal. Middling voters came to feel that impersonal
economic and demographic processes introduced fundamental changes in the social
structure and moral fabric of community life. Voters acutely concerned for their
economic security found in Know Nothingism a movement that addressed, however
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unsystematically, their anxieties over a social order increasingly fragmented by class
and ordered by impersonal market forces, not the ethical maxims of Protestantism".
Know Nothings built on the hoary ideal of America as the land of social harmony,
unified by shared economic goals and Protestant virtues. Permanent cultural
differences and class distinctions scarcely existed in such a construction. In Know
Nothing discourse the immigrant reflected people's worries over troubling centrifugal
forces in American society. That same discourse also inscribed immigrant lifestyle
choices and culture as antagonistic and amoral. Know Nothing discourse, in turn,
framed the movement as an all-purpose vehicle for the advancement of the public
good, defined by its elision of the Irish-Catholic immigrant.^"
Know Nothing Antipartyism
It is easy to trace the social dimensions ofKnow Nothingism, but questions
remain. What was the political character of the Know Nothing movement? What did
it mean in political terms to be a Know Nothing, a third party movement that asked its
members to jettison party attachments and identify with a new constellation of
emotional referents? Here, we need to investigate the formal political frameworks of
the movement. Certainly, the Know Nothing movement had origins in rapid social
change, but in the final analysis was a populist uprising against the regime of regular
politics. As an electoral movement, its success turned on its facility in translating
broad social anxieties into meaningful political and governmental problems.
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What did it mean to be a Know Nothing in the movement's formative days?
At the center of the Know Nothmg movement culture was its double-edged antiparty
appeal: Know Nothings stressed the corrosive effects of a corrupt political regime
while also constructing a positive image of the movement as a popular, regenerative
vehicle for the reform of politics and governance. Know Nothings saw special
interests and partisan intrigue looming everywhere in 1854, corrupting governance
and thwarting the public good. Their broad antiparty rhetoric mediated the many
issues and grievances in play in 1 854-immigration, the expansion of slavery, liquor,
industrialism, political corruption, and so on. Antipartyism blurred this issue-
diversity, enabling Know Nothings to avoid setting priorities on contentious issues
with partisan overtones that might turn some against the movement. The Know
Nothing movement stood against the political power of immigrants, calculating
politicians, and party government; beyond that, any specific elaboration of aims might
inflame divisive partisan identifications.
Antipartyism also served the movement in other ways. As a political
organization, the Know Nothings were lacking in several particulars that formal
political parties always rely upon during campaigns: the emotional ties of rank and
filers constituted over years of partisan campaign and response; the cohesive
functioning of an integrated organization; a stable leadership; a disciplined press.
Indeed, such characteristics were anathema to Know Nothings, who offered an
implicit critique of formal party organization when they routinely denounced "old
fogyism." By focusing on fawning politicians and washed-up party organizations,
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Know Nothings overcame this deficiency by turning i, into a virtue. Know Nothings
attacked partisan politics for its paucity of principles. In turn, they constructed a
public culture that celebrated the movement's sources in the antiparty tradition-,he
framework of public life devoted to nonpartisan governance.
Essex County
March 1854 witnessed the Know Nothings' initial foray into Essex County
politics, but tight-lipped nativists must have quietly organized parts of the county well
before that date. The Know Nothings had founded lodges in Boston in fall 1853 in
anticipation of the city election in December, which the movement carried easily.
Know Nothing lodges, organized as secret fraternal associations modeled on the OUA
and OUAM, spread quickly beyond Suffolk County. But the Know Nothing's cloak
of secrecy kept Essex County in the dark about the presence of the mysterious order
until the spring, when its opening political salvo stunned seasoned observers. With
barely a warning, Know Nothing tickets swept several spring municipal elections,
including Democratic Marblehead and Lynn, and Whiggish Salem, where high
turnout in the plebeian wards delivered a 70% majority for Mayor George L.
Newcomb, a political neophyte with a base in the city's machine shops. Word soon
spread of "wigwams" and "lodges" in several of the factory towns, no doubt piquing
interest in the new movement. By mid-August Know Nothing lodges flourished in
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nearly eveo' Essex County town, leading one knowledgeable sympathizer to crow,
"they claim a clean majority."^'
As the movement spread sympathetic editors printed what they took to be the
Know Nothings' platform. These convey both the abrasive and amorphous quality of
typical Know Nothing boilerplate. The movement stood for "War to the Hilt, on
Romanism!" and "Death to all Foreign Influences whether in high places or low!"
and simply, "American principles." As publicly framed, the Know Nothing agenda
was specific on only two counts: laws to prevent the organization of foreign-bom
militia companies and extend the nation's naturalization period to twenty-one years.^^
As an agenda for future legislative action, this was pretty thin. From time to time
nativist editors betrayed their personal preferences for other reforms, usually
antislavery, occasionally labor and other political economic reforms. But such
digressions rarely occurred within the specific context of advancing the cause of
nativist politics." Early on antislavery and other reforms, though often invoked and
clearly part of the spate of issues which propelled voter disgust with politics-as-usual,
appeared oddly removed from nativism.
Nativists were more direct in pegging the immigrant to problems of
governance. Linked to a raft of social ills, immigrants seemed incorrigible
degenerates bent on undermining cherished institutions and beliefs. Know Nothings
viewed the crime and drinking and public disorder that immigrants allegedly brought
to the New World as problems of social governance which the major parties had
failed miserably to address. What was worse, the politicians, placing party fortunes
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above the public good, vigorously courted these newcomers rather than meet the
public's need for prohibition or pauper removal. The Know Nothings' loldcd their
campaign to curb the political privileges of Roman Catholics into a larger critique of
partisanship despoiling govermmce. This happened, according to Know Nothings,
every time leaders of the two parties shamelessly truckled to imnugrants and other
special interests and ignored the problems caused by both. This ant.party sensibility,
more than any individual issue or combination of issues, provided Know Nothing.sm
with its transcendent quality and unilying thematic thread. Searching for answers for
the Know Nothings stcU-tling success in 1854, one Essex County Democrat recounted
how "Americanism was simultaneously hoisted, and every supposed issue abandoned-
-except opposition to the old parties^ "It is not Anti-Catholicism," continued this
local pol, "which furnishes ground for action...we aie told--but a sudden and
sweeping hostility to the old paities."'"
Know Nothing antipartyism often consisted of blanket indictments of
politicians, reflecting the indeterminacy that this old-line Democrat found so vexing.
At other times, however, nativists were quite specific about recent failures of the
state's political regime. In Tlssex County, this meant the Whig establishment and its
resistance to "reform." I he Whigs' narrow defeat of the 1853 Constitution was one
issue that allowed publicists to synthesi/.e anti-Catholic and anti-Whig sentiment.
Many proponents of the Con.stitution believed that Irish Catholics, energi/ed by
question //6 prohibiting the use of public funds for parochial .schools, had provided
the margin of victory against the Constitution. As a result, griped one nativist, the
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Irish gave "the government of Massachusetts into the hands of a powerful party." Tlte
"whole influence of Catholic priests" combined with "the money-bags of State
Street," had defeated the Constitution. Another described the fallout that this alleged
Whig-Irish alliance caused in local politics: "The Catholics...have only made more
sure the adoption of an anti-sectarian amendment to the Constitution, while the Whigs
have provoked the formation of a new party which...will probably sweep the State
next fall." The "Whigs," concluded this writer, "deserve severe rebuke and
chastisement for first setting the example in Massachusetts of an appeal to religious
prejudices in favor of party success.""
Other recent actions by Whiggery prompted still more opprobrium. True to
their 1853 Fitchburg "reform" platform, Whig lawmakers in 1854 enacted seven
constitutional amendments, including house and senate reapportionment, election by
plurality, popular election of various state and local offices, and the prohibition of
state funds for sectarian schools.^^ But by spring 1 854, such efforts fell short of
reformers' dreams, and at any event had initially encountered Whig stalling efforts.
Meanwhile, Whig lawmakers stood firm against yet another ten-hour bill, and balked
at other popular reforms like the secret ballot and abolition of imprisonment for debt.
The 1854 Whig-led legislature also failed to resolve the thorny issue of revising the
1852 prohibition statute after the state Supreme Court had rendered its search-and-
seizure clause unconstitutional. "A large majority of the people desire extensive
change," spat one critic in summation of the General Court's work, "and not the piece
of patchwork which the Whigs have endeavored to botch up." Another evaluation,
mass
m
flush with scathing contempt, closed with a pregnant warning: "How long the great
mass of the people of this Commonwealth will submit to Whig rule in this manner,
we know not. But for one, we are ready to lay aside party dictation, and help break up
this heartless, unprincipled minority clique, who aspire above the people."" In the
spring and summer of 1 854, labor reformers and Maine Law activists had ample
reason for laying aside "party dictation" to join a movement that promised to bring the
state's Whig-controlled regime crashing down.
The same can be said for Essex County's antislavery forces. The Kansas-
Nebraska Act rekindled intense interest in the slavery issue just as the Know Nothings
were organizing the grassroots. In spring 1854, while Congress debated the bill,
anti-Nebraska meetings, held "without distinction of party," spontaneously erupted i
many towns. In Lawrence, over 1,000 filled the public square on two separate
occasions to condemn the bill as a "deliberate breach of the plighted faith of the
Nation." Another bi-partisan meeting in Amesbury and Salisbury issued a ringing
denunciation of the bill and declared the expansion of slavery a "common danger" to
"Northern capital and labor." Free Soilers undoubtedly took the lead in these
meetings. But from the outset, Know Nothings also positioned themselves in the van
of anti-Nebraska unrest. A Lynn "American" called for a mass meeting and an anti-
Nebraska petition as early as February. As in New London County (see Chapter IV),
the Kansas-Nebraska Act politicized an issue that had, since 1850, remained outside
the framework of formal party politics. Many thus felt the issue had been
purposefully interjected by a self-serving Democratic party and administration on
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behalf of a special i„teres,-,he Slave Power-for rank political and material
objectives.^^
as an
Both the Free Soil and Whig establishments viewed Nebraska
opportunity to improve their party fortunes. With the state's Democratic party toeing
the national pro-Nebraska line, the Whigs jettisoned their old chestnut, the American
System, and focused almost exclusively on anti-Nebraska and anti-Administration
themes. Meanwhile, the Free Soilers, recognizing the broad bi-partisan support for
antislavery in Massachusetts, founded the state's Republican party in September of
1854, after a series of so-called "People's" meetings and conventions. Both strategies
were doomed to fail, but not, as is sometimes posited, because nativism trumped
antislavery among voters in 1854. For one thing, Massachusetts Whiggery had
become synonymous with clubby, aristocratic government well before the party's
eleventh-hour conversion to a radical antislavery-extension position. By August,
when the Whigs formally unveiled their antislavery campaign, much of the party's
popular base had already vanished.-*'
Doubts and suspicions also shadowed the incipient Republican party. Its
principle founders were ex-Free Soilers who were personally and politically
obnoxious to antislavery Whigs and Democrats, whose previous partisan animosities
towards "disunionists" still held strong. The residual bonds of party, more than
anything else, explains why antislavery Whigs and Democrats hesitated to join the
early Republican party, led as it was by longtime Free Soilers with axes to grind. Far
better to sit tight in the Know Nothing movement, which in Essex County, expressed
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unambiguous outrage at the Pierce Administration-that
"tool [of] of southern slave-
breeders"-but was not headed by an overweening cabal of single-minded zealots.
One local nativist said as much. Under the auspiciously blurred rubric Know
Nothingism, "party ties are dissolving, and the northern whig, democrat, and free
soiler, with the Nebraska villainy fresh before them, are shaking hands with each
other over pledges to LIBERTY AND THE NORTH." Thus, despite the
unprecedented rise in antislaveiy feeling during 1854, the reaction to the founding of
the Republican party in Essex County ranged from denunciation of this transparent
"Free Soil trick," to enthusiastic support of antislavery principles but caution towards
the organization itself.^° And when word leaked out that the Free Soil hack Henry
Wilson, the Republican Party's first gubernatorial nominee, was in fact already a
member of a Know Nothing lodge, the new organization had egg on its face and no
hope for the November election. In a final indignity that well-illustrated his
unmatched talent for opportunism, Wilson formally withdrew from the race a week
before the election, having secretly obtained the Know Nothings' endorsement of his
plan to run for U.S. Senate in the upcoming General Court session."'
Wilson was precisely the breed of professional office chaser that the Know
Nothings had secretly banded together to eliminate. From the outset, Know Nothing
lodges turned away many prominent politicians; Essex County lodges required
initiates to foreswear all former party allegiances and political connections before
members would agree to enroll them. Indeed, Know Nothings routinely distinguished
themselves from the unsavory practices of self-interested politicians and their
bankrupt political parties. "Close up all our public offices to those who would sell
our freedom to make party stock out of the operation" of immigration, raged one
nativist editor, as he explained the Know Nothings commitment to long naturalization
periods. Another complained that Catholics form "a distinct and important political
power which the great parties" prized above all. It was therefore "not surprising" that
immigration, "operating on the ambitions of political parties, should be found
corrupting the sources of executive and legislative authority." The influx of
immigrant voters raised partisan temperatures and corrupted govermnent. In such a
context, wrote another nativist, "principles have been sacrificed to the ignorance and
dishonesty of those...who have bartered them for place and power."^^
^^^^^^^
was straightforward: party politicians had dangerously threatened the nation by
courting immigrant votes. As reformers had done before them, the Know Nothings
indicted the partisan motives of politicians, this time for allowing the foreign enemies
of American institutions to gain influence over government.
Antipartyism communicated frustration with the regime, but also romanticized
Know Nothingism as a popular uprising to reform politics and government.
"Glorious Moment!" one Know Nothing editor gleeftilly regaled, "the crushing of
foreign influence and domestic politicians will produce a magnificent era in the
history of the Republic!" "The people have been so often tricked," wrote another,
"that party allegiance is now easily renounced, where the honor of the community and
public good require it." They would do "the CLEAN THING," wrote yet another,
"independent of old party organizations." The Know Nothing object, concluded this
na.,v,s., ,s
.0 take from the parties eontrol of .he government, and put i, in the hands
of the people.""^
The purpose of all this party-bashing was clear: the Know Nothings were a
movement to reform governance, not a party in the conventional sense.
Organizationally, this was to some extent the case; initially, of course, the movement
crystallized as a secret fraternal association. Its first victories in the spring municipal
elections were amiounced in editorials that puzzled over how "reform" tickets could
have exerted such cabalistic influence over so many voters.''^ This was not a formal
party, operating in the open, at the behest of established leaders, in the name of
platforms hammered out at public conventions and celebrated in partisan campaign
rituals. But Know Nothings' public image reflected much more than its early
organizational structure, which in any case gradually took on many of the features of a
recognizable party apparatus even as it remained "dark lantern.""' Know Nothings
sought above all to set themselves up as a patriotic movement apart from Party--that
type of political movement run by loathsome office chasers prone to unprincipled
compromises over pressing public issues. In political cultural terms, these were the
movement's primary emotional identifications and persuasions. The construction was
more than rhetorical. The secret meetings ofKnow Nothing lodges were sites to
forge bonds of patriotic commitment. Other, less furtive events provided similar
space for "becoming" American. A large American picnic, held in rural Georgetown,
attracted hundreds of families from northern Essex County towns. Here
"gentlemen...of sound American principles" and the "fair daughters of Essex North"
turned out for "the good cause." Nativist speeches and patriotic music by a local
brass band punctuated a day of cheerful feasting and friendship. Picnics celebrating
Americanism were both social occasions and formative political cultural events in the
process of establishing emotional ties to the nativist reform movement.''^
Antiparty rhetoric and self-images articulated with the political and social
enviromnent to set the parameters of what it meant to be a Know Nothing. Theirs
was a patriotic movement devoted to the defense of America against "the minions of
the Roman hierarchy." What cause could be any less partisan? Know Nothingism
implied an absence of spoilers and manipulators; indeed, it implied an absence of
party and partisanship itself Know Nothings promised that the movement would not,
"like another recent party, abandon their principles to procure a temporary party
triumph." As another nativist put it. Know Nothingism was "a mighty movement
now surging onward among Americans, awakening the hopes of every true patriot."
Success was certain, this nativist concluded, "if only we can keep politicians from the
helm."''
The epithet "politician" conjured unflattering images of Whig and Democratic
power-brokers, pandering to paddy and the Slave Power. These were the two most
obvious political enemies of "Americanism" in the political universe of Essex County
in 1854, serving to reinforce the rank and file's quixotic idea that the movement was
independent from and in opposition to all things partisan. A Know Nothing rank and
filer from Lynn perhaps described best what it meant to be a Know Nothing when he
endorsed Gloucester's Timothy Davis, Know Nothing candidate for U.S. Congress in
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the 6th district. Unlike conniving politicians who luxuriated in power, the young and
obscure Davis was "but a plain American citizen." Wrote Q: "Having spent his life
among laborers, fisherman, and mechanics, he is not above the people, but o/and
among them." Davis was a humble patriot, committed to nativist policies but
independent of party tethers that could pull him down a wrong-headed course. In
other words, Q concluded, Davis "loves his country more than party."''^
New London County
With the Know Nothings well organized by early 1855, it is not surprising that
established party activists viewed the movement with some alarm. New London Free
Soil leader Edward Prentiss initially suspected Know Nothingism a "Southern trick-
that might swallow up the "cause of Liberty and Temperance." Such fears would
prove entirely baseless, as events soon demonstrated, but on the eve of the 1855
campaign season Prentiss could only express astonishment at the "change
of...sentiment and action of some of (what we thought) our most reliable men." In
spite of his serious reservations Prentiss, no fool in politics, apparently joined a
nativist lodge after he was advised by a leading Know Nothing that membership was a
prerequisite for Know Nothing support of his candidacy for the state senate. Thus
aligned, Prentiss easily carried the 7th Senatorial district as an "American Whig."
For his part, Prentiss had a larger goal in mind when he joined the Know Nothings.
Before the election he and other local Free Soilers had discussed "whether we ought
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no.
,0 join the order and by tha, means do our best to guide the current." Know
Nothingism was gaining adherents everyday, Prentiss observed in early 1855, and
"such men must have leaders[;] our opponents...understa„d that very well.- In
seeming recognition that Free Soilism had reached its natural limits in New London
County, leading antislave^- activists hoped to infiltrate the Know Nothing movement
and guide it towards more radical ground.
Though Prentiss's strategy eventually worked, it was by no means clear in
1855 that Know Nothingism was a force that older party leaders could harness for
their own ends. As the movement spread across the county, the parties found it
difficult to keep their own rank and file in line. Nowhere was this more evident than
in the nominating process for state and federal offices. Typically, local Know
Nothings first met in secret to choose candidates. Then they would colonize Whig and
Free Soil conventions-an easy feat, since the secrecy oath meant that outsiders had no
idea who was and was not a Know Nothing. Thus Know Nothing activists ensured
their man would be endorsed by one of the other parties too. This was how Prentiss,
after timely conversion to nativism, gained both Know Nothing and Free Soil-Whig
backing. These tactics first beftiddled then enraged the old-line party faithftil who
were less skilled at the game than Prentiss. The Norwich Evening Courier, a
mouthpiece for establishment Whiggery, complained that the nomination of Francis
A. Peabody for state senate by the "Whigs" of the 8th Senate District suddenly left the
party without a candidate. "That he is a Know Nothing seems to be settled," the
Courier bemoaned, ''and that the eonvent.on wh.ch nominated hn....was made up of
members of that order, seem to be faets pretty well understood.-"
Though the party's impressive showing in 1855 might suggest a high degree
of organizational and programmatic unity, in reality Know Nothingism in
Connecticut, as elsewhere, composed a multiplicity of interests and issues that dely
easy classification. The labels adopted by Know Nothing cmdidates in 1855 suggest
the movement\s breadth: New London C c>unty Know Nothings variously ran as
"American,'' ''Whig American," "Democratic American," "I-ree Soil American," and
^'Independent American." One (Iroton representative, evidently uncertain as to the
state of things in 1855, decided to cast an unusually wide net by declaring him.self a
"Free Soil Whig American."^' To a considerable extent. New London, indeed the
whole state, lacked a political center of gravity in 1855.
Know Nothingism llUed the vacuum in large measure because of its
multivalent appeal, (nven the extended time between the order's appearance and its
maiden entry into .statewide politics, the nativi.st press had ample opportunity to
develop the nativist case on a range of issues. Several of the state's most important
and widely circulated sheets, including .lames Babcock's New Haven Palladium and
'Lhomas Day's Hartford Couranl, gravitated into the nativist orbit well before the
April 1855 election, giving Connecticut Know Nothingism a distinct antislavery and
protectionist character. These papers were supplemented by two publicly aligned
Know Nothing organs, the Merulcn Transcript and the Norwich State (luard. The
Meriden Transcript, edited by a young Orville II. IMatt, then straight of out a law
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apprenticeship, was the successor organ to the Connecticut Whi,, a "family" weekly
devoted to temperance, public education, the tariff, and the "mechanic arts."
Displaying the political instincts that would eventually make him one of
Connecticut's most influential Republican politicians, Piatt seized the nativist
moment in January 1 855, renaming his paper the Meriden Transcript and fashionmg
it into an unabashed Know Nothing paper. The Norwich State Guard was published
by none other than the obscure Maine Law publicist Andrew Stark. By the fall of
1854, with Comiecticut's Maine Law safely on the books. Stark turned his attention to
nativist politics, running a series of hostile exposes of the "Strides of the Romish
Hierarchy." Stark must have sensed he was on to something big. In February 1855,
still maintaining weekly publication of his "independent" Examiner, Stark put out the
first number of the State Guard}' Together, these four organs framed the public
agenda of Connecticut Know Nothingism by speaking directly to the popular
underbelly of the major parties-rank-and-file Whigs, Democrats, and Free Soilers
disenchanted with the regime of party government.
Connecticut Know Nothingism moved closer to recognizable policy
orientations on antislavery, prohibition, and protectionism than in Massachusetts or
Pennsylvania. Thomas Day stressed the movement's anti-Democratic-Slave Power
tendencies. Know Nothingism, he was sure, aligned "every friend of Freedom,
Temperance, and genuine Americanism" against "such crawling slaves of the South"
as the Connecticut Democracy. If not for the timely appearance of political nativism,
he was convinced, the Democrats would send to the U.S. Senate "some tame tool like
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Isaac Toucey, who shall be proud of his degrading connections with the South." The
key point Day drove home time and again was the failed leadership of the "old-line"
Democracy, evidenced in the Nebraska bill and the party's incessant "pandering to all
the prejudices of foreign-bom voters."" Day pitched political nativism as a vehicle to
halt a pro-slaveiy and pro-immigrant Democratic regime. Avowed Know Nothing
editors Andrew Stark and Orville Piatt also combined nativist chauvinism with
ringing attacks on slaveiy and southern expansionism, sometimes in the same
editorial. Piatt, for his part, was perhaps the most specific about the other issues that
Know Nothingism was designed to redress; he launched his nativist career with a
laundry list of guiding principles that included antislavery, anti-Catholicism, and
protectionist labor doctrines. Similarly, Stark broadened nativism with essays on
slavery and the Slave Power. In one, he itemized 36 points of similarity between
"popedom and Slavedom." Number One claimed, "both are based upon the lust for
money and power." Number Thirty-Six warned, "both can reign together without
quarreling and with mutual helpfulness."^''
Stark's Number One point~the "lust for money and power" allegedly shared
by slaveholders and the Catholic church-was just one of many examples in which an
abiding fear of powerful special interests imbricated nativism. In Know Nothing
rhetoric, the Slave Power and the Papal Power became two sides of the same special
interest coin: both had corrupted the processes of governance in palpable ways,
divorcing policymaking from larger moral considerations. The nonpartisan ideal-that
governance should flow from a moral commitment to the public good, not
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partisanship-also found expression in Know Nothing discourse on the state's recently
enacted Maine Law. Know Nothing sympathizers predictably celebrated the statute,
urged vigilant enforcement at the local level, and warned of a rollback if the anti-
Maine Law Democrats regained a majority in 1855. "Private interests must yield to
the public good," intoned Stark. "How much more when we know that rum-sellers
have not regarded the public welfare." Like the prohibitionists before them, Know
Nothings vigorously defended the statute as the public's instrument to address
problems of vital significance to daily life-crime, poverty, moral debasement in
communities. In so doing, they also endorsed an expanded vision of the state's police
power as an end-run around party government."
Appeals to the "public good," of course, could accommodate an array of issues
and grievances. Despite the movement's clarity on protectionism, antislavery, and
prohibition, there remained an elasticity to antiparty populism in the mid-1850s that
suggested few specific answers to threats to the "public good," to say nothing of how
the Know Nothings would prioritize among those threats. As soon as leaders alighted
upon specific priorities and solutions, differences were bound to appear. All of that
would play itself out later, when the Know Nothings took the reigns of state
government and had to give concrete form to their protean goal of Americanism.
During the campaign of 1855, however. Know Nothings in New London, as in
Essex and Dauphin, could shelter themselves behind a lack of political definition.
With no previous history to encumber them, the secret order could tap a raft of issues
and grievances. Thus, Know Nothings most often struck negative themes that were
sure
,0 resonate with most native-born voters-protection to "American interests,"
attacks on Papal absolutism, hard-drinking Irish, foreign-bom militia companies, the
Slave Power, and the corrupting inHuence of all these on "American institutions."
Stark's S,a,e stood ready to "oppose all papal and foreign influences [upon]
our free, republican institutions."" The movement was, according to Stark, "devoted
to the advocacy ofNative American principles, the good of our Common Country,
our Common home." Who, besides immigrants, could oppose such a movement?
Know Nothings had one consistent answer; party politicians. Unscrupulous politicos
allowed their own personal prejudices and partisan motivations to intrude on their
decision-making. In the worid of the Know Nothings, party had superseded the
public good in governance.
As in Massachusetts, the Know Nothings in Connecticut wrapped themselves
in antiparty raiments. Assailing corrupt political leadership, Know Nothings
represented themselves as patriots of unimpeachable character and motives. The
movement was made up of "honest men,...disgusted with the various measures that
were put forth by party leaders under the guise of "principles."" A lack of principle
implied amoral partisanship. One Norwich rank and filer asserted that the "special
mission" of the movement "is to protect at the ballot box the institutions of our
country." For that glorious purpose, wrote this nativist, Know Nothingism had
disavowed "all allegiance to party" to overthrow "unprincipled politicians, who, for
years, have compromised every proper sentiment, and debased themselves to obtain
elevation, with Catholic votes." Another local rank and filer from the farming town
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of Lebanon struck a similar theme: "whether it (Know Nothingism] is a erafty
machination of any poHt.cal party or no, remains to be proved; at least men of all
political parties have taken a decided stand to defend American Ri^hts.-^^
Know Nothing resistance to Whig governor Henry Dutton also illustrates the
movement's antipartyism. For having presided over the enactment of Connecticut's
Maine Law, Dutton was eulogized by long-suffering prohibitionists, but his political
celebrity served him poorly with the Know Nothings. Know Nothings with Whig
antecedents, intending to formalize fusion with the Whig party, mounted a concerted
effort for Dutton in the state convention. Though most nativists liked Dutton well
enough, some suspected that political calculation had prompted his eleventh-hour
decision to join a nativist lodge. In the state convention a majority made clear their
preference for a less widely known politician. Stark reported that Dutton's "marked
identification with the Whig party" excited opposition to his candidacy under the
Know Nothing banner. No doubt many leaders viewed the situation from the vantage
point of electoral strategy: Whig incumbent Dutton surely would alienate Democrats
who had joined the order. A Dutton candidacy would raise doubts about the
willingness of Know Nothings to practice the antiparty politics they preached. Orville
Piatt put it this way: " The duties of the convention were, in short, to forget as far as
possible, all old party names, to bury obsolete issues, and to unite upon an American
candidate,. ..fresh from the ranks of the people."'"
Of course Minor, successful wool merchant and ex-Whig state legislator, was
not as "fresh from the people" as Piatt and others made him out to be. Indeed, despite
a reputation in New London County for "refusing membership to noddies, particularly
lawyers," Know Nothingism locally was led by such eminent public figures as the
wealthy Whig merchant and railroad developer Henry P. Haven and the Free Soil
lawyers Edmund Perkins and H. H. Starkweather. Nevertheless, publicists drew
distinctions between the Know Nothings' commitment to patriotic principle and the
hollow partisanship of the major parties. The major parties insisted on "fossil issues
of the dead past," accused one nativist, betraying their preoccupation with
partisanship and hence their unwillingness to take the lead on the day's far more
important matters. The parties failed to meet their obligation to the commonweal,
whether that constituted nativism, antislavery, the Maine Law, or whatever else Know
Nothings had in mind when they assailed "old-fogy party hacks." Antipartyism
crystallized dissatisfaction with the regime at all levels and among diverse voters,
while also distinguishing these champions of the people from the partisans of old.
"What is it to be American," asked Thomas Day, in the lead-up to the 1855 election.
Eschewing specific issues, his answer was that ingenious Know Nothing banality:
"America for Americans! is the cry - and it is a cry that will leave its mark...on our
political history."^'
Dauphin Countv
A handful of individuals loom large in Dauphin County Know Nothingism,
and none bigger than Stephen Miller and John J. Clyde. As young turks in the local
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Whig party, the ambitious twosome figured prominemly in the early Maine Law
movement that divided the party in the early fimes. As we saw last chapter, Clyde
edited the IVhig State Journal h.tv...n 1851 and 1853, turning it into a sounding
board for the Maine Law before selling it and moving to the independent Maine Law
paper, the Crystal Fountain. The articulate and charismatic Miller, a Methodist lay
preacher and forwarding merchant, was a regular speaker at local temperance
meetings, and by 1854, had risen to a berth on the State Prohibition Central
Committee. Most significant for the local histoiy of Know Nothingism was Clyde
and Miller's collaboration at Harrisburg's two largest anti-Democratic newspapers,
the Telegraph and the Morning Herald. Clyde and Miller founded the daily Herald in
December 1853 ostensibly "independent of parties, cliques, [and] entangling
alliances...." The Telegraph had long been one of the staunchest Whig journals in the
state. Clyde and Miller gained full control of the paper in May 1854 when the old-
line Whig editor John J. Paterson sold them his controlling share and moved to
Pittsburgh. Editorial duties at the Morning Herald and the Telegraph fell to Miller,
who quickly tacked both sheets towards political nativism.^°
Another important nativist publicist was G. P. Crap, publisher of the
independent Borough Item. Crap joined the very same nativist lodge that enrolled
Clyde and George H. Morgan, the labor reformer and occasional Borough Item
essayist. In early June, as rumor of the movement's growth in Dauphin County was
rapidly spreading, he produced an expose of a Know Nothing meeting after one of his
correspondents claimed to have secretly observed it from a nearby treetop. (In fact,
many details contained in the story, such as a description of an American eagle
embroidered on the Chiefs chest holding a ballot box m one talon and a streamer in
its beak that read "Down with Foreign Influence," indicate that the correspondent
participated m the meeting.) Many impressionable readers were probably made more
curious by the account of the secret meeting, held at night in a wood and attended by a
about two hundred men wearing red wafers on the end of their noses. The highlight
of the evening was a bizarre initiation ritual for new members that involved riding a
goat blindfolded, getting dunked in a nearby swamp after stripping bare, and receiving
the coveted red wafer from the Chief as he read aloud an indecipherable incantation.
Afterwards, Crap's office was inundated by letters from local Know Nothings, many
bemused, a few angered, by the exposure. By this time Crap had already betrayed his
"Americanism," publishing the minutes and resolves of the state American Party
convention in March and some letters from Know Nothing correspondents.
Following the expose, Crap embraced Know Nothing tenets in a series of editorials.''
Miller and Crap were well situated in 1 854 to broadcast Know Nothingism to
a curious public. Though neither identified themselves publicly as Know Nothings,
both commented favorably as word spread of mass conversions to the secret order.
Both also helped the cause in more tangible ways, most directly by a regular
outpouring of nativist screeds. Miller followed the movement's growth closely,
recounting its founding at Harrisburg and subsequent spread across the county in
columns sardonically titled, "More comfort for the Papists and Old Fogy Politicians!"
Miller depicted Know Nothingism as a spontaneous outpouring of patriotic
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Americanism, but at least in Dauphin's Upper End, the movement owed its growth in
part to organizing by Know Nothings from the coal fields of adjacent Schuylkill
County, whence many Upper Enders traced their roots. Whatever the role that
friendship and perhaps even kinship networks may have played in the spread ofKnow
Nothingism, Miller relished in the consternation felt by older politicians at the
swiftness with which Know Nothings organized the county. "[T]he political hacks
who have heretofore wielded and abused power, stand amazed at finding themselves
overthrown by an invisible hand." By June Miller was boasting that Know
Nothingism will "effectually break up canvassing and wire pulling in the political
machinery of the old party organizations, and the office-holders... [will know not]
fi-om whence the calamity came.""
In truth, the "office-holders" of Pennsylvania had to look neither long nor hard
to find the sources of popular antagonism towards "old party organizations."
Throughout 1854 Dauphin's nativist press generated a small library's worth of ad
hominem anti-Catholic recitations. In essays and speeches long on hyperbole but
short on intellectual rigor, Know Nothings could produce no evidence of a secret
Catholic plot to obtain political supremacy in the United States. Rising instances of
crime and pauperism, Catholic resistance to Protestant moralizing, the energy with
which many politicians courted newly naturalized voters-such evidence was
apparently all nativists required for their fantastic theories of Jesuit conspiracies.
Nevertheless, the last claim about the culpability of native politicians was of crucial
significance to the Know Nothing understanding of things. The belief that party
politicians had courted the Irish-Catholic vote led Know Nothings to the self-
righteous conclusion that the "sons of the soil have decided to throw off all allegiance
to party."" Linking political Roman Catholicism to a variety of problems, Know
Nothings in Dauphin, like their comrades in Essex and New London, ultimately
politicized the nonpartisan ideal that governance should be insulated from overtly
political aims. Of course, in nativist rhetoric the links between political Roman
Catholicism and the regime were often framed indirectly and suggestively, as in the
oft-repeated charge that the parties, especially the mling Democrats, were run by
"base trucklers" who genuflected at the shrine of "Papal Power." But few sentient
Pemisylvanians could miss the larger point: the reckless pursuit of party interests now
threatened to give control over the machinery of state to a dangerous special interest.
Pennsylvania nativists believed they had at least one foolproof illustration that hit
close to home, President Franklin Pierce's appointment of Philadelphia Catholic
James Campbell as postmaster general.
Campbell's rise to the prized post began inauspiciously. In 1851 he was the
only Democrat to lose statewide election in Pennsylvania when nativist elements in
his own party reftised to back his election to the state supreme court. Governor Bigler
moved swiftly to conciliate angry Catholics by appointing Campbell as his secretary
of state. A year later James Buchanan, undoubtedly driven by similar impulses,
recommended Campbell for a cabinet position. From his office in Washington, it was
widely alleged, Campbell systematically dispensed postmasterships to Catholic
friends in the Democratic party. To local nativists, the whole arrangement reeked of
partisan horse-trading, while Campbell's discrinnnating use of the patronage power
confinned their worst nightmares. Campbell's rapid ascent laid bare "the whole anti-
American political alliance of truckling, trading, and bartering politicians and
Jesuitical priests with their entire Roman Catholic rank and file enlistment."-
As potent as the Campbell appointments were, other issues accompanied
nativists to the public stage in 1 854. In keeping with the Borough Item^, pro-labor
tradition. Crap covered the defeat of a ten-hour bill in the 1854 legislature, dominated
by a Democratic majority. Then too both he and Miller railed against the political
influence of banking corporations and other business interests at the state capitol,
claiming the 1854 legislative session surpassed all others for bribery and logrolling.
A record 45 charters or re-charters for banks, insurance companies, and railroads did
not help Democratic lawmakers turn back these charges. A correspondent in the
Borough Item, identifying himself as "Know Nothing," believed that "nothing but
bribery and corruption secured the passage of sundry railroad, bank, and other
corporation bills."^^
Harrisburg's well-deserved reputation for corruption dovetailed easily into the
nativists' party-in-govemment polemic. A major issue was the failure in 1854 to sell
the Main Line of the Public Works, Pennsylvania's avatar of political corruption. By
1 854 the idea had gained bi-partisan support across the state, and in fact the General
Assembly produced a bill for sale which Bigler, after some hesitation, signed into
law. But the minimum price, $10 million, was set too high (some felt purposeftilly
high) to attract buyers, frustrating the sale movement for at least another year. Thus
out
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the issue remained potent-a specific case of broken governance that could flesh
the Know Nothings' expansive canvass of antiparty imageiy. Miller pilloried Bigler
and the Democrats for excessive borrowing and tax increases to reward cronies with
jobs on the Public Works. Bringing rampant political corruption to an end, not some
abstract commitment to laissez faire, seemed to motivate many proponents of sale in
Pemisylvania. "The whole system of management of our public improvements for
years past has been a system of partizan piracy," Miller thundered in one editorial.
"The state must come under a new regimer he concluded in another, "these wicked
rulers must give place to a wise and patriotic administration."" While concern over
corruption at the state capitol had long been a part of Pemisylvania politics, nativist
publicists proved especially deft at incorporating these themes into their broader
antiparty appeal. Older suspicions of corrupt government strengthened the immediate
impression of party government run amok.
The opposition of Bigler and most Democrats to prohibition also allowed
nativists to score the Democrats for interjecting party into governance. With great
reluctance, the 1 854 assembly bowed to Maine Law pressure with legislation for a
non-binding ballot question on the matter in the upcoming October election. It also
passed a law that banned the sale of liquor to anyone of known "intemperate habits,"
and another which provided for stricter licencing of taverns and "lager beer" houses.
The licencing bill was later pocket vetoed by Governor Bigler, a fact that outraged
prohibitionists kept before the public eye in 1854. Clearly, such legislative
movements on the anti-liquor front stemmed from prohibition agitation over the
previous years, but Maine law zealots only grew more frustrated by what they took to
be half-way measures. Prohibitionists viewed the non-bmdmg referendum especially
as a ploy by shifty lawmakers to postpone decisive action. State and county
prohibition meetings denounced the legislature's
"unwillingness to trust the people-
but resolved to "defeat the rum party on its own ground" in the fall by working for the
plebiscite's passage. Maine Law forces in Dauphin County proved particularly well
organized, sponsoring lectures and public meetings, often held in Protestant churches,
in most area towns in the lead-up to the October plebiscite.*'
According to Miller, opponents of prohibition were nothing but "time-serving
politicians and hangers on." When Democrats John Patrick and Rev. John Chambers,
two prominent officials in the statewide Sons of Temperance, endorsed Bigler over
Pollock, the de facto ftision nominee pledged to prohibition. Miller went on the
offensive. Patrick and Chambers have "a higher regard for party than for
Temperance," and "prostitute [their] high offices to the basest partisan purposes."
Bigler's actions also illuminated the baleful party connection. Bigler hoped
Prohibition would simply go away, charged Miller, while "questions of less
importance, touching the interests of "the party," have received a large share of the
Gubernatorial attention."**
Prohibition forces refrained from independent politics, continuing the
nonpartisan strategy of querying candidates about their position on the Maine Law
and endorsing those that responded favorably. The result was that the link between
Know Nothingism and the Maine Law remained, by and large, subterranean. The
state
county prohibition committee endorsed the Know Nothing ticket for Governor,
assembly, and senate, though as we have seen, this essentially was a fusion anti-
Democratic ticket. Miller occasionally theorized that the "liquor traffic
-..principally
in the hands oiforeignersr proclaiming that the "final triumph of the temperance
cause depends upon the success of the American movement, and the overthrow of
political demagogues who have so long truckled to foreign influence..." But such
unambiguous linkages were infrequent. Content to brand Democratic opposition as
an example ofhow partisanship blinded lawmakers to the public good of prohibition.
Miller usually lef^ it to his native-bom readers, used to demagoguery about besotted
and degraded Catholics, to identify Know Nothingism as the solution.*'
The relationship between slavery and nativism provides a similar example. As
in Essex and New London counties, the Kansas-Nebraska act sparked antisouthem
and antislavery sensibilities that raised antiparty tempers. At Harrisburg, anti-
Nebraska meetings, at which Stephen Miller spoke, followed Senator Douglas'
introduction of the bill. Anti-Nebraska remained a consistent theme in both the
Telegraph and the Morning Herald XhroughouX 1854. Local opponents of the bill
hewed to the antisouthern/white supremacist variant of antislavery that echoed the
herrenvolk themes of fellow Pennsylvanian David Wilmot. Many probably shared the
perspective of "Mechanic," who framed the issue at stake following Harrisburg'
s
electric anti-Nebraska meeting: "Will free white Mechanics and laboring men go into
a Territory, where laboring men, and labor is degraded?...No never! Then I tell you,
free white laborer of the free States, if you admit the black bond-man and his lordly
master into that magnificent domain,
...you as ellectively exclude yourselves as
though a wall of fire was built around it." For his part, Miller printed a "Black List"
(pun?) of Pennsylvania's
"traitors to the North," the state's eleven Democratic
Congressmen who voted for the measure. Miller was at pains to stress his opposition
to Nebraska in conservative tones. "This is not an "abolition" movement," he
reassured a readership unused to even mild antislavery doctrines, "but a movement of
the moderate, conservative men...who up to this time, have stood shoulder to shoulder
in support of the Compromise of 1 850, fugitive slave law and all." To Miller's mind,
all blame lay with the National Democratic party and its northern puppets for "having
opened up anew the question that has been the source of so much strife, by the
violation of a shared National compact.... The free men of the North, of all parties,"
Miller solemnly intoned, "are now determined to resist, to the last extremity, all
further encroachments of the Slave Power."^"
Miller's use of Slave Power imagery helped established the political lessons
that could be drawn from the bill's passage. As Miller told it, the principal agent of
the Slave Power was the Pierce administration, which dangled patronage before
Northern Democratic congressmen to pressure them into support of the bill. I'hc
larger design of the Nebraska bill was thus to "extend human servitude and sustain
"the party.'"' Miller was most effusive in his denunciations of Governor Bigler's
vacillating response to Nebraska. Bigler, worried over the growth of the Know
Nothing movement and the endorsement of Pollock by both the Whig and Free Soil
state conventions, hoped to gain reelection in part by distancing himself from the
Pierce Administration. At the same time, Bigler could not alienate his base of
Democratic activists and editors, most ofwhom bent to party discpHne and embraced
popular sovereignty. Thus Bigler brought double talk to the rostrum, frequently
espousing opposition to Nebraska in western townships, where Wilmotism was
strongest, and the virtues of popular sovereignty in the Democratic east. It seemed a
sound strategy, certainly a recognition of the potency the issue held in 1854, but left
him and his party wide open to charges of opportunism and inconsistency. Miller and
others across the state punished Bigler for untrustworthiness and base motives.
Because he would not "openly resist the aggressions of Slavery, today," Bigler
"cannot be relied upon for the ftiture-he is hopelessly rotten-unsound to the core,
and will sacrifice his country's highest interests and glory for mere partizan
considerations."^'
Only once in the 1854 campaign season did Miller link Americanism directly
to the antislavery cause. The occasion was Miller's election postmortem, when he
announced the October results in boldface: "Americanism Triumphant-The Nebraska
Swindle Repudiated."'^ Hence in regards to slavery, like prohibition and political
economic reform, the issue-orientation of Dauphin County Know Nothings appears to
have been as protean as that of their New London and Essex comrades. Know
Nothings in Dauphin tirelessly identified Roman Catholicism as the overarching
threat to the nation's democratic institutions and Protestant heritage. Yet, beyond
specific pledges to correct this by electing only Americans to office and extending the
naturalization period, promises of laws to be enacted were rare in Know Nothing
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campaign discourse. Certainly the issue of .he Public Works and Miller's association
with the Prohibition and anti-Nebraska movements gave Dauphin Know Nothingism
a distinctive anti-Democratic temper. Governor Bigler, and by implication the state
and nation's Democratic party regime, appeared as negative referents in local Know
Nothing rhetoric almost as often as Jesuit priests and drunken Irish. Nevertheless,
most of the time native-bon, citizens in Dauphin, as in Essex and New London, were
left to build their own issues and priorities onto the movement's nativist and antiparty
foundation.
The attacks by their opponents gave nativist publicists opportunities to cast
their movement in positive light. Miller berated the local Democratic press for
denouncing the secrecy and religious bigotry of the movement and for urging party
regulars to publicly renounce any affiliation with Know Nothingism. Every Democrat
"who has had the independence to say that he would vote against Bigler," Miller said,
"has been denounced as a "guerilla," and excommunicated from the party." Patriots
should be aghast at such purges. Miller intimated. Having appropriated such
transcendent symbols as President Washington, the American eagle, indeed, America
itself, it required little exertion to find unscrupulous and unpatriotic forces at work
behind the opposition. The movement's opponents were "at war with every principle
of true republicanism," forcing upon their "subjects a system oipartizan slavery, and
servile submission to the will of its leaders." Know Nothings, by contrast, "having
nothing to do with party politics," were incapable of such blind servility to political
dictation. Know Nothing antipartyism suggested that the rank and file, engaged in
a new
great sacrifice for the dearest interests of their country, were independent voters "who
refuse to yield to a blind allegiance to party." And the independent voter, Miller
waxed rhapsodic in an editorial on the same, "exerts a powerful influence for good.-
Independent, but not neutral. Know Nothings assailed a political system that
seemed geared to the advancement of parties only, and so constructed
terminology to represent themselves in public. Supporters variously described Know
Nothingism as "the American movement," the "American Reform Movement,"
"invisible reformers," and "a voluntary police force in aid of Americanism and public
morality."^^ In the Know Nothing lexicon. Party was a term reserved for ridicule.
With the avowed object being the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
American people against all manner of political and social and cultural threats, the
movement's touchstone necessarily was the vague but powerful pledge to resist
partisan influences in the name of the national commonweal.
Antipartyism in Dauphin was most clearly expressed when Know Nothings
differentiated their movement from the normative partisanship of regular politics.
Know Nothing lodges provided rank and filers with concrete evidence of their own
and their movement's anfipartyism. The formation of local lodges was announced
with boasts that members "solemnly pledged to "know nothing" of mere party
organization in politics." Men of all previous party affiliations fraternized in lodge
meetings and secret initiation ceremonies in order to safeguard "all American
Interests." Pledges to uphold the "doctrines of WASHINGTON" and "Protestant
Interests" enlisted popular mythology in the denial of partisanship. Upbeat
summaries of election results showing the spread and triumph ofKnow Nothingism
across the state and nation confirmed the popularity of Americanism and
demonstrated that "these Know Nothings appear to lorow no party."" Antipartyism's
moral transcript-governance in the name of the public good, not party r^le-expresscd
both the movemem-s disgust with the regime of regular politics and its vision of itself
as a patriotic crusade to save the nation.
Nativist rhetoric made the antiparty case in print, but Know Nothings also
publicly affirmed this view in other, more ritualized ways. Members of the "Original
Order of the Know Nothings" in Harrisburg and vicinity turned out in full regalia to
openly parade the streets on the Fourth of July. A month before the election, Know
Nothing women produced a material culture of patriotic Americanism. They
expressed solidarity with the movement by wearing "Know Nothing Head Dresses"-a
sort of bonnet draped with red, white and blue ribbons-and aprons emblazoned with
the national colors as they shopped and promenaded the city. Such public displays of
Know Nothingism were said to educate young people to the principle of "love of
country which will constitute our surest defense against the insidious wiles of foreign
influence."^^ Appropriating the nation's colors and birthday, the Know Nothings
established historical continuities where none actually existed. Believing their cause
to be greater than mere temporal philosophies, nativists came close to reifying Know
Nothingism and its central tenets.
Conclusion
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Know Nothingism has indeed generated a rich historiography. Today most
scholars recognize the multi-issue nature of the movement, particularly in the
Northern United States, where the fecundity of political issues and social forces in
play in the decade before the Civil War yields many interpretative possibilities. It is
hardly controversial to call the movement a welter of ideological and social
tendencies. In all three counties Know Nothingism was socially diverse, though did
have an undeniable plebeian accent. Know Nothingism tapped several streams of
issues and discontents in the political universe of the 1850s. Some of these issues
emerged from political configurations unique to the three counties and states, such as
the anti-Bigler themes of the movement in Dauphin County, or the anti-Whiggery of
Essex County Know Nothingism. Others issues, including immigration and anti-
Catholicism, transcended political context. In its social composition and
contradictory blend of issue-diversity and messianic conviction, Know Nothingism
looks very much like other influential populist movements in American history.
What brought and held Know Nothingism together? Jean Baker has offered
probably the best summation of the current scholarly paradigm. "[F]or nativists the
term "America" and the symbols of Union and Constitution were an effective rallying
point, and efficient means of identification, and, above all, a shorthand for nativist
beliefs."^^ Baker, of course, means here old-fashioned bigotry, but also the emotional
identificafions that Know Nothings constructed as they built their movement.
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Accurate as far it goes, this intellectual and cultural interpretation appears to me oddly
removed from the political context which putative Know Nothings found themselves
in. Conceptualizing Know Nothingism as
.political expression moves us closer to
the heart of the matter concerning parallels with other populist movements, and
indeed, the very character of nineteenth-century populism itself
Know Nothingism's mucilage, at least in these three counties, was
antipartyism. In their public discourse Know Nothings represented themselves as a
popular reform movement, not a political party. In this way they both romanticized
and exploited their movement's lack of history as a party sui generis. Know Nothings
expressed more basic ideals of governance unfettered by the partisan imperative that
drove formal action in the sphere of electoral politics. The Know Nothing focus on
immigrants and "Americanism" must be viewed in light of this formulation. Just as
governance was viewed as that locus of the public sphere where Americans
transcended partisan difference in pursuit of the commonalty, so too Know Nothings
presumed that both their cause and their movement stood above the partisan fray. It
was this emotional connection nativist publicists hoped to complete when they flailed
away at immigrants or penned platitudinous obsequies to American icons like
Washington or common schools. The relative newness of nativism as an explicit
political issue, with all the partisanship that the same implied, contributed to the
distinction Know Nothings drew. When they howled that immigrants would strike a
blow at Protestant traditions Know Nothings signaled their break from the
interminable nattering over tariffs and banks that had constituted the substance of
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politics in the recent past. The problems Know Nothings identified transcended
politics. From that point. Know Nothings represented their grievances by arguing that
politics (partisanship) had prevented the regime's leaders from recognizing and
responding to their problems.
Drawing upon the nonpartisan tradition of governance, the Know Nothings
entered the electoral arena as an a«r/-party and wrought a political upheaval of
unprecedented proportions. Now, Know Nothings set out with confidence to right the
ship of state, to cleanse public life of dangerous special interests, themselves
conflated with the regime of party government. The ironic result of their antiparty
mission constitutes the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
was
THE MANY FACES OF GRACCHUS: KNOW NOTHING GOVERNMENT
As the 1855 legislative season opened Know Nothings in all three counties had
reason to be optimistic. Know Nothing governors controlled the executive branch in
each state, and hence could frame the legislative agenda with their Annual Message, the
legislature's traditional stepping-off point. Control of the executive branch put
considerable patronage in Know Nothing hands, a power with great potential to solidify
the movement. The Know Nothings also enjoyed majority control of each state's
legislative branch. In Massachusetts the entire senate and nearly the entire house
Know Nothing. In Connecticut the movement claimed strong majorities in both
houses. In Pennsylvania the ftiture looked somewhat murkier. Because Pennsyl
elected only eleven of thirty-three state senators each year, the Democratic party
controlled the upper chamber. But the Know Nothings countered with a decisive
majority in the lower chamber and on joint ballot.'
Grassroots nativists touted their elected leaders' reformist intentions and
promised they would seize the opportunity to write law according to Know Nothing
principles. Of Connecticut's 1855 General Assembly, Norwich's Andrew Stark said
simply: "We shall be much mistaken in our expectations if it does not leave its mark
upon our statute book in the form of some wholesome changes and additions."
Commentators in Massachusetts believed that Know Nothing lawmakers were poised
to break the logjam that had frustrated political and social reformers for years. The
vania
1855 General Court was "in the hands of men who were connected with the late
coalition," wrote an onlooker from the senate chamber, combining "all those who wish
to gain a great triumph over the relentless aristocratical conservatism of old fogy
whiggeiy, which has its seat in Boston." Harrisburg's Stephen Miller, soon to receive a
plum appomtment as Philadelphia's flour inspector, wrote that Know Nothmg
assemblymen intended to "steer clear of all entangling alliances with both the old
parties, and plant themselves upon a platfonn of their own." A major piece of that
platform was elimination of Pemisylvania's system of "public plunder," the Public
Works. "[M]any representatives were elected with direct reference to this question," he
maintained. Critics scoffed at such roseate predictions, but on one thing everyone
agreed: in 1 855 the Know Nothings enjoyed a rare opportunity to enact virtually
whatever policies they chose.^
Aside from nativism, the Know Nothings' broad policy orientation was borne of
political circumstances unique to each state. The frustration of prohibitionists, political
reformers and labor activists patterned Know Nothingism in Massachusetts. The
regulation of liquor, the eradication of corruption on the Public Works and sale of the
Main Line figured crucially in Pennsylvania Know Nothingism. Antislavery forces
bulked large in the movement in Massachusetts and Connecticut, suggesting that Know
Nothing government in those states would actively affirm antislavery principles,
something abolitionists had been demanding for two decades. Beyond these issues, the
Know Nothings' antiparty populism communicated a broader if fairly diffuse
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conception of social reform tha, prompted some in the movement to urge expansion of
the state's police power over the economy.
Once in power, however, the Know Nothings confronted a number of structural
and systemic impediments. The slow pace of the legislative process was one obstacle.
The Know Nothings had gained unprecedented popularity with their millennial appeal
to purify politics and governance. Now they had to be patient as bills made their way
through a cumbersome committee and floor process, and demonstrate discipline, for
bills were subject to revision by the vested committee and then faced possible hostile
amendments if and when they reached the floor. The brevity of the legislative calendar
in the antebellum period, anywhere from two to four months, also threatened to
frustrate a movement brimming with reform ideas. Often Know Nothing lawmakers
brought forward several competing bills on the same issue, a fact that illustrates both
the movement's reformist energy and poorly integrated structtire. The Know Nothings'
zeal for drafting public bills, coupled with an immense influx of requests for special
legislation, created legislative bottlenecks. Would the customary short session provide
enough time for Know Nothing lawmakers to satisfy the expectations of a diverse
constittiency? One solution was to lengthen the session. But short sessions reflected
the normative ideal in nineteenth-centtiry America of unobtrusive and economical
government. Extending the legislative calendar would leave Know Nothings open to
charges that they were intoxicated by power and beholden to special interests.
Less mundane features of the nineteenth-century regime also figured to
complicate Know Nothing government. State governments legislated on all manner of
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private and parochial subjects, including certain private property rights and individual
liberties, the establishment of local governments and the designation of their
administrative capacities, and the authorization of businesses and voluntary
associations. In this specific constitutional sense private law remained the creature of
state authority. In practice the state's power over private and local matters was
typically, though by no means uniformly, authorizational in character; nineteenth-
century assemblies devolved much of the routine operations of governance to local
authorities and individuals, again reflecting prevailing ideals of local control and weak
central state authority. Yet, because state legislatures held authoritative power over a
broad range of local and private matters, narrowly defined interests had to mobilize to
gain validation and procedural authority from the state capital. The distributive regime,
marked by particularistic inputs and diffuse outputs, generated its own cultural
momentum and institutional imperatives, both in the polity and legislative arena.
Citizens were used to mobilizing on behalf of parochial issues, and invariably gained
entree to the legislative process through their own representative or senator. Vested
economic interests, such as banking and railroad companies, were equally adept at
pressuring lawmakers for desirable legislation. The result was a deluge of petitions
and informal requests for special legislation on narrowly defined and parochial topics.^
Antebellum lawmakers devoted great care and attention to the requests of
narrow and often temporarily constituted interest groups, for they invariably originated
in their home district. But what were the political ramifications of such a common
sense response to particularistic inputs, especially for a self-styled reform movement
opposed to the status quo? Indeed, aside from political Roman Catholicism, few issues
agitated the Know Nothings more than special lawmaking. Yet despite incantatory
warnings that "legislation, so far as practicable, should be general and unifonn," Know
Nothing legislators found themselves emneshed in a system geared to special
legislation. As we shall see, the Know Nothings' success at breaking from this
distributive framework proved at best mixed, at worst disappointing.^
Know Nothing govermnent faced still greater obstacles. The most troublesome
of all was the movement's own antipartyism. At his inaugural, Pemisylvania Know
Nothing Governor James Pollock spoke in familiar Know Nothing boileiplate about the
movement's pure intentions for governance, a "living illustration" of "a true and single
allegiance" to the commonweal.^ But how would he and his antiparty cohort perform
in power? Beyond nativism and a few other issues, no one could say with confidence
how the Know Nothing vision of the public good would translate in practical terms.
Moralistic and antiparty appeals to reconstitute the public good in governance had won
the votes of the disaffected, but provided little guidance on the panoply of commercial,
fiscal, and governmental issues that perennially crowded the legislative calendar.
Moreover patronage decisions had to be made, which were likely to stoke old
jealousies, and worse, appear incongruous for a movement that boasted of antiparty
designs.
Finally, in the spring of 1855 the slavery issue occupied the public's
imagination as never before. Each newly elected governor devoted a portion of their
inaugural address to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, said by Governor Gardner
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to have "moved men's minds at the North to an extent no other political occurrence has
done within the memory of the present generation." Slavery was now a potent
symbolic issue that politicians could massage to great advantage; it also impinged on
substantive matters in the state capitols. The assemblies in Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts were to elect a U.S. Senator, while Know Nothings in all three states
had the power to legislate policy that related to sectional politics. Meanwhile, a
process of national party-building, earnestly pursued by Know Nothings in spring and
summer 1855, thrust the issue to center stage.^
In short, the Know Nothings would now have to sharpen their vision of the
public good on issues besides Catholicism and party government. The movement,
more a congeries of the frustrated and angry than a formal political party, failed to build
the cohesion and discipline necessary to make the leap. The Know Nothings'
heterogeneity made holding the movement together problematic, while the rank and
file's antipartyism reacted back on the leadership. Having risen to power on popular
fiiistration with party government and its signature compromises and accommodations,
rank-and-file Know Nothings eventually recoiled at their own leadership's handling of
pressing public issues. Compromise and accommodation are paradigmatic to
policymaking and party-building, the public face of political power, but aggravate the
antiparty temper, impatient with political calculation on matters of the public welfare.
Power once obtained unleashed a destructive internal dialectic. Factions rapidly
crystallized and went to war over first principles, the essential ambiguity of which,
ironically, had contributed so much to Know Nothingism's raging popularity and
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populist energy. It would take three years for Know Nothingism to expire completely,
but by the middle of 1 855 the movement was already unraveling.
Know Nothinp Govemment: PrHimin..^
,
nK.^p.^^^j^^^^ 3^^^^ Trends
Certain features of Know Nothing govemment, especially in the three states
under review here, are familiar enough. Contemporary observers made much of the
youth, political inexperience, and plebeian background ofKnow Nothing office
holders. This image, exaggerated by contemporaries for political purposes, is
nonetheless borne out in the hard data. Know Nothing office holders were on average
slightly younger than non-Know Nothing office holders. The matter of experience is
more difficult to nail down. Regarding Connecticut, Parmet found much
impressionistic evidence that many Know Nothing lawmakers hailed from the state's
oldest families, but did not reconstruct a genealogy for all Know Nothing lawmakers
nor show a relationship between a verdant family tree and political experience.
Anbinder undertook a limited comparison of Know Nothing and non-Know Nothing
legislators in 1855 and 1856, and discovered the Know Nothings enjoyed considerably
more "recent" political experience. But it is not clear what such data mean. These
were the years of Know Nothing ascendance, so it is not significant that the
movement's leaders enjoyed greater political success in the recent past than their
immediate competitors did. Purdy's exhaustive work on Massachusetts, on the other
hand, compared Know Nothings to previous as well as future General Courts so as to
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locate Know Nothing government on a meaningful historical continuum, something
contemporaries undoubtedly did when they pegged the Know Nothings as political
neophytes. In that light she found that Know Nothing legislators were in fact
significantly less experienced than their predecessors.'
A more intriguing side of the social profile of Know Nothing office holders is
wealth and occupation. While all three Know Nothing assemblies were socially
heterogenous, distinctive patterns do emerge from the data. Know Nothing lawmakers
on average held less real and personal property than their predecessors and Democratic
competitors. Indeed, especially when compared to their predecessors. Know Nothings
appear substantially less wealthy. In Massachusetts, the average wealth in realty held
by Know Nothing office holders was only 39% of the average held by lawmakers in
1850. Anbinder's data on Pennsylvania and Connecticut are less dramatic, but this may
be partly an artifact of his methodology. He compared Know Nothings to
contemporary non-Know Nothings, an inadequate measure of how the Know Nothings
stack up historically. In any event, Anbinder found that Know Nothings were less
wealthy than their competitors by a factor of one-quarter to one-third.^
Across the board Know Nothings were much less likely to be farmers than were
lawmakers from other parties. Other occupational trends are specific to only one or
two of the states. The number of petit bourgeois mechanics and shopkeepers was
significantly higher in the 1855 assemblies of Massachusetts and Connecticut than in
previous years, but not so in Pennsylvania. Know Nothings from Connecticut elected a
disproportionately large number of solidly bourgeois merchants and manufacturers.
those in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, disproportionately fewer. In Massachusetts
lawyers were greatly under-represented and clergymen significantly over-represented,
although these trends did not prevail elsewhere. In fact the shortage of legal expertise
was so critical in the General Court that legislative committees recruited outside
counsel to assist them on matters of debtor-creditor relations and the regulation of
liquor. Suffolk County senator Albert J. Wright, chair of the Massachusetts Special
Joint Committee on Abolition of Imprisomnent for Debt, candidly admitted that the
committee submitted their draft bill to several Boston lawyers because they "have not
had the advantage of legal talent among their own number." Wright quickly added that
the committee chose lawyers known to be "favorable to the proposition.'"
The crucial issue is whether and to what degree the social characteristics of
Know Nothing lawmakers shaped their policymaking. The question involves more
than analyzing the bills and law produced by Know Nothing assemblies. That aspect of
Know Nothing government has generated a fascinating if not altogether complete
portrait of a movement that largely delivered on its reform promises.'" When properly
understood in relation to the cultural and institutional limits that acted and reacted on
them, all three Know Nothing assemblies were indeed reformist. We shall return to
this matter and the specifics of Know Nothing government in a moment, but now we
should take up another equally important question: Did the 1855 legislatures evince
broad behavioral patterns that might warrant a strong claim for distinctiveness? One
method is to compare the ratios of private to public law passed by the Know Nothing
legislatures to those produced by other assemblies. If the Know Nothings were indeed
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exceptional in avoiding the trough of distributive politics and enacting general reforms,
we should see evidence of this in the aggregate ratios of public to private legislation.
From this wider perspective, however, it appears that the Know Nothing
assemblies did not deviate significantly from antebellum patterns. It is important to
note that in all three states the sheer volume of both private and public law produced by
the state legislatures increased dramatically and almost amiually between 1840 and
1855. But with the one exception of Massachusetts, the ratio of private to public law in
1 855 did not suddenly improve with Know Nothings at the helm. Consider the 1 855
Pennsylvania General Assembly, where reportedly over two-thirds of the members
were enrollees in Know Nothing lodges. It actually passedfewer general bills as a
percentage of total output (13%) than the 1840 assembly (16%), although the Know
Nothings did modestly better in this regard than Pennsylvania lawmakers in the early
1 850s, a period when logrolling and omnibus legislation peaked. On the plus side, the
1855 assembly did scale back dramatically the passage of omnibus bills, a practice
consistently condemned by Pennsylvania Know Nothings. In Connecticut, 34% of
legislative outputs in the 1855 legislature was general in nature, an increase of 3% over
1850 and 9% over 1840. Yet as these figures suggest, the ratio of public to private law
had been slowly rising in Connecticut since the early 1840s. The Connecticut Know
Nothings simply continued an established pattern. Only in Massachusetts do we find a
significant break with previous trends. The Bay State Know Nothings enacted a record
552 laws. Of these 32% were general in scope, representing a meaningful increase over
the last fifteen years during which the ratio fluctuated between 12% and 20%. Yet the
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Massachusetts Know Nothings, widely viewed as refonners. did not best their
Connectieu. cotmten,arts on this score. Indeed, the improved ratio in Massachusetts
may tell us more about legislative conservatism in Massachusetts before 1 855 than the
capacity of the Bay Smte Know Nothings to break dramatically from the distributive
framework.^*
We can identify still more parallels between Know Nothing government and the
nineteenth-century norm by examining general patterns in roll-call voting. As was true
for other nineteenth-century legislatures, the overwhelming preponderance of laws
enacted by the Know Nothing assemblies sparked little if any conflict, even between
rival party blocs. Indeed, neither the vast majority of private nor most public bills
occasioned roll-calls; they were simply passed without fanfare. Nonetheless Know
Nothing assemblies debated and voted on a range of policies that can be divided into
discrete spheres. Tables B. 19 and B.20 presents the Rice Index of Party Cohesion
scores and Index of Party Disagreement (IPD) between Democrats and non-Democrats
(almost all Know Nothing), for select roll calls by policy sphere in Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts. '2 Cohesion and disagreement scores for Connecticut's 1855 legislature
have been tallied by Lex Renda, and are consistent with those in the tables.'^ Indeed,
historians of nineteenth-century policymaking have routinely found high levels of party
cohesion and partisan disagreement on issues that relate to "community mores." On
the other hand economic, governmental, and fiscal policies tended to produce
significantly lower levels of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict, except on the
few issues that were linked to party platforms.''*
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As the tables show, the Know Nothing legislatures fit this general behavioral
pattern. Cohesion and disagreement scores for economic, governmental, and fiscal
policies were typically less robust-in most cases far less robust-than for votes on
policies that reflected competing mores. Naturally, votes on nativist policies generated
comparatively high rates of bloc voting among Know Nothings (for) and Democrats
(against). So too did many other moral or value-laden issues. For example, bills
regulating liquor produced among the highest cohesion and disagreement scores in the
Pemisylvania House (Table B.19). Comiecticut had dealt with the liquor issue in 1854,
so Know Nothing lawmakers there did not tackle the issue. The 1855 Massachusetts
Senate passed a stringent anti-liquor law without a roll, so no scores are included in the
table. However the bill produced a cohesion score of 71 among Know Nothings in the
Massachusetts House, second only to votes on nativist policies (77). Antislavery
policies and resolutions, included under the rubric "mores," also generated strikingly
high levels of bloc voting among Know Nothings in Massachusetts and especially
Connecticut.'' Pennsylvania lawmakers, by contrast, did not vote on bills that can be
directly related to slavery, though as we shall see, the struggle to elect a U.S. Senator
certainly had powerful sectional overtones.
In sum, only a small fi-action of legislation in the 1855 Know Nothing
assemblies disturbed the consensus, a pattern not unlike policymaking in state
legislatures throughout the nineteenth century. Moreover, only a fi-action of the
contested issues generated high levels of unity among Know Nothings and polarity
between them and their opponents.
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It is important to note that the high level of cohesion and party disagreement on
policies related to community mores suggests the ease with which political ehtes could
translate mores issues into generalized policy orientations, both in the wider polity and
the more exclusive legislative domain. Issues such as hquor, immigration and slavery
subsumed the ethnoreligious tensions, political frustrations, and socioeconomic
insecurities of late antebellum society; the meanings that citizens ascribed to conflicts
over mores were subjective, conditional, and multifaceted. Hence, they were more
readily translatable into broad political constructs that could in turn "explain" a variety
of circumstances in the antebellum social formation. Battles over community mores
had powerftil and multiple symbolic dimensions that made it relatively easy, and
economical, for lawmakers to palliate diverse constituencies anxious for responsive
government.'^
With few exceptions economic or fiscal or governmental policies generated
altogether different alignments of interests, and hence, different voting patterns in
nineteenth-century legislatures, the Know Nothing assemblies included. Generally
speaking, the interests brought to bear on lawmakers in these spheres of policy were
notable for their particularism. This certainly holds for virtually all of the private and
parochial topics on which state legislatures held forth. On bills incorporating private
businesses, the parties who manifested interest at the state capitol were invariably
specific to the substantive matter at hand, even though business charter policy certainly
had broad public import. Significantly, the same was true for most public laws as well.
When the 1855 Pennsylvania General Assembly appropriated $10,000 to create the
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Fanners- High School of Pem,sylvania U was responding less to a generalized impulse
for agricultural improvements than a specialized campaign for the project orchestrated
by elites of the state's agricultural society, even if lawmakers identif.ed public benefits
in the institution.'^
That broad behavioral patterns in the 1 855 assemblies did not depart from
nineteenth-century standards is not surprising. The Know Nothings came to power m a
distributive regime in which the allocation of divisible goods and the authorization of
special powers and privileges was normally noncontroversial and nonpartisan, though
by no means inconsequential. Particularistic interests did not cease clamoring for
special legislation, despite the patriotic antipartyism and public-spiritedness that
perfiised Know Nothing movement culture. Observers at the grassroots were keenly
aware that within the prevailing framework inhered a tension, made the more salient
because Know Nothing heterogeneity. "A characteristic of the present legislature is an
extreme sensitiveness to outside opinions," observed the Lynn News. Indeed, several
Massachusetts senators publicly proposed a long legislative session because reform
ideas and special projects proliferated. For its part, the Salem Gazette was not
surprised by such proposals. "[I]t was obvious at the beginning of the session, that all
the members (but a few) being "bran new" at the business, and seven-eights of them
being charged each with some special project or whim, it would require anything but a
short session to give them all a hearing." Pennsylvanians aired related analyses. "We
hear an honest Senator say," read one editorial on horse-trading among Pennsylvania
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Know Nothings, "that he was compelled to vote for a good many banks against Ws
judgemem, in order to secure the charter he was asking for his district.'"*
Patterns of petitioning further illuminate the point. For example, of the 344
petitions to the Pemisylvania Senate in 1855, 78% were for purely private or local
subjects. Moreover only a select few of the petitions for public laws produced the sort
of broad-based mobilization that might suggest a generalized policy orientation across
the state's diverse regions and imerests. The exceptions were petitions for laws to
restrict liquor sales and consumption, which generated tens of thousands of signatures
from across the state, and a smaller petition for sale of the Main Line of the Public
Works. Labor reformers in Philadelphia, Lancaster, and several other factory towns
also mobilized an impressive, if narrower, petition for a ten-hour law. But the
dispersed and specialized origins of the ten-hour petition more closely approximated
the distributive regime's cultural norm. With few exceptions, petitioning involved a
bewildering array of narrowly based groups activated by specialized and/or parochial
objectives, especially when it came to policies of an economic or administrative nature.
And if newspaper accounts are any indication, direct lobbying activities were equally
narrow in scope, if not more so. Small wonder, then, that policy outputs overall were
weighted towards specialized interests and concerns.
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From a wide-angle perspective. Know Nothing lawmakers shared much with
their nineteenth-centuiy counterparts, at the veiy least suggesting the limits of Know
Nothing refonn. That said, there was margin for maneuver within the prevailmg
framework. An agenda for change accompanied Know Nothings into the halls of
power. In the broadest sense, the Know Nothings' experiences with the regime
conditioned their orientation to "reform" and to the state. The subject of Know
Nothing populism-the regime's failure to act in the public interest-defined the object
of Know Nothmg goveniment. The movement's antipartyism demanded proactive
goveniment, especially on issues that Know Nothing publicists singled out to illustrate
the regime's failures. An analysis ofKnow Nothing government in the areas of
govermnent and fiscal policy, commercial policy, and community mores reveals much
about the internal tensions and cultural constraints that eventually split the movement.
Government and Fiscal Policv
Given the movement's signature antagonism towards corrupt party governance,
it surprised no one that to varying degrees Know Nothing lawmakers in each state
pursued political and/or fiscal reforms. In Massachusetts, where the movement closely
adhered to the reformism of the defunct Coalition, Know Nothing political reforms
were indeed impressive, if not wholly attributable to the movement alone. The 1855
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General Court inherited a series of constitutional amendments, based on those
advanced earlier by the Coalition, which had been approved the previous session and
awaited passage in 1 855 before they could be turned over to voters for final ratification.
Constitutional amendments stipulatmg election by plurality in most state races, popular
election of the Governor's Council, the Secretary of State, State Treasurer, and
Attorney General, as well as a raft of county and local offices passed both chambers
easily. Legislation extending the popular election procedure to other local and county
offices also sailed through the General Court. Wary of special interests mtruding on
lawmaking, senators instituted a rule that prohibited members from voting on bills in
which they held a financial stake. The Massachusetts Know Nothings' shrank the
patronage power and expanded representative democracy, earning them high praise
from both contemporary political reformers and later historians.^''
The actions of Know Nothing lawmakers on other fronts of governmental and
fiscal policy, however, fueled opposition and tarnished somewhat an otherwise
laudable reform record. State spending rose to historic levels in 1 855; up 45% from the
previous year alone. Over the course of their two year reign Massachusetts Know
Nothings were especially generous in the area of early social welfare, lavishing
unprecedented sums on the common school system, a refurbished system of pauper
relief, a new school for the mentally handicapped, and a modern hospital for the insane
poor. A 50% property tax hike and a small tax increase on mutual insurance companies
paid for only a fraction of these and other expenditures; the remainder was simply
tacked onto the state's growing debt. Though moral and social reformers might
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champion the Know Nothings' soeial welfare policies, the movement's liberality cut
against prevailing ideals of economy in government.^'
Opponents of Know Nothing government thus had many targets to shoot at.
They seized on the tax increases and higher deficits to excoriate the Know Nothings as
wasteful spendthrifts. It did not help matters when the 1855 General Court voted UscH
a hefty pay raise. Indeed, the salaiy increase, coupled with a long session, extended
committee hearings, unusually high printing costs, and the implementation of another
1855 innovation, a state decemiial census, sent the ordinary expenditures of
govermiient soaring. More than one Essex County observer singled out fiscal
indiscipline as a sure sign of "unblushing corruption." Among the more fiivolous
expenditures held up for public ridicule was the purchase of over 800 penknives, at a
cost of roughly $3 each, that were distributed cunong lawmakers as mementos. Critics
granted that the need for stationary and other incidentals had always led to minor
abuses of the purse power. Yet the case of the 1 855 "Penknife Legislature" was
''singular" because Massachusetts government was in the hands of "a party which was
to reform the abuses and corruptions of the old political parties.""
While the 1855 Massachusetts General Court blew the roof off of governmcnl
spending, the Know Nothing assemblies in Connecticut and Pennsylvania, perhaps
chastened by the presence of a Democratic opposition, proceeded with greater caut
imd deference to normative ideals of economy. In debt-conscious Pennsylvania, K
Nothing and Democratic lawmakers together defeated a proposal to increase fiinding
for common schools, while overall, expenditures remained consistent with previous
ion
now
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sessions, despite a Know Nothing-inspired salary increase of nearly A0%. In
Connecticut, social welfare expenditures modestly outstnpped previous levels. Yet the
appropriations for social welfare purposes by Connecticut's 1 855 assembly paled in
comparison to later Republican-controlled legislatures."
Know Nothing lawmakers in Comiecticut and Pemisylvania demonstrated their
commitment to economical govermnent in other ways. Connecticut's assembly, at the
urging of Governor Minor, launched an ambitious overhaul of the state's judiciary.
The impetus for judicial reform was the system's mushrooming costs and widespread
frustration over its numerous inefficiencies. Spending on the judicial system had nearly
doubled since 1846 to become the single largest item in the state's annual budget. In
addition to that fiscal pressure, proponents of reform also cited a rising rate of crime
among immigrants, claiming it overwhelmed the system. Despite stiff resistance by the
Democratic minority which feared centralization of the courts. Know Nothing
legislators streamlined the bloated system, improving public access to small claims'
courts by expanding the county court circuit and devolving purely routine matters such
as divorce and probate to local justices of the peace.^'*
In Pennsylvania, the drive to economize manifested in the struggle to sell the
Main Line of the Public Works. The sale issue had been an important subtext to state
politics since the mid- 1 840s and a potent symbol of the Pennsylvania Know Nothings'
antiparty indictment of fraudulent governance. In the 1855 session the issue bulked
larger than any single order of business. While the movement for sale crossed party
lines, differences over the terms and conditions of sale generated weak but crucial
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partisan tendencies. Many Democrats favored sale but on terms more demanding than
their opponents. A few held out against sale altogether. Distrust of the power and
influence of J. Edgar "ntompson's Pemisylvania Railroad, the only likely purchaser of
the Main Line, informed the Democrats' cautious attitude towards sale. The 1854
Democraticcontrolled legislatare had passed a bill for sale of the Main Line at a
minimum price of $10 million, only to have it pocket vetoed by Governor Bigler. Few
ardent proponents of sale believed the Pemisylvania Railroad would buy at the $10
million price tag at any event. As expected, in 1855 Governor Pollock denounced the
Public Works for its "prodigality, extravagance, and corrupt political favoritism" and
urged the legislature to avoid "the errors of former legislation" by crafting a bill to sell
the Main Line "on terms favorable to the State, and beneficial to the purchaser."^^
Initially, Know Nothings at the grassroots seemed confident that their elected
leaders would swiftly resolve the sale issue. Championing sale as way to provide tax
relief, Stephen Miller also advocated abolition of the three member Canal Board as a
means to purify government. The Canal Board drained the treasury and threatened
American interests. Miller insisted, for it regularly "planted along the improvements an
army of foreigners, to eat out our substance, and vote down American citizens."
Moreover, Miller charged that the Canal Board and its fi-iends were responsible for
encumbering the 1 854 sale bill with onerous provisions. To many Know Nothings,
eliminating the Canal Board and selling the Main Line would uproot a corrupt vested
interest and break the reform logjam.
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Producing a workable sale bill, however, proved extremely difficult for
lawmakers; the legislature bogged down in a protracted struggle over details. The
minimum price remained a source of contention. Some legislators were comfortable
with the $10 million price tag; others, charging that figure was a thinly veiled plot to
prevent sale altogether, urged $7 million; still others argued for some compromise
figure and a few for no minimum price whatsoever. More ambitious reformers
proposed sale of the entire Public Works system. An intense lobbying campaign by the
Pennsylvania Railroad greatly complicated matters. President J. Edgar Thompson
coveted the Main Line, his corporation's principle competitor for the western trade.
Aware of the popularity of the sale issue, he let his terms be known in a series of
indiscreet communiques: $7.5 million for the Main Line, plus elimination of the
company's tonnage tax which had been imposed as a condition of incorporation in
1 846. Lawmakers had designed the tonnage tax to protect the Main Line's coal and
timber shipping revenues, jeopardized by competition from the new railroad. By 1 855
most advocates of sale accepted Thompson's reasoning that the tonnage tax violated
principles of fi-ee enterprise and would be obsolete at any rate once the Main Line was
disposed of. But other lawmakers opposed repeal of the tonnage tax because of the
revenue it generated for the state. Many too were simply repelled by the influence that
Thompson and his corps of lobbyists appeared to wield over the entire process. Indeed,
the Pennsylvania Railroad's ubiquitous hand was obliquely acknowledged more than
once during floor debates. Convinced that the Pennsylvania Railroad controlled "too
many members," one Democratic legislator, matching the Know Nothing's ethnic
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intolerance, spat that the company was "playing the Jew with us." In the context of the
railroad's aggressive lobbying campaign, senate and house Democrats, along with a
handflil of nervous Know Nothings, msisted that any sale bill contain a condition that
the Pennsylvania Railroad pay an additional sum above the minimum price."
As the legislative struggle wore on, reformers grew impatient. The Democrats
scored the proponents of sale for caving to corporate pressure and betraying the public
trust. Many Know Nothing opinion leaders expressed frustration over the whole affair.
By March even Stephen Miller acknowledged that the 1855 assembly had wasted too
much time on special legislation and salary increases. "The people expected better
things from this legislature," he wrote in an unguarded moment. Miller addressed
public letters to "Our American Legislators" to express the "people's" disapproval of
"the delay that has occurred" in the sale of the Main Line and abolition of the Canal
Board, as well as "the long continuance of the present session." Writing in "no spirit of
dictation or unkindness," Miller nevertheless warned that the success of the American
party "requires immediate passage of these bills and the early adjournment of the
Legislature."^^
In the end, Miller and other political reformers had to be satisfied with barely
half a loaf. In the last week of the session, a price of $7.5 million for the Main Line
was finally agreed upon, with the proviso that if the Pennsylvania Railroad should be
the purchaser, it would pay $8.5 million. In return, the railroad was to be exempted
from the tonnage tax, and the Commonwealth's traditional right to "enter upon, resume
and purchase the railroad of said company" was to be forever voided. It seemed a
even
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victory for the Pennsylvania Railroad, yet the company held out until 1857 for
better terms-a complete exemption from all state taxes, present and future. Thus,
although the 1 855 Know Nothings were instrumental in producing a sale bill, no
insignificant achievement, they did not succeed in sellmg the Main Line. Probably
because of this failure, Miller held back commentary on the bill's passage. Political
refomiers were frustrated ftirther by the defeat of companion measures to abolish the
Canal Board and sell other parts of the Public Works. Perhaps most important, the
entire process made many Know Nothing legislators appear as tools of the
Pennsylvania Railroad. Despite majority control of state government, Pemisylvania
Know Nothings had fallen short of their lofty goals.^'
Commercial Policv
Know Nothings did not revise the basic relationship between government and
the economy. But in all three states they responded to the late antebellum context of
economic uncertainty with a flurry of legislation designed to strengthen family security
in the industrializing market economy. Consider Connecticut's 1855 assembly. It
expanded the state's mechanics' lien law; revised the insolvent debtors' law to ensure
due process for debtors, and a more equitable distribution of property among multiple
creditors; and extended married women's property rights to cover personal property,
thereby insulating virtually all of her property from seizure by her husband's creditors.
Massachusetts' legislators produced a similar list of reform, and went further to abolish
center
era.
imprisonment for debt and expand the state's homestead exemption law from $500 to
$800. Pennsylvania's 1855 General Assembly enacted an expanded mechanics' lien
law; made it lawfr.1 for mn keepers to seize a borders' baggage as a lien on up to 14
days back rent; and extended the legal status of "feme sole trader" to married women m
cases where the husband "from drunkeness, profligacy, or other cause, shall neglect or
reftise to provide for his wife, or shall desert her."^°
Stay laws, mechanics' liens, and homestead exemptions had been at the
of land reformers' and urban mechanics' political goals throughout the Jacksonian
By the 1 850s, such policies had become fairly routine in most states. Indeed, nearly all
of these laws built upon existing statutes and passed without a roll-call. In fact, few
occasioned serious legislative debate or much public commentary, signaling a general
consensus among Know Nothing lawmakers and'the public at large that these sorts of
policies were neither particularly controversial in 1855 nor a radical departure from
established precedents in antebellum contract and property law.^'
Still the Know Nothings' broad orientation to mitigate the particular insecurities
of petit bourgeois families did not result in unambiguous triumphs for small producers.
In Massachusetts, where the movement's small producer tendencies are well-
established, a proposal to expand preferences for mechanics' back wages in attachment
proceedings went nowhere, presumably because generous preferences made banks less
inclined to loan money for risky improvements. The Connecticut House passed a
homestead exemption law, only to see it defeated by the senate.^' These failures
suggest that the specific motivations underlying Know Nothing legislation on debtor-
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creditor relations were complex. Thougl, the sources are nearly silem on the question
of motivation, a few hint at the competing interests and legal tangles that lawmakers
had to sort through. How to accommodate the hoaty ideal of small producer security
amid a ramifying market without injuring the interests and crucial stimulative
capacities of creditors seems to have been the primary concern ofKnow Nothing
lawmakers.
Massachusetts is a case in point. Governor Gardner urged abolition of
imprisonment for debt in his inaugural address to the General Court, but quickly added
that provisions were necessary to protect against "fraudulent debtors" and ensure "the
payment of his just debts," injunctions that shaped the final legislation." J. Q. A.
Griffin, a Republican-Know Nothing from Charlestown and Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee responsible for the 1855 mechanics' lien law, struck a similar
note of compromise when reporting the "great practical difficulty in framing a
satisfactory [lien] law." He explained:
[I]f a statute be enacted such as the mechanic demands, the owner of the
building may be defrauded or wronged. While on the other hand, if we afford
adequate protection to the owner, we leave the mechanic without'that security
which he requires. There is, moreover, a limit which we cannot pass in
legislating on this matter.
A major complication for the committee was the practice of subcontracting in the
construction market, which created a maze of economic exchanges and contractual
relationships. This came to the fore in attachment proceedings when a general
contractor went insolvent and fled without paying the subcontracts. In such cases.
Griffin explained, the subcontractors often filed liens against the property owner,
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creating a legal (and social) tension between statutory intent and contract law. "How to
afford adequate protection to all these parties is the problem so difficuh to solve,"
Griffin wrote. In the end, the committee's bill limited the lien to subcontractors who
provided materials (thus preventing laborers m the employ of the subcontractor from
joining the attachment as co-claimants) and gave notice of intention to file a lien before
furnishing materials and commencing work. A mechanic's incentive not to file
attachment thus became greater under the 1855 law, for to do so could conceivably cost
him business. Furthermore, property owners could now prevent attachments simply
"by giving notice in writing...that he will not be responsible" for materials and wages.^^*
The interaction of contract doctrine with an increasingly complex market thus
mediated the Know Nothings' efforts to continue statutory recognition of small
producer security. While this esoteric legal process largely played out in committee
rooms, other more controversial commercial policies spilled onto the public stage.
Conflicts over labor reform and differences over the proper balance of regulation and
promotion of business punctuated Know Nothing government and shaped the public's
reaction to it. We shall consider each in turn.
Labor reformers in all three states viewed the Know Nothing movement as a
potential vehicle for realizing their longstanding goal of a ten-hour workday. As we
have seen, ten-hour reformers in all three states, especially Massachusetts, had been
active for several years organizing petition campaigns and raising public awareness of
the issue. When the 1855 assemblies opened it was clear that they would deliberate
seriously on the matter. The Massachusetts General Court was convened scarcely more
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than a week when the Newbu^ort HeraM observed that a ten-hour bHl was already
.n
the making, and "from the great number of mechanics in that body," was almost certam
to pass. As Comiecticut's General Assembly organized at the begim^ing of May, the
Norwich State Guard list., a ten-hour law as "among the refonns we hope will receive
the attention of our Legislature.'- If there were any lingering doubts, renewed petition
campaigns soon dispelled them. In Pemisylvania the biggest of these campaigns
centered in Philadelphia and Lancaster, the state's largest textile centers, but the issue
also generated small pockets of support in scattered factory towns. In Hairisburg, for
example, George H. Morgan and other local labor refonners staged ten-hour meetings
blocks from the Capitol. In Massachusetts and Comiecticut the pattern was similar:
pressure emanated principally from textile towns such as Lowell, Chicopee, Salisbury,
and Lawrence, Massachusetts; Willimantic and Norwich, Connecticut. None of the
1855 petitions came close to matching the size and scope of the 1853 Massachusetts
campaign, yet joint select committees quickly formed to tackle the subject.''
Laws regulating the hours of labor in factories constituted a significant
extension of the state's police power over economic relations. Several states, including
Pennsylvania (1849) and Connecticut (1842), had experimented with general ten-hour
and especially child labor laws, but such legislation had always proved controversial. If
anything, by 1855 the issue was more highly charged. Counter-petitions against the
laws flowed into the state assemblies. Some opponents argued that placing a statutory
limit on the workday would depress wages, and thus hardly benefit the laboring classes.
More significant, others attacked the laws from the standpoint of an emergent liberal
orientation that defined the economy as purely pnvate and self-regulatmg. In this
framework the police power becomes not only unnecessary but injurious, both to the
property claims of individual capitalists
.«^the public welfare, subsumed in Capital.
As one Whig American legislator explained:
"legislation on the subject is not required,
and not to the advantage of the operative, but on the contraiy, is really injurious."
Another Democrat was "opposed to all legislation on the subject. It appeared that
[legislators] were about to ruin what they wanted to mend." Such ideas, though rapidly
in ascendance in certain quarters after the Civil War, were at odds with deeply
embedded legal and political economic traditions of the antebellum republic. Labor
reformers' attempts to apply the police power to productive relations in privately-
owned factories compelled their antagonists to elaborate a counter-vision of the public
welfare that specified the divisibility of the private from the public.^'
Proponents of hours' legislation made their stand on traditional formulations of
the police power. For one thing, the state had an imperative interest in promoting
harmonious relations between labor and capital, relations that long hours severely
strained. As a ten-hour meeting of operatives and citizens of Lancaster, Pennsylvania,
resolved: "[I]n our opinion the interests of Labor and Capital are identical, and that all
circumstances which render strikes for hours or wages necessary are detrimental to that
identity." A ten-hour law would conduce to a commonality of interest because factory
operatives, persuaded of the justice the measure, "will not be satisfied with anything
less than the Ten Hour System." Here the petitioners were engaging in revisionist
history. Earlier labor protest in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and Lancaster in 1 849 and
agam in Lancaster and Hamsburg ,n 1 853 stemmed from the earlier mtervent.ons of
state government. Inspiration for those protests came from the 1848 and 1849 ten-hour
laws. The state's legal recognition of shorter hours emboldened operatives to formally
claim their rights. In 1 855 workers simply turned agam to the state for an elaboration
of the police power. In making their case, labor reformers also emphasized that long
hours of toil was both unhealthy and an obstacle to moral and spiritual self-
improvement. Again, in this formulation the issue was ofparamount public concern,
and thus Mly within the state's purview. Hence the reform manifested "a deep interest
in the welfare of our countiy, in the education of our children, in the support of our
churches and in the perpetuity of those glorious institutions and great blessings
bequeathed to us by our fathers," explained Augustus C. Carey, Chair of the
Massachusetts Joint Special Committee on the Hours of Labor. Transfonnations in the
gendered composition of industrial work embodied in the rise of large factories also
figured crucially in the case for ten-hours' labor. The maintenance of traditional gender
norms amid the social transformations of late antebellum society was of particular
concern to labor's champions. As "mothers of the coming generation," wrote Carey,
women factory workers needed time "to be trained in other duties besides those of
spinning and weaving." Excessive hours of factory work rendered female operatives
"unfit for the duties which await them in life."^^
Know Nothings in all three states placed special emphasis on the social and
moral problem of child labor. The arguments of Norwich's Andrew Stark are telling.
Endorsing a ten-hour day for all operatives, Stark nevertheless focused on the particular
evns of child labor. Laboring in dreadful conditions, young operatives ,u.kly became
overtasked, and soon "the fear of the overseer is the only motive" co.pelHng them to
daily toil. Under such conditions, Stark maintained, youth "have no time to read, no
time nor disposition to thmk." In broader terms, Stark believed that a ten-hour law for
minors was needed to revivify the nation's sapped moral will. As Stark put it: "Let
such things be regulated by legislative enactments, and one thing will be done to save
our country from mental and physical deterioration, and our own institutions from
downfall." Emphasis on the debilitating influence of factory work on women and
children permitted labor reformers to cast the issue in terms that transcended the
boundaries that opponents erected to differentiate private issues from public ones."
Labor reformers also manipulated the nativist political context to impute special
meaning and urgency to their cause. Stark's appeal to "save our country" was an
indirect reference to nativist patriotism. In Massachusetts, the immediate impetus for
the Know Nothings' 1855 child labor law was a series of conflicts between the school
committee and Catholics in the textile city of Lawrence. The school committee
charged that Irish children had labored in the textile mills during the exact periods that
a Catholic priest vouched for their attendance in the city's Catholic parochial school.
Petitions from Lawrence demanded the law be revised to give final authority over the
question of school attendance to local school committees, thus undermining Catholic
autonomy. Know Nothing lawmakers responded with a law that prohibited children
under aged 1 5 from working in factories unless they attended either a public or private
school, "of which the teachers shall have been approved" by the local school
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commi«ee, a. leas, eleven weeks a year. Nativis, political culture enabled
Massachusens Know Nothings to confront the state's powerful textile industry and chip
away at its dike against state regulation.^"
Similarly, ten-hour petitions in Connecticut struck nativist chords. A ten-hour
law would ensure the "right of American citizens" to have time enough for their
"physical, social, moral and intellectual wants." The coercive nature of the relationship
between management and operative, read one, undermined
"independence and
fearlessness...the noble characteristics of Americans." Petitioners appealed to nativist
chauvinism by drawing parallels between their own condition and that of American
slaves and European proletarians. "In the pride of Americans we have [boasted] of the
superiority of our condition over that of all other people in the worid, and in the
kindness of our hearts we have felt umneasured commiseration with the negro slaves of
our own country, and the factory laborers and miners of England, but we are growing
ashamed and alarmed, for ourselves and our country, to see how near we have
approached their worst condition." Slavery also proved a potent symbolic weapon for
labor reformers. In one editorial Stark attempted to fuse the moral and social
arguments underpinning antislavery and labor reform by asking "Shall the Children be
slaves?" Stark suggested that northerners practiced hypocrisy when they condemned
Southern slavery and ignored "oppression north of Mason and Dixon's line."""
Such appeals swayed nativist lawmakers in all three states, at least on the child
labor front. The chairman of Connecticut's Joint Committee on the Hours of Labor,
Lebanon senator and antislavery Know Nothing Learned Hebard, admitted that the
provisions of the state's 1842 child labor law "are almost, if not totally disregarded."
That statute had established a ten-hour day for chUdren under aged 14 and prohibited
their employment unless they had attended school at least three months a year. Hebard
said the commmee had found "an existing wrong" m Connecticut's textile industry
regarding not only the question of child labor but the condition of adult millhands too.
"How to reach, or remedy the evil," Hebard wrote in measured prose, "has been a
matter of embarrassment with your committee." The committee rejected a bill to
establish a legally binding ten-hour day for the entire industry. Instead, it proposed a
sort of compromise that in substance became Comiecticut's ten-hour law. The
committee recommended: a blanket declaration that ten-hours' constitt^te a legal day's
work in Comiecticut, with a "special contract" proviso that gave corporations the right
to "negotiate" longer hours with adult employees, thus conceding a core principle of
liberal political economy regarding the adult labor market; a compromise eleven-hour
day for minors under 1 8 that would, in principle, be legally binding; the total
prohibition of child labor under age 1 1 .'^^
Hostility even to these compromise measures was intense. The textile industry
had opposed the 1 842 law because young millhands performed essential tasks which
adult operatives resisted taking up. The industry ignored the law because they feared
that sending lapboys, bobbin girls, and apprentices home after ten hours' labor would
result in a defacto ten-hour day for the entire mill. More basically, the law set a
precedent that the textile industry was simply loath to accept. These interests came into
play in 1855. On the senate floor, Hebard and others beat back several efforts to
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eliminate U,e symbolic ten-hour day and ,he eleven-hour day for minors. Before the
bill's final passage, however, opponents were successful m dropping the mimmum age
for factory work from 1 1 to 9 years."^
In Pennsylvania the process and outcome was similar. Proponents of hours'
legislation invoked the 1849 ten-hour law for legal precedent, while also pointing out
that it had in fact gone entirely unenforced. Veteran labor refomiers wanted a
restatement of the general ten-hour rule for incorporated manufactories coupled with
new enforcement mechanisms. These proposals made little headway in the 1 855
legislature, so labor reformers turned to an alternative ten-hour law for minors and a
bill requiring factories to provide a reading library for their operatives. That latter
proposal was defeated decisively in the Democratic senate, but both house and senate
judiciary committees reported out ten-hour bills for employees aged 20 years or less in
textile, bagging, and paper manufactories. Opponents attempted to weaken the bill
with amendments reducing the minimum age to 16 and limiting its application to
factories with more than 50 hands. Democratic lawmakers from Philadelphia took the
lead in steering the bill through committee and floor debates intact. In the end the bill
passed easily with particularly sfrong support from senate Democrats and Know
Nothings in both houses. Indeed, the cohesion demonstrated by house Know Nothings
on this bill was as high as any during the 1855 session (Table B. 19).^^
The result of labor reform in Massachusetts, aside from the child labor law,
proved disappointing, especially since the Bay State labor movement enjoyed direct ties
to the Know Nothing General Court. Know Nothing representatives Augustus C.
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Carey (Ipswich), Putnam C. Taft (Worcester), and Middlesex County senator Elihu C.
Baker (Medford) had cut their political eyeteeth on the grassroots ten-hour movement
of 1851-3; Taft had served as President of the state's Ten Hour Central Committee. All
three gamed berths on the jomt select committee organized to receive petitions and
draft a ten-hour bill. Few doubted that 1 855 would be the breakthrough year for long-
suffering labor reformers. In the past,
"[IJegislation has been had to protect the
capitalist, resolves have been presented and passed in favor of the slave of the south,"
wrote Carey in the preface to the ten-hour bill, reported out unanimously by the
committee, while factory operatives "have been compelled to toil on, umioticed by
those in power...remembered only when their vote was necessary to the office holder's
welfare." Carey insisted that things were different now. Factory operatives, "knowing
that this legislature is made up of men whose interests are the same as their own, appeal
to us with a degree of hope amounting almost to a certainty."^^
Such confidence was misplaced. Reflecting the strength of labor reformers in
the 1855 General Court, the committee's bill called for a legally binding ten-hour day
for all categories of workers in certain industries including textiles. It was a daring and
uncompromising bill that entailed considerable risk since the textile industry had
voluntarily adopted an eleven hour rule at the height of previous ten-hour agitation in
1853. In 1855 many eleven hour petitions, signed by folk who sincerely wished to
codify the industry's political expediency, were introduced by legislators who probably
saw the eleven hour alternative through equally expedient eyes. Labor reformers were
well aware that an eleven-hour bill would probably pass. But labor veterans held out
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for a ten-hour bil, because i. originated in the labor movement, not the counting houses
of the textile industty, and because "there may be a disposition on the part of some of
the mills to return to the old system." The ten-hour question embodied a twenty-year
struggle in Massachusetts between labor and a baronial textile industty backed by
Boston's financial citadels. Indeed, the committee exempted from their bill many
categories of workers in the powerful railroad industry. Before the final report, several
more categories of workers were hastily added to the exemption clause, including
employees of glass works, blast furnaces, paper mills, operators of electric telegraphs,
and night watchmen/^
Thus amended, the bill sailed through the house by better than a two-to-one
margin. The senate was the stumbling block. After a hostile special proviso
amendment failed, the bill's chances suddenly and unexpectedly dimmed. A last ditch
eleven-hour amendment was summarily rejected, evidently put forward to stave off a
total loss. The original bill was then defeated handily, with the crucial votes coming
from the labor movement's backyard: the counties of Essex (4 nays out of 5 votes),
Middlesex (4 of 6), and Worcester (3 of 4). Such a pattern of opposition is intriguing
in light of Charles Cowley's tantalizing but unprovable charge that "corporation gold"
was used to "line the pockets" of lawmakers before the final vote. In any case, the
failure galled labor. An Amesbury ten-hour advocate wrote: "It is evident that the
laboring classes have been mistaken in their men, so far as the Senate is concemed.'"*^
Soon thereafter Massachusetts labor reformers experienced another crushing
defeat on an issue unrelated to commercial policy but close to their hearts: the secret
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ballot. Putnam Taft reported a bill from the House Jud.da^ Committee that revwed
the 1851 and 1852 secret ballot provisions of the state's election codes, both of which
had been repealed in 1853. The house passed the bill, only to see it languish in the
Senate Judiciaiy Committee, headed by none other than Elihu C. Baker. Baker finally
reported out a negative recommendation, thus imperiling this second plank of labor's
unwritten platform in Massachusetts. The senate first accepted Baker's report, but
upon reconsideration, rejected it and sent the bill to a second reading. However, that
vote was only successftil because senate president Henry W. Benchley, a Worcester
Know Nothing with ties to the city's nativist labor movement, cast the tie-breaker. The
victory was Pyrrhic, for the vote demonstrated that the bill lacked enough support to
safely carry the senate, a fact that doomed the bill in subsequent efforts to force a final
vote."*
It seems likely that Baker's opposition to the secret ballot bill was motivated by
political calculations. Baker's star was rising in the fledgling American party; he
would soon receive a berth on the party's Executive Committee. Perhaps Baker and
other Americans believed that the open ballot procedure, in the context of the discipline
the movement had shown in the election of 1854, was one way for them to maintain
that discipline as the movement completed the transition to an open political party.
Whatever the case, political pressure certainly impacted the prospects for labor
legislation in all three states, especially in light of the considerable resources that
industrial interests could provide any fledgling political party. After all, even in
Massachusetts labor was but one of several overiapping factions and tendencies in the
was
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Know Nothing movement. Of course, that Know Nothings even contemplated hours'
legislation is quite significant in and of itself It is equally true that statutory regulation
of child labor was an important early breakthrough in the history of social policy, one
that Gilded Age reformers would subsequently build upon, and just as certainly reveals
a broader reform sensibility in play among the Know Nothings. Still it must also be
acknowledged that powerful currents against labor interests influenced the majority of
the Know Nothing movement. In all three states thoroughgoing labor refonn
either defeated or side-stepped in favor of fairly timid measures that left adult factory
operatives with scarce little to celebrate.
We can see the limits ofKnow Nothing labor reform by turning to the question
of enforcement. A major impulse behind the 1855 legislation was the failure of
previous laws regulating the length of the workday. Such legislation, though under
increasing ideological attack, broadly accorded with traditional police power theory in
American political economy and jurisprudence. Generally, the more regulatory aspects
of the police power were traditionally vested in local communities. Out of deference to
the principle of popular sovereignty, state government normally limited itself to
delegating regulatory functions to local governments. Thus empowered, local officials
crafted specific regulations for public health and safety, public markets, liquor licensing
and consumption, and so forth, as their community demanded. The extent of regulation
by local governments, as well as the acquiescence of state governments and the courts
in such activities, proves the myth of nineteenth-century laissez faire."^ This
distributive culture of governance also had its political benefits, namely, allowing
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political elUes
.o „,o.d power ,o particular soc.al and poli.ica, eon.ex.s. Thus no.
incdemally U,e broader ,oal ofham,on, ,n n,a„ers of eovernance was also (ideal,,)
accommodated by .he dis.ibu,ion of .he public's coercive power .o local au.horUies
who were subject
.o close community scru.iny.
By passing s.a.ewide legislation govemmg ch.ld labor, i. can be said
.ha,
.he
Know Nothings gestured
.owards a reconcep.ua.iza.ion of d,e locus of .he police power
in an indus.rializing socie.y, namely, in .he diree.ion of grea.er ce„.ralized s.a.e
auU,ori.y. As we shall see, .he Know Nolhings' prohibi.ion s.a.u,es carried a sim.lar
po.en.,al. Ye. in the final analysis .his was a ges.ure principally in .he realm of U,eo.y,
no. substonce. The enforcement mechanisms of the 1855 labor laws, Urough more
explici. than earlier statutes, relied on the traditional ,dea that local authorities were
best suited to wield .he police power on the public's behalf Thus the Pennsylvania law
entreated ail "ward, borough and township constables...to attend to .he s.rict
observance" of .he .en-hour law. The Connec.icut and Massachusetts laws stipulated
tha. viola.ors pay a fme into the .own .reasury for the support ofcommon schools,
thereby relying principally on the monetary incewive of local school officials in
de.ec.ing viola.ions.'" Though imporlan. in laying an intellectual foundation for later
social and labor reformers, .he Know No.hing view of the state as evidenced in these
laws did not break fundamentally from customary bodies of thought or practice.
This becomes clear in an episode of labor conflict in Connecticut that followed
quickly on .he heels of .he 1 855 .en-hour law. As .he law .ook effec. in Angus.,
suppor.ers expec.ed .ha. it would be "complied with cheerily by employers, and
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across eastern
summer,
most
ic
state
in.is.ed upon by operatives.- Soon however a wave of strikes swept
Connecticut as n,i„hands demanded enforcement of the ten-hour t.,e whiie employers
held fas, to the proviso clause. Concentrated at Wi,lin>antic. North Windham, and
Norwich, labor protest in eastern Connecticut was fttrious but short-lived that
Evidence on these outbursts is sketchy, but a few key points are clear. First and
important, the strikes resulted from the millhands' newfound confidence
.nstilled by the
passage of the ten-hour law. The actions ofgoven^ent figured prominently in publ
life during the 1 850s. giving rise to popular efforts to concretize the rights that the
had formally recognized but left at the mercy of private negotiation and administration.
Second, the strikes rapidly lost momentum due to public apathy, resulting in few if any
gains for millworkers. At several mills, workers offered compromise proposals for an
eleven-hour day during the week and a nine-hour Santrday, but management at most
mills refirsed such overtures. The industry stubbornly fought the supposedly binding
eleven-hour day for minors because abiding it would have strengthened the movemem
for reduced hours for all millhands."
Ten-hour supporters were left with few options but to appeal to public opinion,
presumably enshrined in the law. According to labor reformers the "necessity of the
law is made apparent by the deliberate opposition" it generated. "The public have a
deep interest in this subject," wrote Andrew Stark in an attempt to galvanize local
support for the workers' cause. But in the face of industry opposition and most
importantly public indifference, particulariy among local elites whose support was
crucial, fiiistrated reformers could do little but issue toothless proclamations that "rich
men. or con,ora,io„s, which violate
.his law will find ve^ little favor with the
public."" With protest easily snuffed out the 1855 ten-hour law became another in a
series of unenforced and largely symbolic antebellum labor laws. The specifics of
Connecticut's law and the conceptualization of society and the state Utat underlay i.
were paradigmatic of the limits of refom, in the distributive culture of governance.
To say this is to put Know Nothing government into perspective. We gatn sttll
greater perspective if we examine other dimensions of commercial policy under Know
Nothing government, namely the regulation and promotion of business. Massachusetts
provides a most interesting and contradictoty case. On the one hand. Massachusetts
Know Nothings created an Insurance Commission with broad powers of inspection and
oversight, and a state Pilots' Commission that superseded local oversight of Boston
Harbor. Traditional police power doctrine concerning the public's interest in well-
regulated commerce informed the creation of these commissions. These acts originated
in the Committee on Mercantile Affairs and Insurance, and the accompanying reports
attest to this committee's keen concern for the public welfare. In the case of the
Insurance Commission, committee chairman James M. Hood pointed to the deficient
"security offered by the policies of a number of different [insurance] companies" in the
state. Consumers were threatened by the rampant speculation of the industry. "This is
notoriously the case with companies that most anxiously solicit business, allure it with
low premiums, and issue policies with little caution as to the risk," wrote Hood. For
precedent Hood invoked the state's Banking Commission, "universally regarded as
successful" and necessary. To Hood and his colleagues, it was "obvious" that "without
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any superv.s.on of State authority," the public, confidence in the insurance indust^
and the safety of policyholders would be jeopardized."
In many other areas of commercial policy, however, the Massachusetts Know
Nothings submerged their protean public vision in a sea of particularistic policymaking
*at served aggressively promotional ends. Their general incorporation law for
manufactories doubled the maximum capital that could be incorporated under the law
and gave corporations the power to issue special stock, something they had long
coveted. Moreover.the 1855 legislature granted 21 charters or capital increases to
banks and 20 to insurance companies, the laner a pre-Civil War record. The number of
special laws, new charters, and charter extensions for railroads tallied 54, another
unprecedented figure. Indeed, railroad promotion took on near manic dimensions in
1855. The General Court gave several local govermnents the power to subscribe to
railroad stock, and passed legislation that extended state loans to the Western Railroad
and the Vermom and Massachusetts Railroad. Those last two bills were thwarted only
because Governor Gardner's vetoes were upheld in close votes."
That railroad interests should receive such solicitude from the General Court is
not surprising. During debates on Gardner's veto of the bill to aid the Vermont and
Massachusetts Railroad, lobbyists mingled with lawmakers on the house floor,
prompting an order that the floor be cleared. The scene recalled Hemy Wilson's words
two years earlier: "[W]e have annually here around the Slate House, numbers of men
who come here as the agents of these [railroad] corporations, either to accomplish
something for themselves, or to defeat somebody else.'"* Indeed, railroads played a
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prominen, role in shap.ng Know Nothing poi.cy„ai.ing. The ,ssue of safe„ a>
.ihoad
crossings is
.Hustra.ive. Since the early iSSOs dangerous railroad crossings in ,he city
of Boston and adjacent towns had sparked public outc„ for br,dges and unden^asses to
accomtnodate safe travel and commerce on the Hub's bustling avenues and streets. In
1 854 .he General Court appointed a commission
.o examine the problem. It heard
testimony from the railroads,
"represented either by their officers or by counsel," and
presented a detailed plan to the 1 855 General Court that called for several route
changes and construction of a series of tunnels and bridges to eliminate the remainder
of the more heavily trafficked crossings. The ratlroads were to pick up the bill for these
changes and receive eminent domain grants and charter extensions for the new
corridors. As committees in both houses considered the report and various other
options, lines that promised to be affected by the outcome, including the Boston &
Lowell and the Eastem Railroad, weighed in at the capitol with requests that any laws
regulating crossings should be statewide in scope, so as to burden all railroads equally.
This was the political context behind the 1855 "Act to Secure the Safety of Passengers
at Railroad Crossings," which required all engines to stop completely before
proceeding slowly through a crossing, and "An Act to Prevent Obstructions to
Highways and Townways by Railroads," which specified that railroads be financially
responsible for building bridges and underpasses at crossings with major highways
throughout the state."
Another 1 855 law required railroads to post adequate security for assessment
proceedings prior to seizing land through eminent domain, clearly a victory for property
the vested committees as "inexpedient,"
.nclud.ng a general incorporation law for
railroads, unlimited HaHHty for stockholders m raHroad companies, the erection of
gates and the employment of flagmen at all street crossings, and pro rata regulation of
passenger fares and frdght schedules. The one exception, a bill for a state RaHroad
Commission, modeled on the state's Banking Commission, was rushed onto the senate
floor in the final days of the session, only to be defeated 20 to 1. In fact, the state's
railroads had little to fear from the bill; the House Committee on Railroads and Canals
had already killed the measure with a negative report. Even a proposal to prohibit
railroad companies from hiring persons of "known drinking habits" was
uncharacteristically squelched in this militantly anti-liquor General Court.^«
The question of the proper balance of regulation and promotion of business
interests also bulked large in Comiecticut's 1855 General Assembly. Under Know
Nothing government the powers of the state's Railroad Commission, founded in 1853,
were expanded; one act stipulated that railroads obtain a certificate from the
commissioners attesting to the road's safety before it could open for public travel. The
1855 legislature also reestablished the independent three member Banking
Commission, originally created in 1837. Empowered to inspect the books of private
banks, verify specie reserves, monitor currency levels, and make annual reports to the
General Assembly, the Banking Commission had been abolished in 1854 because the
state's banking interests viewed it and other regulations as overbearing and
unnecessary. For its part, the 1855 assembly viewed these commissions as public
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necess,t,es and legally justifiable under i„con,ora..o„ and police power doctrine. The
1855 Railroad Commission noted that much of the capital controlled by the state's
railroads "has been fUntished by persons of limited means, in small amounts," and that
"in too many instances these investments have proved disastrous." Because so many
middle class folk, "unskilled
.n the affairs of corporate bodies," had money mvested in
railroads, i, was "necessary that the same legislative body which created these
corporations, should throw around the same safeguards, and exercise the same
supervision over .heir financial affairs, which are considered necessaty to guard and
protect other public interests."^'
In addition to extending the police power over these powerftil industries, the
1855 legislature resisted pleas from both for additional charters and capital increases.
Here lawmakers bucked powerfril recent trends; 65 banks and 20 railroads received
private charters, or were authorized to increase capital, in the 1850s alone. In 1855,
only one additional bank and a one railroad was chartered, though 1 1 banks, previously
chartered under the 1852 free banking law, were re-chartered as private banks.
Regarding banks, the 1855 General Assembly seemed to follow the recommendation of
their newly reconstituted Banking Commission. An avalanche of petitions for bank
charters fell upon lawmakers, but in its annual report the Bank Commission stated
"there is sufficient capital in the state; they therefore are opposed to the charter of any
new banks.
While a broad consensus characterized charter policy and government
commissions in 1855, a major controversy erupted over the state's free banking law.
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The 1 852 law was a sore point for the state's banking interests. The act stipulated that
banks chartered under its provisions transfer pubhc securWes to the State Treasurer,
who then issued special "circulating notes" to each bank equal to the market value of
the stocks. The circulating notes were engraved and printed under the authority of the
Treasurer and registered with the state's seal; the Treasurer held the stocks as security
against any bank that might suspend redemption of its notes. In addition, the law
required a minimum specie reserve equal to 10% of circulation, and capped
capitalization at $1 million. Because of these regulations, most private investors
avoided the free banking law, continuing to petition for, and receive, private charters of
incorporation through the 1853 and 1854 legislative sessions. Champions of the
banking community viewed the law's restrictions and procedures as "harassing
legitimate commercial activity," and launched an intense lobbying effort in 1854 and
1855 to rescind it.^'
Meanwhile many of the law's supporters, including 1 1 of the 13 banks that
were incorporated as "free banks" under its provisions, also clamored for repeal. For
one thing, the recent recession had sent the bond market into a tailspin, restricting the
amount of currency that the free banks could issue against their securities. Economic
recession gave powerftil momentum to the effort to repeal the free banking law, now
portrayed as irresponsibly anti-bank and an obstacle to recovery. Others pointed to the
inconsistencies in Connecticut's two-tiered banking policy. As the Hartford Courant
put it, "we believe ours is the only state presenting the anomaly of an effective Free
Banking law, and new [special] bank charters being granted at the same time.""
was
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With opposition mounting and support wavering, the 1855 Banl. Conu^ission
recommended repea, of the ,852 law. The legislature again followed the commission's
lead, voting for repeal in a tight vote. A majority ofKnow Nothing legislators backed
repeal, but the crucial margin came from Democrats, about one-quarter ofwhom broke
with their party and voted with the repealers. Once again banking in Connecticut
to be conducted exclusively through special incorporation. In this way. Connecticut's
banking industry achieved a major victoty. And in a related measure, the 1 855
legislature also increased the amount of capital and deposits that a Comtecticut bank
could loan out of state, a clear victoty for Hartford-based institutions with interests in
western railroads."
However, the 1855 assembly passed additional measures related to banking
policy that were designed to raise revenue and ensure sound banking in a volatile and
capital intensive economy. In the same bill that sanctioned increases in the amount of
out of state loans, the legislature capped a bank's indebtedness and circulation at 25%
of capital "actually paid in." This was a new, more restrictive cap that aimed to curb
note over-issue. In the past, private bank charters had routinely included provisions
that limited indebtedness, but normally to 50% of capital stock paid in. In the free
banking repeal law, the General Assembly included a condition that all free banks must
first deposit a "bonus" of2% of its capital stock into the state treasury before receiving
the special charter. Later in the 1855 session, this bonus requirement was expanded to
cover all future banks chartered through 1857. The banking community considered the
bank bonus law a b,ow
.o .he indus.^. One commentator denounced as "a„ wrong
in both theory and practice and a disgrace to Connecticut legislation.-
Connecticut's
, 855 session thus produced a mixed record on banking pohcy.
The banking community was relieved ofwhat it perceived as onerous regulation and
was given the uniform policy it demanded; proponents of greater regulation could point
to the refttrbished Bank Commission and certain other minimal standards of sound
banking. And with the general bank bonus law, the legislature aff.rmed a commitment
.0 general legislation designed with some broader public end in mind. Prior to the mid-
1850s, bonuses were irregularly imposed on banks. The provisions of these early
bonuses, ftahermore, reflected the changing character of public policymaking in
Com>ecticut. Before 1 840, bank bonuses were almost always for a particular economic
project such as the purchase ofnew railroad stock or money for river and harbor
improvements. Bank bonuses were thus a means for legislators to exact concessions
from banking interests and ftuther fttnd popular development projects. By the late
1840s and early 1850s, if banks were required to pay them at all, bonuses were without
exception designated for charitable or social reform purposes such as the State Normal
School or local libraries or hospitals." The 1855 bank bonus law, in contrast, required
all banks to pay bonuses directly imo the state treasury. Bonus monies were no longer
tied to some specific economic or benevolent project; they were deposited into the state
treasury and became part of the general operating ftind. Bonuses were no longer
imposed intennittently, at the caprice of some legislative committee or faction; they
became a routine requirement for all banks.
If lawmakers in Massachusetts and Connec.icu. achieved something of a
balance benveen the regulation and promotion of business in 1 855, those in
Pennsylvania sided more with promotion. Under pressure to reduce the state debt, the
1 855 General Assembly did enact legislatton establishing procedures for the collection
ofbank taxes by requiring annual reports of capital stock and dividends to the Auditor
General. But plans to impose bonuses on banks and restrict the emission of small
notes, invariably proposed by the Democratic minority, met with defeat on the senate
and house floors. A railroad safety bill passed the Democratic senate only to be
quashed by the Know Nothing house, while proposals for regulating passenger and
freight rates on railroads failed to make it ou, of committee." More revealing still is
the 1855 Pemisylvania Assembly's record on business charter policy. Dozens of
applications for new bank charters and capital increases to existing banks appeared
before the 1855 legislature, prompting Governor Pollock to warn legislators against an
"extravagant, improper or um-easonable increase of banks and banking capital." From
the grassroots nativists decried the horde of lobbyists who brought scores of bank and
railroad charter applications to the halls of the capitol. Stephen Miller, believing first-
time lawmakers especially vulnerable to lobby pressure, cautioned Know Nothing
assemblymen to "avoid a professional borer as you would the itch.""
Few lawmakers in 1855 could resist the temptation to scratch the special charter
itch. The assembly enacted a record 3 1 special laws incorporating new banks and
insurance companies or granting extensions and capital increases to existing ones.
Most new bank charters, furthermore, were granted for 20 year periods, an unusually
long chaner ,ife " Part, cohesion scores on a selected number of ban. charters
suggests the cross pressures that produced this l.bera, batch of special legislation (Table
B.I9). Throughout the sess.on sonte senate and house Democrats of the old Jackson.an
school and Know Nothings with Whig roots voted consistently pro- or anti-banlc, but a
majority evinced no clear pattern of voting that might indicate a strong ideological
position on special incorporation. Rather, regional considerations and political
calculations appeared to shape legislators' decisions. Petitions for economic
improvements invariably argued that they constintted a public necessity, implying that
local communities were the appropriate arbiters of questions involving economic
development Prodded by such entreaties, lawmakers appeared willing to lend support
for projects outside their district in order to secure the support of colleagues for projects
demanded by their own constituents.*'
Thus the culture of logrolling, especially pronounced in a large and diverse state
like Pemisylvania, decisively affected policy outputs on commercial policy, a fact that
was not lost on local nativists. As the session unfolded grassroots commentary on the
1855 legislature turned increasingly negative. Despite assertions that Know Nothing
legislators would resist the beguiling influence of lobbyists, Stephen Miller quickly
grew disenchanted as borers easily swayed assemblymen into supporting a large
increase in banking capital. "The reckless facility with which the Legislature of
Pennsylvania--and especially the House of Representatives-thrust through the
applications for new banking institutions," he wrote in one representative editorial,
"has alarmed the people, startled the commercial community, and astonished every
reflecting citize„;-our legislators,
.onied tyrants and unscrupulous ntonopol.sts
excepted."
,n search of an explanation for the fiurry of special bills. Miller turned to
the culture of distributive politics. Even prudent lawmakers had the.r own "pecuhar
inlerests" to advance, he acknowledged, so they feared "to intetpose [against special
bills] lest they may arouse a spirit of retaliation when their locality is to be provided
for." Miller's analysis was on the mark, and could well have described his own
position when it came to banks in Dauphin County. While Miller recognized that a
frenzy of bank chartering could tarnish the reform credemials of his fledgling party,
without apparent irony he backed bills for new banks in Harrisburg because the
"business and population of the county has greatly increased since 1850. while the
banking capital has not."'°
The Know Nothings' record on special incorporation proved especially
troubling because of their professed intentions to purge special interests from
government. Critics juxtaposed the Know Nothing record with earlier reform
pronouncements, raising doubts about the integrity of Know Nothing leadership. An
excellent illustration of how the Know Nothings' distributive proclivities reacted back
on the movement is the case of the Norwich Gas Light Company, chartered by the 1855
Connecticut General Assembly amid intense local controversy. The charter gave
Norwich Gas a monopoly over the supply of gas to the city, leaving the Know Nothing
legislature open to criticism that it had worked to "crush out the rights of the citizens of
Norwich.""
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The story of ,he Norwich Gas Ligh, Company beg,„s i„ ,85,, when inventor
Frederick W. Treadway was granted a fifteen year monopoly privilege by the Norwich
Condon Cot^ci, to provide natural gas to the city. Treadway's conrpany co^.enced
laying a networlc of pipes to serve both conunercial and residential needs. Trouble
developed quickly, however. Res.dents complained of leaking pipes and noxious odors
from the coal-based gas; shade trees died along roads where the company had laid
pipes; waste from Treadway's firm backed up into cellars, kitchens, and baths. Several
lawsuits for recovery ofdamages failed because limited liability doctrine and the city's
failure
,0 secure indemnity against damages sustained in the course the company's
normal operations. Thus popular pressure built to halt further installation of gas lines
by Norwich Gas, something the Norwich Common Council ordered in the summer of
1852. But Treadway ignored the order, and in February 1854 the council voted
unanimously to revoke Treadway's license."
Treadway responded by hiring a coterie of lawyers, including soon-to-be Know
Nothings Edmund Perkins and H. H. Starkweather, to lobby for a state charter, which
the 1 854 assembly granted. With his new charter, Treadway insisted that the monopoly
privilege granted under the initial city license still held. Outraged residents backed a
movemem to organize a competitor to Treadway's company under the state's joint
stock law. The new company quickly rose $60,000 in stock subscriptions from area
residents. Threatened by this competition, Treadway's lawyers filed a legal challenge
to the joint stock company, claiming it violated Norwich Gas's exclusive monopoly
right. Meanwhile, Treadway, Perkins, and Starkweather halted their competitor's
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operanons by leading gangs of workmen
.0 ,he join. s.oe. company's excava.ion sUes
and filling in the ditches.'^
The issue was apparently settled in January 1855 when the circuit court ruled
against Treadway's company, declaring the monopoly granted under the original
license unconstitutional because the city's charter did not give it the power to create
monopolies. With the legal dispute now settled, in March the Norwich Common
Council voted
.0 grant the join, stock company the right to lay its pipes again. But
Treadway, Perkins, and company were undeterred. Treadway again sent work gangs to
thwart the joint stock company's operations, while Perkins, newly elected Know
Nothing representative from Norwich, drew up an amendmem to Norwich Gas's
charter that would grant it exclusive monopoly privileges. Later, enemies of
Treadway's company accused Perkins, a longtime Free Soiler. ofjoining the Know
Nothings and securing election to the General Assembly merely to win a monopoly for
Norwich Gas. While such charges probably exaggerate things, there is no doubt that
Perkins' election positioned him well to gain the monopoly privileges that his client
had long coveted. It also gave munition to opponems who wanted to show the
hollowness of the Know Nothings' refonn claims."
A storm of protest erupted as word of Perkins' efforts in Hartford reached
Norwich. Opponents raised a remonstrance against Perkins' charter amendment,
complete with official resolutions of the Norwich Common Council." Meanwhile,
residents geared up for the June municipal election that turned on the controversy. The
Know Nothings nominated a ticket that opponents quickly dubbed the "Monopoly
T.cker because "ne.,, every r.^ on [i,] is an "oM Gas .an. Opponents
.joined
With a "New Gas,"
„. .>E<,ual Rights" t.cket
.ha, hrough. together Democrats, o.d-hne
Whigs and naseem Republicans under a banner proc,a,nnng
..<,ua, privileges
.0 both
companies-exclusive privrleges
.0 none " By now reports filled dre local press
.hat
"some of the most active and unscrupulous members" of the local Know Noth.ng
movemem joined "for no other reason than to break down the Joim Stock Company-
Many rank-and-file Krtow Nothings "were opposed to such a perversion and abuse of
the power and influence of the Order," a fact bonre out by the difficulty the "Old Gas"
ticket had in wim,ing the local Know Nothing nomination. The nominations split the
Know NoUiing caucus almost evenly. The unusually intense municipal election was a
disaster for Norwich's Know Nothing movemem. Unable to galvanize its rank and file,
the Know Nothings suffered abysmal turnout and won less than 35% of the popular
vote, a drop of over 20 points from April's statewide election. In the aftermath, more
than one observer claimed that many Know Nothings had rejoined their old party via
the anti-monopoly movement.^^
With the municipal elections less than a week old, the Committee on
Corporations Other than Banks reported out Perkins' resolution for a monopoly
privilege for Treadway's company. In one of the few instances of even moderate
polarization on business charter policy in 1855, the house passed the bill with a
majority of Democrats opposed and a majority ofKnow Nothings in favor. The senate
followed suit after adding an amendment, subsequently agreed to by the house, which
capped the price that Norwich Gas could charge customers. The issue split the New
London County delegation, aln,os. entirely Know Noticing or Know NoU,.„g-affi,ia.ed
representative fron, Stonington and opponent of tl,e bi„, later recounted that the
Committee on Incorporations initially planned to report the bill with a negative
recommendation only to change course a. the last minute with a near unanimous
endorsement. Palmer was nonplussed; local critics seized on his suggestive account to
attack the secret and mysterious workings of the Know Nothings. Led by scheming and
unscrupulous men, the Know Nothings, said one critic, "originally intended as an agent
for the advancement and security of popular rights, was converted into an engine for
crushing out popular rights, for the benefit of a private cotporation.""
Community Mores
In many respects the Know Nothings were most successftil breathing Hfe into
their vision of the pubhc good in the area of community mores. Fearing a papal
conspiracy against American republicanism, Know Nothing office holders vigorously
built up the Catholic "threat" with the clear intent to strike it down and eam popular
approval, even if their nativist policies overall were less severe than their rhetoric. In
Boston, Massachusetts, Governor Gardner opened his inaugural by reciting
immigration statistics. He concluded that "the times are peculiarly propitious for the
development of this great American movement," evidently for the benefit of his slow
listeners. From there he urged the Know Nothing General Court to abide "the great
pnmao. principles of our gove™.em, a„d...,he semi„e„.s and purposes of its
founders." Uke the tyranny of the British Crown, the hydra-headed ev.ls of
immigration and political Rontan Catholics,
".end naturally to attract and b,nd
together the people in one u^ted national, not party,
.ove.ent." T.e nativist thente
was especially prontinent in Gardner's address, reflecting the polit.cal priorities of His
Excellency, but his basic message was restated in Ha^isburg and Hartford. Control of
.he machinery of state gave Know Nothings a platform to cement certain emotional
identifications in the public's mind. Bruiting about and acting upon nativist prejudice
would reify the movement's campaign abstractions. Voters would have some tangible
sense that the Know Nothings could deliver on promises to reconstitute a larger moral
purpose in governance/*
Know Nothings in all three states acted upon nativist prejudice in ways that
went well beyond the symbolic. Pennsylvania Know Nothings, backed by a majority of
their Democratic opponents, enacted a church tenure act that prohibited clerical
authorities from holding church property and transferring it to successors, a blow at the
Catholic practice. Comiecticut's 1 855 assembly required all church property be vested
in the laity through incorporation. To assure that the measure apply to Catholic
property only, exemptions were given to the Methodists, Shakers, and Jews. Violations
could result in seizure of land by the state. In addition, Governor Minor dissolved
several Irish militia companies, while the assembly passed legislation stripping state
courts of the power to naturalize aliens, passed a literacy test for suffrage as an
amendment to the constitution (it had been approved the previous year), and initiated a
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cons.,n«io„a, a„,e„d.e„. of U,ei. own: a 2
, „a,u.a,iza.o„ penod. Pass.ng eas.,,
.he 2
.
year amendmen, would need a ,wo-,hirds majority in , 856 before i, could be
presented to the public for ratification."
Nowhere was the nativist assault more thoroughgoing than in Massachusetts.
Operating without opposition in the General Court, the Bay State Know Nothings
abolished irtsh militia companies; dismissed Irish state workers; banned the teaching of
foreign languages and required daily readings from the King James Bible in the state's
public schools; banned the spending of state fimds for parochial schools; prohibited
state courts from naturalizing aliens; and advanced the ideals of American
republicanism by creating a special joint legislative committee to investigate alleged
acts of "villainy, injustice, and wrong" in convents and parochial schools. The farcical
Nunnery Committee, as it came to be called, eventually was the source of a major
public scandal that at least made for entertaining reading in Massachusetts and beyond.
In the meantime, Massachusetts Know Nothings dusted off an old Free Soil-inspired
statute, the 1852 pauper removal act, and ordered the Board of Alien Commissioners to
briskly enforce its draconian provisions. Hundreds of indigent immigrants were
summarily shipped back to the Old World; a beaming Governor Gardner boasted the
state had saved over $ 1 00,000. As in Connecticut. Massachusetts Know Nothings also
initiated a series of constitutional amendments that would require approval of
subsequent General Courts. One prohibited anyone who held "allegiance to a foreign
potentate" from serving in government, two others withheld the right to vote or hold
public office from all who had not domiciled in the country for at least 2 1 years. Only
the „„st extreme
„a.ivis. proposals, such as an a™e„d.e„.
,o *e s..e co„s.itu.i„„
.ha,
would have prevented
.he foreig„-bom fton, ho,d.„g offiee/o. failed
.o win favor
with the 1 855 General Court.'°
The movemews millennia. Pro.es.an.isn. also fueled i.s drive
.0 impose s.ric.er
codes ofpublic morali.y on an ethnically and socially diversifying socieiy.
Massachusetts Know Nothings were par.icularly ac.ive in .his area, enac.mg legislaiion
regulaiing billiard rooms and bowling alleys and imposing
.ougher penal.ies for
proprietors of broftels, gambling houses, and speakeasies.'' Bu. i. was
.he crusade
agains. liquor
.ha. most clearly reflected the Know Nothings' view of the state as
arbiter of public morals. The temperance movemen. was a prominem consii.uency in
the Know Noihing movemen.,
.hough its rela.ive influence varied from ste.e .0 state.
Anti-liquor refomiers were not disappointed by Know Nothing government. In
Comiecticut Governor Minor hailed the 1 854 prohibition statute and warned that any
effort to repeal it would be "detrimental to the best interest of the State." Likewise
Governor Pollock and Governor Gardner urged passage of strict anti-liquor laws. As
Gardner put it: "The evils of intemperance...drain our treasury, and swell the long
catalogue of pauperism and suffering. They are universally recognized as a legitimate
object of legislation."*^
Cues from the executive branch dovetailed with grassroots pressure .0 produce
tough anti-liquor legisia.ion in bo.h Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. In Massachusetts
lawyers from .he ranks of the state temperance movement assisted lawmakers in
drafiing a densely packed twenty-page statute aimed at answering the constitutional
,
,
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problems orenfce^en.
.,3. ,He .a,e sup..e co„„ Had
....fied .„ .He sea.cH and
se,zu. cause of .He earlier
, 852 p.ohiHUion
.aw. Pe^s^van, asse™H„„e„ vo.ed
near,,
.„a„i.„„,, ,
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
^
and prohibited a,e saie ofli.uor in ,uan.i.ies ,ess .Han one ,uar,. T.e provisions of
this so-cailed "Jug Law"
.arge.ed recrea.,onal beer houses, centers of work.ng-Cass
German and Irish sociabili.y and poli.ica, cul.ure. The close vo.e on .he bill reflec.ed
more U,an Democratic opposition. Prohibi.ion forces had originally insisted on a total
ban, and looked upon remedies like the Jug Law as half-way measures. But because of
.he defeat of the prohibition plebiscite in 1854. most Know Nothing leaders den,u„ed
on complete prohibition. As it became clear that the votes were simply not there for a
prohibition bill, the State Prohibition Committee grudgingly gave its approval
.0 the
Jug Law. Nevertheless some prohibitionist lawmakers dissented from the Jug Law on
grounds that its licencing guidelines amounted to state endorsement of the liquor
trade."
The constitutionality of unleashing the state's police power on the manufacture
and sale of liquor was never doubted by most Know Nothings. When it came to state-
society relations in the sphere of public morals, most probably agreed with Stephen
Miller: "When men have been led from the right, the hand of society must be
interposed to preserve them." Indeed, this formulation perfused the Know Nothing
defense of state coercion over the consumption and distribution of liquor. The
traditional options open to liquor reformers-moral suasion or local option or licensing-
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-had failed ,o decease American, appe.i.e Cor ,i,uo. and
..ponan,
.e™
.He
soca, problems attendant upon the lucrative trade. Advocates of liquor regulation
maintained that sweeping statewide laws were neeessa,, to correct the abuses. Because
.he ".aking of„oney" was less "important than the
.orals, virtue and the peace of the
conrn,unit3,," the state's interest in promoting the public good tru.pcd the private
property rights of liquor dealers and manufacturers."
But not evetyone shared this expansive view of the police power. Discretion
over liquor historically lay with local communities, either through the piecemeal
licensing regime erected by local governments, or more diffusely, the efforts of
voluntaty temperance societies to change informal custom. Statewide prohibition
statutes, like blanket laws regulating the length of the workday, thus deviated in
principle from traditional conceptions of where power and authority resided. As legal
historian William Novak has written: "State prohibition involved a distinctively
upward shift in the locus of public decision-making power in the American polity."
Indeed, in more than one state supreme courts overturned prohibition statutes by
moving towards the doctrine of absolute private property rights and a more vigorous
insistence on judicial review of statutory police power. Like the efforts of early labor
refontiers, prohibitionists ironically helped produced a "new private rtghts orientation"
in American public life."'
The effects of opposition were felt most immediately in the spotty enforcement
of these laws coupled with (at least in some states) important political reactions to
them. Despite their sweeping implications for state-society relations, enforcement of
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*ese law. again turned on *e compliance, or a. ,eas, acquiescence, of loca„y
—ed authori... For a brief
.i.e, in ,oca„.ies where ,he proh.bUionisr
.ove.en.
was strong, vigilance con™i„ees organized ,o ensure local enforcemem, bu,
.he zeal
for such activity dissipated by the late 1850s and just about disappeared with the
coming of the Civi, War. In Pennsylvania, where the Jug Law seemed a duplici.ous
attack on the urban working class, and to a lesser extent in Massachusetts, the
Democratic opposition seized on the Know Nothings' anti-liquor statutes to re-energize
i.s rank and file. The reaction was strongest in Pe^sylvania. where many Democrats
who had joined the refonnis. Know Nothings in 1 854 recoiled at the elitist Jug Law.
returned to their old party, and helped elect a Democratic majority in 1856."
Just as the Jug Law exacerbated differences within the Pennsylvania Know
Nothings, so too nativist extremism in Massachusetts. The proximate cause of public
reaction in Massachusetts was the Numieiy Committee, whose shenanigans acted as a
prism through which critics focused public attention on the disastrous consequences of
Know Nothing govermnem. After a Boston paper published an expose of the Numtety
Committee's boorish behavior in a Catholic boarding school, the General Court
determined to launch an official fact-finding investigation. It was quickly disclosed
that Boston representative Joseph Hiss, the state party's Grand Worshipful Instructor,
had made ribald remarks to the nuns, while his committee billed the state for an
expensive champagne dinner.
The revelations prompted a broader probe into the committee's activities.
Evidence surfaced that Hiss, after a day of chasing evil at a Lowell convent, had
Charged «.e Co_ea,.h for an evening orsn,o.ing, dr.„k,„g, and sex w..H a loca,P—
e.
H.S.S de^aucH was splashed across ,He pages ofnewspapers
.KrougHou.
,He
state, indeed, probabl,
„„ single subjec. elicited
.ore press coverage in Massachusetts
dunng spring
,855 than the spectacular buffoonery of Hiss and the Nunnery
Contn^ittee. For .any the case involved far
.ore than the rogue act of one
.isguided
party patriarch. Crttics used the affair to Ulustrate how secret political
.anage.ent
inevitably led to public disaster. The analysis of the
„as typ.cal. The
Know Nothings- manner of electioneering
"co.pels the people to vote blindly, [and
will] always result in the election of such nten as Hiss...whose elevation to places for
which they are morally and mentally so unfit has caused an ineffaceable stain upon the
fair fame of Massachusetts." In Essex County, staunch Know Nothing editors at first
tried to defend the Nunnery Committee, but fell silem when the report of the "Hiss
Affair" broke. Critics interpreted the efforts ofsome house Know NoUungs to prevent
the stoo^ fi-om going public as a sign of official party "whitewashing." It seemed the
organization was more interested in the
-future prospects ofKno^-NolUngism- than
"the honor of Massachusetts." Under imense scrutiny the house, after prolonged
debate, voted to expel Hiss."
While predictions of the order's imminem demise in the wake of the Hiss Affair
were patently premature, there can be little doubt of its long-term negative impact upon
the movement, at least in Massachusetts. Of course, the Know Nothings could and did
poim to a long record of "reform" achievemems in 1855. But the Nunnery Committee
seemed to be the unparalleled example among many instances ofKnow Nothing
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were
hypocrisy in govemmen.. Fur*er compounding
.he order's lo„g-.en„ difficulties
a series of conflicts over slave-y-related issues in the 1855 legislatures.
While all but a fraction ofKnow Nothtngs in the three states opposed the
Kansas-Nebraska bill (the dissenters from this view were most Democrats and the few
single-minded nativists), divisions existed as to the movement's proper course in the
growing sectional controversy. By 1855 the climate of public opinion, though clearly
in transition, was such that thoroughgoing assaults on slavery still tarred one with the
abolitionist brush. The northem mainstream, especially outside the New England
states, was far more comfortable with antisouthemism than antislavery per se.
Certainly the fact that Slave Power imagety resonated so widely by 1855 was no
insignificant development for the broader antislavety cause. And for that antislavery
had political nativism to thanlc, for to the extent that the Know Nothings in 1 854-5
framed the Kansas-Nebraska act as one ofmany examples ofhow special interests
intruded on governance to the detriment of the public interest, it can be argued that
Know Nothing populism in the North, far more than any previous insurgent expression,
popularized one of the principal idioms of the first political abolitionists. Still the early
Know Nothings' ubiquitous anti-Slave Power rhetoric, coupled with the more
occasional gestures towards radical antislavery doctrine by the movement's loose free
soil faction, left them vulnerable to charges of sectional extremism. This dynamic
weighed heavily on some in the upper echelons of the movemem who wished to temper
the Know Nothing's antislavery edge. They eyed the 1 856 presidential campaign,
when the support of southern Know Nothings would obviously be crucial. Those
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Know Nothings who wished to put antisouthemism (or antislaveiy) atop the
movement's list of public priorities clashed with the putative leadership of the
American party over both the symbohsm and substance of its emergent position on
sectional issues. The lines of battle over slavery both within and without the American
party were first drawn in the 1855 legislatures.
Slavery and slavery-related issues occasioned the least discord among
Comiecticut Know Nothings, testifying to the breadth of free soil sentiment in the
movement in that state. Nevertheless a radical free soil faction failed in an early
attempt to commit the Comiecticut Know Nothings to a more uncompromising
position. The Joint Special Committee on Federal Relations, headed by Norwich's
Edmund Perkins, drafted resolutions strongly condemning the Kansas-Nebraska Act
and civil strife in the Kansas territory; insisting upon the Federal government's right to
legislate policy in the territories; and declaring that "Comiecticut will never consent to
the extension of Slavery" over the western territories. To head-off expected criticisms,
the committee also included two resolutions stressing the state's commitment to
sectional harmony and its willingness to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, despite that
law's "odious character" and the people of Connecticut's wish that it be repealed
through lawftil political means. The resolutions sailed through the house and senate
along strict party lines. Few Know Nothings opposed them. Not satisfied with the
timid language on the Fugitive Slave Act, New Haven senator James Babcock,
editor/proprietor of the New Haven Palladium, led an abortive effort to replace the
preamble to the resolution with much sterner antislavery language. Though defeated
.wo
.0 one, Babcoek-s preamble a«rac.ed support ftom a„ three New London Count,
senators, a sign of the more radical orientation of eastern Connecticut. More
signtficant, Babcock would emerge as one of the state's archttects of the Republican
party; the Babcock preamble was an early test of the lengths to which Comtecticut
Know Nothingism would go on the slavery issue."
If the slavety issue in the Comtecticut 1855 assembly prompted only a brief
glimpse of the divisions that would soon confound the Know Nothings, it produced far
more serious and immediate problems in the capitals of Pemisylvania and
Massachusetts. Tl,e question in Pennsylvania turned on the choice of a United States
Senator, which ended in a hopelessly deadlocked General Assembly. On the surface,
the election of a U.S. Senator should not have been a problem for the Know Nothings.
Those in the know said the order controlled over 90 of the 133 votes on joint ballot.
But party factionalism was especially strong among Pemisylvania Know Nothings.
Longtime Democratic leader Simon Cameron was the choice of a substantial
Democratic-Know Nothing faction in the assembly. With a reputation for self-
aggrandizement and political intrigue that few Pemisylvania politicians could match,
Cameron nonetheless emerged as an early front rumier for the senate seat. He had solid
nativist credentials and spent the fall and winter of 1854-5 quietly cultivating ties and
trading favors with leading Democratic and straight Know Nothings. The case for
Cameron grew when Governor Pollock, a Whig-Know Nothing, tacitly endorsed him.
The vast majority of ex-Whigs and some straight Americans, however, opposed any
candidate of Democratic antecedents because untrustworthy on the slavery issue.
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though they failed ,o unite behind a single candidate in opposit.on to Cameron.
Cameron's assurances that he opposed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Pierce
Administration, and would work to ovenum the Fugitive Slave Law were met with
skepticism among the Whig-Know Nothings."
Complicating a Cameron scenario was a lack of support in his home base of
Dauphin and Lancaster coumies. Stephen Miller remained non-committal throughout,
while other area Know Nothings wrote letters exposing Cameron's role in drafting a
series of Lancaster County Democratic resolutions that pledged fealty to the Pierce
Administration. Lancaster's Thaddeus Stevens, who had joined the Know Nothings
more out of disgust with the local Whig machine than love of nativist politics,
assiduously worked behind the scenes to defeat Cameron. Thus when the Know
Nothings convened their legislative caucus to chose a senatorial candidate, few could
predict the outcome.'"
In the end Cameron's questionable antislavery credentials combined with his
supporters' heavy-handed maneuvers to prevent his election. At the Know Nothing
caucus pro-Cameron forces improved their man's chances by admitting a handful of
legislators of dubious Know Nothing connections and by winning approval of a secret-
ballot procedure. The latter move particularly irked Cameron's opponents, for rumors
of bribery and pay-offs by Cameron's friends abounded, the insurgents hoping that an
open vote might expose the culprits. Cameron's opponents nevertheless succeeded in
preventing his nomination over five ballots. On the next ballot Cameron seemed to
win the nomination, but it was quickly discovered that an extra vote had been cast. The
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anti-Cameron men moved ,0 adjourn the caucus, only to be ruled out of order by the
chair. Twenty-nine legislators then walked out in protest. The downsized caucus
proceeded to nominate Cameron.
A few days before the jomt session convened, the bolters drafted a public
circular explammg their action and vowing to oppose Cameron's election. Citing
''corrupt.on...behind the throne," the circular recounted the events of the Know Nothing
caucus. Calling Cameron "one of the most intriguing, if not the most corrupt politician
in the State," they asked whether or not "the people of Pennsylvania expect something
more of the present Legislature than the election of an old party hack?" The seceders
painted Cameron as a pro-slavery man. Claiming his record as "an American and Anti-
Slavery Man...speaks for itself," the circular reprinted the Lancaster County
Democratic resolutions as evidence of Cameron's deception and unfitness for the
senate seat.'' Amid allegations of bribery and with Cameron's sectional loyalties in
doubt among antislavery Know Nothings, the joint session deadlocked. On three
ballots, Cameron averaged about 8 votes shy of the necessary majority. The assembly's
37 national Democrats mainly backed Charles Buckalew and some other lesser
candidate, while over thirty Know Nothings scattered their votes, thus preventing a
Cameron victory. Two weeks later the legislature tried again, but with Cameron's
friends refusing to withdraw his candidacy, the result was the same. Finally,
lawmakers agreed to adjourn the joint session without electing a U.S. senator.'^
The failure to elect a U.S. senator was a serious blow to the credibility of the
new party. Even Know Nothing loyalists upbraided the legislative leadership for
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having wasted so much time on the issue, only to end with Pennsylvania wUhout its full
complement of representation in Washington. More important, the imbroglio revealed
the extent to which previous partisan identifications remained saliem among
Pemisylvania Know Nothings. Many Whig and Democratic Know Nothings lined up
on opposite sides of Cameron's candidacy, and in the end preferred that the position go
unfilled than compromise or see their adversaries win. It was a portentous sign of the
movement's severe factionalism over the slavery issue.'^
In this light it is important to recognize the weakness of antislavery forces in
Pennsylvania in 1 855. The question of the relative strength of antislaveiy among the
Pemisylvania Know Nothings is a tricky one, because most Know Nothings were
certainly agreed on opposition to the Pierce Administration and the Nebraska bill. It is
equally clear, however, that only a fraction believed antislavery deserved equal billing
with nativism and political reform, to say nothing of putting it above all else. Thus
while antislavery forces could point to Cameron's defeat as a victory for their cause, it
constituted the only strong evidence that even a minority of Pennsylvania Know
Nothing legislators sought to follow the lead of their Connecticut brothers on the
politically vexatious slavery issue. Indeed, where Connecticut's Know Nothings united
behind resolutions adopting a firm non-extension position, a similar resolution failed
adoption in the Pennsylvania House, dominated by Know Nothings.**"
The overall weakness of antislavery in the Pennsylvania Know Nothing
movement comes into sharper relief in light of the preponderance of uncompromising
free soil sentiment among the majority of Massachusetts Americans. The 1855 General
Court sent Henry Wilson to the U.S. Senate, a well-known antislave^ man of Free So.l
antecedents. In overwhelming fashion it enacted one the nation's most rigorous
personal liberty laws that aimed to prevent slave claimants from sdzmg runaways (and
free blacks) in Massachusetts under the Fugitive Slave Law. The 1855 legislature also
voted easily to remove Judge Edward G. Loring from his position as Suffolk County
Probate Judge. The previous year Loring had ordered runaway slave Anthony Bums
back to slavery under the Fugitive Slave Act, and his removal had become a cause
celebre among Massachusetts Free Soilers and abolitionists alike. In fact, a broad-
based movement of antislavery radicals and abolitionists coordinated two massive
grassroots petitions for Loring's ouster and a stringent personal liberty bill, by far the
two largest petitions to appear before the 1 855 General Court. With good reason
abolitionist doyen William Lloyd Garrison proclaimed that the 1855 General Court had
"trampled in the dust the temptations of pro-slavery Nationalism.'"^
Slavery-related policy did not, however, pass the General Court without
controversy. The election of Wilson occasioned some opposition from more
conservative Know Nothings who doubted his nativist convictions. And though
Wilson's antislavery credentials were impeccable-he was nominated in 1854 by the
old Free Soilers as Massachusetts' first Republican gubernatorial candidate-many of
Boston's Free Soil patricians viewed the "Natick Cobbler" as a scheming upstart.
Indeed, Wilson's core base, Middlesex County's middling petty producer class, lay
outside the orbit of Boston's fashionable antislavery salons. Moreover Wilson's deal
with the Know Nothing leadership to withdraw from the 1854 governor's race in return
366
for Ae U.S. senate seat had enraged many Free Soil nabobs who remained hostile to
Know Nothingism. Even more indicative of the divisions among Massachusetts
Americans were Governor Gardner's vetoes of the personal liberty law and the Loring
removal order. His Excellency had national aspirations, and hoped the vetoes would
send a signal of moderation to Americans outside of Massachusetts. The Know
Nothing legislature easily overrode the veto of the personal liberty bill, but failed in a
close vote to remove Loring. The vetoes presaged a protracted struggle between pro-
Gardner forces and more radical antislavery elements."
Conclusion
The Know Nothings' took control of government by translating the social and
demographic transformations of the late antebellum era into failures of politics and
governance. They had campaigned as antiparty reformers determined to oust the
special interests and their political puppets from the key institutions of American public
life. Once in power they brought forward an array of political economic and cultural
policies and in many instances produced significant "reform" legislation. Indeed, many
Know Nothings assessed their leadership's performance in government in positive
terms, echoing the conclusion offered by the New Haven Journal at the end of
Connecticut's 1855 session: "We do not know of any Legislature which has manifested
so much independence of party interests, or has accomplished so much positive
reform." To varying degrees Know Nothings in all three states could point to
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meaningft,, refo™ policies
.ha. m^y had surely expeced fro™ a populis.
.ove.en.
which drew i.s inspira.ion from ,he ni„e.een,h-cen.urys
„o„par,isan framework of
public life.''
Yet contradictions and divisions also marked Know Nothing government. A
few Know Nothing leaders publicly acknowledged as much, while many who began
1855 either critical or careftilly non-committal wasted no time exposing glaring
inconsistencies. The Norwich gas controversy, in which Know Nothmg leaders threw
their influence behind an economic monopoly; the sorry spectacle of the Numiery
Committee, in which Know Nothing public officials abused power and made a
mockery of the movement's professed morality and piety; charges of bribery and wire-
pulling in Pemisylvania; extravagant expenditures in Massachusetts; salary increases;
failed political economic reform; a penchant for private lawmaking-for good reason
commentators noted how general laws "do not find the support...which it was supposed
they would" among Know Nothing legislators.'^ At the very least, such evidence
illustrated that government under the secret, oath-bound Know Nothings did not
significantly differ fi-om previous regimes.
This picture clarified further when critics took aim at Know Nothing patronage.
Ordinarily patronage provoked little public commentary, for spoils constituted the
currency of politics. But Know Nothings had campaigned on the theme that theirs was
no ordinary time. IfKnow Nothings justifiably viewed patronage as a vestigial right of
office, opponents excoriated these selfless reformers who "have become aware of the
urgent necessity which exists for routing present incumbents from their posts of profit.
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was
by mlcing U,e chairs themselves." Massachusetts Governor Hen^ Gardner
especial,, sk„,ed a. dispensing patronage, solidifying «endships and loyalty that
quickly tta^ed the antiparty Know Nothtng movement into a formidable political
machine-one run in the interest of His Excellency. Know Noth.ngs maintamcd, not
without cause, U,at their appointments proved
.heir antipartyism-for^er Democrats,
Whigs, Free Soilers, and Native Americans all found government positions as the
Know Nothings se, about replacing the old party hacks with the new patriots. Others
looked upon the scramble for lucre as old-fashioned office chasmg. What should have
been a fairly routine turnover ofgovernment posts became evidence that the movement
did not want for the personally and politically ambitious. And certainly the praetorian
moves of a Gardner or Wilson or Cameron reinforced these perceptions."
What had happened? Under Know Nothing auspices a cacophony of voices laid
claim to the public good. To the extent that the Know Nothings' legislative record
reveals a broader commitment to reform, it is because certain historically under-
represented or disadvantaged interests gained entree to the state through the movement.
This was no small achievement: viewed as a whole. Know Nothing government
demonstrated the movement's roots in and responsiveness to the changing political
economic and social circumstances of late antebellum society. Nevertheless a great
variety ofcompeting interests rode into power under the Know Nothing banner, pulling
the people's revolution in many directions. In the end the prevailing culture of
governance trumped the populist promise in the antiparty ideal. In the process of
governing. Know Nothings for the most part engaged in distributive politics. They
369
responded to an incong^ous assor,„,en. of particularistic constituencies with policies
and patronage that satisfied so.e, angered others, and added to the overall confeion
about the movement's integrity and efficacy. As leaders maneuvered among
conflicting currents of opinion, deep divisions were exposed. The result was that
tensions and contradictions stand out as the defining feature ofKnow Nothing
government.
More important, through their own actions in government, the Know Nothmgs
had shown umnistakable signs of the very failures and special interest soHcitude that
had originally turned political nativism into the most successful populist insurgency in
the nation's history. This was not a good omen for a movement that had won control of
govermnent in the name of the white Protestant folk. From the start the exercise of
power set in motion a ruinous dialectic within the movement, a centrifuge which
accelerated as northerners turned increasingly to the sectional crisis. Slavery along
with state and local issues provoked a debilitatmg factionalism, while the absence of
institutionalized culture of loyalty and discipline eventually undid the incipient party.
As is well known, the Republican party reassembled the fragmented pieces of northern
Know Nothingism into a durable and disciplined political movement, one that put the
nation on a collision course to civil war. It remains for us to trace that process at the
grassroots.
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855-8, MSA; Acts- 1 855 File, Chapter 489: Original Bills, MSA; Speech ofJohn L
Smith, Esq., ofBoston, on the Removal ofE.G. Loring Esq., Form the Office ofJudge
ofProbate, for the County ofSuffolk, Delivered in the Ma.ssachusetts House of
Representatives, Tuesday, April 1 0th. 1855 (Boston: William White, 1855). See also
382
Mulkem, Know-Nolhing Party m MassachuseUs, 97-9; 104-5.
(Chape, Hi„: U„i;ers,.y of'NrrhCr.itp^ss
^s'in^
GW, 22 August 1 855 ^ ' 20 ^"ly 1 855; S/a/e
98. Newburyport Herald, 1 March 1 855.
.855; m %:r.r,^^ 23 .anua,,
Ad.oca,e,
,0 March 1855;Newbu"p rtZw 0 /a^ut"] 830 ^ ^'"'^''r^ 'Janua-y 1855; Mulken,, ^«»..-^.Z, ^ 3 '
CHAPTER VII
QUIETING THE POPULIST SPIRIT: HERREm^OLKA^TISLAVERY AND
THE REPUBLICAN EMERGENCE, 1855-1858
Well before the adjournment of the 1855 assemblies the popular mood was
shifting. Nativist editors who earlier had skillfully blended state and local and national
issues into an antiparty indictment of the regime, now commenced a steady antislavery
drumbeat. In late April 1 855 Norwich's Andrew Stark proclaimed flatly that the
"pressing curse and danger" to the nation "is not Popery, but Slavery." Most Know
Nothings were as yet unwilling to go quite that far, but the gravitational pull of
sectional politics was unmistakable in the spring and summer of 1855. Another
Comiecticut Know Nothing editor amiounced that "warfare upon Southern aggression,
partially stilled for a time by the absorbing question of Americanism, will rise ere long,
loudly and earnestly, from every quarter in the North." Political nativists in Essex and
Dauphin counties aired similar hopes. Amesbury's William H. B. Currier catalogued
recent Slave Power aggressions-the Fugitive Slave Act, the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise, border ruffianism in Kansas. "This places the argument in favor of a
Republican movement upon the strongest possible ground. No man who regards the
subject from an intelligent stand-point can fail to see...the necessity of union" of
antislavery forces in the North. Harrisburg's Stephen Miller began 1855 condemning
the "fierce fanaticism and base treachery of the advocates of slavery extension," and by
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Administration.'"
As i. turned out, of course, these appeals for a united pol.tical
„,oven,ent based
explicitly on sectional identiHcations proved to be premature. The chatn of events
which nnally produced a Republican majority in the North is familiar enough. The
passage of the pro-Nebraska Section XII of the American party platform by the party's
National Council in June 1855 and the genesis of a North American splinter movement;
the long factional struggle over the House Speakership in 1855-6; the reaffirmation of
Section Xn and the nomination of Millard Fillmore for president by the American party
in 1856; the formal founding of a North American movement as a result of the Fillmore
candidacy; the fusion of the North Americans with the Republican party behind their
presidential candidate John C. Fremont; the strategic battles between North Americans
and Republicans over the choice of Fremont's nmning mate, state platform language,
and the fusion label; the mexorable march of events-"Bleeding Kansas," the caning of
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, the Dred Scott decision, the Lecompton
"fraud." Against this backdrop, leadership cadres of the Republican and American
parties waged intense "wars of maneuver" over who would take control of the anti-
Democratic forces nationally and in each northern state. By the end of 1857 the
Republicans had defeated their nativist rivals in Connecticut and Massachusetts, while
it took them another year to do so in Pennsylvania. The politics of this process, and
especially the factional struggles between Republican and American leaders at the
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scholarship.^
Tlierefore, rather than rehearse the familiar „arra.,ve. U see^s more useful ,o
probe .he Repubhcan aseendaney for „ha> i. reveals abou. .he ongoing sahenee of
populis, an.ipar.yism in .he a,ree eoun.,es. A. .he mos. basie level,
.he Republieans
triumphed beeause
.he Slave Power supplan.ed
.he Irish immigrant as ,hc key
emotional referent of northern poli.ies. This is elear enough. Behind this sh.f. lay a
Republican eap.ure and elabora.ion of the an.ipartyism
.ha. .he Know No.hings had
constructed to politicize governance.
As late as Spring 1 856 the Republican party was a weak, minority political
movement in the three states. Much of the party's early impotence can be traced to the
leadership of the movement and its unidimensional appeal. In its initial phase the
movement was essentially a top-down operation staffed mostly by upstart ex-Free Soil
and Liberty party men, whose stem and self-righteousness style, though admirable in
hindsight, made many at the time squirm at the thought of working with them. More
important, and not incidental to the early antislavery movement's political style, its
message was a mixture of incendiary antislavery and antisouthern themes. In the first
year or two of Republican party activism, the most popular association among the mass
public was "abolitionism," a negative emotional referent forged over decades of
experience with "disunionists" North and South. Political memory made the early
Republicans difficult bedfellows, not only for ex-Whig or Democratic leaders and
operatives, but the mass electorate as well.
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The 1856 I>rcs.dcnt.al c.uwas changed everything. Con.ing on the heels ol the
popuUst erupt.ons of ,854-5, it gave the movement an opportunity to buUd a
lunctionally n.tegrated and more democratic party structure. In Connect.cut and
Massachusetts, most grassroots American leaders, operatives, and editors (locked to the
movement under the Fremont
.gis, and rem.ned therealter. In Pennsylvania, where
antislavery sentin.ent was as weak as in any other northern state, factionalisn, and
disunity marked the statewide 1-Yc^n.ont can.pa.gn. In Dauphin ( cn.nty, however, the
union movement proved more hannonious; a harbinger ofbe.ter fortunes ,or lus.on
efforts across the state in the coming years. Where the Pennsylvania lus.on nu>vement
was successful, it borrowed heavily fron. North An.er.can.sn, forging a platforn. that
combined antislavcry and antisouthernism, nativism, and state political refonn.'
Likewise in Massachusetts the state fusion effort resulted in a Republican a.id
American agreement on the reelection of 1 lenry CJardner, who continued to stump on
nativist themes. These were important concessions to both nativist ideals and leaders,
gestures that would become central to formalizing the antislavcry majority after the
1 856 elections. Hut in I'all 1 856 all eyes were on the presidential race, and the slavery
question pushed to the lorelront of politics.
Equally important, accompanying the resources and skills brought by this mass
inllux ol- North Americans was the reformist /cit^icisl so central to northern politics
since the early 1 850s. The Republican achievement was to harness the antiparty energy
of Know Nolhingism for antislavcry, and eventually partisan, purposes. The Slave
Power symbol figured crucially in this project, for it allowed the Republicans to
elaborate and popularize a
.e.a-„a„a.,ve of southern pros.aver, do.,„a.io„ of
govemrrren,. The RepubUcan promise was a.wa.s
.o restore„n,,
purpose by stopping Denrocratic-Slave Power aggress.ons on the public good.
Deemphasizing
.he older
.oral argunrem of an.isiavery,
,he Fr.„on, campaign
adopted a her.er,.„,k appeal that stressed the plebeian theme that the Slave Power
regime threatened white small producer freedom and independence.
Leavening the appeal was a gradual broadening of the social dimensions of the
Democratic-Slave Power threat. Goven,ance under Democrat.c-Slave Power ausp.ces
put the North's cherished values ofWWi economic independence and moral self-
improvement a, grave risk through the westward spread of slavety and the hegemony of
doughface politicians in the northern states. The social implications of life under the
thumb of the Slave Power were symbolically and emotionally proximate to the moral
and social imageiy that Know Nothings had constructed to "explain" both the
immigrant threat and the failures of party governance. The result was that before the
Civil War Republicans produced a series of sectional and anti-Democratic
identifications, conflated with the public interest and, in tum, translated into a surrogate
for partisanship. It was a powerful blend of the antiparty ideal of politics and
governance with a proto-partisan appeal that, in the course of the Civil War and after,
became a full blown party vernacular and institutional memory.
388
After their first season in control of state government, troubled loomed for tl,e
Know Nothings. Grassroots lodge membership declmed. whUe factional.sm dogged
the movement. ,n New London Cotutty, for example, the charters of several lodges in
New London, Lyme, Salem, and Colchester were either revoked by the state
organization or given up by the membership in public protest of the movement's
leadership. "Those who control and manage the affairs of this corrupt concern are in it
for the spoils of offices!" exclaimed a letter signed by 68 members of Lyme Know
Nothing Council No. 147 upon learning that the state council had rescinded their
charter. At issue for the Comtecticut American party hierarchy was a rumor that
members of the Lyme Council had not voted the Know Nothing ticket in fttll in the
April 1 855 election, a charge never denied by the Lyme protesters. To the apostate
Lyme Americans, the revocation of their charter demonstrated that "no person is
permitted to hold an opinion which has no the sanction of the self-constituted mouth-
pieces of the party." Across all three counties and states, the Know Nothing movement
faced defections and a changing membership.'
No inconsiderable problem was mounting distrust of the "dark-lantern" tactics
that had propelled the movement to stunning victories the year before. Opponents
targeted the Know Nothings' secrecy as a principle reason for the special interests and
political intrigues and scandals that seemed to follow the movement into power. For
advocates of an open organization, therefore, the facts were in the fire; continuina
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secrecy and oaths threatened to blow up in the Know Nothings' faces. "There is
already a deep and vety general feeUng against the secret plotttngs whrch have been
allowed to control elections," one Essex Cottnty editor wrote. "The people, particularly
the An^erican Mechanrcs," read a public letter by members of the Hanisburg Order of
United American Mechanics, "are ready for an open, free and independent American
party." ,n this context the Massachusetts Know Nothings, now formally the American
party and controlled by Governor Henry Gardner, dropped secrecy in June 1 855. The
Connecticut Americans soon followed suit, while the Pennsylvania Americans pledged
themselves to the National Council's more vague anti-secrecy language. Having
largely abandoned secret oaths and dark-lantern tactics, the Americans were confidem
that "with our principles known and openly avowed, whoever sympathizes us in this
matter of reform, can be and act with us."^
The "principles" to which this Know Nothing referred sharpened after the split
in the American party National Council at Philadelphia. Across the counties, as indeed
throughout much of the North, nativists hailed the northern delegates' protest of the
tacitly pro-slavery Section XII plank. At their convention in Springfield, the
Massachusetts American party voted to formally break from the national party, thereby
establishing themselves as an official North American state movement, and adopted a
platform combining antislavery, antiparty, and nativist themes. Connecticut and
Pennsylvania Americans also embraced the multifaceted appeal. There was "no
diversity of opinion in the Free States" on the matter of non-extension of slavery,
insisted a Newburyport American. "But, under no circumstances, let American
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pnncples be lost sigh, of." "[T]he thing which has aroused the North is not the
condition of the bondsman, but its own danger" wrote Andrew Starlc after the
Connecticut An,ericans officially incon^orated antislave^ into the state platfom,. "and
the absolute necessity of self defense against the aggresstons of the slave power."
Atttislaveo. now figured crucially in the North American party appeal. Political
nativism was by no means discarded; Know Nothings in all three cout«ies devoted
equal time to anti-immigrant and antislavery themes during the 1855 canvas. As
Hartford's Thomas Day put it: "Republicanism and Americanism were bro.hers, a
smart pair of Yankee twins." As Day understood it, the twin themes constituted the
dominant frameworks of thought among the northern public. Republicanism was a
"white man's" cause "to preserve all" of the territories "from the pestilence of the black
race." Americanism advanced "the superiority of native Americans...over the mongrel
agglomeration of all tribes, and religions, poured helter-skelter on our shores from
Europe, Asia, and the far off Isles of the South Seas."*
Day's concephtalization was only unusual in the extent to which he
systematized the herremolk ideal. Political nativists in the three counties shared his
fundamental view that nativism and antislavery could be, indeed, were already
synthesized in the North American movement. With this blend of issues and appeals,
grassroots North Americans forged an early articulation of the herremolk free labor
ideal that would become one comerstone of the Republican ascendancy.
In the short term, however, the refiirbished North American movement
presented a major obstacle to a Republican breakthrough in the Fall 1 855 and Spring
among
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B56 state elections. At the state ,eve,, the ntovetnent«zed in conventions that
paid scant at.ent.on
.o issues and theses bes.des slavery. TT,e Republican insistence on
an unalloyed anUslavety organization proved disastrous; a series of overtures
both Republicans and North Anrericans to unite behind fusion state tickets either fell by
the wayside (Connecticut and Massachusetts), or failed because of the fusion
candidate's radicalism
( Pennsylvania's race for Canal Commissioner). Meanwhile, a,
fte grassroots Republican organizing proceeded haltingly. Few political editors, a.
least in the three counties, adopted the straight-out Republican position that fte "old
issues are settled. The contest is between Freedom and Slavery." Those inclined ,o
an.islavery could remain comfortably in .he North American party, at least for the time
being; certainly the majority of the anti-Democratic electorate preferred Uie North
American alternative to the widely scorned "black Republicanism.'"
The essential weakness of early Republicanism was confirmed in the state
elections in Fall 1 855 and Spring 1 856 (Comiecticut). Only in Essex County did the
Republicans run anything remotely resembling an effective campaign (Table B.3).
There one of every four votes were cast for Republican gubernatorial candidate Julius
Rockwell, while Republican candidates in four towns won election to the General
Court. But overall the Republican influence was greatest in fUsion with Americans in
races for seats to the General Court. Even here, however, the Americans remained the
dominant force. Demonstrating pockets of vitality in this most antislaveiy of the New
England states, overall the Essex County Republicans were routed by the Americans,
principally, it was said, because of that party's still considerable hold on an.islavery
veers. '"New London ana Dauphin
.he results were worse s.n,. Conneciieu,
Republican candidate Gideon Welles actually polled a lower percentage in New
London County (8.6%, than he did statewide (,0.,»/.). ,„
.^ces New London
County Americans, fearing a Democratic surge, forged fission tickets wtth the early
their control for another year. Straight Republican cand.dates carried only four towns.
In Dauphin the Republican party remained so small and disorganized that it failed to
run an independent ticket. However, a late insurgency running under the Whig party
banner, formed in protest of the American party county machine's continued reliance
on secret nominations, possibly drew some support from the area's tiny Republican
movement. Consisting mainly of alienated Krtow Nothings, the Whig insurgents
denied the Dauphin Americans a countywide majority.'
As distressing as the results looked, the Republicans could idemify some
positive signs in these early elections. For one thing, fttsion at the grassroots worked
much more smoothly than at the state level. Even if the Americans controlled most of
these efforts, the candidates who emerged satisfied the Republican's antislavery raison
d'etre. Far more important were sure signs of American party transition and decline.
In each county and state, the Americans polled less than a majority of the votes cast, a
significant decrease from the previous election. Part of the reason lay in the
Republican movement itself, which hived off the most thoroughgoing antislavery
Know Nothings, at least in Essex and New London counties. But more significam
were defections by fonner Democrats. Democratic-Know Nothings returned to their
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old party i„ droves, precipitating a rebound for the northern Dentocraey in a„ three
sm.es. Tlte Dentocratic campaign s.de-stepped the siavety issue, stresstng instead state
and local issues such as .he Know Nothings' assaults on liquor and inuntgrant and
working class lifestyle choices, and the
.ove.enfs history of poHtica, corruption and
inWgue. The Americans partially counter-balanced these defections by attracting ™ore
conservative old-line Whigs and new voters who saw ,he movement as a potential
alternative to the extremism of both U,e Republicans and Democrats, but the
disappointing popular vote suggested
.he American party was losing s.eam. The anti-
Know Nothing message clearly resonated, raising turnout in New London, where low
turnout had inflated the Know Nothing majority in 1855 (Table B.5). In Dauphin, the
fact that 1 855 was not a Governor's election sent turnout plummeting, but it was the
Americans, no. the Democrats, who suffered most.' The Democratic surge was
particularly noteworthy in Pemtsylvania, where German anger at the Know Nothing Jug
Law and widespread disgust with the 1 855 General Assembly fueled a Democratic
tekeover of state govemmem. In Coratecticut, Democratic candidate Samuel tagham
shocked the Americans by winning a plurality over their incumbem Governor William
Minor. As expected the straight American and American-Republican majority in the
General Assembly reelected Minor to another term. Nevertheless, while the American
party remained the most powerful anti-Democratic movement, momemum at the
grassroots had clearly shifted away from them."
Populism Into AntislavPTy
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The resurgence of .he northern Democracy pu, ,he Repubhcans and North
Americans leadership on notice that untty of action wouid be of paramount importance
in .he upcoming presidential election. "We now see the necessi^ of a con.p,e,e u.ion
of the An.i-Administration forces in order to succeed in the Presidential campaign,"
wro.e one Com,ec.icut North American activist in the wake of Democratic gains.
Stephen Miller, by Summer 1856 a virtual convert to Republicanism, reported to
Simon Cameron that the sentiment in Dauphin County was now against "distinctive
Republican and American meetings previous to the [state] election."" Across the three
counties, as throughout much of the North, the imperative of defeating the Democrats
in the presidential race facilitated successful fusion efforts. Though a stubborn faction
of the American party clung to the chimera of a Fillmore victoty, and North Americans
remained a strong independem force, even dominant in some states, including
Pennsylvania, overall the Republicans emerged from the 1856 canvas as the
indisputable leaders of the North's anti-Democratic coalition.'^
Republicans aggressively took their case to the people in 1 856. Republicans
and North Americans jointly sponsored "Fremont Clubs" and "Union" and "People's"
meetings in virtually every town and village, attesting to the significance that anti-
Democratic political elites placed on the grassroots. Pennsylvania Republican
Alexander McClure hinted at the movement culture that underlay the grassroots
Fremom campaign. "Local mass meetings were held in schoolhouses and at the
unknown as a rule
,„ previous ca™p,gns. delivered able and impressive appeals
.o
.he
masses." Invariably appeal to voters echoed the antiparty theme of old: citizens
••wiU,out respect to past or present political distinctions, who are opposed to..,he
extension of slaveo....in favor of Free Speech, free territory. Free Labor. Free Kansas,
Fremont and Dayton...." Of crucial import in focusing th.s effort were the stunmer's
fot^ative political events-the sacking of Lawrence, Kansas, by pro-s,ave,y settlers and
.he caning of Charles Sumner by South Carolina's Preston Brooks in the U.S. Senate
Chamber. In this context antislavery and Fremom meetings became occasions for
expressing sectional loyalty and unity in the face of the Democratic-Slave Power threat.
A massive "indignation meeting" at Amesbury and Salisbury, Massachusetts, called
"without distinction to party" to condemn the Sumner caning, heard speeches from
Whigs, Republicans, and Americans pledging to "forget, forgive and unite." The Slave
Power, said old Liberty activist John Greenleaf Whittier, "is only strong through our
dissensions. It could do nothing against a united North. The one indispensable thing is
Union." Even if fusion proponents glossed over the considerable factionalism and
horse-trading among the leadership, across the three coumies the public facade of the
Fremont movement was harmony and union. Antislavery and anti-Democratic activists
of various stripes shared speaking and organizing duties and publicly buried party
labels and divisions under the sectional Fremont banner. In the cnicible of 1856 North
Americans and Republicans, along with a smanering of ex-Whigs, and ex-Free
Democrats, started tnerg.ng organizat.ona, networks into a single framework that
would constitute the later Republican party."
A crucial dimension of the an.i-Buchanan appeal was the idea that the Fremont
campaign spontaneously reflected the anti-Democrat.c interests and views of the
northern public. Perhaps because of the pers.stence of factionalism within their own
ranks, fusion leaders denied the key role played by political elites in orchestrating the
Fremont campaign. Thus the union movemem, in the words of one Essex County
editor, was not the result of "party leaders, but of the PEOPLE themselves, breaking
away from all party com,ec,ions." Buchanan and the Democrats, on the other hand,
were mere political traders. Tlte Union state convention in Pemtsylvania, said one
supporter, contrasted sharply with the Democratic Convemion: "There were no borers
to force favorites upon the ticket; but all seemed animated by the desire to select the
vety best candidates." Framing Ute antislavety cause as a people's uprising against the
pro-slavery oligarchy, Fremom and later Republican activists tapped the antiparty
politics that had been central to the Know Nothing eruption. Examples of Slave Power
influence over the Democratic party were linked to special interest governance. A
Buchanan victory would put "arrogant men" in control "of the Administration and the
destinies of the nation." The Democratic party had been "revolutionized, conquered
from within" by a "rich slave-owning, haughty, labor-despising aristocracy." The Slave
Power, through the Democratic party, governed for purely political and selfish
purposes-the promotion of slavery's westward expansion. "Who does not forget petty
party differences as he sees," read another antislavery editorial, "under the rule of the
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Dcn,ocrnc, of ,„e p.sc,,, day. a scna.or of Massachu..„...H„„n,,v hca.c, i„ sca.c
by a democraUc representative of Sonth Caro„„a. backed up by the adtninistrafonV"
Through the use of the Slave Power construct antislave^ cdUors also brought
social fears into play. Southerners had used govcrnn.cntal power to overturn the
Missouri Compromise and extend slavey into previously free territo^. Once there, it
was argued by some, the degrading slave-master relationship m.ght vety well spread to
.he North. Antislavet^ editors seized on the most radical of southern pro-slavery
arguments-that slavety was the natural condition of labor-to make the case that white
.lorthern workers could be next on the slave-holders' lis, of exploitable labor. In this
way a racialized subtext imbricated the ideal of independent •free labor," and hence,
the antislaveiy mes,sage itself Appeals to the material self-interest of free laborers in
the North implied a tnaintenance of the racial and ethnic prerogatives enjoyed by the
North's Protestant white producing classes. Built on powerful traditions of culture and
identity, the popular free labor appeal, no less than political nativism, inscribed
American public life with the cultural indulgence of the white Protestant small
producer.''
In certain contexts antislavery publicists were explicit. "It is not color alone,
they say, that lays the foundation for slavery," essayed Hartford's Thomas Day.
''Slavery is (he natural and normal condition ofSociety in their estimation, and Wl IITE
SLAVERY is as consistent and as proper as black slavery." "Kansas should be free,"
wrote another antislavery editor from Dauphin County, because with western migration
growing, "this magnificent land will be the only locality open to the choice of the free
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wh..e senler." Nonvich RepubHcan LafayeUe Foster denied any
"philanthropy...in
regard to U,e black race." ,n fighting the spread of slavey into U,e Kansas territory.
Foster claimed to be speaking for "the white race, for their freedom of speech, for their
freedom of press, for all those rights." Even in Massachusetts, where popular racial
attimdes were less severe and certainly no. often crudely avowed, antislavery advocates
occasionally framed the 1856 election as a struggle p.tting "free white mechanics"
against the despotism of "slave labor.'"^
It should be stressed that there was an expedient dimension to the explicitly
racialized antislaveiy appeal. Direct references to race invariably occurred only after
Democrats or Fillmore Americans attacked the racial implications of antislavery.
Indeed, a major component of both the Democratic and Fillmore American strategy
was to paint Fremont supporters as "black Republicans" and "nigger worshipers."
Coupled with their emphasis on preserving national harmony through defeat of
Fremont, Democrats and Fillmore Americans expressed the fears ofmany that
antislavery government, such as the Fremonters wanted, constituted black solicitude.
Harrisburg's John J. Clyde, by 1856 a leading Dauphin County proponent of Fillmore,
peppered his conservative unionism with stories of black activism on behalf of the
Republican party to demonstrate the "workings of abolitionism." hicredulous reports
of Republican meetings being "addressed by a NEGRO!" and of white activists being
"thrust back from a Fremont barbecue to give place [at the head table] to negroes"
showed how "officious" blacks had become in the charged atmosphere of sectional
politics. Clyde shamelessly ridiculed local "gemmen ob color" and "ladies ob color,"
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in
members of Ha^sbu^g, unusually large free black population, for a„en,p,ing
.o si,
the from rows of theaters and for canning on polit.cal conversations in public. Black
public activism challenged the city's rigid rac.a, caste system and signified to racists
like Clyde the necessity of defeating Fremont.'^
In light of the race-baiting of northern Democrats and Fillmore Americans, it .s
important to acknowledge the variation that existed on race matters between the
opponents and proponents of antislaveiy politics. After all, Free Soilers, Know
Nothings, and Republicans were the most consistent supporters of black suffrage and
personal liberty laws in the North, not Democrats; Republicans would effect
emancipation, the Freedman's Bureau, and the Reconstruction Amendments, not
Democrats. While the racial implications of mass-based antislavery politics produced
fears and anxieties among ordinary northerners regardless of political affiliation.
Democrats and Fillmore Americans were far more explicit, direct, extreme. "As for
Slavery's being a curse to the niggers," advised "H. W." in response to a series of
antislavery editorials in the Amesbury Villager, "it is the only condition suited for
them. By advocating the election of James Buchanan or Millard Fillmore, you might
receive for your paper more influence than you will by joining the party of freedom
shriekers."'*
All understood the distinction that this writer drew. Very few Fremonters
shared his extreme views; more than a few celebrated leaders of the Fremont campaign
clearly embraced the role of "freedom shrieker" out of genuine aversion to African
slavery and hope of eventual moral uplift of the enslaved." But in the end free labor
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appeals, inCud.ng those tha, n,ade „o mention of race, mediated ,he inferred racial
prerogatives of whites. At stake
.„ ,856 (as in ,360 and the Civrl War, was nothing
less than the freedoms and rights that people ascribed to their public life, and few
antislavery supporters interpreted this to include blacks, slave or free. In this way the
slave was both a. the center and periphe,, of the mass-based ant.slave,, movement.
Slaveholders, and more broadly the South, derived unprecedented economic and
political power from the enslavement of millions of Africans. To the masses who
voted antislavety in
.856 and later, slavety constituted a threat to themselves, not the
African slave.
And that threat manifested at the highest levels of government. The Fremont
campaign folded free labor appeals into their overriding political theme of rescuing
government from the clutches of the Slave Power. A vote for Fremont, according to
antislavery proponents, was a vote to end the tyrannical control of the Slave Power
the nation's public life. Through its acquiescence in Slave Power aggression, the
Buchanan Administration had shown itself to be run by "selfish and sectional
politicians." Democratic leadership was thus "powerful for mischief, but feeble in the
maintenance of laws for the protection of the people and honor of the country." The
Fremont appeal was a patriotic imperative, supporters said, made necessary by the
government's pro-slavery/pro-southem record. The Democratic platform "is set up for
the sole purpose of giving the slave states the control of the government," thundered
Lynn's J. F. Kimball. The caning of Charles Sumner proved "a conspiracy for the
extension of slavery and for the subjugation of every opposing power, principle, and
over
senument throughout the land," read an ant.lave^ resolution adopted by Norw.h
residents. The caning of Sumner, Bleeding Kansas, the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise, the Fugitive Slave Act, the forcing of Section XII on the American party
at Philadelphia-all illustrated the scheming Slave Power m act.on, Fremont publicists
wrote time and again. As the Know Nothings had proved, demagog, conspiracy talk
worked well in the unsettled political cultt^e of the 1850s. But this was a conspiracy
that seemed closer and more menacing (and certamly more evident) than anything the
Vatican could pull off In the end the Fremont movement rested its case on reclaimmg
government in the name of the people from the most dangerous of special interests. It
was time "to give the government of the country into the hands of free white men than
to leave it any longer to the owners of black slaves."2o
In the three counties the Fall elections demonstrated the success of the
Republican-American fusion movement. Republicans joined North Americans under
the xgis of "Union" that blurred the Republican influence over the entire affair.
"Union" candidates in state races easily carried Dauphin and Essex counties
(Connecticut held its state elections in the spring), while Fremont gained nearly 69% of
the vote in Essex and 56% in New London. More striking was the paltry total
registered for Fillmore in New London and Essex. The presidential contest all but
killed the independent American movement in New London County, where Fillmore
attracted a mere 3.6%. Independent Americans could be only slightly less gloomy at
results in Essex County, where Fillmore won barely 1 1%, about where he finished
statewide. Republicans seized control of the Massachusetts General Court, though a
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significant fraction of ,hem were fom>er Americans wt,o ran on "American-
Republican" fi,sion ticlcets. In Essex County,
.he number of straight Republican
assemblymen elected (27) dwarfed both Fusionists (4) and independent Americans (3).
m contrast, the results looked far less decisive for the Republican movemem
Dauphin County. The Union state ticket carried the county, but Buchanan
plurality in the presidential contest a month later. Part of the problem lay in the
inability of the state's Republican and American leaders to agree on a common
"Union" slate of presidential electors. The deal struck allowed each party to run
separate Fremom and Fillmore "Union" tickets. If the Union ticket had won the state,
then Pennsylvania's 27 electoral votes would be divided in proportion to each
candidate's popular vote, to the evem that Pemrsylvania's electoral votes would decide
the presidential election for either candidate, the entire slate would go to that candidate.
The arrangement was moot, for Buchanan carried Pennsylvania, though by less than
1 ,000 votes. But it did provide a unique oppommity to read the relative strength of
Americanism and Republicanism in the 1856 Union movemem. to Dauphin, as across
Pemisylvania, nominal Americans still held the upper hand to the tosion movement, as
"Fillmore-Union" tickets accounted for over 59% of the Union total. On the other
hand, the Straight Fillmore ticket gained only a mere 106 votes countywide, strongly
suggesting that most Americans looked favorably upon alliance with the Republicans.^'
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In the process of building a sec.ionai majority, antislave^ activists had imitated
social and cultural
the antiparty style of the early Know Nothings. Mixing powerful
anxieties associated with slaveiy, the movement framed the Slave Power as a comipt
and menacing special interest in control of the Federal government. The Republican
and North American merger inflised the antislavery movement with antiparty themes
that lifted the movement to majorities in 1 856. Moreover the Fremont campaign had
demonstrated conclusively the relative weakness of independent Americanism.
Antislavery political elites now turned to the state elections of 1857 and 1858 to
solidify their position, promising a continuation of the ftision movement. "If we
prevail," reported a Fremont-American editor from New London, "we must not act
merely as allies, but as a party, one and indivisible."^^
Republicans very much viewed the state contests as an extension of the 1856
presidential race. Yet in the wake of the 1856 election, sectional politics moved to the
more complex rhythms of state and local issues. While never losing sight of their
larger goal, defeat of the Slave Power, Republican forces in all three states faced more
mundane issues and practical strategic problems. The ensuing state campaigns
challenged Republicans to formalize their party structure, integrate their appeal, and
link national politics to state and local concerns in ways that could crystallize their hold
over the grassroots. Herrenvolk antislavery remained the core of the Republican
agenda, brought into play through appeals to defeat the Slave Power's doughface tools
.n state goven^em. A, the same time Republicanism self-consciously blended
anttslavety with nativism, protectiontst labor doctrines, and state policies where the
local context demanded. Their success at doing so can be measured m the dissipation
of populist insurgency and a return to two-party stability by the late 1850s.
In Massachusetts the final transition to Republicanism proceeded swiftly, in
large measure because of the Republicans' effective response to na.ivist pressure, and
later, state fiscal issues. Die-hard Gardner Americans in the 1857 General Court, at the
urging of His Excellency, brought forward a constitutional amendment to establish a 14
year waiting period for immigrant voting rights. Most Republicans rejected this
proposal, bu, shrewdly kept their nativist credentials intact by offering a compromise
two year waiting period. Under Gardner's influence, thoroughgoing nativist legislators
blocked this milder bill, creating an impasse that potentially set up the issue for the
1857 election. Republicans, however, nominated Nathaniel P. Banks for governor,
whose close ties to the American party warmed the hearts of political nativists. Most
leading nativist newspapers-what was lefl of a once considerable network of Know
Nothing organs throughout the state-foreswore their old warhorse Hemy J. Gardner
and endorsed Banks, who ran as an "American-Republican" mainly on the 1855
Springfield multi-issue platfonm of the state's North American party. "There was
nothing more evident," claimed political nativists in 1 857, than the fact "that the
American party-as a party-is growing weaker and weaker by the year. But its
principles may live and find expression long after the party becomes a mere faction.
They can only ,ive, however, by that „,ore powerft. and dominant eleven, of party
action-Republicanism.""
With U,e nomination of Banks, most nativists in effect conceded political
leadership of the state to the Republicans, who mixed antislavety appeals with
condemnations of fraudulent immigrant voting and calls to enforce the state's 1855
prohibition law. Meanwhile, Banks' supporters attacked Gardner and the Straight
Americans for "routinely descending to the lowest extreme of the low standard of
political action." Gardner was a force for proslave^
"hunkerdom," more interested in
his "personal and party ends" than in defending antislavety and American principles.
To many, those principles reflected both antislavety and nativism, insofar as Banks and
the Republican party stood for "the purity and principles of Ute government under our
fathers." Linking the Gardner Americans to excessive political intrigue and pro-slavery
government in Washington, and integrating nativism and antislavery. Banks defeated
Gardner, the titular leader of independent Americanism in the Bay State, with a
plurality in the three way race. A General Court dominated by Republicans then
elected the Waltham "Bobbin Boy" governor by an overwhelming margin.^'
Once in office Republicans continued to respond to state and local issues. In
his inaugural address, Banks indicated his support for "legislative safeguards...to
maintain the purity of elections and to protect the rights of American citizens." The
General Court responded by passing the two year waiting period amendment. The
following year a Republican General Court again passed the amendment, sending it to
voters, who promptly ratified it. Banks also satisfied antislavery zealots by ordering
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.™ova, of Judge Edw.d G. Lonng. Moderates on ,he s.ave^
.sue we. appeased
by a revision of*e sme's ,S55 persona, Hberty ,aw, said ,o have inflanred sectional
discord. And in .he con.ex, of the
, 857 f.nancial crisis, Banlcs and the Republicans
turned to protectionist labor doctrines and clangored for retrenchment and reform in
State govemment.^^
If Massachusetts RepubUcans responded decisively to poHtical nativism, still
salient in the Bay State despite Hllmore's abysmal showing, those in Connecticut could
afford to be less solicitous of nativism. For one thing, the 1 856 election showed how
anemic independent Americanism was in Comiecticut. Thus in Spring 1857
Comiecticut Republicans, meeting in a "Union" convention with North Americans,
refused to add a nativist plank to their antislaveiy and anti-Slave Power platform.
Nevertheless, they did make cmcial concessions to what was left of the Connecticut
American party. Republicans agreed to nominate Alexander Holley for governor, the
former Know Nothing Lieutenant Governor and the choice of North Americans. They
also added other prominent Know Nothings to the state ticket. The Republican reftisal
to explicitly endorse nativism while agreeing to nominate well-known Americans
reflected their master strategy that "the better portion" of former Know Nothings
should receive "all the offices, but not under their name and platform." Despite the
Holley nomination a small faction of Americans, irked by the silence of the Union
platform on nativism, staged a rump convention and nominated a straight American
ticket. In New London County the Straight Americans targeted "mechanics, poisoning
their minds by the belief that they have been swallowed up by Republicanism." In
response, local Republican organ.zers placated the Americans by backing several ex-
Know Nothings in state assembly and senate races on the Union ticket. As a result,
boasted New London Repubhcan Augustus Brandegee,
"the large majority of the
'
American party, and all its respectability, are with us."^^
Com^ecticut Republicans reasoned that independent Americanism could be
defeated through antislaveiy appeals and by opening their party organization to former
Know Nothings at the local and state level. If there were any doubts the infamous Dred
Scott decision dispersed them. Republicans assailed the divisive partisan aims of
Americans who doggedly resisted flision with the Republicans. The harmony of Union
meetings across the county and state, wrote one, "demonstrate that the patriotic
elements of political power have fbsed into one glowing mass [and] are not to be blown
into fragments by the explosive mixtures of small politicians whose desire for office
was only equaled by their unfitness for its duties.""
The results of this strategy were more mixed than Republicans had hoped.
Holley gained a bare majority, though Union candidates swept into both branches of the
General Assembly. With the independent Americans almost completely out of the
picture, electoral lines resembled those of the 1840s, which is to say that the Democrats
retained considerable potency in Connecticut. Running against the Republicans'
sectional extremism and profligacy in state government, the Connecticut Democracy
remained very competitive in Connecticut throughout the late 1850s. Antislavery was
central to Connecticut Republicanism, but the strength of the Democratic opposition,
coupled with an intransigent cell of independent Americans, compelled them to expand
their appeals. In 1 857 Governor Holley issued a plea to impose restrictions on
immigrant voting, which the General Assembly ignored. The following year
Republicans moved to pacify restive Americans by adding a literacy test to the "Union
state platform. In 1^58 the Republican General Assembly passed constitutional
amendments for a literacy test and a one year waiting period for immigrant voting
rights. These amendments went down to overwhelming defeat in 1859 after the last
remnants of independent Americanism disappeared. Probably more important to the
Republicans was the banking crisis of 1 857. The hard times facilitated new attacks on
the National Democrats' free trade policies, which "failed to discriminate in favor of
American labor." Protectionist labor doctrines blended with denunciations of the
Lecompton constitution to keep Connecticut narrowly Republican.^"
Nowhere were protectionist labor doctrines more important in solidifying the
Republican ascendance than in Pennsylvania. Statewide the American party still
retained the nominal allegiance of the majority of anti-Democratic voters. But both
Republicans and Americans realized that continued ftision was necessary in order to
defeat the Democrats. In 1857 the Republicans and Americans again agreed to another
"Union" anti-Democratic convention, adopting a multi-issue platform that stressed both
antislavery and nativism. Republicans, the weaker of the two factions statewide but the
controlling element at the convention, were able to nominate the old Free Soiler David
Wilmot for governor. Popular among western antislavery people, Wilmot inspired few
Americans from central and eastern Pennsylvania. With the "Union" movement thus
controlled by Republicans, insurgent Americans held an independent convention that
m our
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nominated a
..aigh, American
.icke,. LocaU,. ,he Un.on ™,ve™e„. carefully hewed
.0 .he .ul.ifaee.ed sU,.e p,a.fo™, appealing
.o vo.ers "wi.hou. regard
.0 pas. poli.ieal
dis.inc.ions. who are opposed
.0 .he ex.cnsion of slavery [and] foreign inHuences
elec.ions...who are in favor of purifying .he ballo. box [and) excluding fro™ our shores
Foreign paupers and criminals."^^
Despite blending antipartyism, nativism, and ant.slaveiy, WUmot's candidacy
presented severe problems for the Union movement. Natwists across the state doubted
Wilmot's pledges to restrict immigrant voting rights, while his well-known radicalism
on the slaveiy issue alienated conservative voters who in 1 857 were less interested in
sending an antislavery message. Democrats decisively carried the election, while only
two of five voters backed Wilmot. In Dauphin County, Union forces attributed the
defeat to apathy among anti-Democratic forces. Locally Wilmot gained only 67% of
the combined Union total in 1 856, while Democratic candidate William Packer actually
outpolled Buchanan by 16 votes. The Republican's strategy of forcing the nomination
of a radical antislavery man in this conservative state had proved disastrous.
The financial panic struck late in the campaign, too late in fact to affect the
outcome. But in the ensuing months the downturn ravaged the state's textile, coal, and
iron interests, throwing thousands out of work and putting the economy at the center of
the state's politics. Almost immediately the Union movement regrouped by striking
populist themes of Democratic and Administration inaction in the face of economic
crisis. Workers and mechanics in Philadelphia were urged to "throw off the trammels
of party and unite together" for recovery policies like the protective tariff Harrisburg's
410
in
George Bergner, now editor of the Harr,sburg Telegraph and leader of Dauphi
Cotu,ty.s Union-RepubUcan faction, wrote a ser.es of editorials an.icipattng tl,e Union
state convention, about to meet in Harrisburg. Bergner was convinced tl,at
protectionism would constitute the crucial issue in the ca„,paign. "The masses of the
people-farmers, mechanics and workingmen-the
"bone and stnew" of the land who do
the voting," he wrote, will "accomplish at the ballot box what has been dented them by
their recreant Representatives and the powers at Washington. Their votes, at the
coming election, will be cast with direct reference to this question " For Bergner and
other Republican leaders of the splintered anti-Democratic movement, a focus on the
economy enabled them to drive home the necessity of coordinated action against the
Democrats. "This is a great national question," Bergner claimed, and the only certain
way to establish the "protective principle is to defeat the party in power and to return to
Congress such men as will give heed to the popular cry and minister to the public
wants."*
At their state convemion, the Union movemem recast itself the "People's party"
and reftirbished its platform. It added a strong protective tariff plank and ringing
denunciations of the Democrats' handling of the economy. Gone was the strident
antislavery language and specific denial of Congress's right to extend slavery in the
territories. In their place was merely an attack on the Buchanan Administration's
acceptance of the Lecompton constitution, said to violate principles of "popular
sovereignty." The platform retained calls to restrict immigrant political rights and stop
foreign-bom election abuses, but the emphasis on protectionist labor policies and
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Lecompton clearly se, .he ,one for ,he 1 858 People's party campaign. The Dauphi
County
"People-s" convention embraced the new departure, excoriating the "crintina.
extravagance of the Buchanan Admin.stration." Lecompton and protectionism together
mediated a renewed emphasis on the Henen.o,k ideal of small producer independence
and security, undermined by National Democratic leadership. Through fraud and
violence the Buchanan Administration had imposed "upon the white freemen of Kansas
a constitution repugnant to their feelings and wishes." The tariff likewise ought to be
revised so as to "afford protection to the free white labor of the nation." Combining
herre„.otk Slave Power themes with protecUonist economic appeals, the People's party
state campaign repositioned political debate onto the national govemmenl."
On election day the People's party carried the state in a startling reversal of
political fortunes. One Republican activist called it a "sweeping revolution" in
government. Indeed, where Democrats had controlled nearly two-thirds of the General
Assembly in 1858, the 1859 Pennsylvania House would be two-thirds People's party.
Democrats retained only 4 of their 1 5 Congressional seats (out of 25 statewide), and
only 2 of those were held by openly pro-Lecompton men. It was a political lesson that
the People's party leadership, made up almost entirely of Republican and old North
American activists, did not soon forget. In 1 859 and again in 1 860 the state's anti-
Democratic coalition retained the People's party label along with the successful
combination of herremolk amislavery, nativist cultural and economic appeals, and
producerist economic themes."
Conclusion
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Tl.e Pennsylvania People's party bent to the logic of one activist, who observed
in 1 860 that the state "cannot be carried on the anti-slavey issue only. Fr.n.ont proved
that.'- And so, too, did anti-Democratic activists in Connecticut and Massachusetts,
where the final transition to Republicanism was not merely an extension of the
unalloyed herrenvolk antislavery that fueled the Fremont campaign. In all three
counties and states, Republican activists opened antislavery politics to former Know
Nothings and leavened the herrenvolk antislavery appeal as the local context
demanded. Their flexibility and pragmatism, a style of leadership so noticeably absent
in the early years of political antislavery, paved the final road to the Republican
takeover of the North.
At the same time it cannot be said that the incorporation of protectionism and
nativism diluted in any meaningful way the herrenvolk antislavery essence of
Republicanism. At its core. Republicanism pivoted on anti-Democratic Slave Power
demonology which, despite its reliance on white producer antisouthemism, led
inexorably to antislavery. Republicans everywhere returned again and again to this
central tenet of their politics, and demanded that statewide fusion movements do the
same. Fears of Democratic-Slave Power domination of American public life, both its
social values and political institutions, constituted the warp threads of the Republican
appeal and subsequent potency. Formally spun during the Fremont canvas, this
constituent element of the antislavery majority traced further back, to the northern
Know Nothings- populariza,.on of .he Slave Power construct during their a„t,party
campaign against the regime of party governance. Henenvolk antislavery was styled
on Know Nothing antipartyism, insofar as the Know Nothings had demonstrated that a
focus on political, even conspiratorial, threats to governmental institutions could
mediate broad social and cultural values with the nonpartisan ideal of governance. The
Republicans politicized the Democratic-Slave Power as the single greatest threat to the
public interest, defined largely in tenns of the North's producerist mythology; a white,
Protestant, middling way of life.
If Republicanism shared much with Know Nothingism, it also differed from
that quintessential expression ofpopulism in several crucial respects. In political tenns
Know Nothingism turned on an antiparty indictment of party governance and special
interest politics. To be a Know Nothing meant not simply abiding the movement's
ethnic prejudice, something most Protestant northerners had little trouble
accommodating to. To be a Know Nothing one had to be an anti-partisan. One had to
share the movement's anger at governance under the major parties, whose leaders
seemed more interested in advancing the causes of wire-pullers and special interests
than the public good.
Republicanism pivoted on a narrower and more disciplined appeal. Of course
the Republican goal was the same~the public good in governance. No political
movement goes very far without first framing itself as champion of some protean
public, or nonpartisan purpose. The difference for Republicans was the enemy they
identified and the way they went about combating it. Consistently and systematically.
the Republicans linked problems m American public Hfe to the Slave Power and its
northern Democratic allies. They trotted out example after example of tangible
Democratic-Slave Power aggressions on the (white northern) public interest. They
identified themselves and the antislave^ mission crisply and definitively. They drew a
sharp line of opposition to the Democratic-Slave Power, and demanded the. followers
accept it as a sine qua non of participation. Dunng the wars of maneuver with others
who shared their anti-Democratic animus but resented their leadership, the Republicans
also set aside petty jealousies and compromised on secondary issues for the long-term
good of the antislavery cause. Hardly antipartisans, Republicans proved themselves
deft politicians indeed. Some, such as die-hard nativists, coveted the concessions that
Republican tacticians made available. Most others gravitated to the Republicans
simply because their leadership style and message, in the context of the mounting
sectional crisis, appeared selfless and wholly attuned to the national good. The
majority of northerners warmed to the project of Republican party-building because it
seemed appropriately aimed at a larger moral purpose. And later, after the Republican-
led North had finally defeated the Slave Power, the patriotic service of Grant and
Sherman and countless other heroes, real and imagined, the trailblazing example of
Fremont and the early antislavery activists, including the once-reviled abolitionists, and
the vision, perseverance, and simple eloquence of that most mythic of American icons,
Abraham Lincoln, provided a store of tropes and memories that propelled the
Republican into the next generation of politics and beyond. Learning to become
a Republican partisan would never be easier.
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oleman,
30^ Philadelphia A^or//. American, 1 9 February 1 858, as cited in Malcolmbiselen the Rise ofPennsylvania Protectionism (Philadelphia: University of
7J*^; 1^^^^^^^^^ '''^ '"^^ ^'^^^'^'^-^ ^« J-^'
31. Harrisburg Telegraph, 4 August 1858. See also ibid.: 18 August 22
September, 6 October 1 858. For more on the crucial 1 858 election, see Coleman
Disruption ofthe Pennsylvania Democracy, 110-8; Collins, "The Democrats' Loss of
Pemisylvania in 1858;" Eiselen, Rise ofPennsylvania Protectionism, 246-9; Huston
/he Panic of1857 and the Coming ofthe Civil War, 1 43-57.
32. McClure, Old Time Notes, I: 345. See also Coleman, Disruption ofthe
Pennsylvania Democracy, 1 1 7-40; Holt, Forging a Majority, 242-89.
33. Philadelphia North American, 30 March 1 860, as cited in Eiselen, Rise of
Pennsylvania Protectionism, 257.
CONCLUSION
The stoo. ofKnow NoUungism's eclipse is a familiar one ,o sci>oIars of
American populist movements. Rising suddenly, with unusual energy and a thumping
determination to change things, populist third party movements have suffered quick
defeat throughout this nation's past. Depending upon their perspective commentators
have expressed either relief or frustration a. the seeming ease with which the political
mainstream diffuses populist anger, coopts the third party agenda, beats back the heady
promise of thoroughgoing change.
What the critics of popuHst insurgencies ignore, of course, is that defeat often
yields important long-term victories. Without question third parties have served a
crucial function within our political system, venting new issues and mobilizing new
political demands which invariably have been met-if not on the populist's own terms.
It is not exaggerating the point to say that whatever degree of responsiveness and
imiovation exists in our system of politics, the principal credit belongs to third parties.'
Major parties represent vested interests who are naturally resistant to change; most
major party leaders sensibly fear risking all on novel issues and demands that carry
uncertain political consequences. While there was much that was reprehensible in the
Know Nothing agenda, and no inconsiderable amount of facile demagoguery in Know
Nothing political culture, the movement's millennial Protestantism inftised the
Republican party with a Pentecostal temper that it retained well after the Civil War.^
And there was also a far more profound and historic legacy. For smashing the Whig
party and framing an early popularization of the antislavery appeal, the northern Know
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Nothings can take indirect credit for the election of Abraham Lincoln, the first
President openly hostile to slavery.' No other populist movement can boast of such a
monumental impact on our history.
Just as we can probe the aftermath of Know Nothingism for signs of its long-
term effects on American public life, so too we must examine public life prior to the
populist eruption to fi.lly grasp its origins and import. Northern Know Nothmgism was
a creature of the nineteenth-century's culture of politics and governance. Much the
same may be said, I suggest, of all nineteenth-century populist movements. People's
routine experiences with partisan politics and governance socialized them into two
frameworks of public life, interrelated yet phenomenologically distinct. The values of
partisanship-commitment to principles, selfless devotion to the cause-were ritualized
during campaigns, celebrated at rallies, bruited about in homes and taverns, and
expressed on election day when men who presumably personified a party's values
stood for office. The values of nonpartisanship-commitment to the public good,
search for a harmony of interest-guided governance, both state and local, on most
matters that lay beyond people's learned partisan political differences. The broadly
shared values and experiences of partisanship and nonpartisanship intertwined to shape
popular political character and thought. Partisanship and nonpartisanship together
formed the constitutive elements of nineteenth-century public life.
Know Nothing populism sprang from the interaction of these two frameworks
of thought and experience with the disruptive economic and demographic changes of
late antebellum society. Social change produced new problems of governance in public
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life and. eventually, explicit polifcal demands on the regime. Citizens expected their
party leaders to respond in ways that advanced the public good, the objective that most
people idealized in their public lives. Normally political elites succeed in harnessing
what stands for the public good to party objectives, conflating the values of
partisanship with public goals. To the extern that nineteenth-century partisan politics
became one means of realizing the end. citizens enthusiastically received and remade
the culture of partisanship and abided their leaders' partisan directives. But when
leadership for party's sake interfered with the realization of the public good, when
political elites seemed by their actions or inactions to have abandoned the public good
for partisan or personal objectives, refonners had the opportunity to focus voter anger
on governance.
Eventually the Know Nothings appropriated the reform mantle, directing
themselves to issues of governance in public life by politicizing the nonpartisan ideal.
Herein lay the political contribution of populism and its broader systemic significance.
The regime's failure to respond to felt needs prompted an antiparty uprising to
reconstitute nonpartisan governance. Know Nothing populism as both a process of
political mobilization and oppositional culture created, however briefly, a politics
bereft of the partisanship that under normal circumstances defined one dimension of the
nineteenth-century's political public sphere. In the 1850s new issues of public life
entered formal political space via the bridge that Know Nothingism provided between
the cultures and traditions of governance and electoral politics.
This formulation of populism and public life should have applications beyond
the 1850s. One argument of this dissertation has been that the style and conduct of
leadership figured crucially in mneteenth-centu,^ politics, as of course it does today.
For citizens who looked to third party alternatives in the 1 850s, there reached a point at
which the issues in play-liquor, immigration, political economic reform, slavery-by
themselves mattered less than the perceived mam.er in which party leaders reacted to
them. A leadership's partisan calculation, in certain contexts, could seem a betrayal of
public trust, a design for special interest control over public life. Issues are the building
blocs of politics. The analysis presented in this dissertation suggests that the manner in
which political elites handle issues, their perfoimance of the public's business, was of
equal importance in determining the relationship between party leaders and mass
publics in the nineteenth-century.''
Certainly the history of the Know Nothing movement and party attests to the
salience of leadership questions in nineteenth-century politics. Despite some
impressive "reform" achievements, the brief era of Know Nothing power was fraught
with embarrassment, failure, and contradiction. Efforts by American party leaders to
enlist political nativism for narrow personal and political objectives enabled
competitors to portray the third party as a hobby horse for scheming politicians,
precisely what the populists had promised to overcome. The early Republicans,
deploying their own version of the popular antiparty vernacular, cast the leadership of
the American movement as political traders, relying on the Slave Power threat to
discipline the anti-Democratic electorate against the wire-pullers who ran things in the
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American party. Know Nothmg populism attracted a raft of operatives and hacks
whose personal and political ambitions eventually steered h down political dead-ends.
Of course, the quality and character of third party leadership varies from movement to
movement. But the histo^ of nineteenth-century third partyism strongly suggests that
the Know Nothing movement and party differed only in degree, not in kmd. To one
extent or another, populist expressions always act as magnets for frustrated political
aspirants whose pretensions for power pooriy serve the populist rank and file.
The culture of nineteenth-centuiy governance decisively impacted the trajectory
of Know Nothing populism. In the context of emergent political issues and elite
uncertainty regarding them, the regime's distributive mainsprings made it especially
easy for the Know Nothings' to argue that politics and government was suddenly awash
in special interests. Once in power, however, these champions of the people served so
many interests and produced such ambiguous policy that it is difficult to nail down
precisely what Know Nothing government stood for. This in itself is not unusual. The
nineteenth-century's regime of distributive governance generated a similarly
ambiguous pattern of particularistic policy outputs that in the aggregate served to
modernize the American economy, despite the persistence of the police power in
nineteenth-century statutory law and jurisprudence. What was unusual, however, and
highly problematic for the Know Nothings' long-term fortunes, was that their behavior
in power (governance) contradicted their intention to roust special interests from their
perch atop the distributive regime. The Know Nothings served as a vehicle for a great
variety of interests to enter government and exercise power and influence. To be sure.
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some of these interests had been ignored or disadvantaged by the two major parties.
But many other groups simply adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the "populist
moment," carrying on their vested interests in much the same mam.er and with much
the same success as before.^ The culture of distributive politics and governance was far
more stable and limiting than the populists had first imagined.
Limits from within also shaped Know Nothing populism once it achieved its
first goal of wimiing a seat at the table of power. The Know Nothmg movement lacked
the materials necessaiy to fend off the dialectic which invariably defeats third parties.
At the height of populist fury the Know Nothing movement seemed boundless in its
potential for political change. Its appeal as an antiparty reform movement galvanized
many fed up with the partisan truckling and maneuvering of the major parties around
public issues that were felt to be above mere politics. Populism's great attraction is this
antiparty, democratic ethos. Yet by entering formal politics and government the
antiparty uprising, in effect, sank to the level of mere politics. And mere politics was
something the movement was ill-equipped to succeed at, for it requires long-term
strategies and short-term accommodations and an institutional culture of loyalty of the
sort which political parties rely upon to discipline their ranks and smooth over
factionalism. Know Nothingism's raging popularity rested in large measure on the
presumed absence of such tactical and institutional imperatives. The movement's
transition to power, its ultimate metamorphosis into a formal party, compelled
decisions and actions that contradicted the antiparty spirit at the center of its appeal.
The Know Nothing party failed to escape the dialectic their triumph set in motion.
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rk.k loss was histoo^'s gain, insofar as i, permitted ,he Republican party ,o rise
and strike at slave.,.
,t .s perltaps small consolation for third party movements that
their demise is by no means as complete as their forma, disappearance might suggest.
But those interested in building the next third party movemem may hold out optimism
that defeat is no. a foregone conclusion. The third party dialectic is not an iron cage, as
the Republican breakthrough attests. Its transcendence requires unusual political and
social circumstances, dedicated and gifted leaders, and most important, a rank and file
sufficiently persuaded of the righteousness of the cause and their leaders' commitment
to it and to them above all else. Such a confluence of political events and social forces,
of grassroots pressure for genuine change and leadership responsive to that impulse, is
neither particularly rare nor doomed from the start. Indeed, the depth of Americans-
anger with the regime of politics and govermnent today, their desire to transcend the
partisanship and special interest politics that currently grips Washington, suggests
another populist moment is near at hand, if not already upon us. However daunting the
project of building and sustaining an independent refonn politics, ultimately the
outcome of the next populist moment will be, as always, in the movement's hands.
Notes
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1. Ronald Formisano also makes this nnint- tu^ t r
s i979r "'"^ ""'--'^ ofNorc-H^^^^^
Nn.hln ^ '^'"''"""fl''^ "TT'^ Antimasonic and Know
VoM L V •1'".^,'"" ''"'""Ser, Jr., ed., His.ory of U.S. PolUicalParUesol. I (New York: Chelsea House Publishing, 1973), 575-620: 620.
4. The larger point here being that scholars too readily assume a
IT^I T .'''""""f'P ''^'^^^n fe" interests, and political behavior andthought tn the mneteenth century. We know that today such a tidy relationship d^es not
extst; to treat the mneteenth-century electorate differently simply because tZut washigher, because mneteenth-century parties and insurgent movements advanced broadpolicy orientations (can we not identify same in the twentieth?), and because the
mneteenth-century's regime of "courts and parties" differs from our modem welfare
state, sets up an arbitrary break in the development ofAmerican political culture It is aquestion of degrees, but it is perhaps too easy (however convenient for purposes of
penodization) to speak of nineteemh-centuty political behavior and thought and mean
something uneriy alien from "modem" politics.
5. The phrase of course belongs to Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise-
The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
describ™:,eirdt":^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ~ --^^^ -anting and
have been cognizant of the recfm^In ^ku '".''"'"'"'8 statistical tools 1
fudging fto.v
^^^^z^^::^^^:^r''
'r'---
.etho<l.og.;ist~^^^
have.he^::i;r^rarriei^^rin^^^^^^^^^
excessive quantitative oresentatinn. i, T , '""""S^^'Ph burdened by
decided ^oio,::::::z"^^:^^:rn^;^^^ *°"8>.t i„ n,ind th.
i
many practical uses, the most import^fof wW^ch for1 '"«'>°''s do have
the town level census of voters for Massachusetts in 1850 contained in Massa huset
for 1852, and the town census of polls and voters in the Connecticut Register fori 861Unfortunately, no such data exists for Pennsylvania in the antebellum years Todetermine the number of voters in New London County before the Civil War I
Tf nolkin f^V^''
T.''''''''
" '''' ""^^^P^^^^ ^^^^ fig-^ by th^ number
ot p Is m 1852. The next step was to divide the number of voters by the total
population of Essex and New London counties at 1 850 and 1 852 respectively New
fn?mn' f«Tn ^''T,
"''^"^'^'^ logarithmically using federal census data
ror 184U, 1850, and 1860, as were county populations for all intervening years The
voters-to-population ratio was then multiplied by the annual county population
estimates, producing an estimate of the eligible electorate for the years 1842 to 1857
The actual gubernatorial vote for each year was then divided by the estimated eligible
electorate, producing the estimates of voter turnout in the table.
The correlations in Tables B.8 through B. 18 are Kendall's tau rank order
coefficients. As with the interyear correlations (Table B.4), the Kendall coefficients
were produced using Stata 3 statistics software. Kendall's tau is simply a measurement
of agreement between two or more sets of ordinal ranks, in this case, of party vote and
the social variables listed in the tables. It is a linear «ati.ti. a a
mfluence of social variables on voting behav'r ' . t^'T'
shorthand for countywide tendenci s1 votef?^e
'
'Ted
" '
disagreed pairs as 11^^r::^Z^Z ^
methodological and epistemological. The small size of the universes he efcountiesangmgfrom 18 to 30 towns) rule out multiple regression. But ev n ifle ^0^;;contained enough towns to safely warrant the application of ecologica reLes^^^^^^would not have employed this method. The impulse behind this dLmt^rZ^^^
expbre people's political ideas and their interaction with the"e
century governance, not estimating the relative influence of socfal charactSc onvoting behavior. We already have a small library's worth of such woXfindings of which are cl^^^^^ suggested in my more modest rank order correladons.
lables B.7 and B.8, presenting the Essex County vote during the Coalition
years, also require explanation. Unfortunately, town-level voting data on races for theGeneral Court, where the Coalition was operative, are not readily available- for ho e
races, newspapers generally reported only the winners' names, place of residence andparty affiliation. Thus the data in the tables are based on official returns for
'
gubematonal elections. Nevertheless we can get some idea of the Coalition's base bv
merely reversing the correlations in the Whig column in Table B.8, or by combining thetree Soil and Democratic percentages in Table B.7. This is hardly ideal but it
represents the easiest way to limn the Coalition vote.
Finally, the Rice Index of Party Cohesion expresses the degree to which a
political party is united on a particular legislative roll call, while the Index of Party
Disagreement is a measure of partisan polarity on a given roll (Tables B 19-B 20)
Both indices range from 0 to 1 00. The Rice Index of Cohesion is calculated by
dividing the number of party members voting in a majority by the total number of party
members voting, subtracting 50, and multiplying by 2. Hence if 75 of 100 Democrats
vote yea on a bill, the cohesion score would be 50. The Index of Party Disagreement is
computed simply by determining the percentage of two parties voting Yea on a given
bill and subtracting the smaller percentage fi-om the larger.
APPENDIX B
TABLES
Table B. 1
:
New London and Essex County Churches, 1 850- 1860
Cong Bapt
No. of
churches 29 32
Accom-
modations 13,825 12,176
New London County
1850
Math Episc Univ Presb Rom Cath Other
26
7,100 2,500 1,300 1,100 1,200 2,175
No. of
churches 33 37 20
Accom-
modations 13,920 13,605 7,375
1860
7
3,200
2
,300
1
200 9,550 250
Essex County
1850
No. of
^^"-^ ^'''^
^P'^^ ^^'"Cath Others
Churches
Accom-
modations 34,211 10,350 15,625 9,460 10,590 2,200 3,175 2,800 4,078
60 16 32 24 24
1860
31 23 11 11 14
No. of
Churches 65 13 34
Accom-
modations 38,535 10,650 16,485 13,675 10,500 2,100 6,130 10,486 5,050
Source: DeBow, Seventh Census ofthe United States: 1850 (Washington: Government
Prmtmg Office, 1853), 61-3, 85-6; Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Statistics ofthe United States in
1860 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), 360-1, 408-9.
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Table B.2: Dauphin County Churches, 1850-1860
1850
No. of
""-^ Me„„ Morav Bap, Episc Ron, Ca,h 0,her
Churches 9 24 15 7 4 12 5 ,
modations 4,700 12,800 4,760 3,475 680 4,060 1,700 600
10
500 3,050
No. of
1860
Acr." " 35 7 0 NR 2 2 2 5
modations 7,218 10,875 13,300 4,350 0 NR 950 1,100 800 2,600
•Nole. Census ,akers included Me,hodis,-oricn,cd United Brchren and Church ofGod(W,nebre„nar,ans) under ti,e rubric Merhodism. My own survey of each ,ow„ s i 850 census ofchurch accomraodahons found ,ha, ,hese secte constinrtcd 86 percen, oUh^l^V^^- u„jInBrchren 69"/., Church ofGod 17«/o, Weslyan and Methodis, EpiscopatMrZL ^ d ralNonpopuh„on Schedules: Dauphin Coun,y, Social Statistics, 1850; DeBow, The s 'enlCensus of.he Unued S,a,es: 1850. 200-5; Kennedy, Sms,ics of,he United S,aes7n Iteo 454-
Table B.3: Percenmge of Party Vote for Governor in ,he Three Counties. 1840-1860
Essex County
Whig% Dem./. Lib/FS% NatA../. K„No,h% Rep-/. Na. Dem% Sca«
1840 58.3 40.7
.7
1841 51.4 44.9 3.4
1842 44.9 47.4 7.6
1843 45.6 40.6 13.3
1844 51.4 38.1 10.4
1845 45.1 30.3 11.1
1846 51.2 29.7 13.9
1847 47.2 36.9 10.2
1848 49.5 18.6 31.9
1849 50.6 27.2 21.9
1850 47.5 30.3 18.2
1851 48.4 32.2 19.2
1852 42.9 29.2 26.9
1853 45.5 26.3 23.2
1854 18.8 6.6
1855 9.6 21.5
1856 6.2 20.8
1857 33.5
1858 26.3
1859 31.4
1860 18.8
12.9
4.7
3.8
66.9 5.7
43.1 25.1
.2
.3
.1
.5
.1
.5°
.5
.3
1.5°
.3
.3
.2
.9
4.6
.2
1.6
.1
3.9 68.9^ 3
18.9 47.0 6
61.5
12.7 55.7 2
14.8 62.9 3.5
Nat Dem% = percentage of votes for National Democratic candidates Bradford Wales f 1853)
and Benjamin Butler (1860). ^
° includes percentage of vote for Workingmen's party gubernatorial candidate Frederick
Robmson.
2 equals vote for American and Republican flision candidate Henry J. Gardner.
Source. "Abstract of the Returns of Votes for Governor, 1820-1845, and 1846-1861"
Microfilm Mss., Massachusetts State Archives.
Continued, next page.
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Table B.4: Town Vote for Governor in the Three Counties
Interyear Correlations, 1 840- 1853
1840/41
1841/42
1 842/43
1843/44
1844/45
1 845/46
1846/47
1847/48
1848/49
1849/50
1850/51
1851/52
1852/53
Dauphin Essex
Wh e i-'ciiiocrai Whig Democrat
94 QA
.89
.87
96 0
1
.01
.86
.82 7 1
.20
.94
.87 79
.yi
.92
.44
.78
.82
.83
.90
.66
.81
.89
.66
.67
.93
.89
.88
.85
.73
.85
.87
.83
.93
.87
.71
.64
.94
.87
.85
.85
.84
.83
.82
.92
.85
.77
.86
.56
.86
.84
New London
Whig Democrat
.88
.85
.73
.90
.94
.82
.87
.77
.77
.83
,56
,65
.87
.88
.85
.91
.95
.84
.81
.75
.78
.84
.86
.79
Note: Correlations generated by Stata 3 statisitcs software. For sources on election returns, see Table B.3
Table B.5: Estimated Voter Turnout, Essex and New London Count ies, 1842-1857
Essex New London
1842
Total Vote Turnout Total Vote Turnout
14,565 79.6 5,952 65.4
1843 14,479 76.1 6,210 67.2
1844 16.831 85.1 7,360 78.4
1845 12,380 60.3 7,121 74.7
1846 1 1,957 56.2 7,024 72.6
1847 12,71
1
57.7 7,248 73.8
1848 17,367 76.2 7,764 77.9
1849 14,071 59.8 7,324 72.4
1850 17.164 70.7 7,473 72.8
1851 18,882 75.5 7,778 74.4
1852 18,1 19 70.4 7,905 74.1
1853 17,397 66.4 7,425 69.8
1854 17,236 63.3 7,322 69.4
1855 17,573 62.9 7,721 73.5
1856 21,649 76.0 8,019 75.0
1857 17,817 61.1 7,350 67.5
Note: See methodological note. Appendix A. Sources. Mass. Senate Documents. 185 I, No. 30 (Boston State
Prmtcr, 1851), 3; Connecticut Register...for 1862 (Hartford: State Printer, 1862), 34-6.
Essex Ne^ London
%Diff o/„3rdPar o/oDiff %3rdPar o/oDiff o/„3rdPar
0.8
1840 12.6 0.0 17 7
843 ,0 I. 5.8 2.6
o
5.0 13.3 114 3 8
15.4 0.0 13.3 10.8 3 3 5845 5.7 20.7 ,4.7 24.4 3 3 4 5
8.3 17.9 21.5 18.6 491«^^ 18.8 4.3 12.3 13.7 79 43
1848 18.0 0.0 30.9 33 4 8 l1
•849 7.8 0.0 23.4 21.9 60 7
1850 19.4
.2 17.8 18.9 2 5 7
1851 15.8 0.0 16.2 19.2 To 50
1852 1.4 6.1 7.8 25.5 2 7 6
1853 1.8 27.8 19.3 27.8 22.6 27.6
Source: See source notes for Table B.3.
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.222 .253
510 .327 .164
436
Table B.7: Percentage Essex County Vote by Types of Towns, 1850-1852
^
'^^^ 1851
,,,,Governor Governor
Whg Dem FS Whe Dem «,u
Statewide
.468 .297 .226 469 ^19 208 T.'!?Essex County
.475 .303 .182 484 32? foo
^
'^^^
N = () -^^^ ••^22 .192 .429 .292 .269
Nonindustria! (5)
towns
.599 .210 .191
.600 .233
.167
Farming (2)
towns
.520 .385 .095
.580 .296
.123
Shoe (14)
.440
.334
.225
Factory (3)
.533 .258
.209 .495 .345 .,60
.389 .389
.222
Mixed-Indus. (4)
.466 .322
.212 .531 .333 .136
.408 .356
.236
Fishing (2)
towns
.453 .385
.162 .467 .367 .165
.345 .370
.285
Orthodox (18)
towns
.560 .248
.192 .549 .288 .164
.470 .286 .244
Dissenting (4)
towns
.416 .372 .211 .436 .379 .186
.349 .367
.283
Mixed Rel. (7)
towns
.385 .359 .256 .430 .348 .222
.399 .294 .307
Note: Nonindustrial towns = towns with fewer than 15% of 1855 population employed in non-
agricultural labor; Farming towns = those nonindustrial towns where the number of farmers exceeded
numbers of non-farmers; Shoe towns = towns where over 50% of non-agricultural workforce employed
m boot and shoemaking; Factory towns = towns where over 50% of non-agricultural workforce employed
m textile factories; Mixed-Indus. = industrial towns characterized by a mixture of small and large
manufacturing industries; Fishing towns = towns where over 50% of non-agricultural workforce
employed m fishery; Orthodox towns = towns where over 60% of all church accommodations at 1850
were Congregationalist, Presbyterian, and Episcopalian churches; Dissenting towns = towns where over
60% of all church accommodations at 1850 were in Baptist, Methodist and Universalist churches- Mixed
Rel. - towns where neither Orthodox or Dissenting churches dominated town, as defined by above
Sources: "Abstract of the Returns of Votes for Governor, 1846-1861" Microfilm Mss., Massachusetts
State Archives; Federal Nonpopulation Schedules, Essex County Agriculture; Social Statistics, 1850;
DeWitt, Statistical Information Relating to
. Industry in Massachusetts... 1 855, 1 1 1-72.
Table B.8: Kendall's Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for Select V. • k.
and Party Votes, Essex County, 1850-2
1850
Governor
Whg Dem FS
1851
Governor
Whg Dem FS
1852
Governor
Whg Dem FS
Whig Vote
Prob Z>|tau
Dem. Vote
Free Soil
Farming
NonFarm.
Indus.
Valuation
Dissent
Orthodox
Note: See methodological note, Appedix A. Farming = percentage of 1 850 population that
were fanners; NonFarm = percentage of 1 855 population engaged in non-Agricultural
employmem; Industry = percentage of 1855 population engaged in industrial work only;
Valuation
- per capita valuation of each town at 1 850; Dissent = percentage of 1 850 church
accommodations that were Baptist, Methodist, and Universalist; Orthodox = percentage of 1850
church accommodations that were Orthodox Congregationalist, Unitarian Congregationalist,
Presbyterian, and Episcopalian. Sources: Federal Nonpopulation Schedules, Essex County
'
AgriculUire; Social Statistics, 1 850; DeWitt, Statistical Information Relating to
. .Industry in
Massachusetts... 1855, 1 1 1 -72, and Abstract ofthe Census ofthe Commonwealth of
Massachusetts... 1855, 13-9, 206-7.
-.50
-.345
-.468
-.394
-.508
-.269
(.000) (.009) (.000)1 (.003) (.000) ( 037)
-•50
-
-.153
(.000) (.249)
-.468
(.000)
-.138
(.294)
-.508
(.000)
-.214
(.097)
-.345
-.153 -
(.009) (.249)
-.394
-.138
(.003) (.294)
-.269
(.037)
-.214
(.097)
-
+.222
-.217
-.042
(.097) (.105) (.75)
+.042
-.153
(.752) (.154)
+.016
(.906)
+.122
(.364)
-.085
(.527)
-.127
(.343)
-.138
-.015 +.172
(.294) (.91) (.189)
-.138 +.099
(-29) (.453)
+.202
(.124)
-.044
(.736)
-.01
(.91)
+.237
(.072)
-.084
-.148 +.256
(.524) (.26) (.051)
-.163 +.015
(.216) (.91)
+.266
(.043)
-.009
(.94)
-.02
(.881)
+.183
(.165)
+.611
-.35
-.26
(.000) (.007) (.047)
+.414 -.187
(.002) (.154)
-.261
(.047)
+.458
(.001)
-.32
(.015)
-.217
(.099)
-.316 +.157 +.246
(.016) (.233) (.061)
-.21 +.191
(.108) (.145)
+.127
(.335)
-.271
(.039)
+.092
(.484)
+.152
(.248)
+.316
-.157
-.209
(.016) (.233) (.112)
+.149
-.209
(.256) (.112)
-.09
(.495)
+.239
(.069)
-.129
(.325)
-.085
(.52)
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Table B.9: Percentage New London County Party Vote by Types of Towns.
1852 1853 1854
Governor
Kai.f:,,,
-^"
- - - - - - -
-
•owns
.42 .53 .05
.28 .53 .19 .26
.49 .05 .20
Industrial (2)
towns
.58 .48 .02 .32 .41 .27 .37
.40 .04 .19
Factory (3)
towns
.43 .48 .08 .34 .49 .17 .28
.46 .06 .20
Fishing (2)
towns
.48 .43 .09 .19 .44 .38 .19
.31 .07
.43
Mixed (5)
economy
.34 .53 .13 .15 .53 .32 .14
.48 .09 .29
Orthodox (5)
towns
.46 .49 .05 .35 .48 .16 .32
.46 .04 .18
Dissenting (6)
towns
.40 .52 .08 .14 .50 .36 .16
.43 .08 .34
Mixed Rel.(7)
towns
.50 .42 .08 .28 .46 .26 .28 .42 .06 .24
Note: Farming towns = those in which 5% or less of the 1 850 population were employed in
nonagr.cultural work; Industrial towns = those in which more than 15% of the population in
1850 engaged m mdustrial work other than in textiles; Factory = those in which over 50% of
nonagricultural employees engaged in woolen or cotton mills; Fishing = those in which more
than 10% of population engaged in fishing; Mixed = those in which less than 15% of the
population employed in nonagricultural labor; Orthodox towns = those in which 60% + of the
total church accommodations in 1850 were Orthodox Congregationalist, Unitarian,
Presbyterian, and Episcopalian; Dissenting = those in which 60% + of the 1 850
accommodations were Baptist, Methodist, Universalist, Christian, Seventh-Day Adventist
Mixed - those in which neither Orthodox or Dissenting congregations dominated town, as
defined by above. Sources: Federal Nonpopulation Census Schedules, Connecticut Industry
1850; Agriculture: 1850; Social Statistics: 1850, Mss., Conn. State Archives; DeBow,
Statistical View ofthe United States... Compendium ofthe Seventh Census; Kennedy, Statistical
View ofthe United States, 1860; official election returns printed in the Hartford Courant and
Hartford Times.
Table B.IO: KendalFs Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote
and Select Variables, New London County, 1853-1854
Whg
1853
VJlJT CI UUI
Dem
>*
r
FS Whg
1854
Governor
Dem FS ML
Whig Vote
Prob Z >|tau
1
- 281
(.103)
-.OUo
(.000)
-.255 +.132
(.14) (.444)
-.673
(.000)
Dem. Vote
-.281
(.103)
1 1
-. 1 1
(•52)
-.255
(.14)
-.343
(.047)
+.007
(.97)
Free Soil
-.608
(.000)
- 1
1
(•52)
-1- 1 'JO
(.444)
-.343
(.047)
-.185
(.284)
Farmine +.02
(.91)
+ 281
(.103) (.24) (.622)
+.45
-.132
(.009) (.444)
-.281
(.103)
NonFarm. +.059
(.733)
-.386
(.025)
+ 177
(•307) (•85)
-.jUJ +.238
(.004) (.169)
+.15
(.384)
Indust. +.124
(.427)
- 32
(.064)
-1- OSS
' .I/O J
(.622) (.733)
OAT 1 1 A
+.14
(.075) (.417)
+.059
(.733)
Valuation +.399
(.021)
-.281
(.103)
-.059
(.733)
+.36
(.037)
-.242 +.185
(.161) (.284)
-.346
(.045)
Dissent
-.223
(.196)
+.079
(.648)
+.197
(.254)
-.446
(.01)
-.013 +.04
(.939) (.818)
+.393
(.023)
Orthodox +.307
(.075)
-.163
(.344)
-.203
(.24)
+.451
(.009)
-.046 -.04
(.791) (.818)
-.333
(.053)
Note: See methodological note, Appendix A. Farming = percentage of 1 850 population that
were farmers; NonFarm = percentage of 1850 population engaged in non-agricultural
employment (e.g., industry, fishing); Indust. = percentage of 1850 population engaged in
industrial work only (excludes fishing); Valuation = per capita wealth of each town at 1 850;
Dissent = percentage of 1 850 church accommodations that were Baptist, Methodist, and
Universalist; Orthodox = percentage of 1 850 church accommodations that were Orthodox
Congregationalist, Unitarian Congregationalist, Presbyterian, and Episcopalian. Sources: see
source notes for Table B.9.
Table B.n
:
Percentage Dauphin County Party Vote by Types of Towns, 185,-,853
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1851 1852 1853
Dauphin
Governor State Rep state Repwhg Dem Whe Dem mi t*/u„ r.-_ ^g ML Whg Dem ML
28
^County
.58 .42 .48 .46
.06
.35
.37
Farming (16)
towns:
S -27 .26
Small (5) .47 .53
.38 .59
.03
.28
.48
.24
Mixed (3)
economy
.73 .27 .69 .29
.02 .57
.30
.13
Industrial (2)
towns
.56 .46
•51
-39 .10 .38 .37
.26
Urban/ (1)
Commercial
.46 .54
.31 .59
.10
.14 .39
.47
German (5)
churches
.62 .38 .55 .43 .02
.47 .42 .11
Dissenting (4)
churches
.79 .21 .72 .28 .01 .68 .20
.11
Mixed Rel.(12)
churches
.53 .47 .42 .50 .08 .27
.38 ,35
Note: Farmmg towns = those in which less than 5% of the 1850 population were employed in
nonagricultural work; Daiiy = farming towns in which avg. farm produced $300 or more in dairy goods-Mixed dairy/wheat farms = farming towns in which avg. farm produced between $250-$299 in dairy
'
goods; Small farms = farming towns m which avg. farm produced less than $250 and owned less than$100 worth of farm machmery; Industrial towns = more than 15% of the population in 1850 engaged in
mdustrial work; Mixed economy = those in which less than 15% of the population employed in
nonagricultural labor; Urban/Commercial = nonfarming towns with less than 15% of population
employed m mdustry; German towns = those in which 60% + of the total church accommodations in
1850 were Lutheran, Reformed, or German Catholic; Dissenting = those in which 60% + of the 1850
accommodations were Moravian, Christian, Winebrennarian Baptist, Methodist; Mixed = those in which
neither German nor Dissenting congregations dominated town, as defined by above. Sources Federal
Nonpopulation Census Schedules Pennsylvania Industry: 1850; Agriculture: 1850; Social Statistics-
1850, Mss., Pennsylvania State Archives; DeBow, Statistical View ofthe United States Compendium of
the Seventh Census; Kennedy, Statistical View ofthe United States. I860; official election returns printed
in the Harrisburg Telegraph.
Table B. 1 2: KendalPs Rank Order Co.ela>,on Coefficients for Select Variablesand Party Votes, Dauphin Cotuity, 1851-53
1851
Governor
Whg Dem Whg
1852
Assembly
Dem ML Whg
Whig Vote
Prob Z>|tau|
-1.0
(.000)
-.834
(.000)
-.066
(.659)
Dem Vote
-1.0
(.000)
.Oj*T
(.000)
-.107
(.473)
-.567
(.000)
Maine Law
(.659)
-.107
(.473)
-.420
(.006)
Industry 1 1 1 >l+.114
(.469)
-.114
(.469)
+ 124
(.432)
-.200
(.205)
+.124
(.433)
+.095
(.546)
Valuation +.37
(.019)
-.37
(019)
+ 200
(.205)
-.305
(.053)
+.342
(03)
+.362
(.022)
ValFarm +.483
(.001)
-.483
(.001)
+ 420
(.005)
-.333
(.026)
-.062
(.679)
+.373
(•015)
MechAg +.4yy
(.001)
-.499
(.001)
+ 467
(.002)
-.396
(.008)
-.145
(.333)
+.512
(.001)
Dairy +.356
(.017)
-.356
(.017)
+.404
(.007)
-.285
(.057)
-.137
(.362)
-J- IQl
(.001)
Farms +.261
(.081)
-.261
(.081)
+.246
(.101)
-.190
(.204)
-.261
(.082) (.101)
oerm. i^nrcn
-.068
(.657)
+.068
(.657)
-.059
(.70)
+.041
(.79)
+.005
(.976)
-.114
(.459)
Dissent +.534
(.001)
-.534
(.001)
+.543
(.000)
-.507
(.001)
+.009
(.952)
+.435
(.005)
Orthodox 0.00
(1.00)
0.00
(1.00)
-.119
(.439)
+.085
(.58)
+.264
(.086)
-.068
(.658)
1853
Assembly
Dem ML
-.567
-.420
(.000) (.006)
-.013
(.933)
-.013
-.214 +.133
•400 +.152
391
.129
••425
-.226
-.356 122
.13 -.382
014
.119 +.323
Note: See methodological note. Appendix A; source note for Table B.I 1.
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Table B.13: Kendall's Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote and SelectVariables, New London County, 1855
v oi
1855
Governor
Whg Dem KN
Whig Vote
Prob 7 >ltfliil
-
-.137
(.426)
-.36
(.037)
Dem. Vote
-.137 -
-.503
(.004)
Free Soil/
KnNoth
-.36
-.503
( C\(\A\
-
Farming +.072 +.137
-.294
V-o / / )
/ AOO\(.088)
NonFarm.
-.02
-.346 +.399
(.021)
Indust.
-.02
-.333 +.333
(.91) (.053) (.053)
Valuation +.373
-.033
-.307
(.031) (.85) (.075)
Dissent
-.262
-.407 +.485
(.129) (.019) (.005)
Orthodox +.255 +.32 -.399
(.14) (.064) (.021)
Note: See methodological note, Appendix A; source note Table B.IO.
Table B.14: Percentage New London County Party Vote by Types of Towns, 1855
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1855
Governor
Whg Dem KN
Statewide
.14
.42
.44
N.L. County
.09 32 59
N = ()
Farming (6)
towns
.10 .38
.52
Industrial (2)
towns
.11 .36
.53
Factory (3)
towns
.10 .28
.62
Fishing (2)
towns
.07 .25
.68
Mixed (5)
economy
.07 .29
.64
Orthodox (5)
towns
.15 .39 .46
Dissenting (6)
towns
.07 .28 .65
Mixed Rel.(7)
towns
.09 .32 .59
Note: See methodological note, Appendix A; source note Table B. 1
0
Table B.15: Percentage Dauphin County Party Vote by Types of Towns, 1854
Statewide
Dauphin
County
1854
Governor
KNAVhg Dem
.550
.450
,646
1854
Supreme Court
N = ()
Farming towns: (16)
Dairy (6) .716
farms
Mixed (6) .592
dairy/wheat
Small (5) .526
farms
Mixed (3)
economy
.738
Industrial (2)
towns
.601
Urban/ (I)
Commercial .619
German (5)
churches
.594
Dissenting (4)
churches
.733
Mixed Rel.(12)
churches .619
Whg Dem
.215
.456
KN
.329
1854
Proh. Plebiscite
For Against
.492
.508
.354
.224
.367
.409
.418
.582
.284
.350
.287
.363
.389
.611
.408
.335
.348
.317
.312
.688
.474
.198
.493
.309
.322
.678
.262
.262 .264 .474
.281
.719
.399
.127
.355 .518
.379
.621
.381
.112 .401 .487
.666 .334
.406
.273 .363 .364 .198 .802
,367 .417 .221 .362 .273 .727
381 .173 .392 .435 .506 .494
Note: See methodological note, Appendix A; source note Table B.l 1.
Table B 1 6: Kendall's Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for Select Variableand Party Vote, Dauphin County, 1 854
Governor:
KN/Whg Vote
Prob Z>|tau|
Dem Vote
Supreme Court:
1854
Governor
KNAVhg Dem
1854
Supreme Court
Whg Dem KN
1854
Proh. Plebiscite
For Against
-1.0
(.000)
-1.0
(.000)
+.115
-.763 +.467 +.186
-186
(.444) (.000) (.002) (.215) (.215)
-.13 +.715
-.42
-17 +17
(.384) (.000) (.005) (.256) (.256)
Whig +.115
(.444)
-.13
(.384)
-.225
-.341
(.132) (.023)
-.178
(.235)
+.178
(.235)
Dem
-.763
(.000)
+.715
(.000)
-.225
-
-.436
(.132) (.004)
-.138
(.355)
+.138
(.355)
Know Nothing +.467
(.002)
-.42
(.005)
-.341
-.436
(.023) (.004)
+.452
(.003)
-.452
(.003)
inaustry +.238
(.131)
-.238
(.131)
-.095
-.152 +.314
(.546) (.334) (.046)
+.191
(.227)
-.191
(.227)
Valuation +.391
(.013)
-.391
(.013)
+.057
-.352 +.352
(.717) (.025) (.025)
+.314
(.046)
-.314
(.046)
ValFarm +.475
(.002)
-.475
(.002)
+.293
-.396 +.194
(.05) (.008) (.194)
-.024
(.874)
+.024
(.874)
MechAg +.380
(.011)
-.380
(Oil)
+.388
-.396 +.083
(.01) (.008) (.578)
-.103
(.49)
+.103
(.49)
Dairy +.364
(.015)
-.364
(.015)
+.436
-.317 +.02
(.004) (.034) (.895)
-.024
(.874)
+.024
(.874)
Farms +.190
(.204)
-.190
(.204)
+.261 -.19
-.123
(.081) (.20) (.411)
-.325
(.03)
+.325
(.03)
Germ. Chrch -.159
(.30)
+.159
(.30)
-.187 +.05 +.068
(.224) (.744) (.657)
+.005
(.976)
-.005
(.976)
Dissent +.48
(.002)
-.48
(.002)
+.256 -.426 +.238
(.096) (.006) (.121)
+.049
(.748)
-.049
(.748)
Orthodox +.272
(.077)
-.272
(.077)
-.323
-.187 +.374
(.036) (.224) (.015)
+.391
(.011)
-.391
(.011)
Note: See methodological note, Appendix A; source note Table B.l 1.
Table B.17: Percentage Essex County Vote by Types of Towns
1854
Governor
Whg Dem Rep KN
Statewide
.211 .107 .05
.632
Essex County
.188 .066
.057 .669
N = ()
Nonindustria! (5)
towns
.322 .034
.049 .595
Farming (2)
town^
.177 .09 .025
.709
Shoe (14)
towns
.183 .077 .073 .67
Factory (3)
towns
.139 .078 .036 .747
Mixed-Indus. (4)
towns
.158 .06 .047
.735
Fishing (1)
towns
.16 .067 .08 .693
Orthodox (18)
towns
.229 .059 .054 .658
Dissenting (4)
towns
.128 .104 .063 .705
Mixed Rel. (7)
towns
.161 .07 .064 .705
Note: See methodological note, Appendix A; source note Table B.7
, 1854
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Table B.18: Kendall's Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for Select Variablesand Party Vote, Essex County, 1854
1854
Governor
Whg Dem Rep KN
Whig Vote
Prob Z>|tau| (.038) (.721)
-.522
(.001)
Dem. Vote
-.267
(.038) (.381) (.886)
Republican +.046
(•721)
- 113
(.381)
-.J i J
(•015)
Know Noth.
-.522
(.000)
+ 018
(.886) (•015)
Fanning
-.084
(.524)
+.037
(.778)
- 066
(.612)
. 1 ^ J)
(.348)
NonFarm.
-.154
(.232)
+.175
(•175)
-f- 051
(.694)
'
. i v/o
(.402)
Indus.
-.136
(.293)
+.157
(.225)
+.023
(.858)
+.081
(•533)
Valuation +.421
(.001)
-.239
(.063)
-.198
(.125)
-.117
(.363)
Dissent
-.181
(.161)
+.07
(.589)
+.081
(.529)
+.111
(.388)
Orthodox +.181 -.07
-.081 -
-.111
Note: See methodological note, Appendix A; source note Table B.7.
Table B.19: Party Voting in the Pemisylvania House of Representatives, 1855
of R„;c^r
K.N. Dem. Whig Whig Dem
K.N. K.N.
N= (20) (13) (25) (22) (20)
MORES (5)
Nativism (1)
Liquor (3)
Schools (1)
77 56 77 58 49 49
67 45 45 43 63 48
80 56 87 65 50 49
75 67 79 53 33 51
COMMERCE (16)
Small Note Ban (2) 24
Child Ten Hour Law (1) lOO
Bank Incorporations (13) 54
GOVERNMENT (8) 36
U.S. Senator (3) 43
Sale of Main Line (3) 23
County School Supt. (1) 38
Abolition of Canal Board (1) 53
38 50 42 23 20
21 59 88 14 19
78 76 07 41 12
38 47 37 22 22
37 45 41 41 34
38 28 00 12 25
42 68 100 28 37
33 05 05 76 31
27 65 26 67 52
FISCAL POLICY (4) 35 37 34 31 49
Bank Bonus Law (1) 08 56 29 50 25
Tax Cut on Real Prop. (1) 33 33 50 40 89
RR Tonnage Tax Repeal (1) 53 27 44 16 67
Salary Raise (1) 47 33 14 16 13
27
Sources. Roll calls taken from Harrisburg Legislative Record, 1855; Party affiliation from Harrisburg
Morning Herald, 24 October 1854.
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Table B.20: Party Voting in the Massachusetts Senate 1855
^°p' n^.P'^n''^ ^""^'^ of Cohesionof Roll Calls
K.N.
N= (40)
MORES (9)
Nativism (5)
Billiard Rooms (1)
Antislavery (3)
COMMERCE (10) 44
Labor Reform (3) 50
Bank Incorporations (2) 24
Railroads (5) 48
Aid to (3) 55
Charter Extentions (2) 39
GOVERNMENT (6) 63
Popular election of Govt.
Officials (3) 71
Election by Plurality (1) 66
Representation (1) 62
Auth. Town Agents to Sell
Liquor for Certain Purposes (1) 33
Source: Journal of the Massachusetts Senate, 1855, Mss., Massachusetts State Archives.
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